



U.S. POLICY OF AFGHANISTAN: 1989-2002

**ABSTRACT
THESIS**

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BY
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THESIS

ABSTRACT

Afghanistan's history is quite unique where its political- internal and external affairs were always mired in the projection of regional and super powers. Since ancient time Afghanistan had always been the land of conquest for other powers. Afghanistan's strategic location between Central and South Asia is of immense geo-strategic significance for the landlocked countries of the Central Asia. The resurgence of great powers' interests in Central Asia in recent years has made Afghanistan once again a much coveted strategic pivot in the current Great Game. Its very geographical location as a buffer state plunged it into the ground of proxy politics of super powers during the cold war period. After the end of the cold war once again it plunged into Civil War which was exploited by regional powers as a vehicle to settle their disputes against their rival states. In 21st century the Afghan's wounds which suffered in its long battle history is not yet better. After the event of 11 September 2001 or 9/11, Afghanistan became the military base/ground for the U.S. for hunting down terrorist bases/groups with a long term plan to secure military base in order to protect their energy interest. It also could serve as a replacement once the oil reserves in the Gulf start depleting seriously by the middle of the next century.

This thesis is a modest attempt to study the U.S. Afghanistan policy which has remained involved in its affairs since pre-World War II. The event of 11 September 2001 has rekindled the U.S. interest in the region once again. This thesis is divided into five chapters. The first chapter deals with historical background of the U.S. Afghanistan relations since pre-World War II to the end of World War II. In modern time the U.S. started considering the importance of Afghanistan's geo-strategy since the outbreak of World War II. The advance of German forces towards Stalingrad led to the fears that the logistic link through western Iran would be denied to allies, and hence eastern Iran or western Afghanistan were considered as significant locales for an alternate route. In 1942 the U.S. formally established diplomatic relations with Afghanistan. After the end of World War II the containment, circling and rolling back communism became major U.S. foreign policy concerns. The U.S. tried to bring countries settled along the Soviet Union border (it was well-known southern frontier) into its military alliance which would be an effective containment of the Soviet Union on its southern frontier. Afghanistan is one such country close to Soviet Union

border. It was considered suitable for rolling back the spread of communism in this region. In 1979 when Russian army invaded Afghanistan it became a buffer zone and proxy war ground. The U.S. and its allies supported Afghan Muslim guerrillas, ranging from indirect financial assistance, weapon, and military training support to encourage the influx of foreign volunteers from different countries to join with the Mujahideen forces (Islamic guerrilla) for sucking the Soviet into Vietnamese quagmire.

The second chapter deals about the involvement of the U.S. in the Afghan civil war (1992-1996). This chapter attempt to find out why, how and with what political objectives the U.S. came to involve in the Afghan civil war. The end of Cold War which followed with the collapse of the Soviet Union finally led to an end of Afghan-communist regime in 1992. The civil war in Afghanistan soon became the ground of proxy war of regional powers who exploited the factional rivalry in Afghan's civil war as their vehicle to preserve their interest or to use against its rival state. The fall of pro U.S Shah regime in Iran caused the U.S. to worry about the security of this region. Therefore containing Iran became a major U.S. foreign policy goal in this region. The U.S. sympathy with Taliban (Sunni) group was because of its rivalry with pro-communist Russian group (Northern Alliance) and their anti-Iran stance.

The third chapter deals about the U.S., Afghanistan and the problem of terrorism (1996-2001). This chapter traces the rise of Islamic extremism in Afghanistan. It seeks to find out how the U.S. got involved with Islamic extremist group (Taliban). It is also attempted to see why and how this Islamic extremist group turned against the U.S. and how the U.S. handled such forces in Afghanistan. After the end of the Cold War the U.S. has been gradually under attack by Islamic extremist groups both within the country and also in foreign countries especially in Middle East. The Islamic fighters who had come from different countries used Afghanistan as their base for training and to carry out global jihad of which the U.S. and Israel were the prime target. The U.S. alleged that the extremists were commanded by Bin Laden and had collaborated with Taliban regime. Taliban provided all facility and basic need to run their camp. In fact the Islamic extremists had developed its global Jihad agenda since 1989 and after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Mujahideen turned their jihad against the U.S. and Israel and pledged to root out U.S. influence in the Middle Eastern countries. After several incidents of terrorist attack on the U.S. especially

after its embassies in Nairobi and the Dar-es-Salam, Tanzania were bombed in 1998, the U.S. alleged that Bin Laden was masterminded behind the scene. The tension between the U.S. and Afghanistan (Taliban regime) over Bin Laden's extradition continued till 11 September 2001 terrorists' strike on the U.S. in which about 5000 people were killed. This incident confirmed that the U.S. homeland itself was vulnerable to the consequences of its foreign policies and that determined enemies could attack and inflict horrendous damage upon U.S. cities. Terrorism replaced communism as the source of fear and loathing the war the U.S. has been fighting abroad since 1947 had finally reached its shores. This event, the U.S. alleged, was launched by Afghanistan based Al-Qaeda group. Thus the U.S. moved its forces to attack Afghanistan in order to root out Al-Qaeda base and to replace hostile regime with a pro-U.S. regime in Afghanistan.

The fourth chapter deals about the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan after the event of 11 September 2001. This part of the study primarily focuses on the U.S. war on terror. It examines the U.S. claim that it acquired the right to attack and remove Al-Qaeda base in Afghanistan after it was attacked by terrorist group on 11 September 2001. This incident triggered the U.S. and some of its allies from NATO to move with large number of forces to set up its military base in Afghanistan in order to tackle the problem of terrorism emanating from Afghanistan effectively.

The event of September 11, 2001 and the resulting conflict in Afghanistan signified not only the beginning of a new era in world politics, but also led to struggle for influence in new energy resources heartland - Central Asia. As the geography of Central Asia is a land lock nature it has to be depend on another country to run its energy through pipeline route to the world market. There is a plan of construction of a massive new oil and gas pipeline stretching along East-West energy corridor that will link Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and ultimately Afghanistan, Pakistan and India. Afghanistan is one country which could provide an alternate rout outlet to Arabian Sea via Pakistan port. But the success of the project of oil pipeline which would pass through Afghanistan depends on stability in Afghanistan. The events of 11 September 2001 provided opportunity to the U.S. to replace Afghanistan's hostile Taliban regime with a pro-U.S. government so that the project of running oil and gas pipeline from Caspian Sea and Central Asia to southward (Afghanistan-Pakistan corridor or even beyond to India's port) would be easier.

The movement of the U.S. and NATO forces into Afghanistan is perceived as an integral part of the U.S. plan to meet new security challenges of the 21st century. Nuclear Issue is an important factor which has influenced the course of international politics and diplomacy since the end of the Cold War. The West fears the threat which comes from nuclear proliferation by a number of third world countries, including the South Asian neighbours India and Pakistan. The U.S. believes that the spread of nuclear technology know-how and weapon capability to these countries would pose a threat to its own security and the world. The growing instability in Pakistan where Islamist groups have been challenging the Government is also a cause of concern. If Pakistan's government is captured by some party which opposes the U.S. and nuclear arsenal falls in this group's hand or some group having sympathy with Al-Qaeda or Taliban it will be dangerous situation so far as the U.S.'s interest in this region is concerned. If the Pakistani government loses control over nuclear proliferation by its scientist Abdul Qadir Khan it could be sold to Iran, Libya or Al-Qaeda group. The U.S. is more worried about a scenario when such lethal weapons fall in the hand of its enemy.

The movement of the U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan after 11 September was also perceived as a part of a long term strategy to contain Iran and enhancing security in the Gulf and the Middle East. Since Iranian revolution, which overthrew pro-U.S. regime (Shah) in 1978, up to now Iran has remained a threat to the strategic balance in West Asia, and being an obstacle to the U.S. hegemony in the region. Various issues make the U.S. worry about of Iran's behaviour. Such as, it has been trying to get nuclear weapons which could disturb the balance in the region. Iran has also been backing Islamic groups (Hizbullah and Hamas) in this region to counter the aggressive Israeli behaviour toward Palestinians, Lebanon and unknown Arab countries in future. Moreover, the U.S. is more concerned about Iran playing vital role in Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline project to supply its energy resources to South Asia and probably would extend beyond to China which will be a major setback for the U.S. policy to exclude Iran from this region. Iran could also play key role in transporting energy resources of Central Asian countries where it could provide outlet route to the sea via its port. Iran and Russia are also playing vital role over energy of Caspian nation and both of them are against the presence of outside powers in the region and more concerned with preventing the U.S. from straddling the Caspian and the energy flows from the region.

The U.S. is worried about security of oil flow in the Arabian Gulf water that is the Strait of Hormuz Sea lanes through which passes the bulk of the global oil, could be blocked by Iran on the day the U.S. and Iran enter into serious conflict. The U.S. has been trying to do everything to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons and dominating the region. Therefore the movement of the U.S. and NATO forces into Afghanistan after 11 September 2001 was possibly as an integral part of a long term plan to contain Iran and preparing to invade Iran or to use forces to manage Iran if the situation necessitates.

The current U.S. policy towards Afghanistan especially after 11 September is also perceived as an integral part of a long-term plan to contain China. From 1991 to 2000 the security competition among the great powers was not obsolete, either in Europe or in Northeast Asia. The rise of China is the most dangerous threat to the US. Though Russia was defeated in the long-cold war but it still backs China to be a super power state as a counter-balance to the U.S. in this area. The growing industrial base makes China to look aggressively for energy resource to fuel its industrial need. China has replaced U.S.'s import market in many areas such as in Iran and Africa. Some Arab countries have also started looking east over their oil export market, especially in Central Asia and Caspian Sea. China had made agreement to import energy from this region through its pipeline to west of China. Recently China signed an energy agreement with Iran which involved constructing an oil pipeline from Iran to the Caspian Sea, from there would link up with the planned pipeline from China to Kazakhstan. China has also planned to build railway track to connect western China-Pakistan and Iran so that China could transport energy from Iran by land which is easier than through the Sea. The close boundary of China with Central Asian countries make China easy to transport whether by railway linkage or Pipeline. China has also revived the ancient Great Silk Route which will open up China's northern land border for direct links with Europe and the Middle East via Central Asia.

The most concerned thing for the U.S. about China is its key role in developing the lethal weapons and civilian nuclear project of Iran. China-Iran cooperation threatened to diminish the military advantages the U.S. enjoyed vis-à-vis Iran and increased Iran's ability to threaten the Sea-lanes and oil supplying states of the Persian Gulf. This conflict between China and the U.S. was manifested in the areas of nuclear energy, guided and ballistic missiles, and dual use goods relevant to production of chemical or advanced conventional weapons. China regarded that Iran

could play key role to counter the U.S. hegemony in this region. Such behaviour made U.S. aware about China's role in this region. Thus there was little doubt that the movement of the U.S. and NATO forces into Afghanistan after 11 September seemed centered on its security establishment and focused on the alleged threats from major rival states notably China and Russia. Moreover, the presence of the U.S. in this region could lock out China from the energy business as the U.S. feared that China could assist the Central Asian Republics in setting up their own oil companies.

The movement of U.S. and NATO forces into Afghanistan after 11 Sept 2001 was also perceived as an integral part of a plan to round up or circle the influence of Russia which has been creeping in Central Asia's region. Among the major U.S. foreign policy concern after 11 Sept was to establish its influence in newly independent nations comprising the commonwealth of independent states (CIS) or Central Asia. The U.S. would maintain the new world order by rooting out and limiting Moscow's influence in this region.

Russia has huge reserved energy resources. It will play a key role in European market by selling its energy to EU market. Russia used energy as a weapon against U.S. hegemony in Europe. Russia attempted to control the flow of oil and gas from Caspian Sea and Central Asian countries. It has been viewed in the west as an attempt by the Russian security establishment to impose a single direction for the pipelines via Russian territory. This would give Russia tremendous control over the flow of oil and gas to western markets and will make the west vulnerable to Russia's political whims. Russian energy policy could also be part of an overall policy which aims to keep the west out of Central Asian countries preserving it under an exclusively Russian sphere of influence. While Russia tried to establish monopoly over energy resources of this region and dismantle U.S. position in the region. Therefore, denying Russia the right to influence the regional economy and politics seemed to be the major concern of the United States. The scrambling over energy resources in Central Asia and Caspian Sea made Afghanistan never end from being a proxy war ground when the U.S. was looking for the way to make Afghanistan as a land-bridge to build pipeline route from Central Asia to world market through Afghanistan to Pakistan's or India's port.

Recently Russia has been moving spirit behind the idea of gas OPEC an organisation of natural gas producing nations. The new body was formalized at a meeting of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) in Doha, Qatar, on 9 April 2007. It will unite Russia, Iran and Qatar, which account for 60 per cent of global gas

reserve, with Algeria, Venezuela and Central Asian gas exporting countries. The idea of a gas OPEC has rattled the U.S and Europe as it would shift the alignment of forces in the energy markets and leave them out in the cold. Russia has been trying to offset Western efforts to control the energy markets. Russia using energy resources and arms export potentially to project its influence across the world. The political objective of Russia is to control Middle East petroleum and to deny to the NATO members and to Japan, in a prelude to a general conventional war, and in contriving interruptions in supply that could be turned to the Soviet advantage by splitting allies from the United States in a divisive tactic to create oil shortages as a means of weakening allied commitments to the U.S. led security arrangements.

Apart from this recently Russia defied U.S. efforts to isolate Iran, by supplying \$ 700 million worth of Tom 1 advanced air defence missile systems to Tehran in 2006. It was the biggest of several defence contracts between Moscow and Tehran since 2000. Iran armed with Russian weapons and pursuing a common energy strategy may emerge as Russia's strategic partner in West Asia. Russia also supported Iran to build a railway line along the Caspian linking Iran with Russia. It will be part of the north-south transport corridor, a joint project of Russia, Iran and India.

Thus after the 11 Sept event the U.S. and NATO forces moved into Afghanistan, to replace U.S. hostile regime with a pro-US one and to set up its military base in Afghanistan probably as a long-term plan to ensure its presence in this region to contain Iran, Russia, and China.

The fifth chapter deals with the concluding remarks and the major findings. The study found that Afghanistan has always been mired in the complicated projection of the super powers since ancient time. The geographical location of Afghanistan has made it a strategically important area for the United States to maintain its political and economic interest since the end of World War II. During the Cold War Afghanistan had been a buffer zone to contain the spread of communism into Indian subcontinent and the Middle East. After the end of the Cold War Afghanistan also had been the ground of proxy war for the U.S. to threaten Iran. After a pro-US regime of Shah of Iran was overthrown by anti-US Islamic extremist group in 1979, Iran became a prime threat to its economic interests and political hegemony in the Gulf region. In the future Afghanistan might serve as a military base for the U.S. to attack Iran if it becomes necessary. Afghanistan could also be a base for the U.S. to monitor Pakistan's nuclear threat in future when internal political instability

might lead to a situation where power is captured by a party having sympathy with Taliban. In the 21st century the world enters into an energy war era where Afghanistan lies on the path of energy pipeline from newly independent Central Asian Countries and Caspian Sea which have huge reserves of energy resources that made the west to believe that it could make the region as the Persian Gulf of the next century. It could also serve as a replacement once the oil reserves in the gulf start depleting seriously by the middle of the next century. Therefore in the future Afghanistan *might still* be under the complicated projection of not only the United States but also of the new rising powers and regional states.



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
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CERTIFICATE

This is to certify that this study entitled “**U.S. Policy of Afghanistan: 1989-2002**” carried out by **Mr. Abdulloh Yusoh** in the Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University, Aligarh is to the best of my knowledge an original work and is suitable for submission for the award of the degree of ***Doctor of Philosophy*** in Political Science.


(Dr. Aftab Alam)
Supervisor

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INTRODUCTION

Afghanistan's history is quite unique where its political- internal and external affairs were always mired in the projection of regional and super powers. Since ancient time Afghanistan had always been the land of conquest for other powers. Afghanistan's strategic location between Central and South Asia is of immense geostrategic significance for the landlocked countries of Central Asia. The resurgence of great powers' interests in Central Asia in recent years has made Afghanistan once again a much coveted strategic pivot in the current Great Game. Its very geographical location as a buffer state plunged it into the ground of proxy politics of super powers during the cold war period. After the end of the Cold War once again it plunged into Civil War which was exploited by regional powers as a vehicle to settle their score against their rival states. Even in the 21st century the wound of Afghan people who suffered a lot from long battles in the past has not yet healed. The event of 11 September 2001 once again made Afghanistan the battle ground of energy war of this century.

This thesis attempts to study about the U.S. Afghanistan policy which has remained involved in Afghanistan affairs since pre-World War II. The event of 11 September 2001 has rekindled the U.S. interest in the region once again. In order to make systematic presentation of the issues discussed, the study is divided into five chapters. The first chapter deals with historical background of the U.S.-Afghanistan relations since pre-World War II to the end of World War II. The first chapter seeks to find out when, how, why, and what mattered to the U.S. in dealing with Afghanistan during said period. The U.S. came to involve with Afghanistan's affairs since it was under the pressure of expansion of British India and Czarist Russia. Afghanistan started looking for a third power which could serve as a balance of power. Afghanistan was afraid of the fact that once it enters into any alliance with the U.S. it could enable British India and Czarist Russia to intimidate it. Consequently during this period there was no major breakthrough in diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Afghanistan as the U.S. was also aware of the fact that Afghanistan was under Russia influence. Moreover, after communist revolution the U.S. attitude towards Russia has been remained hostile. However, in 1942 the U.S. and Afghanistan formally established diplomatic relations on very firm basis. The advance of German

forces towards Stalingrad led to the fears that the logistic link through western Iran would be denied to allies, and hence eastern Iran or western Afghanistan were considered as significant locales for an alternate route. The presence of the U.S. in Kabul was seen as an essential prerequisite for securing this route. In June 1942, the first US ambassador was dispatched to Afghanistan. The main reason behind the U.S. decision to forge close relationship with Afghanistan was more because of its strategic significance.

The next part of chapter one deals about the U.S. policy toward Afghanistan after the end of World War II up to the end of cold war (1945-1989). This part of the study try to find out why and how the geo-strategy of Afghanistan came to play key role for the U.S. in pursuing its policy of containing, encircling and rolling back the spreading of communist Russia. It also seeks to analyse how the U.S. turned Afghanistan to be the ground of proxy war to suck the Soviet troops into Vietnamese quagmire. After the end of World War II the containment, circling and rolling back communism became major U.S. foreign policy concerns. The U.S. tried to bring those country which settles along the Soviet Union border (it was well-known southern frontier) into its military alliance which would be an effective containment of the Soviet Union on its southern frontier. Afghanistan was one country which has geo-strategy close to Soviet Union border suitable for rolling back the spreading of communism in this region. When the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in 1979 the U.S. was quick to support Muslim guerillas (Mujahideen) ranging from indirect financial assistance to the weapon support and encouraging the influx of foreign volunteer from different countries to join with the Mujahideen forces in Afghanistan to fight and suck the Soviet troops into Vietnamese quagmire. It was the pressure of heavy arms supported by the U.S. and its allies to the Muslim guerillas (Mujahideen) which caused Soviet Union to withdraw its military from Afghanistan in 1989.

The second chapter deals about the involvement of the U.S. in the Afghan civil war (1992-1996). This chapter attempt to find out why, how and with what political objectives the U.S. came to involve in the Afghan civil war. The end of Cold War which followed with the collapse of the Soviet Union finally led to an end of Afghan-communist regime in 1992. The civil war in Afghanistan soon became the ground of proxy war of regional powers who exploited the factional rivalry in Afghan's civil war as their vehicle to preserve their interest or to use against its rival state. The U.S. got involved in supporting factional group in Afghanistan in order to preserve its

various political objectives and interests. The discovery of huge energy resources in Central Asia and Caspian Sea was one of the most important reasons of the U.S. involvement with Afghan factional group. The U.S. knew that Afghanistan could be an alternative route to flow energy resources to the world market through pipeline from Central Asia via Afghanistan to Karachi port or India port. As Afghanistan was plunged in to factional rivalries it was bound to cause difficulties in running this project. The stability in Afghanistan was a pre requisite for the U.S. and its allies and therefore they started searching for a factional group which could bring stability to Afghanistan so that the pipeline project would easily be built.

After the end of Cold War dual containment of Iran and Iraq became a major U.S. foreign policy goal. The U.S. (during Clinton administration) was clearly sympathetic to the Taliban as they were in line with its anti Iran policy. Taliban forces were supported by many Arab militants most of them were strongly anti-Shiite; they contributed accentuating the common prejudice among Afghan Sunni against the Hazara Shia, which was backed by Iran with the aim to counter the Pushtun Sunni (Taliban) that was supported by the United States, Saudi, and Pakistan. Fight fire with fire, was the U.S. reasoning: combat the militant Shiism of the Iranians with even greater militancy and violence by some groups which were considered as orthodox Sunni Muslims. Taliban also served as bulwark to counter the Russia's influence in this region.

The third chapter deals about U.S. and the problem of terrorism (1996-2001) in the context of Afghanistan. In this chapter endeavor is made to find out when, why and how Islamic jihad group (Al-Qaeda) came to play an important role in Afghanistan's affairs during Cold War time. How did the U.S. deal with Islamic jihad group/ Al-Qaeda/ in Afghanistan during Cold War? How Al-Qaeda group came to collaborate with Taliban in Afghanistan? After the end of Cold War why and how the Islamic Jihad group (Al-Qaeda) along with Taliban group turned against the U.S.? What is Al-Qaeda's ideology and its political objective? Why the U.S. became the prime target of Al-Qaeda? How Afghan veteran (Al-Qaeda) commits its operation against the U.S. and its interest out of Afghanistan? How the U.S. handles with this terrorist group? During cold war time the proxy war tactic was a major instrument that was used by the U.S. to counter the expansion of communism around the globe. Afghanistan during 1979-1989 was one country that became the ground of proxy war where the U.S. backed Islamic fighters Mujahideen from around the world who had

come to Afghanistan to suck the Soviet troops into Vietnamese quagmire. It was following the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan in 1989 that the secret development of Islamic radical camp took place in Afghanistan. Afghan veteran (Mujahideen) saw the fall of the Soviet Union as a sign of total victory. Thereafter they advanced their world wide Jihad and where the next global primary targets of the Mujahideen were Israel, the U.S. and its interests which exist around the world.

Once Taliban established its complete control over Kabul in 1996 these groups of Jihad continue to use Afghanistan as the ground and base for training their men who came from different countries to carry out their global jihad. Since the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in 1989, the U.S. had gradually been under the attack from terrorist group several time whether in its homeland itself or in foreign countries and whether on its military or its civilian especially in Gulf countries and Africa. After several incidents of terrorist attacks on the U.S. especially after its embassies in Nairobi and the Dar-es-salam, Tanzania were bombed in 1998, the U.S. alleged that Bin Laden was masterminded behind the scène. The U.S. demanded that the Taliban must hand over Bin Laden to appropriate authorities but the Taliban ignored to do so.

The tension between the U.S. and Afghanistan (Taliban regime) over Bin Laden's extradition continued till 11 September 2001 terrorists' strike on the U.S. in which about 5000 people were killed. This incident confirmed that the U.S. homeland itself was vulnerable to the consequences of its foreign policies and that determined enemies could attack and inflict horrendous damage upon U.S. cities. Terrorism replaced communism as the source of fear and loathing the war the U.S. has been fighting abroad since 1947 had finally reached its shores. This event, the U.S. alleged, was launched by Afghanistan based Al-Qaeda group. Thus the U.S. moved its forces to attack Afghanistan, to root out Al-Qaeda base and to replace hostile regime with a pro-U.S. regime in Afghanistan.

The fourth chapter deals about the U.S. strategy in Afghanistan after the event of 11 September 2001. This part of the study primarily focuses on the U.S. war on terror. It examines the U.S. claim that it acquired the right to attack and remove Al-Qaeda base in Afghanistan after it was attacked by terrorist group on 11 September 2001. This incident triggered the U.S. and some of its allies from NATO to move with large number of forces to set up its military base in Afghanistan in order to tackle the problem of terrorism emanating from Afghanistan effectively.

After 11 September 2001, the U.S. led its forces to attack the Taliban regime in an attempt to destroy the foundations of Al-Qaeda. This was the first time since the Vietnam War that the U.S. led its military to attack a sovereign country under the war on terrorism. The U.S. tried its best to project its war in response to the 9/11 as part of a global war on terrorism, though the real motives included the projection of military power in the heartland of Asia, in the Caucasus and in the Middle East especially after the discovery of large energy resources in Caspian Sea and Central Asia. A land lock country has to be dependent on another country to run its petroleum energy resource through a pipe line route to the world market. Due to such geographical difficulties, countries around Caspian Sea and Central Asian region came to play important role in transporting energy of these land lock countries. One of these countries is Afghanistan which could provide a land-bridge from Central Asia to South Asia to flow their energy to the world market by running energy pipeline through Pakistan and Indian ports.

Energy security is an integral part of the U.S. war on terror. The U.S. is currently facing with new threats which challenge its energy security. In Saudi Arabia the main oil exporter to the U.S. it is facing various factions of Islamist groups who are opposed to U.S.'s hegemony in the Arab world and these groups try to pressurise Saudi government to keep distance from the U.S. as they feel disappointed due to the U.S. stance on Palestinian-Israeli dispute. Another threat perception to the U.S. hegemony could be the Iran factor which is on the verge of developing nuclear technology which would create an imbalance in the region. In addition, it is believed that Iran was backing Islamic groups (Hizbullah and Hamas) in this region to counter aggressive Israeli behaviour towards Palestinians.

The U.S. administration is also worried about the growing instability in Pakistan where Islamic fundamentalist groups are posing a stiff challenge to the Government. The U.S. knows that if political power in Pakistan is captured by a group or a party which is opposed to the U.S. and if Pakistan's nuclear arsenal falls down in their hands or if Al-Qaeda expands its influence in Pakistan. it will be a serious danger to the U.S. interests in the region. The failure of Pakistan government to control the activities of its nuclear scientist Abdul Qadir Khan, who could sell nuclear technology to Iran, Libya or an Al-Qaeda group which, would be a disaster for the United States.

China as a big economic and military power with its fast growing industrial base is aggressively campaigning for searching an alternative energy resource to fuel its industrial needs. China has surpassed the U.S. as the biggest exporter of goods in many areas such as in Iran and Africa and some Arab countries have begun looking toward east for their oil export markets, especially in Central Asia and Caspian Sea region. China had entered into an agreement to import energy from this region through its pipeline in west of China. As china has close proximity with Central Asian states, it is more convenient and economical for it to transport it both by rail and through a pipeline. In addition, China has allegedly played a key role in developing lethal weapons and civilian nuclear projects of Iran, because China think that Iran could play a key role in countering U.S. hegemony in this region.

Moreover, after the break-up of the USSR, the re-emergence of Russia as a major economic and military power after a decade of instability has further compounded the U.S. woes. Russia has a huge reserve of energy resources which could be used as a weapon to play a key role in the European market. In addition, Russia has devised a plan to play a key role in transporting energy resources of Central Asia and Caspian Sea to European market through its territory. Moreover, Russia has recently been the moving spirit behind the idea of a Gas OPEC, an organization of natural gas producing nations. The new body was formalized at a meeting of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) in Doha, Qatar, on 9 April 2007. It will unite Russia, Iran and Qatar, which together account for 60 per cent of global gas reserves, with Algeria, Venezuela and Central Asian gas exporting countries. Russia has swapped energy assets and developed joint upstream and downstream projects with all of these countries. The idea of a Gas OPEC has rattled the U.S and Europe as it would shift the alignment of forces in the energy markets and leave them out in the cold. This plan would offset Western efforts to control the energy markets. Russia is expected of using energy resources and arms export potentialities to project its influence across the world. Moreover, Russia defied U.S. efforts to isolate Iran by supplying \$ 700 million worth of Tor M 1 advanced air – defence missile systems to Tehran in year 2006. It was the biggest of several defence contracts between Moscow and Tehran since 2000. Notwithstanding the nuclear controversy, Iran armed with Russian weapons and pursuing a common energy strategy may emerge as Russia's strategic partner in West Asia.

The fifth chapter offers concluding observations, briefing and summarization of overall U.S. policy towards Afghanistan since pre-world war II up to the 11 September 2001.

The study used the descriptive method based on documentary analysis procedures. The study data is primarily based on books, journals, magazine, articles, newspapers and internet resources. Most of sources collected from Indian libraries such as Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis (IDSA) New Delhi, Jawaharlal Nehru University New Delhi, Maulana Azad Library AMU, Aligarh, and Jamia Milia Islamia New Delhi.

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CHAPTER – I

The U.S. - Afghan Relations: Historical Background

I. From Afghan Independence to the End of World War II

The situation of Afghanistan is somewhat unique in the Muslim world. Its existence as a political entity to the rivalry between foreign imperialist powers made it a harmless buffer state.¹ For over a century Afghan policies had been almost entirely dictated by the country's position between two aggressive and antagonistic powers and the necessity of preserving its independence.² In 1919 Afghanistan under Amanullah's leadership declared war against British Empire. This less known third Anglo-Afghan war consequently led to the conclusion of the treaty of Rawalpindi in August 1919. Though largely dictated by the Britain this treaty finally gave Afghanistan the freedom to conduct its own foreign affairs. But the British concession was ambiguous, and the Afghans hedged their bets by sending a mission to the newly installed Bolsheviks in Moscow in October 1919. During this visit Russia obtained Afghan support for the Bolsheviks in Muslim central Asia in return for assistance against the British.³

In July 1921 a delegation from Afghanistan led by Wali Muhammad arrived in Washington after making a tour of European capitals, with the objective of establishing diplomatic relations with the United States. However, the delegation reception was not auspicious, as the U.S. government merely expressed regret at the death of Amir Habibullah, and congratulated king Amanullah on his accession. The delegates left Washington extremely disappointed, for Amanullah had hoped to avoid his country's dependency on Britain or the former Soviet Union by introducing the United States as a balancing third power and as provider of Western know-how to further his policy of modernization.⁴

Haunted by continued British pressure, and cautioned by historical Russian ambitions, Amanullah desperately wanted to forge close ties with the United States, for two important reasons. First, the USA was physically distant great power, capable of helping a country like Afghanistan without acquiring the geographical leverage which had enabled British India and Tsarist Russia to intimidate it. Second, the USA had a relatively unblemished colonial image, which protected, Kabul from criticism for dealing with a colonial power. Indeed initially Washington showed

some receptiveness President Warren G. Harding received Wali's mission on 26 July 1921, which some Afghans construed as US recognition of both Amanullah's government and Afghanistan's independence. But unfortunately both countries could not proceed further on diplomatic front for many years⁵

It is interesting to note that even after independence the British government evidently used their diplomatic muscle in whatever way possible to keep the Afghan leadership weak and incapable of having any regional impact. This was manifested most sharply in British efforts to frustrate Kabul's urgent search for wider international recognition of Afghanistan's independence and alternative sources of foreign aid, partly to counter what it perceived as the persistent British menace.

To execute their plan to accompany independence move with substantial modernization steps Amanullah needed to gain as much international recognition and support as possible. Immediately following the signing of the treaty of Rawalpindi, they dispatched mission, headed by Mohammad Wali a leading figure in the negotiations with the British, to Soviet Russia which was the first to recognize the sovereignty of Afghanistan, and established diplomatic relations in 1919.⁶ Hoping for permanent relations with the Bolsheviks he on the same day wrote letters to Japan, America, Persia (Iran), France and Turkey on behalf of "the independent and free government of Afghanistan"⁷ A mission was sent to Tashkent and Moscow, led by Mohammad Ali, and it was received by the Soviet authorities, as it was carrying a letter from king Amanullah to Vladimir Lenin seeking Soviet assistance in the emancipation of Afghanistan. A Soviet diplomat, Michael K. Bravin, was sent to Kabul to prepare the way for the establishment of diplomatic relations, to be followed by a Soviet delegation charged with negotiating a treaty of friendship. The result was the Afghan-Soviet treaty of friendship of 1921, by which the two states recognized their mutual independence and agreed to be bound not to enter into any political or military accord with a third state that might prejudice either of the signatories. The terms of the treaty had serious implications for the content of the Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1921, under which Britain endeavored to exclude Russia from involvement in Afghanistan.⁸

A friendship treaty signed in Moscow on February 28, 1921, formally sealed the friendship and mutual sympathies which had been developing and strengthening between Afghanistan and Russia since last two years. Lenin wrote to Amanullah that the British felt they were being beaten in their own game. Incidentally, the

British refused even to call Amanullah "His Majesty" and had not formally accepted Afghanistan's independence.⁹ The main aim of the British was to keep Afghanistan under its thumb and torpedo any close understanding between Afghanistan and Soviet Russia. Meanwhile the British officers were planning a diplomatic blockade while some of them, like general Malleon, were thinking in military terms. The Soviet leadership suggested to Amanullah a friendship treaty between Afghanistan and Soviet Russia. This scared the British and shattered their diplomatic blockade.¹⁰ The establishment of permanent diplomatic relations between the two great nations opened up broad possibilities of mutual assistance against any encroachment by foreign predators upon other people's freedom and possessions.¹¹

It became clear to Amanullah and his supporters and all along the Soviets' gestures of friendship and good will had not really been meant to facilitate Afghan independence but to assist themselves in domestic consolidation and socialist empire building, with a special imperative to avoid British opposition through Afghanistan. Meanwhile, the Afghan leaders were in no position to change the situation radically. To confront the Soviets, they needed substantial Western support. They made some efforts to secure it, but to little avail. Ironically, even then neither the British nor the Americans were prepared to respond positively to Kabul's call for more cooperative relations. In order to attract American friendship and ensure equilibrium in Afghan relations with Moscow, Kabul in 1925 even went as far as to forward the U.S. State Department through the Afghan Minister in Paris to make a draft treaty of friendship with the US but Washington never responded.¹²

However, the close scrutiny of Amanullah's objectives clearly establishes that his leadership wished only to pursue a balanced and neutral foreign policy and friendship with Soviet Russia was intended to aid the promotion of this policy, which was expected to provide Afghanistan with an anti-British lever, and, by the same token, to induce Britain and other Western powers to put their relations with Afghanistan on a similar footing, this is why, despite all the British discouragement, Amanullah's leadership never abandoned its efforts to seek American and German friendship. Nor did it ever waver in its staunch ideological opposition to 'Godless communism' thus setting limits on the extent to which relations with Moscow could develop. It never envisaged friendship with Soviet Russia as an end in itself, but merely as a means to strengthen a neutral and balanced independent foreign policy for Afghanistan in a Zone of sustained great power rivalry.¹³

A. The establishment of the U.S.-Afghanistan diplomatic relations

Second World War provided the motivation for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Afghanistan when in 1942 the German advance on Stalingrad led to fears that the logistic link through western Iran would be denied to the Allies. Eastern Iran or western Afghanistan were considered as ideal locales for an alternate route and the U.S. presence in Kabul was seen as an essential prerequisite for securing this route. On 6 June 1942, Cornelius Van Engert became the U.S. first resident ambassador in Afghanistan.¹⁴

In fact Afghanistan had shown its interest to establish diplomatic relations with Afghanistan soon after its independence. But the USA was reluctant as it viewed that Afghanistan was still within the British sphere of influence. Since imperial era Americans and British seemed to perceive the world similarly if not identically, and it followed that they should co-operate as best they could in their common interests.¹⁵ By the beginning of the twentieth century, the two countries became associated on various policies.

Despite granting independence to Afghanistan Britain still tried to use their diplomatic muscle in whatever way possible to keep the Afghan leadership weak and incapable of having any regional impact. Britain continued its efforts to frustrate Kabul's urgent search for wider international recognition of its independence and alternative sources of foreign aid partly to make up for the loss of British support and partly to counter what it perceived as the persistent British menace. British continued to accept only a settlement that retained Afghanistan within the sphere of British colonial interests.

Disappointed with continued British pressure even after independence king Amanullah sent a mission to the newly installed Bolsheviks in Moscow in October 1919. This visit had in fact been preceded by a Bolshevik mission to Kabul to obtain Afghan support for the Bolsheviks in Muslim Central Asia in return for assistance against the British. In July - August 1920 Lenin took the position that the communist parties would assist bourgeois nationalist liberation movements in their struggle against imperialism and even to form alliances with such movements. This was to define Soviet attitudes towards the national revolutions then taking shape in Ataturk's Turkey, Reza Shah's Iran, Amanullah's Afghanistan and Sun yat sen's China.¹⁶

In the very early years of Soviet rule the West got scared of the spread of Bolshevik doctrines about property, religion, and the relationship of the individual to the state, through propaganda or the communist international established by Lenin in Moscow in 1919.¹⁷ During 1920s and 1930, the Soviets had called for the world revolution, the destruction of capitalism and the economic system of the United States.¹⁸ The Soviet leadership viewed the capitalism as the chief obstacle to humanity's liberation movement. From the moment the Soviets seized power its leaders continued to see the capitalist states as enemies and the Soviet relationship with them as one of constant struggle.¹⁹ The United States, however, found it impossible to reconcile itself to the ideology and practices of Soviet Russia, which seemed more alien, and more hostile to democracy, than the ideology and practices of czars.²⁰

Indeed initially Washington showed some receptiveness to Afghan requests. President Warren G. Harding received Wali's mission on 26 July 1921, which some Afghans construed as U.S. recognition of Amanullah's government and Afghanistan's independence, and promised to consider seriously the question of U.S. diplomatic representation in Afghanistan, but unfortunately nothing more happened for many years. Another reason which made U.S. to delay its decision to establish diplomatic relations with Afghanistan was Afghan - Soviet treaty of friendship of 1921, by which the two states recognized their mutual independence and agreed to be bound not to enter into any political or military accord with a third state that might prejudice either of the signatories. The terms of the treaty had serious implications for the content of the Anglo-Afghan treaty of 1921, under which Britain endeavored to exclude Russia from involvement in Afghanistan.

On May 27, a message from Lenin and Kalilin greeted the "independent Afghan people heroically upholding their freedom against foreign enslaves" and proposed an exchange of representatives, "the establishment of permanent diplomatic relations between the two great nations will open up broad possibilities of mutual assistance against any encroachment by foreign predators upon other people's freedom and possessions," it said. Tarzi in his note to Chicherin said: The main inducement to my government to conclude a treaty of friendship with the government of Russian Soviet Republic was a common policy of overthrowing imperialist despotism all over the world and especially the policy of emancipation

of all the peoples of the East, without distinction of nationality and religion, from the rule and tyranny of world predators.

On the other hand the US astonishingly displayed as much insensitivity as the British to Afghan needs. The US position was influenced by its ambivalence towards the communist regime in Russia; its perception of Afghanistan as unimportant to USA; its treatment of Afghanistan as part of the British sphere of influence and therefore British responsibility; and more importantly as some informed Afghan sources believe, London's constant advice to Washington not to help Amanullah get off the British hook- the British continued to give advice until the mid 1930s. The USA neither officially declared support for Afghan independence for another decade nor established full diplomatic relations with Afghanistan until 1942.²¹

After being freed from their efforts in repressing anti-Bolshevik forces elsewhere in the former czarist empire Bolsheviks started re-conquering Central Asia. This caused serious concern for Afghan rulers and Amanullah once again started looking towards the West for assistance²². The expanding of Russia's actual control to the current border between Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics had disturbed Afghans.²³ This development seriously perturbed the Afghan government, which rapidly became disillusioned with and distrustful of the Soviets. It became clear to Amanullah and his supporters that all along the Soviets' gestures of friendship and good will had not really been meant to facilitate Afghan independence and modernization but to assist themselves in domestic consolidation and socialist empire building, with a special imperative to avoid British opposition through Afghanistan. However, the Afghan leaders were not in position to change the situation radically. To confront the Soviets, they needed substantial Western support. They made some effort to secure it but to little avail. Ironically, neither the British nor the Americans responded positively to Kabul's call for more cooperative relations. In order to again attract American friendship and ensure equilibrium in Afghanistan relations with Moscow, Kabul in 1925 even went as far as to forward to the U.S. State Department through the Afghan Minister in Paris (then General Mohammad) Nadir a draft treaty of friendship with the USA; but Washington never responded.²⁴

In 1928, both France and the United States signed a treaty renouncing the resort to war as a national policy. It came to be known as Kellogg-Briand pact. The U.S. ambassador, Amour, in Paris was instructed by the State Department on 22 September, 1928 to transmit two authenticated copies of this treaty to Minister of Afghanistan in Paris. The acting Afghan Minister in Kabul had expressed Afghanistan's readiness to adhere to, and earnestly participate in the Kellogg-Briand pact (1928). Thus, indirect diplomatic relations were in auguries between Kabul and Washington through Paris. The French Minister in Kabul was further urged to "make the decision of the Afghan government, officially known to the government of the United States of America."²⁵ However, the establishment of direct diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Afghanistan still bore no fruit. There were many factors behind the U.S. reluctance to establish direct diplomatic relations with Afghanistan under Amanullah's leadership as they found his nationalist militancy seriously vulnerable to Bolshevik influence. Other factors included - Amanullah's Islamic rhetoric, anti-British and anti-colonial and pro-independence agitation and the British still making 'sphere of influence' claim on the country.²⁶

However, the process of normalization of Afghan-U.S. relations suffered a setback in 1928 following the downfall of Amanullah. Though there was no immediate success in this regard, the United States had started dealing with the government of Afghanistan through French legation in Kabul.²⁷ After the overthrow of Amanullah in 1929, the British supported a tribal coalition led by the future ruler Nadir Shah.²⁸ Within six months Nadir Shah came back via India and assumed power in Kabul as king. He got generous help from Britain both in cash and armaments.²⁹ During Nadir's rule he adopted a foreign policy of 'positive neutrality' and reciprocal friendship with all states. He sought to achieve two immediate objectives 'non-provocative' balanced relationships with both Britain and the USSR, and acceptance by the Muslim states.³⁰ Nadir Shah had appointed his half brother Muhammad Aziz, to be ambassador to Moscow in recognition of the significance of the post. Nadir Shah opened up negotiations for a review of the 1921 treaty, and the new Afghan-Soviet treaty of mutual neutrality and non-aggression signed on 24 June 1931 included a clause specifically calling for the prohibition in both states of activities that might cause either military or political damage.³¹ Further Nadir found it expedient to confirm all Amanullah's treaties with Moscow. And he also supported Soviet initiatives at a number of international conferences.

One of the clauses of non-aggression pact stipulated a ban on activities of organizations hostile to one of the contracting parties on the other's territory.

In order to strengthen Afghanistan's independence and international profile Nadir started wooing European powers such as France and Germany. The idea of rapprochement with Berlin was particularly attractive to him, by the same token, he was interested in establishing ties with the USA, but it did not find it feasible to create a mission in Kabul.³²

There were many factors behind the U.S. decision about not establishing direct diplomatic relations with Afghanistan during Nadir rule. First, as U.S. administration still opposed relations with Russians.³³ As discussed earlier that after Nadir had become ruler of Afghanistan he did not only review the 1921 treaty (which was done by Amanullah) but also a new Afghan treaty was signed on 24 June 1931.³⁴ The new ruler Nadir Shah continued to rely primarily on Germany and the small but vital colony of Germany. Nadir Shah even planned to make Berlin the chief outpost in Europe of Afghan trade, instead of London or Moscow. But such outcome was checked by a dramatic series of events which harmed Afghan-German relations, although German responsibility was in fact only of the most indirect kind.³⁵

An important factor was a friendship treaty with Japan signed in 1930, and development of limited trade and educational ties, between them, but Japan ran into the same reservations and difficulties that faced the United States. These factors caused U.S. reluctance to establish a mission in Kabul, because, in the state Department's opinion, Afghanistan was "the most frantic, hostile country in the world today". In its opinion Nadir Shah (the Afghan king) was not able to control the tribes and would soon fall. Nonetheless, U.S. recognition was definitely a boost to Nadir's regime. As a whole there was no major breakthrough in the efforts for establishing direct relations with the United States.³⁶

After Nadir Shah's murder, real power came into the hands of his brothers. The boy king was no more than a convenience.³⁷ At that time the new king was Mohammad Zahir Shah, the 19 year old son of Nadir Shah, who was educated in France, from 1933 to 1953. It was three royal uncles, who ruled through Zahir Shah until 1963 when the king became his own Master. Through most of this period it remained an axiom of Afghanistan's foreign policy to limit dependence on either of the over-powerful, neighbors British India and the USSR.³⁸ In addition, the new

regime faced with a problem; on the one hand they were determined not to accept aid or technicians from the Soviet Union and on the other anti - British feeling were now so strong.³⁹ According to Frank A. Clement, in this time, Afghanistan made further overtures to the United States and tried to use commerce to forge closer links by offering attractive incentives to U.S. companies, However. Britain negated some of attractiveness of these commercial agreements by creating problems in term of access from Indian ports, insisting that all goods had to be transported by Indian railway even vehicles capable of proceeding under their own power. The US Consul at Karachi was approached about establishing diplomatic relations during a visit to Kabul in 1931, but he could give no reason to the Afghan government for the unwillingness of the United States to open an embassy in Kabul.⁴⁰

During 1934-35 the communist approach shifted from condemnation of social democracy, collective security, and Western militarism to collaboration with other anti-fascist forces in popular fronts, alliance systems, and rearmament. The United States and the U.S.S.R. established diplomatic relations for the first time in November 1933, and in September 1934, the Soviet joined the League of Nations, where Maksim Litvinov became loud proponent of collective security against fascist revisionism.⁴¹

Afghanistan's continued attempt to obtain prestige grew increasingly difficult in the face of the impending war. In 1937, Afghanistan signed the treaty of Sa'adabad with Turkey and Iran, a harmless pledge of mutual non-aggression that nevertheless marked the first time that either the Turks or the Afghans had shown any friendship for their Persian neighbors. During this period Afghanistan had its first taste of diplomatic relations with the United States. Although the latter had been one of the first countries approached by the Afghans after they gained their external independence, their overtures had been rejected by Harding administration.

In July 1934, after the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the United States recognition of the Soviet Union, a note went to the U.S. Department of state suggesting that it might be well to "strengthen the political and economic relations" which Afghanistan had and still has with the high government of the United States. But it was not until 1936. that the United States *charge- d- affairs* in Iran visited Afghanistan and concluded a treaty of friendship. No diplomatic section was set up; however, the United States continued to deal with Afghanistan through British offices.⁴²

Afghanistan under Zahir Shah emphasized the need to strengthen the political and economic relations with the government of United States. Zahir Shah in his personal letter to U.S. President Franklin D. Roosevelt informed the latter about the death of his father king Nadir Shah and added that “we are pleased to notify the desire of the Afghan government to strengthen the political and economic relations with the government of United States.” And President Roosevelt in his reply to Zahir Shah informed that: “I cordially reciprocate the sentiments which you express and, in extending recognition to your majesty’s government, take this opportunity of assuring you of my hope that friendly relations will always exist between the United States and Afghanistan.” Thus, it was for the first time that the United States announced its recognition of Afghanistan. Immediately thereafter, Afghanistan proposed a friendship treaty between Afghanistan and the United States. Consequently, on 26 March 1936, the agreement was signed between Kabul and Washington at Paris. Thus, by March 1936, Afghanistan’s government had been recognized by the United States.⁴³ Afghan government demonstrated its confidence in America altruism by granting a 75 year concession. A concession was signed and ratified with the Inland oil Exploration Company in April 1937, but the company withdrew from the concession in 1938 because of the international situation in Europe.⁴⁴

The Second World War brought with it a challenge in the sphere of the government’s foreign relations. Before the war, the Afghan had accepted economic assistance only from countries that were geographically remote enough (like Germany, Italy and Japan but not Britain and Russia) not to be able to influence their political independence.⁴⁵ In October 1936, Germany and Afghanistan entered into a confidential protocol “under which Germany provided Dm 15 million of war materials on credit, to be repaid in part with products from Afghanistan. German become an important player in the economy of Afghanistan and was regarded as politically significant in the country’s attempt to balance the influences of Britain and Russia. In 1937, the German airline, Lufthansa, established a regular service between Berlin and Kabul, with a view to extending the service into China, and in the summer of 1939, a German delegation arrived in Kabul with the objective of exploring the possibility of expanding Trade.⁴⁶

On 22 June 1941, the Nazis attacked the USSR. Stalin entered into an alliance of necessity with old rival Britain, against the common enemy.⁴⁷ In the Second World War, maintenance of the allied coalition of the United States, Great Britain, and Russia required exacting exercises of the art of diplomacy.⁴⁸ For both powers, close Afghan-German ties became unacceptable, and they demanded expulsion of all Axis citizens from Afghanistan, despite Afghan hasty proclamation of complete neutrality in the World War. Iran's refusal to obey a similar order led to its occupation by the Soviet and British forces in August 1941. To avoid a similar fate, but Afghan acquiesced to the Soviet British pressure on condition of providing safe conduct to Germans, Italians and Japanese to their countries.⁴⁹ A move that Afghanistan resented as an infringement of its sovereignty but still complied with and all Axis nationals left for India under the promise of free passage to a neutral country. Although Axis diplomats were allowed to remain, their attempts to foment an uprising against Britain among the Pushtun tribes on the Indian side of border were unsuccessful, despite sympathy for the Germans because of their traditional enmity with Britain.⁵⁰ As during the World War II, Afghanistan briefly became the Switzerland of Central Asia in a new game of intrigue as Allied and Axis coalitions jockeyed for position in the region. One of the reasons of German to be in Afghanistan was its geopolitical importance in this region.⁵¹

In time of war, this Afghan connection was regarded with even greater suspicion by the British; Kabul was full of hostile embassies so nervous were the British about the harmful influence the Axis powers could have at Kabul and indirectly on the frontier, that presence of any foreigners on the frontier was regarded with the utmost suspicion.⁵²

World war II provided the motivation for the establishment of diplomatic relations between the United States and Afghanistan when, in 1942, the German advance on Stalingrad led to fears that the logistic link through western Iran would be denied to Allies. Eastern Iran or Western Afghanistan were considered as ideal locales for an alternate route, and a U.S. presence in Kabul was seen as an essential prerequisite for securing this route. On 6 June 1942, Cornelius Van Engert became the U.S. first resident ambassador in Afghanistan, even though the German defeat at Stalingrad meant that Afghanistan was not needed as a supply route for the Allies.⁵³

Thus during World War II, Afghanistan maintained a policy of strict neutrality. The government in Kabul realized that its alignment either with Axis or Allied powers could endanger the independence and sovereignty of Afghanistan. The Afghan policy of strict neutrality won appreciation and recognition from the victorious Allied powers.⁵⁴ The neutrality remained constant throughout the war, although it was strained by an Allied demand, made in the fall of 1941, for the expulsion of all Axis nationals. Not only was this ultimatum a blow to national pride, but it demanded the violation of one of Afghanistan's strongest traditions-the law of hospitality, many of the Afghan leaders advocated resistance, but Hashim Khan (one of uncles of Zahir Shah) saw the situation more clearly ; the fate of Reza Shah Pahlavi in Iran was an object lesson.⁵⁵

Thus so far, we have seen that the advent of US-Afghan relations before the Second World War commenced on the basis of mutual desire for friendship and cordiality. Prior to First World War, both the United States and Afghanistan were pre occupied with their regional and domestic roles. Random efforts were made by both the countries to forge closer relations. The subsequent period especially 1930s and 1940s marked a watershed in US-Afghan relations when both side reciprocated positively to each other's friendly gestures. The beginning of 1940 was marked by establishment of relations between Washington D.C. and Kabul at ambassador level. By this time, the Second World War concluded, the US-Afghan relations had been founded on very firm basis.⁵⁶

B. United States and Afghan's Modernization and Economic Development

The U.S. involvement in modernization and economic development of Afghanistan can be traced back to the reign of king Habibullah whose contribution to the process of modernization was not substantial, despite his personal fascination for Western technical inventions. His father had set up workshops with foreign help to manufacture shoes, soup and other articles for his *harem* and the ladies of the court. He had hired foreign technicians and advisers to assist in introducing new technology in some limited fields, such as mining. Habibullah commissioned an American engineer to build the country's first hydroelectric plant, to supply power to palaces and public buildings in Kabul. To indulge in his passion for motor cars, he had also built a road. But the plan got a set back as the World War I broke out.⁵⁷

Thus during Habibullah's reign we do not see any major breakthrough in the Afghan's modernization and its economic relations with the U.S.

During the reign of king Amanullah (1919-1929) Afghanistan gained independence from British colony as a result of the third Anglo-Afghan war of 1919, and the king sought to open up diplomatic relations with the major powers of the world. In addition, the king desperately needed expertise to develop his modernization projects.⁵⁸ The United States had shown no interest in establishing diplomatic relations with Afghanistan following its independence. A variety of factors contributed to this reluctance, the foremost being the view that Afghanistan was still within the British sphere of influence. In addition, Afghanistan was not seen as a market for U.S. exports or as a source of strategic raw materials. It is also true that most Americans had little or no knowledge of the country, and there was no public interest in the region. Washington therefore had to rely on Britain for information about the area, and the British government had no desire to encourage U.S. competition in Afghanistan.

In 1921, a delegation from Afghanistan, led by Wali Muhammad, visited Washington with the objective of establishing diplomatic relations with the United States. But no result was achieved. Amanullah had hoped to avoid his country's dependency on Britain and the Soviet Union by introducing the United States as a balancing third power and as a provider of western know-how to further his policy of modernization.⁵⁹ However, during king Amanullah's reign no major breakthrough in Afghan-US economic relations was achieved.⁶⁰

The Afghan efforts to establish diplomatic relations with Europe yielded some result. In 1923, the German Minister plenipotentiary, Fritz Grobba, was sent to Kabul, and it was clear that Afghanistan and Germany had mutual interests, as the king desperately needed expertise to develop his modernization projects. Germany offered to provide industrial hardware and skilled engineers and technicians at highly competitive rates. The commercial relations between the two countries developed through a consortium of German companies. But due to one or other reasons other European powers did not show any interest in these modernization projects.⁶¹

Further more, on January 5, 1928, Amanullah left for Europe. In Italy he negotiated about arms purchase, bought 150 fiat cars and arranged for Italian engineers to be sent to Afghanistan which he wanted to modernize at the earliest.

And from Italy he went to France where he signed a treaty with France for some projects, ordered consignments of rifles and ammunition, arranged for more Afghan students to come to France and more French teachers for Afghan schools. Amanullah then moved to Germany where he signed a preliminary agreement for giving concessions to German and French firms to build railways in Afghanistan. He also placed orders for 200 cars and two aircrafts for starting an Afghan civilian air service, an idea which the Germans enthusiastically welcomed.⁶²

After dawn fall of king Amanullah Nadir Shah became the king of Afghanistan. Nadir Shah and his successors were more successful in encouraging the growth of an alternative source of state revenue, through direct and indirect taxes on joint-stock companies, these companies were chiefly engaged in trade, organizing the export of the valuable karakul sheep skins fresh and dried fruits, cotton and wool. They operated largely under the aegis of the private Bank-i-melli, established by the leading Afghan entrepreneur, Abdul Majid Zabuli. It was Zabuli who, as minister of national economy, had visited Washington in 1948 to seek U.S. assistance in the financing of a modest development plan.⁶³ At the same time, Afghanistan made further overtures to the United States and tried to do more commerce with U.S. companies. However, Britain negated some of the attractiveness of these commercial agreements by creating problems in term of access from Indian ports, insisting that all goods had to be transported by Indian railways, even vehicles capable of proceeding under their own power.⁶⁴

In July 1934, after the election of Franklin Delano Roosevelt and the United State's recognition of the Soviet Union, a note went to the U.S. Department of State suggesting that it might be well to strengthen the political and economic relations with Afghanistan. But it was not until 1936 that the United States charged affairs in Iran visited Afghanistan and concluded a treaty of friendship. No diplomatic mission was set up, however, the United States continued to deal with Afghanistan through British offices. Same year the Afghan government demonstrated its confidence in American altruism by granting a 75 year concession to the Inland Exploration Company of New York for the development of Afghanistan's presumed petroleum deposits, the first and only time that such a concession had been given. But the threat of war made American investors reluctant and in 1939 after a few preliminary soundings the Inland Exploration Company gave up its concession.⁶⁵

Under this agreement the American company had acquired the rights of exploring oil in Afghanistan. This agreement was quite useful for the company. Reports indicated that German foreign office and Berlin based Soviet Ambassador made frantic efforts for thwarting the conclusion of this agreement. Seeing that their efforts in thwarting the conclusion of the said agreement could not succeed, the Soviets adhered, to other techniques of pressurizing Afghanistan. Consequently, Moscow laid claim over Afghan territory along the Afghan-Soviet border, which was refuted by the then Afghan government.

After American company had concluded oil exploration agreement with Iran and Afghanistan the Afghan Ambassador in Moscow told the former that the Soviet officials were annoyed because of having not been consulted by Tehran and Kabul in connection with conclusion of such an important agreement. Such an attitude by the Soviet might have been governed by the fact that as they regarded some area of both Iran and Afghanistan reportedly under Soviet influence and under these circumstances they could not afford to be ignored.

Because of these reasons, the Soviet did not allow transition facilities to Afghanistan. There also existed no treaty or agreement between Moscow and Kabul in this regard. The Afghan Ambassador in Moscow is on record of having said that it would have been better if the American did not use Russian rail transport for supplying their material to Afghanistan, otherwise Moscow could exert pressure on Afghanistan. The Afghan Ambassador in Moscow further told that Russia was not prepared to provide transition facilities through its territory because Moscow was trying to impose a trade agreement on Afghanistan which was detrimental to the latter's interests.⁶⁶

Even the global situation was not conducive for foreign investments during that period. By 1938, the possibilities of the outbreak of hostilities in Europe had become almost certain. The Inland Company thought that, in the event of war, oil field in Afghanistan could be vulnerable to Soviet or Iranian attack and only British help could save them. The US decision served a blow to Afghanistan's policy of seeking support, services, and investments from distant countries which were, it was hoped, politically disinterested in Afghan affairs. Seeing the US disinterest in large-scale and long-term investments, Afghanistan became determined to refuse concessions to the Russian and British nationals into the country in significant

numbers, and thought of rather relying on Germany, Italian, Japanese and Czech investments and technicians.⁶⁷

The outbreak of World War II had adverse effect on Afghan economy. Due to war the exports of karakul to the western countries from Afghanistan had almost stopped. At this crucial juncture, the United States came to Afghanistan's rescue and helped the latter in exporting Karakul to American markets. In December 1942, the State Department of the United States mooted the idea of constructing a road passing through India, Afghanistan and the Soviet Russia to reach China with a view to supply material to China through road transport. Consequently, one Gordon Bowles, a US citizen was sent to India to explore the feasibilities of such a plan. But Soviet refused to permit any American national even for survey purpose in its territory; consequently, Washington shelved this plan.

In April 1944, John L. Savage, an engineer belonging to the United States Bureau of Land Reclamation paid a visit to Afghanistan with a view to help the latter in devising irrigation plans. In 1945, many countries signed an interim agreement with the United States pertaining to international civil aviation matters. The purpose of this agreement was to establish an international organization for civil aviation. Afghanistan also signed this agreement. During the same year, the US Ambassador in Kabul presented a memorandum to the government of Afghanistan urging the latter to bring the production of opium in that country under strict control for exclusive use in medicine and other scientific purposes. The Afghan government accepted the American request, and declared that it was going to ban the production of Opium from 21 March 1945. Later the World War II helped in cementing the bonds of friendship between Washington and Kabul.⁶⁸

II. U.S.-Afghan relations after the end of the World War II

After the end of World War II United States of America had emerged as the world leader. The Soviet Union had survived the war. It also resulted into the end of British and was quietly preparing to leave India forever.⁶⁹ It was the time when the Monroe Doctrine had become an intellectual lodestone for U.S. policy makers seeking to stabilize the Middle East after 1945. Hoping to avoid a vacuum in a region whose strategic importance was fast becoming unparalleled, the White House

agreed in March 1947, to assume Britain's long-standing commitments in Greece and Turkey under the auspices of Truman Doctrine.⁷⁰

After World War II the shattered and broken British, German, France and other imperialist powers receded. The Americans began to advance the theory of "filling the power vacuum". The US was interested in acquiring influence in Afghanistan more especially because it was strategically important for the post-war Western policy of encircling and rolling back communism. It had a key position in any military advance toward the Soviet Union whether from Iran or from Pakistan. Attempts were therefore, made to draw the country into the new military pact, Baghdad treaty.⁷¹ The Afghans quickly realized that the power of Great Britain as a barrier against Soviet expansion had been replaced by that of the United States of America. The reputation of the United States then enjoyed in Asia for its position on imperialism was still important from the Afghan point of view.⁷²

A. The U.S. as a balancing power

In the post-World War II period Afghanistan first tried to keep balanced relations with the Soviet Union and the United States, which now replaced Britain as the leading Western power.⁷³ In the countries lying between the Turkish straits and the Himalayas, the United States had largely taken over Great Britain's historic policy of curbing Russian expansion in the direction of the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and the plains of India. As the decline of British power in the area became more apparent the traditional Anglo-Russian rivalry had broadened into an opposition – animated by somewhat altered conceptions on both sides. The primacy of American responsibilities in Western Asia was formalized by the commencement of the Greek-Turkish aid program in 1947. In Iran and Afghanistan it was signalized by no such dramatic event, but American involvement perceptibly increased as British influence waned.⁷⁴

In the period 1946-53 Afghanistan tried to maintain balanced relationship with Soviet Union and the United States, engaging both in its economic and infrastructural development. It refused to join the chain of anti-Soviet alliances forged under American initiative; a military alliance between Kabul and Washington was forbidden under the Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1931, which was still in force. Immediately after World War II, however, the Afghan king appeared to be looking up to the United States as a protector of its independence from a Soviet threat. The imminent withdrawal of British imperial power from the Indian

subcontinent left Afghanistan without its traditional policy of balancing Russian influence with British.⁷⁵ Further more, the withdrawal of Great Britain from the Indian peninsula has changed the relationship and has altered any ability of Afghanistan to play one side against the other. The country's willingness to accept aid and support from the United States represented the desire to find an alternative against Soviet pressures.⁷⁶

As the Afghan Prime Minister, Shah Mahmud Khan, son of king Zahir Shah, declared in 1946 that he was: "Convinced that America's championship of the small nations guarantees my country's security against aggression. America's attitude is our salvation. For the first time in our history we are free of the threat of great powers' using our mountain passes as pathways of empire. Now we can concentrate our talents and resources on bettering the living conditions of our people." Though the American response was initially lukewarm it changed significantly after the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine. Consequently, between 1949 and 1979, Afghanistan received massive American economic aid.⁷⁷

B. The U.S. policy of containment and Afghanistan

Soon after World War II, the cold war developed between the Soviet Union and its former allies.⁷⁸ The United States and the Soviet Union both fought on the side of the allies during World War II. But after the war, the two countries became bitter enemies. The Soviet Union, as a communist country, opposed democracy. It helped communists take control of most of the countries of Eastern Europe and also aided communists who seized control of China.

The Soviet Union and China then set out to spread communism to other lands. The United States as the world's most powerful democratic nations was threatened by communist take-over. And hence the containment of communism became the major goal of U.S. post-war foreign policy.⁷⁹

Cold war is the term used to describe the intense rivalry that had existed since the end of World War II between groups of communist and non-communist nations. On the one side were the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and its communist allies, often referred to as the Eastern bloc. On the other side were the United States and its democratic allies, usually referred to as Western bloc. The struggle was called the cold war because it had not actually led to fighting or hot war on a wide scale. The cold war has been characterized by mutual distrust.

suspicion, and misunderstanding by both the United States and the Soviet Union, and their allies. The United States accused the USSR of seeking to expand communism throughout the world. The Soviet meanwhile, charged the United States with practicing imperialism and with attempting to stop revolutionary activity in other countries. The United States wanted a world of independent nations based on democratic principle.

Though the cold war did not begin until the end of World War II, in 1945 the U.S.-Soviet relations had been strained since 1917. In that year, a revolution in Russia established a communist dictatorship there. During the 1920's and 1930's, the Soviet called for world revolution and the destruction of capitalism, the economic system of the United States.⁸⁰ Furthermore, the Soviet leaders viewed capitalism as the chief obstacle to humanity's liberation. From the very moment the communists seized power in Russia they defined capitalist states as enemies. Since the Soviet defined the capitalist states as foes, the relationship between it and them *would be marked by conflict until the victory of what the Soviet call socialism and the defeat of capitalism.* The Soviet relationship with them was one of constant struggle.⁸¹

During World War II, many communists fought alongside the allies, some of which were colonial powers. But after the war, the communists called for an end to colonialism and sought power for themselves.⁸² In 1941, during World War II, the Soviet Union joined the Western Allies in fighting against Germany, it seemed possible that a lasting friendship might develop between the United States and the Soviet Union based on their war time cooperation. However, major differences continued to exist between the two, particularly with regard to Eastern Europe. As a result of these differences the United States adopted a "get tough" policy toward the Soviet Union after the war ended. The Soviets responded by accusing the United States and the other capitalist allies of the West of seeking to encircle the Soviet Union so they could eventually overthrow its communist form of government.⁸³ And the United States began to advance the theory of "filling the power vacuum". The US was interested in acquiring influence in Afghanistan more especially because it was strategically important for the post-war western policy of encircling and rolling back communism. It had a key position in any military advance towards the Soviet Union whether from Iran or from Pakistan.⁸⁴

American initiative evolved gradually during 1946-1947 and was precipitated by Stalin's attempt to extend Soviet influence beyond Eastern Europe, and then the Soviets began moving forward the Persian Gulf and into the Mediterranean Greece. Turkey and Iran were the first to feel Soviet pressure. The pressure on Iran began in 1946, when the Soviets refused to withdraw their troops from that country. These troops had been there since late 1941, when the Soviet Union and Britain had invaded Iran to forestall increased Nazi influence. The Soviets had occupied northern Iran and the British the central and southern sections. When the British withdrew, the Soviets sought to convert Iran into a Soviet satellite.

During this period the Soviet Union also exerted pressure on Turkey. By now, the United States was convinced that the Soviet goal was nothing less than domination of Turkey and fulfillment of the historic Soviet ambition to control Constantinople and gain access to the Mediterranean. Control of Turkey, of course would have left Moscow in a better position to intimidate Iran and Greece.⁸⁵ The Soviet Union was also demanding military base in Turkey⁸⁶ the proximity of the Soviet union was something that Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan were never allowed to forget, and there were signs that Moscow might be planning a more determined bid for the favour of the Arab peoples than it had seen fit to make while the fate of Palestine was in the balance.⁸⁷

After World War II The Soviet Union not only moved to Middle East but before the war ended, the Soviet union had already absorbed three nations along the Baltic sea- Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The communism also gained strength in the far East. The Soviet Union had set up a communist government in North Korea after the war. In China, Mao Zedong's communist after replacing Chiang Kai-Shek's nationalist armies had joined the communist world bloc.⁸⁸ In all these situations, the American government was once more confronted with the need to support Britain the traditional guardian of area.⁸⁹

At the same time United States being conscious of the oil of the Middle East being occupied by Soviet, began to think about the doctrine of containment for the security of Middle East as Britain had reluctantly begun its slow motion retreat from the region giving chance to U.S. to promote its interest in the region.⁹⁰ It was in the years after World War I that Americans first became conscious of the oil of Middle East; British and French interests were on the ground first. In Southern Iran the British, through the Anglo-Iranian oil company, attained and held a monopoly; but

in Iraq and in the little Sheikdom of Kuwait American companies won a part interest, and in Saudi Arabia and the Bahrain Island field, they secured complete control. World War II, with its terrific drain on the petroleum resources of United States and Caribbean fields, emphasized the dependence of Western Europe, and even perhaps the future dependence of the United States, on the Middle East.⁹¹

Washington knew the importance of Middle Eastern oil which was evidenced in the plan, proposed in 1944, but finally set aside, to build pipeline from the Arabian field to the Mediterranean. The U.S. was also aware of the danger of Soviet to seeking influence in the region. The Soviet troops had remained in northern Iran after the end of Second World War had been withdrawn only as a result of pressure applied through the United Nations. At the Potsdam Conference (1945) and later, the Soviet had asked a trusteeship in the Mediterranean and a major share in control of the Bosphorus and Dardanelles. Denied these requests by western governments, the Russian had pressed Turkey for a new regime for the straits and for cession of the provinces of Kars and Ardahan at the eastern end of the black sea. At the same time, the communist were seeking to control of Greece through aid to native guerillas and infiltration. It was these communist pressures, and Great Britain's confessed inability to give further aid in resisting them that led to the setting forth of the Truman Doctrine and the granting of American aid to Greece and Turkey. The Middle East and Gulf oil countries were so important for both U.S. and Russia that each tried its best to control this region and to be under its sphere through political or military alliance.

After 1945 U.S. defined the Soviet Union as a mortal threat to the United States and that dictated global vigilance against Russian-backed communist subversion. U.S. policymakers from Harry Truman to Jimmy Carter waged a cold war against the Kremlin from the sun-drenched shores of the Eastern Mediterranean to the snow capped mountains of Afghanistan. Some historians point to the Red Army's belated departure from Iran in early 1946 and to its sudden arrival in Kabul in late 1979 as proof of Moscow's unwavering drive to dominate the Middle East.⁹²

According to Tucker one of the major turning points in U.S. foreign policy after World War II was the containment policy which became a capsule characterization of post-war American policy toward the Soviet Union. The main aim of this policy was containing wherever possible the expansion of Soviet influence as well as the expansion of communism in general or a policy of moderate

containment that may prove inadequate to sustain the power and discipline even to protect interests on which United States essential security depends.⁹³

The cold war complicated U.S. relations with Afghanistan because, in its quest for allies to contain the Soviet Union, the United States would not guarantee to protect Afghanistan against Soviet aggression. It preferred to deal with Pakistan for the defense of the Indian subcontinent. As a consequence, Pakistan became a member of the Baghdad Pact, and Afghanistan was forced to adopt a policy of positive neutrality, which gradually led to a growing dependence on the Soviet Union. However, the United States continued to provide assistance to Afghanistan via loans and grants of \$286 million between 1950 and 1971, with an emphasis on aid for communications infrastructure, education, and agriculture. But it did not provide military support to guarantee Afghanistan's independence.⁹⁴ According to Frank A. Clements, the Afghans were dismayed that the United States repeatedly refused to provide Afghanistan with arms - a decision motivated by the belief that such assistance was more likely to be used against Pakistan as both Afghan and Pakistan having clash over Pushtunistan issue.⁹⁵

According to Gorge B. Cressey, if Afghanistan appeared remote, and perhaps unimportant, its problems were nevertheless real to the Afghans. It is well to remember that this country, along with Turkey and Iran, represented almost the only section of the entire Soviet frontier where there was no cushion of buffer of satellite communist states. In his view Afghanistan's significance to the free world should not be undervalued.⁹⁶

C. The U.S. and Pushtunistan issue

After the partition of India a new Muslim state of Pakistan was formed.⁹⁷ This new states faced with a serious problem of linguistic provincialism especially among the speakers of Pashto (pushto, pakhtu) who wanted that their entire area, which lies in Pakistan and Afghanistan, to be a single political unit.⁹⁸ But Pakistan announced its "one unit" plan calling for the merger of the provinces of West Pakistan. This decision disturbed the Afghans, to whom the elimination of the North West frontier province seemed part of a move to destroy the identity of the eastern Pushtun. And undoubtedly this was one of the motives behind the plan, for incipient sectionalism remained Pakistan's most serious problem.⁹⁹ While, Afghanistan came to be substantially synonymous with the Pushtunistan issue, the argument that all of

Pushtun areas of Pakistan should belong to Afghanistan, or at least be independent, claiming that a large chunk of Northwest Pakistan belongs rightfully to Afghanistan. The Pushtunistan issue had been an important item in Afghanistan politics for years.¹⁰⁰ Afghanistan had long standing claim to the Pushto-speaking areas of Pakistan. The Afghan ruler in 1949 denounced the frontier agreements with the departed British and demanded that the Pushtunistan speaking areas in Pakistan be given independence as a sovereign state of Pushtunistan. In response, Pakistan closed the border, on which Afghanistan depended heavily for imports. Thus ensued a verbal war of attrition between the two Muslim neighbors. The United States, considering Pakistan's participation in a chain of military alliances ringing the Soviet Union could not but turn down Afghan requests for military aid.

The United States, the new colonialist power, seemed to be more interested in geography than history. Its aid to the new states was not intended for the establishment of democratic institutions or the solution of regional problems, but to create a military line-up against the Soviet Union through defense-treaties. Pakistan was an early recruit to his crusade against communism.¹⁰¹ After World War II, the United States, as the world's most powerful democratic nation was threatened by communist takeover. The containment of communism became the major goal of U.S. post-war foreign policy.¹⁰² The conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan over Pushtunistan issue, brought the two sides very close to a major war, on the one hand, and plunged Afghanistan into a serious economics crisis, on the other. Meanwhile Afghanistan quickly realized that while Moscow was prepared to side with Afghan on the crisis and to provide him an expensive alternative air transit route, it was disinclined to support Afghan in a war, for two main reasons: first, Pakistan by now was militarily far more powerful than Afghanistan and Afghan defeat could land the Soviets in a major regional conflict, from which the USA, as an ally of Pakistan, could not remain aloof, second, as the Afghan-Pakistan crisis peaked, with no solution in sight despite an offer of mediation by the Shah of Iran, Moscow found itself embroiled in a more dangerous confrontation with the USA (the Cuban missile crisis), the fallout from which prompted Soviet caution over the ensuing months.¹⁰³

Pakistan retaliated by putting impediments in the way of Afghanistan's imports and exports, a large proportion of which went through the port of Karachi. Afghanistan, for its part, indulged in spasms of anti-Pakistani and anti-British

feeling, accused the U.K. of encouraging Pakistan's hostile attitude, and evinced some dissatisfaction also with the supposed pro-Pakistani sentiments of the United States, possibly by way of warning gesture, the Afghan government found employment for a group of Russian technicians and received an official Soviet trade mission in Kabul.¹⁰⁴

After world war II, the South-Asian state with which the United States wished to build a close political –military relationship was Pakistan and it appeared to be far more attractive to Americans than Afghanistan or even Iran in the late forties as the key nation that could make the United States a key lever in the stability and security of the Persian Gulf-South Asian region, and in this major policy decision the United States was strongly influenced by the British foreign office.¹⁰⁵ The US, strategists for their part viewed Afghanistan as of negligible importance to long-term American interests. Since the USA was already treaty-bound with Pakistan on military co-operation it did not feel the need to nurture Afghanistan. The Afghan government, however, saw a clear need to build up its military strength in order to avoid any external incursion into its territory and any undermining of its national interests. Since it conflict over Pushtunistan with Pakistan, various regions in Afghanistan felt the need for a powerful ally. And the Soviet Union was a natural choice.¹⁰⁶ According to Arnold Fletcher, Soviet Union had a willingness to support the Afghans against Pakistan over Pushtunistan conflicts.¹⁰⁷

United States tried to persuade Afghan to solve the problem of Pushtunistan issue with having a talk with Pakistan as US feared that Afghan would turn to Soviet helps. In the words of a senior US State Department official: “we attempted . . . to dissuade the Afghans from pressing this issue, since it could have led to war with Pakistan and created opportunities for Soviet intervention in both countries.” Iran also tried to persuade Daoud to keep distance from Soviet Union. The Soviet Union had supported Daoud over Pushtunistan issue.¹⁰⁸ In 1954, the United States concluded a military treaty with Pakistan, and the later joined the chain of interlocking alliances forged by Washington to contain Soviet influence. That year 1953, was also the year of the death of Stalin. By 1954, the Soviet Union had entered a new era in foreign and domestic policies with Nikita Khrushchev as leader of the CPSU. The Soviet-Afghan treaty of 1931 was extended. In 1954 the Soviet voiced support for Pushtunistan, thus trying to draw Afghanistan toward its

influence as the United States brought Pakistan into own. The Soviets began to extend economic aid to Afghanistan.¹⁰⁹ According to Mary Bradley, after Pakistan refused to discuss the fate of their Pushtun subjects the irredentist movement had taken on international overtones. American military aid to Pakistan had been cited as influencing and fortifying Pakistan's stand. The Russians support to Afghans on Pushtun issue encouraged the Afghan government to encourage the movement.¹¹⁰

Soon after the takeover by the Ayub government, tension between Afghanistan and Pakistan aggravated after the modernization of Afghan army and the open support it was receiving from the Soviet Union, reached new heights. In the fall of 1960 and again in 1961 open conflict again over Pushtunistan issue. (Bajaur fighting). The Afghans reacted by breaking off diplomatic relations with Pakistan. Consequently, the end of diplomatic relations closed the border and blocked Afghanistan's major shipping route. This caused Afghan to turn to Soviet Union, which thus became Afghanistan's sole means of contact with the outside world. Although Pakistan's actions were bound to be injurious to American interests in the area, its dependence upon United States aid was not sufficient to prevent its persisting in them indeed , when the United States protested the use of its planes and military equipment in the Bajaur fighting. General Ayub Khan rejected the protest closing the border and halted shipments from the United States for its projects in Afghanistan, since it refused to avail itself of the Soviet route, with the result that the U.S.S.R. gained an enormous advantage over the competition in its economic program.¹¹¹

Daoud expected this development to exert pressure on Washington to soften Pakistan's opposition on Pushtunistan issue. As Washington remained reluctant to mediate, Daoud's tough approach back fired. The result was an escalation in the war of words between Kabul and Karachi, on the one hand, and plunged Afghanistan into a serious economic crisis, on the other. Meanwhile, Daoud quickly realized that while Moscow was prepared to side with him on the crisis and to route,¹¹² this issue had created opportunities for Soviet intervention in Afghan again.

The conflict between Pakistan and Afghanistan over Pushtunistan issue had erupted again, in 1973. The Baluchi provincial government formed by the opposition National Awami Party (NAP) was suspended by the federal prime Minister, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the populist leader of the Pakistan People's Party (PPP). This action led to an armed insurrection by the Marri and the Mengal tribes

in the form of terrorist attacks, one of which took the life of the local PPP leader, Hayat Mohammad Sherpao, who was promptly declared a Pushtun martyr of the federalist cause.

The situation in Pakistan held out opportunities for Daoud. He quickly established a camp in Kandahar for the training and arming of Baluchi freedom 'fighters'.¹¹³ The Pakistan People's Party of late Bhutto has taken a softer line on Soviet intervention in Afghanistan and there was evidence of Soviet interest in supporting the PPP. Wali Khan and his supporters had always been believed to have a pro-Soviet orientation. The Pakistan army had shown it to be coup-prone and there had been reports of successive unsuccessful plots against General Zia.¹¹⁴ Daoud came more closer to the USSR and increased his support to the Pushtunist movement, so much so that in 1975, Pakistan's Bhutto accused him of training 15,000 Pushtun and Balochs in Afghanistan for infiltration into the two Pakistani provinces - the North West Frontier and Balochistan.¹¹⁵ Bhutto retaliated by encouraging Islamic and other anti-Daoud factions to stage armed insurrections in 1975. These turned out to be uncoordinated and ineffective. They were ferociously repressed. Hundreds of Islamists were executed or imprisoned, or fled into exile in Pakistan.¹¹⁶

In 1976, after Jimmy Carter had entered the White House, American diplomacy became somewhat active in Afghanistan. The National Security Council, headed by Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, devised the concept of regional influence by letting Shah of Iran to play a greater role in the intermeshing region of the Persian Gulf and South Asia. Afghanistan provided the link between the two even more than Pakistan. The Carter administration encouraged the Shah to take over a large share of the American burden of policing the strategic region of the Gulf. The Shah sought to build bridges of friendship with Afghanistan. He wanted the Persian Gulf and South Asian regions to be less polarized between the two superpowers, and wanted countries like Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Afghanistan and India to draw a little distant from their respective superpower patron. At the superpower level, the Soviet Union was trying to persuade the Shah to be less dependent on the United States, while the United States pleaded with India and Afghanistan to be 'genuinely non-aligned' between Washington and Moscow.

Daoud was also persuaded to be truly non-aligned and was made to realize that support for Pushtunist made him excessively dependent on the Soviet Union.

Shah tried to improve relations between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and was not entirely unsuccessful. Daoud halted Afghan mass media attacks on Pakistan and, in 1977, was said to be close to reaching an understanding with Bhutto on the basis of which he could 'expel' the Pushtun and Baloch partisans who had fled to Afghanistan and were allegedly being trained by the Afghan army.¹¹⁷

Within the year Daoud was willing to make a momentous bargain with the Bhutto government and the late Shah of Iran. The Shah and Bhutto jointly began negotiations with the Daoud regime in Kabul and an agreement was finally reached between Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan. Daoud was willing to accept the Durand line as international boundary in exchange for the Pakistani commitment that it would implement the regional autonomy guarantees of its 1973 constitution. The carrot of agreement was a massive aid programme to Afghanistan from Iran nearly US \$3 billion in aid for Kabul. It included a commitment to build a rail line South from Kabul through the cities of Kandahar and Herat to the Iranian border directly linking Afghanistan to the Gulf ports, thus ending Afghan dependence on trade via Soviet and Pakistani territory.¹¹⁸

In Daoud's strategy, he hoped to obtain economic benefits and more propitious regional environment. Daoud and Zulfikar Ali Bhutto exchanged visits in 1976. The changes in the situation in Pakistan where the elections of 1977 led to Zia ul Haq's successful coup as well as changes within Afghanistan in the end prevented the finalization of an agreement. Daoud visited Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, confirming the re-direction of his foreign policy towards the conservative states of the region, and his decision to keep his distance from the socialist camp. It was in this spirit that he attacked Cuba's adherence to the Soviet line during the preparations for the non-aligned summit of May 1978. These internal and external developments in Daoud's foreign policy were destined to precipitate his break with his communist allies.¹¹⁹

After the down fall of Daoud's regime a Marxist regime came to power. Afghanistan raised the controversial issues of Baluchi and Pushtun self – determination at the 1978 session of the UN General Assembly. The old geopolitical tensions between Pakistan and Afghanistan were renewed, with the difference that there were now in Kabul a Marxist regime potentially more capable of exploiting the divisions and discontents in Pakistan's two most sensitive minority ethnic provinces, Balochistan and the NWFP. After the movement of Soviet troops into

Afghanistan for two years Gen. Zia had been asking the United States, Iran, Saudi Arabia and other countries for money and weapons to halt the spread of Soviet influence from the Durand line to the Arabian Sea.¹²⁰ Moscow assured Pakistan that it had no wish to violate the Durand line, Soviet troops operating in Afghanistan scrupulously refrained from crossing the border in pursuit of the Afghan rebels.¹²¹ Pakistan denied the Soviet allegation that it was feeding the insurgency and made an offer of its cooperation in bringing international peace force to be stationed in Afghanistan to see that no foreign power interfere in its internal affairs.

Major U.S. newspapers agreed that Zia was now seeking some accommodation with the Soviets because of his alarm at the possibility of hot pursuit, his fear of his complications with India, the Islamic world and the third world, and his perception of the inadequacy of the aid amount. In the American press there was an understanding of Zia's predicament but little credence in his anti-Soviet intentions. The Washington Post said that if Zia made Pakistan the American surrogate in Southwest Asia, he would expose the smoldering protest movement of the Baluchis to Soviet encouragement. The real Soviet threat to Pakistan was not of a direct invasion but of 'meddling'. However, Zia was aware about the growth of pro-Soviet constituency in the country as well as among Pakistanis living in England. This constituency's strongest base was the Baluchis. It was spreading to the cadres and supporters of the suppressed Pakistan People's Party and had already enlisted its ranking leaders. Intelligence reports reaching New Delhi suggested that in the middle and junior ranks of the officers of the Pakistani armed forces, there were factions that would heed to Moscow because neither the US nor China had given Pakistan a fair price for its friendship.¹²² There were warnings that Brezezinski's strategy might prove counterproductive. William Hyland, Kissinger's former deputy, for instance, writing in the Strategic Review of fall 1979, said of impact of the China card on the Soviet Union: these maneuvers must be viewed in the broader context of Soviet global strategy surveying the new quadruple entente. The Soviets could easily perceive that one of the gaps in the 'encirclement' was the area that the British used to call "the northern tier", the string of Middle Eastern states running from Turkey to Afghanistan (more recently termed the 'arc of crisis'. The Soviet seemed to have made a strategic decision to exploit this gap. Their moves included the remarkable new relationship with Afghanistan; the switch in support from Somalia to Ethiopia and the related intervention with Cuban troops,

the signing of a friendship treaty with Turkey in June 1978, the Soviet – inspired coup in South Yemen in the same month, and some probing for an accommodation with Pakistan.¹²³

The Soviet entry into Afghanistan in December 1979 created a new situation and increased the interest of the Soviets and the United States in this area which now had assumed strategic importance.¹²⁴ It is known to have unexplored mineral resources of copper, fluorite, limestone and oil. It is estimated that known gold deposits in Balochistan exceed the value of twelve billion dollars, and the proven Iron-ore deposits are in excess of twenty-three millions tons. It has the reserves to expand considerably its existing production of natural gas, coal, limestone, magnetite, marble, sulphur and barite. Balochistan has a coastline of 750 miles. Its port of Gwadar which, because of Chinese help in its development has acquired greater importance is barely some 250 miles from the straits of Hormuz, the focal point in the oil route from the Russian Gulf to Western Europe and The East.¹²⁵ By 1981 the great powers' policy towards Balochistan became clear. The United States, after the induction of President Reagan's Republican administration, decided to prop up Zia ul Haq's regime with military and economic aid and use Afghanistan as a lever to bleed the Soviet Union the way the later had bled the United States in Vietnam. The United States did not wish to see the Soviets increase their influence in Balochistan and took comfort in the thought that communist cadres or communism had made no inroads into the feudal pattern of Baloch Society.¹²⁶

D. The U.S. aid programme to counter Soviet influence in Afghanistan

Large scale foreign aid began during World War II (1939-1945). From the early 1940s to the mid 1960s, the United States gave or lent about \$140 billion in foreign aid. At one time or another, almost every country in the world has received U.S. aid since World War II. About a third of all U.S. aid has gone to help other nations build up their armed forces and to build up national wealth and income in poor countries. The threat of communism changed the emphasis in foreign aid. Americans were concerned about the communist take-over in China in 1949, the Korean War in 1950's and increasing cold war tensions between the United States and the Soviet Union. To stop the spread of communism, the United States had found the North Atlantic treaty Organization (NATO) and pledged military aid to NATO members. It gave military and economic aid to developing countries facing

Soviet or Chinese pressure. The United States gave mutual security aid to those countries which considered being of major political importance. The Soviet Union also embarked upon the policy of military and economic aid. It provided aid to several countries, including Afghanistan, Cuba, Egypt, India, North Korea, and Vietnam.¹²⁷

The underlying objective of the U.S. aid operations in the developing world was not only to save them from communism, but to retain them under their own thumb by keeping their leases on the soil and by exerting, through aid, all – round political, economic and military pressure on them. From 1949 to 1985, the US government spent more than \$100,000 million on arms, military equipments and ammunitions in 86 countries.

The loans were used to interfere in the internal affairs of the recipient countries. They are usually granted on the condition.¹²⁸ In cold war period the third world became competition place of superpowers in 1950s when the USSR first bid for allies and client states in Africa, Asia, and Latin America the superpower had wrested for influence through program of military and economic assistance, Afghanistan was one under Soviet influence.¹²⁹

The auspicious rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union was being fought out through competition in the field of aid, and at least in the short term Afghanistan gained the benefit. From 1950 relations between the great powers were regulated by an informal agreement between the Soviets and the Americans which defined their zone of influence, respectively to the North and South of the Hindu Kush.¹³⁰ As U.S. was alarmed by the speed of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan Washington attempted to counter it by expending its economic aid to the country, which by 1979 amounted \$520 million in total. Much of the money was spent on infrastructural projects proved to be beneficial to the Afghans, and it enabled the USA to secure enduring leverage in Afghanistan. The two American projects an international air port in Kandahar and an agro-irrigational venture in Helmand turned out to be prohibitively expensive white elephants. The United States failure to provide military aid and to mediate actively in the Afghan-Pakistan dispute, the very two areas that Moscow had deftly used to penetrate in Afghan.¹³¹

In the same, Soviet desired to counter the activity of the United States in Afghanistan, where it was a potential threat to the sensitive area of Soviet Central Asia. Another motive was the desire to put pressure upon Pakistan, and thus to

render its United States bases more vulnerable. Soviet aid to Afghanistan was to stimulate an anti imperialist movement and it was directed against the expansion of these monopolies in the East. The Soviet Union usually made capital investment and provided military assistance. The United States had indeed provided capital to Afghanistan, but this had been in the form of loans and grants rather than capital investment while American military assistance had been negligible.

It seems likely that the extent of Soviet aid to Afghanistan was a practical rather than ideological attempt to tie the developing Afghan economy to that of the Soviet Union. The extent of Soviet aid and the closing of the Afghan export-import route through Pakistan brought about a major shift in Afghanistan trade with most of Afghanistan's exports and import going to or through the U.S.S.R. Some western observers pointed out that Afghanistan had become so economically dependent on the Soviet Union that the latter could establish political control if it chose.¹³² There can be no doubt that the beginning of Soviet aid to Afghanistan was what chiefly fostered the interest of the United States in the country, and the creation of what Henry A. Byvoade, American ambassador to Afghanistan from 1959 to 1961, had called an economic 'Korea'. In this new economic battleground of the cold war, the USSR has had the advantages of proximity to Afghanistan. The USSR quickly agreed to finance the paving of the streets of Kabul, a relatively, inexpensive project, after the United States had refused to do so.¹³³

Though the US denied giving military aid to Afghanistan but it had provided aid in other fields. Aid from the Americans had been generally in the field of communications,¹³⁴ infrastructure, education, and agriculture.¹³⁵ Education aid programme included grants to Afghan students to study at American universities.¹³⁶ The US-Afghan relations in field of education had begun in the early of 1930's when Afghan students began to go to study in the United States. By 1935 Afghan-American diplomatic relations were established, and in 1942 an American delegation was opened in Kabul. In 1946 the Ministry of Education, admiring American methods and achievements, decided to introduce to some extent, American educational methods. The United States has been active ever since in numerous aspects of Afghan education.¹³⁷

Kabul University opened a faculty of medicine in 1932 during the reign of king Nadir Shah. Other faculties were established in 1946. The institute of education created in 1955, to assist the Ministry in many phases of planning and

improving teaching technique. One young member of the Royal family, who worked at the institute, visited to the United States on a tour of American schools and colleges. Following this visit the Ministry of Education made major decisions regarding the budget, inspection of schools and general maintenance. At the institute they worked with members of the Columbia University teacher college team, first through a training program, followed by a term abroad for further study. Then they returned to become full-fledged members of the institute.¹³⁸ In addition, American aid was also sought in the field of education through the US Department of State. A number of teachers were recruited for service in Afghanistan, usually on three year contracts most of these were assigned to Habibia, the oldest and largest of Afghan schools, although a few went to conservative Kandahar. Dr. Paul Bushnell, professor of education at Wooster College, Ohio, was chosen to direct Habibia College, which soon had fourteen American instructors, including four women.¹³⁹

In the 1950s and 1960s when Kabul University grew rapidly, many of the departments, called faculties, were supported and staffed by foreign universities. The faculty of medicine, for instance, was aided and staffed early on by Lyon University, France, agriculture by the University of Wyoming, from USA.¹⁴⁰ Economics (1957, Bochumbonn), education (1962, Columbia University, USA which also sponsored the Ibn Sina teacher training institute in Kabul) and Engineering (1963, US engineering team, formed by a consortium of nine US institution.)¹⁴¹ By 1962 over one thousand Afghans had received some American education. These students had been sent to The United States under the auspices of their own government. In addition, the international cooperation administration, and private foundations as the American Friend of the Middle East, with assistance from the US government, had signed contracts with Columbia and Wyoming Universities to bring a number of American teachers to Afghanistan, some of these were assigned to the Afghan School of Vocational Education (Originated by an American , Richard Soderburgh), and others to the University of Kabul, the technological institute, and the teacher training School.¹⁴²

In field of **transport aid programme** US funds had helped in launching Ariana the first Afghan Airline which operated between the major Afghan cities, with flight to Delhi, Beirut, Mecca, Tehran, Prague, and Frankfurt.¹⁴³ This was supported by a US company of Pan-American World Airways which had held a 49 percent interest in Ariana Airlines since 1957.¹⁴⁴ Another U.S. aid in the field of

transport was for building canals and some 450 kilometers of inter-project highways.¹⁴⁵ The vast new network of roads to the south and south –west was built by American companies.¹⁴⁶ The US also built a highway between Kabul and Kandahar and an ambitiously modern airport in Kandahar that turned out to be a white elephant.¹⁴⁷ Another aid form was agriculture project which US offered instead to finance new contracts for an American engineering firm that had been commissioned by the Afghan government in 1946 to assist in the planning and implementation of a multi-purpose agricultural project in the Helmand valley.¹⁴⁸ On November 24, the U.S. Export-Import Bank announced that it was authorizing a \$21 million line of credit to finance hydraulic and irrigation works in southwestern Afghanistan's Helmand River valley.¹⁴⁹ This project started first by the Afghans alone and later employing Japanese technical assistance, to reclaim the great river basin where ancient irrigation systems had been destroyed. It was a controversial undertaking which required close to \$ 150 million of Afghan and American resources during a fifteen year period. In 1946 the Morrison-Knudsen company took a \$ 17 million contract to construct new and repair existing irrigation dams.¹⁵⁰ Water from dam was to be carried for and wide by a new network of canals-the Baghra and Nadir Shah- which in the words of American water men, would 'bring water to the thirsty land'.¹⁵¹

Military aid programme- There were many factors that influenced the Afghan decision to seek military aid from the USA. Afghanistan had sent a mission to make a special plea for the supply of weapons to defend its territory in case of Soviet aggression in the wake of the British withdrawal from India sub-continent and to maintain internal security against tribal insurrections.¹⁵² Obviously, the existence of large semi-independent groups of well-armed men in the country remained a constant threat to the central government. The mischief of which many the tribal leaders, particularly the unalterably reactionary mullahs, were capable had been amply demonstrated in 1947. In addition, the Afghan leaders feared that the tribes east of Durand line might once again be bribed or induced to invade Afghanistan, as had happened in the past. These groups believed that Pakistan was behind it.¹⁵³ And Afghan fears regarding the USSR were not without foundation, in view of what had occurred since 1945, and what was happening in eastern and southern Europe. Furthermore, the communist parties of Asia, with Soviet support, appeared to be in the ascendant.¹⁵⁴ As Afghan realized fully that, without the

powerful British presence to balance Soviet pressure to the north, their freedom would be undermined and that they would be easily crushed by Moscow. Drawing from their experience of great game diplomacy, they attempted to negotiate another set of deals with the United States to counterbalance their dependence on Soviet Union. With this aim in view, in 1954 the government of Prime Minister Mohammad Daoud approached the Eisenhower administration in Washington for limited military aid to update its vintage and often obsolete military hardware.¹⁵⁵

The Afghan government had sought military aid from the United States in the hope of modernizing the Afghan army, whose equipment was almost ludicrously antiquated. The infantry still carried rifles of Snyder and Lee Enfield type, dating from the nineteenth century, and ammunition was so scarce and unreliable that few soldiers were even able to fire their weapons. The twelve biplanes of which the Afghan air force consisted dated from World War I, and the artillery was equally antiquated that some of the Pushtun tribes were better armed hardly contributed to the stability of the government.

The consistent refusal of the United States to provide weapons left Afghanistan the only non communist nation on the Sino-Soviet periphery that had been so neglected. To the argument that such arms would be used against Pakistan rather than the Soviet Union, the Afghans insisted that they had no intention of attacking Pakistan. And without question, however much the hostility between themselves and Pakistan played apart in their desire for a larger and better equipped army.¹⁵⁶

After British withdrawal from the Indian subcontinent in 1947, the Afghan ruling envisaged creating an American military connection as crucial defense against Soviet power. Despite its prodigious security assistance efforts elsewhere, the Truman Administration remained unimpressed either with Afghanistan's strategic importance or with the efficacy of American military aid containing Soviet expansion in that theater.¹⁵⁷ These Afghan demands for economic and military assistance from the United States were therefore highly political. In their concern to maintain their traditional neutrality and independence, the Afghans were only trying to bring into partnership, as they had done in the 1930s with Germany, Japan and Italy, a geographically remote world power that had the capacity to assist.

Again in October 1954 Mohammed Naim, the Foreign Minister (and Daoud's brother) went to Washington to appeal once again for military assistance.

The reply of Eisenhower's Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, was negative. But in turn, instead of asking for arms, Afghanistan should settle the Pushtunistan dispute with Pakistan. In Dulles's Manichaean world view, Afghan neutrality meant non-alignment a status that had no value to him at a time when he was busily forming military alliances like SEATO and the Baghdad Pact (later CENTO) to contain the Soviet Union. Pakistan had joined SEATO in September 1954. It was to adhere to the Baghdad Pact a year later. Pakistan as a potential ally was not to be antagonized.¹⁵⁸ The US did, however, propose to Afghanistan that if it wished to obtain American arms, it should join the Baghdad pact. Daoud could not do so because of Pakistan's presence in the pact.¹⁵⁹ Afghanistan was determined to keep to a position of non-alignment or neutrality in its relations with the superpowers.¹⁶⁰ However, Washington was particularly uninterested in providing military aid and in mediating actively and impartially between Kabul and Karachi. It regarded Afghanistan as strategically less important than its two neighbours.¹⁶¹ In the U.S opinion Afghanistan was not of any great importance to the United States nor was the United States in a position to dislodge the Soviet Union from the vantage point it had achieved since the early fifties. Robert G. Neumann, who was United States ambassador to Afghanistan from 1966 to 1973, has recorded that John Foster Dulles had turned down Afghan requests for military aid because of the location and poor communications of Afghanistan which would require the United States to undertake an enormous logistic effort risking an escalation of the cold war with the USSR. Neumann's successor, Theodore L. Eliot, jr., gave two additional reasons for the conclusion reached by Dulles. The first was the close relations the United States had build up with Pakistan. The second was that sending military equipment to Afghanistan would so alarm the Soviets that they would make some kind of move against Afghanistan.¹⁶²

It was a formal decline of Daoud's request led to the latter and his brother Deputy Prime Minister and Foreign Minister Mohammad Naim, not only to feel insulted, but also to interpret the rejection as an ominous sign of Washington's growing commitment to Pakistan against Afghanistan (as well as India). A U.S. diplomatic observer noted in April 1954 that: a belief is growing in Afghan governmental circles that the US has turned its back on Afghanistan.

Daoud now found it imperative to play their 'Soviet card' by turning to Moscow for aid. In essence, Daoud's neutrality in foreign policy clashed with

Washington's global resolve to help only those states which were prepared to embrace the United States anti-Soviet stance. While, fearing US encirclement and the probability of Washington's establishing strategic military bases in Iran and Pakistan, the Khrushchev leadership welcomed Afghanistan's request for support in 1955 and with a long-term view of Soviet interests to exploit the window of opportunity presented by the developments in Afghanistan. Moscow not only began a generous programme of economic and military aid to Afghanistan, but also supported Kabul in its claims against Pakistan.

The underlying Soviet aims were clear to counter-balance the American penetration; to exert pressure on the regional states not to allow the USA to establish missile bases on their soil; and to secure a bridgehead in Afghanistan in an attempt to strengthen Moscow's bargaining position in the event of fortuitous developments in the region. Such development was a distinct possibility in view of the regional states fragile social and political structures, historical disputes with each other, and involvement with the USA.¹⁶³

III. United States and *Saur* revolution

The so called 'sour revolution' was in fact a military coup carried out by leftist officers of the armed forces under the direction of the PDPA. It is generally agreed by the two PDPA factions that putsch was planned for the late summer of 1978.¹⁶⁴ In Afghanistan, Parcham and Khalq reunited in July to oppose the regime of Daoud Khan. Thus was the rebirth of the PDPA, with Noor Mohammad Taraki and Babrak Karmal as its first two front-rank leaders. Reports indicated that the two Afghan Marxist groups had reunited under Moscow's pressure. The truth probably was that the Marxists themselves realized the need to combine forces to be able to defeat Daoud's plans to eliminate their influence in Afghan politics, and the CPSU encouraged them to reunite.¹⁶⁵

The conflict between Daoud's government and PDPA began with Daoud's foreign policy were destined to precipitate his break with his communist allies. Daoud attempted to make regional agreements, with the aim of accelerating Afghanistan's development and bringing it out of its seclusion. In 1976 the country took a step toward the recognition of the Durand line as the international frontier. This was a move towards abandoning its irredentist ambitions, tending towards the

resolution of the old quarrel with Pakistan. An agreement would have represented a decisive change in Daoud's strategy, from which he hoped to obtain economic benefits and more propitious regional environment during a visit to Iran the same year, Daoud obtained a promise of aid for the construction of a railway in western Afghanistan. The following year, in 1977, Daoud visited Egypt, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia, confirming the re-direction of his foreign policy towards the conservative states of the region and his decision to keep his distance from the socialist camp. These internal and external developments in Daoud's foreign policy were destined to precipitate his break with his communist allies.¹⁶⁶ In addition, Daoud's regime was in miserable economic shape; a situation which the U.S. government tried to exploit. This time, however, interference in Afghanistan was carried out in a massive way, and in accordance with the Nixon Doctrine, through the then Shah of Iran. The Shah offered \$ 2 billion in aid to Afghanistan-for a certain price; Afghanistan had to move away from being a non-aligned country with close ties to the Soviet Union which included military cooperation and training to become a pro-U.S. country.¹⁶⁷ The tilt that Daoud wanted to introduce in the Afghan non-alignment had been prevented from the view-point of Washington it was an unfriendly act and tantamount to walking into the enemy camp. If you are not with us you are against us-that has been the attitude of the USA towards all the nations of the world. John Foster Dulles had made it most explicit when he characterized nonalignment as immoral.¹⁶⁸

Daoud accepted this conditional aid, and the Shah began to exercise increasing power in Afghanistan, especially through his CIA trained secret police, SAVAK. In spite of this aid Daoud did not solve his country's economic problems and was faced with mounting opposition. He tried to crush this resistance through increased repression, carried out largely under the guidance of SAVAK. In early April, 1978, one of Afghanistan's popular leftist leaders Mir Akbar Khaiber was assassinated by the Daoud regime (the Afghan police were, at the time, trained and devised by West German police officers).¹⁶⁹ To this day no proof has come to light of the identity of the killers, or whose purposes they were fulfilling – whether the murder was done by agents of the Daoud regime, or of the US or Soviet embassies, or indeed whether the murder was yet another example of bitter intra-factional rivalries inside the Afghan left wing itself. But in the highly-charged atmosphere of Kabul, the assassination was immediately seized upon as proof positive of

American interference, and the left wing was able to mount massive demonstrations two days later, at the burial, the biggest ever seen in Kabul, estimated by many observers as up to 15,000 strong. A focus of the marchers was the US embassy, where slogans against the CIA and imperialism were enthusiastically shouted by the youthful mourners.¹⁷⁰ A few days later Daoud had virtually arrested all leftist leaders. As they were about to be executed, anti-Daoud section of the Afghan military revolted and ousted him. Noor Mohammad Taraki, a civilian, took power, and Babrak Karmal became Vice President.¹⁷¹

The *Saur* revolution of 1978 itself was frowned upon by not only her neighbors-Iran and Pakistan, but also by China and the USA. While, the neighbors feared that the success of the revolutionary government would encourage similar developments within their own countries, Washington and Peking looked upon it as a gain for the USSR in this part of the world and sought to reverse it. The US Vice President Rockefeller made a significant remark while talking to pressmen in Peshawar: "All this is contrary to our thinking". Later disclosures clarified the frustration of USA because Washington itself had planned to overthrow Daoud and install his army chief Gulam Hyder Rasooli in his place. The *Saur* revolution had upset the whole plan.

The April Revolution had led to frantic consultations between Washington, Beijing, Tehran and Islamabad. Immediately thereafter the Shah had meeting with Pentagon experts about the role of CENTO in the context of Afghanistan developments. About the same time the Chinese Foreign Minister paid a visit to Tehran and had discussions about doing something in Afghanistan.¹⁷² In spite of this the other countries 'directly interested in the developments in Afghanistan' were found to 'over look these factors'. The specters of a leftist government in Kabul, in close relationship with the USSR, Sinha remarked, "appeared to western observers and many others as an extension of the Soviet 'menace' advancing Moscow one step further in its historical ambition of getting access to the warm waters of the Arabian Sea". As a super power the United States of America was obviously interested in Afghanistan, the US policy towards Afghanistan, generally speaking has been aimed at enabling Afghanistan to avoid being pushed completely into the Soviet orbit. It was officially reiterated that the policy of the US toward Afghanistan was aimed at 'promoting Afghanistan's independence and her genuine policy of non-alignment.' But the kidnapping and killing of Adolph Dubs, US Ambassador to

Afghanistan, in Kabul on 14 February by four Afghan terrorists marked a distinct worsening of relations between the two countries. This unfortunate incident occurred at a time when the US was attempting to placate the moderates in the government of Mr. Taraki and 'isolate the extremists' in it. The US policy after that, stiffened: "As a sequel, on 22 Feb., came President Carter's order to severely reduce its civil aid programme in Afghanistan."¹⁷³

Russia before the October Revolution, was perceived as a rival imperialism and, thereafter, as an obstruction to imperialist advance. In its propaganda the West still maintained the myth that the USSR, even after the Revolution was successor imperialist and had the same designs in the region as the Czarist Russia had. Its friendly relations with Afghanistan or with any other country for that matter, had always been frowned upon by imperialism whoever developed such friendship or cordiality was declared an enemy. That was so with Amanullah's Afghanistan and Jawaharlal Nehru's India. And that was so with Indira Gandhi's India and Kamal's Afghanistan.¹⁷⁴

The psychological operations of the Department of the Army, was published by the central office of the US army in Washington, had spelt out the details as follows: "Psychological operations are actions designed to influence foreign nations. Psychological activities are those carried out in peace time or in place other than war theaters, planned and carried out to influence the feelings, attitudes, behavior of foreign groups in a manner favorable to the achievements of the policies of the United States. The element of psychological warfare can only be developed successfully if the daily life of the nation is kept in a state of commotion." Strategy for this include: (1) create discouragement, demoralization apathy, (2) discredit the ideology of the popular movement, (3) promote disorganized and confused behavior, (4) encourage divisive and anti-social actions to undermine the political structure of the country, (5) promote and support movements of resistance against the authorities.¹⁷⁵ That is why Soviet and Afghanistan recognition of this change (in US stance) was marked shortly thereafter by accusations that the resistance was being inspired, supplied and even conducted by Americans presumably in concert with Pakistanis, Iranians, and Chinese who had already been publicly blamed.

The anti-Afghan operations, it must be understood was not an isolated operation. It had wider ramifications than just curbing the freedom of Afghanistan. It was a part of the US aggressive strategy in Asia, components of which were the

development of the central command, further militarization of the military regime in Pakistan, introduction of the Mossad in Sri Lanka and development of new military collaboration with China.¹⁷⁶

After the revolution, it took the Khalqite leadership only seven months- until the last week of November 1978 to complete its reforms and get rid of its Parchamit rivals.¹⁷⁷ With the proclamation of the Democratic Afghan republic, the PDPA took care to assure the Afghan people that the State would protect their religious faith and that they would be free to observe their religious rites and customs. Nevertheless, as the radical reforms began to be implemented in October 1978, the clergy rose in protest, and by January 1979, the traditional ruling elements-the property-holders and the clergy joined together to mobilize large segments of the urban-rural people in all Afghanistan to offer armed resistance to the Marxist regime.¹⁷⁸ The Russians were identified with the repression of the Khalqis. The growing dependence of the Taraki regime on Soviet advisers, arms and finance, when combined with the openly avowed sympathies of Khalq leaders for the 'Great northern neighbors' (as the Soviet Union was styled) had resulted in popular suspicions that Russian communists were now ruling Afghanistan.¹⁷⁹

The reforms, on the other hand, provoked unprecedented tension in the countryside. The pressure brought on them forced many tribal chiefs and their followers to move into Pakistan where they received with open arms by the unpopular Zia-Ul-Haq regime, eager for an anti-communist cause to support and the means to consolidate its rule with international assistance. Pakistan also claimed to have spent the equivalent of \$ 145 million on 'humanitarian assistance' to the Afghan refugees. In the meantime the forces of opposition were rallying in Pakistan. Eight training camps were established in the North West frontier province to turn simple Afghan refugees into guerrilla fighters.¹⁸⁰

The new government had failed to energize the masses in support of the revolution. It had also failed to persuade the United States, China, Pakistan, and Iran to end their opposition to the new order in Kabul. While, financial help from the United States, other western countries and Saudi Arabia had dried up, enough money had already begun to flow to the regime's enemies. To counter these external and internal challenges, the regime turned to Moscow.¹⁸¹ Before Taraki and Amin were going to make a new treaty with Soviet a large numbers of Soviet military and civilian advisers were already present in the country. Its signature was also a signal

to the US and its Pakistani ally that their support of counter-revolutionary forces would bring in the Red army.¹⁸² The Afghan – Soviet treaty of cooperation and friendship signed on 5 December 1978 was an offspring of Afghan government's military, political, economic cultural, ideological and psychological needs and shortcomings. Under one of the treaty's articles, Afghanistan could call on Soviet military assistance in its hour of need.¹⁸³

In 1978 eight training camps had been set up by the new military regime of Pakistan to turn simple Afghan refugees into guerillas. According to western sources, the number of these armed insurrectionists was around 5,000. They attacked Asadabad the principal town of the province, and successfully occupied an important and strategically located fort.¹⁸⁴

The Soviet foreign policy since the Bolshevik Revolution had been dominated by a deep fear of military encirclement. International considerations therefore certainly played a part in the Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan. As Brezhnev told Pravda after the Soviet invasion, there had been a real threat that Afghanistan would lose its independence and be turned into an imperialist military bridgehead on our southern border. A more immediate cause for concern was the tacit US backing, through its Pakistani and Saudi allies, of the Peshawar-based Afghan Islamist parties. The establishment in Iran of a radically Islamic regime that was as stridently anti-communist as it was anti American, as well as the prospect of an Islamist Afghanistan could have serious repercussions in the contiguous Soviet republics of Central Asia where Muslim revivalist movements were gaining influence.¹⁸⁵ In addition, Soviet fear of encirclement had increased during the previous few years, following the rapprochement between China and the USA, and the Sino-Japanese treaty of peace and friendship (August 1978). The year 1979 had begun with an invasion on a grand scale – that of Cambodia by Vietnam, the Soviet Union's client state in the region. China's response to that challenge was the 'punishment' of Vietnam, by sending a punitive expedition into Tonkin.

The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan was unavoidable if Kabul were to be saved from the rebels. In the words of Pravda, 'the fiery ring of counter revolution backed actively from abroad became tighter round the capital . . . the terse announcement of 27 December stressed the intervention's legitimacy as well as objectives. Legitimacy rested on the Soviet – Afghan treaty of 1978. The request for military help came from the 'political leadership' of the Saur revolution rather

than from the government headed by Amin. The objective was to 'defend the gain of the April revolution,' and to prevent the imperialist powers from converting a 'neighborly' country with a border of great length into a bridgehead for penetration of imperialist aggression against the Soviet State.¹⁸⁶ The Soviet fear of fierce resistance by Muslim tribesmen to radical and anti – religious reforms had created a situation in which it looked as if the Soviet – supported regime might fall, perhaps the Soviet feared that the Islamic fundamentalism then sweeping Iran and Pakistan might also engulf Afghanistan, which lay between these two countries, creating an insecure situation on the Soviets' southern border where it might affect the approximately 50 million Soviet Muslims living in the area.¹⁸⁷ The Soviets reiterated their determination to defend legitimate interests of national security and a fraternal revolution. The burden of Moscow's carefully orchestrated articulations was that the United States was turning Wilson's blind eye on the changes that had occurred to the global balance, that it was determined to take the world back to the wasted epoch of cold war.¹⁸⁸

For Soviet strategists, at least, intervention in Afghanistan was a defensive move, primarily. However, odd and incomplete the socialist revolution had proved under Taraki and Amin, Afghanistan since 1978 was considered by Moscow as part of the 'Marxist' grouping of progressive states. Afghanistan was tied to the Soviet Union and other Socialist states by a whole range of agreements. There was by the end of 1979 a heavy Soviet investment in 'socialist' Afghanistan, to be reckoned not in capital alone, but in prestige; thousands of Soviet advisers, civil and military, were propping up the Kabul government, of whom scores had already been killed in the civil war. If Amin's regime was toppled by the insurgents, then at local levels Soviet soldiers and civilians alike would lose their lives in the general hatred, regardless of what Afghan opposition leaders intended. The Soviet Union offered three basic grounds for its intervention in Afghanistan:

1. A request for military assistance from the Afghanistan government.
2. The Soviet Union's commitment to give that assistance by the 1978 Treaty.
3. Self – defence against foreign armed aggression in accordance with the UN charter (article 51).

Meanwhile, Amin had repeatedly declared in 1979 that the Afghan army alone would combat the opposition, and the military situation had by no means deteriorated sharply by the winter of 1979.¹⁸⁹

With factional fighting among Afghan communists undermining the war against the Islamic radicals and weakening Moscow's influence, on Christmas eve the Kremlin airlifted thousand of Russian commandos into Afghanistan, where they installed a staunchly pro – Soviet regime 'in this extremely difficult situation, which has threatened the gains of the April revolution and the interests of maintaining our national security.' Brezhnev told the Politburo a week later, "a decision has been made to send the necessary contingent of the Soviet army to Afghanistan". It was probably a defensive maneuver and not the first step in a Kremlin master plan to drive the United States out of the Persian Gulf.¹⁹⁰ According to Raja Anwa the real background of the military action of 27 December was not short fanciful interpretations of the Soviet move. Amin until then described as a diehard communist, butcher and Russia's puppet; became overnight a 'great nationalist' and 'martyr' it was said that the Soviet Union had invaded Kabul because Amin had refused to allow Soviet bases on Afghanistan soil: in order to get rid of the nationalist Amin, the USSR had invaded Kabul and put its real pawn (Kamal) on the Afghan chessboard. It was also argued that by taking the US embassy staff hostage in November 1979, the Iranian students had created a situation where armed American intervention in Iran could take place any time. The Soviet Union, it was alleged, had demanded the Shin Dan air base near the Iranian border so that it could exercise effective control over the Gulf region and perhaps also discourage the US from attacking Iran. Amin's rejection of the Soviet request for the Shin Dan base, it was stated, had become the direct cause of his fall.¹⁹¹

The situation looked different from Washington's suspicion on Soviet action. The military move into Afghanistan was the first step in a colossally ambitious strategy of regional domination the 'drive to the south; the taking of regional domination the 'drive to the south; the taking of a 'warm water port' on the Indian Ocean and to control (or even to annex) oil-rich states of the Gulf.¹⁹² The Iranian crisis had led to the collapse of the balance of power in southwest Asia. Brzezinski informed his boss a few hours after the red Army arrived in Kabul, "the age – long dream of Moscow to have direct access to the Indian Ocean will have been fulfilled at America's expose. Historically, the British provided the barrier to

that drive and Afghanistan was their buffer states, and it could produce Soviet presence right down on the edge of the Arabian and Oman gulfs.” Carter had to move decisively to create a new security framework. Brzezinski insisted not only to reassert U.S. power and influence in the region but also to demonstrate his genuine toughness. Secretary of State Cyrus Vance, on the other hand, counseled restrained. “My view was that Moscow has acted as it did . . . to protect Soviet political interests in Afghanistan which they saw endangered”. He recalled in his memories “They feared that the regime would be replaced by a fundamentalist Islamic government and that this would, in turn, be followed by a spread of ‘Khomeini fever’ to other nations along Russian’s southern border.”¹⁹³

IV. United States and Afghan Crisis: Middle East Factor

Stability in the Middle East has been a vital area of concern for US policy makers since 1946. Hoping to avoid a vacuum in a region whose strategic importance was fast becoming unparalleled, following a decade of ugly Anglo – Arab confrontations that undermined regional security and invited Soviet meddling, in 1957 U.S. policymakers unveiled the Eisenhower Doctrine. This made Washington the senior member of the Anglo – American partnership in the Middle East. When Britain liquidated its last imperial outposts in the Arabian Peninsula and the Persian Gulf in the late 1960s, U.S. officials edged toward what come to be known as the Nixon Doctrine, which envisioned regional proxies such as Iran and Saudi Arabia serving as junior partner against the Kremlin. When events in Iran and Afghanistan showed that America’s proxies simply could not do the job, Jimmy Carter promulgated his own doctrine and, with a bow to Harry Truman, informed the world in January 1980 that the United States had vital security interest in the Middle East for which it was willing to fight, whether it had dependable partners or not.¹⁹⁴

On March 25, 1979 in a special coordinating committee meeting Brzezinski circulated a report on the general direction of American foreign policy. It warned that “our policy is neither coherent nor constant; on a number of specific issues, notably Iran and the Middle East, we are in fact losing momentum with potentially very destructive consequences for our interests.” The policy paper called for a unifying theme to give clarity and purpose to American policy. He stressed that the

Soviet invasion of Afghanistan must focus our attention on a major new order of politico – economic, military threat to the non – communist world security and Soviet domination of Middle East oil. To counter Soviet aggression according to Brzezinski report, “The United States had to dramatically reassert in its global leadership through an “integrated approach and demonstrate its deterrent capabilities so that we can sustain a credible overall response”.¹⁹⁵

In addition, the U.S. fear of Soviet foreign policy was a deadly mix of traditional Russian expansionism and the revolutionary drive of ideological communism. It was imperialism multiplied by a factor of two, even without communism, Russia would still be an expansionist power. Communism however, added impetus to the quest for global predominance. For the Soviets, expansionism was the status quo. As Khrushchev told President Kennedy at Vienna in 1961, “the continuing revolutionary process in various countries is the status quo, and anyone who tries to halt this process not only is altering the status quo but is an aggressor”.¹⁹⁶ According to George B. De Huszar, from the Soviet point of view, the Near and Middle East contains attractive assets. Since Bolshevik revolution in 1917 its basic interest in the Middle East, has not changed. The Soviet Union therefore, has sought to covert Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan into satellite states similar to those which existed in Eastern Europe. The Soviet aims looking toward the security of oil installations in the Baku region, an outlet on the Persian Gulf, and pressure on Turkey for a more favorable straits regime and a pro – Soviet orientation in Turkish policy. Soviet political interests seem equally obvious, involving political “conquest” or subversion of the Middle East. The fact was that the Middle East was the greatest oil bearing region in the world; it was obvious that the Soviet would be interested in controlling the oil pipelines or denying their use to others.

It seems clear from the policies it has pursued, as well as from the obvious interests involved – strategic, political, and economic that the Soviet Union in one way or another, looked toward the domination of the Near and Middle East in order to achieve its objectives in the world, the strategic position of the Near East, together with the resources it commands, made it an obvious place from which the USSR could reach out into South Asia and Africa. It should also be remembered, however, that in the event of such control, the Near East would become a springboard for world revolution in the interest of the Soviet states.¹⁹⁷ And

furthermore, because of its geographic position, the Kremlin could choose the particular region where the least opposition was offered. In the west it was near to western Europe; in the south it was close to nations located in the Near and Middle East; it was also close to India, and through its Chinese ally it was close to South East Asia and Japan. The Kremlin was putting pressure on Iran and other. Near Eastern countries were active in Afghanistan which would enable Soviet Russia to dominate the Khyber Pass through which Pakistan could be menaced.¹⁹⁸

Apart from U.S. fear of Soviet foreign policy and its proximity to the Middle Eastern oil producing countries there were still many events that could lead to inviting Soviet influence in this region. South Yemen, under the leadership of the revolutionary Abd-al-fatah Ismail, seemed intent on subverting North Yemen and spreading revolution throughout the peninsula. Soviet bases were being built in Ethiopia and South Yemen. The opposition of the Camp David by Saudi was another important factor. Foreign Minister Saud al Faisal mentioned the “positive” Soviet role in the area. Fahd also referred to the importance of the Soviet role but said that talk of diplomatic relations was premature.¹⁹⁹ In late 1970s Saudi leaders distanced themselves from the American camp, and showed an increasing independence in conducting their foreign affairs. By now Moscow had learnt that Saudi Arabia had a unique position in the Arab world and shared goals in common with those of the Soviet Union: containment of Israel, establishment of a Palestinian homeland, and exclusion of Jerusalem from Israeli control.

In the late 1970s the other prominent state in the Arabian Peninsula which actively shared these objectives with the USSR was Kuwait. The presence of a large Palestinian community in the country and the Soviet bloc becoming more supportive of the PLO, the Kuwaiti government improved its relations with the socialist states. In 1976 it followed up a modest arms deal with Moscow with trade pacts with east European countries. Nearly three years later the Kuwaiti army had tested Soviet made ground to ground lunar missile as part of military exercises. Soviet also expressed the hope that these missiles would be available “on the expected day of liberation of the Arab land under Israeli occupation.”²⁰⁰

Another event that frustrated the U.S. administration in the Middle East was civil war between Christian and Muslims in Lebanon that each side was supported by an external power. As a result, Israel and Syria almost came to direct confrontation in 1981. It was feared that such a military clash would inflame

regional tensions and would place the Soviet Union in vital position with which Syria had a treaty of friendship.

Another important development was attack on Iraq by Israel as it suspected Iraq of producing nuclear weapons which would be used against it. Iraq also had rejected the Camp David process. This thing became politically damaging as it revived the Arab perception of Israel as the prime foe. This was a set back for U.S. effort to portray the Soviet Union as the chief threat to the region and to forge an anti – Soviet alliance with moderate Arab states. It also endangered further efforts toward achieving a broader Arab – Israel peace.

The 1982 Israel invasion of Lebanon to crush the PLO and solve the political problem of the Palestinians by purely military means dramatically underlined the question of U.S. – Israel common interest. In Arab eyes the United States had tacitly approved the Israel invasion because it had failed to stop it. It now appeared to U.S. that the Palestinian problem could not be subordinated to regional anti – Soviet policy.²⁰¹ With the worsening relationship between Israel and the Arabs and the continued crisis in U.S. – Iranian relations, Foreign Ministers of 40 Islamic countries assemble in Islamabad grappling with the Afghan question. The PLO delegate warned not to make 'to much of the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan; it would only weaken the Arab's ability to fight for a national home for Palestinians. The foreign minister of Iran accused both superpowers of harboring parallel aggressive designs against the Persian Gulf and Arabia.²⁰² And Syria sought to counter US efforts to arouse Islamic nationalism against the USSR.²⁰³

In late 1970s, the Kremlin deployed a pincer movement against the gulf.²⁰⁴ It was an example of Soviet military activity in the early and mid 1970s. According to reports in 1975 Soviet intelligence – gathering vessels were maintaining a constant surveillance of the straits of Hormuz. Soviet Mig 25 reconnaissance aircraft made a number of flights over Iran. The troop movements along the Soviet – Iranian border was also reported several times in 1970s.²⁰⁵ Again in 1978, Soviet transports airlifted twenty thousand Cuban troops into Ethiopia, not only to assist its communist government in its war with Somalia, but also to establish military facilities across the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia. Later that year, a pro – Soviet group in South Yemen took power, thereby giving Moscow a beachhead on the Arabian Peninsula. South Yemen soon launched an overt military attack on North Yemen. From South Yemen terrorists launched operations against Saudi Arabia and

guerrillas conducted attack in a border province of Oman.²⁰⁶ Same year Soviet Union had signed a treaty of friendship with Turkey. And some probing for an accommodation with Pakistan was also witnessed.²⁰⁷ In 1978, a military coup put into power the Afghan communist party, which quickly signed treaties with Moscow. When a popular rebellion threatened to topple the communist regime the Soviet Union invaded the country putting its fighter bombers within reach of the straits of Hormuz from their newly acquired Afghan bases. Kremlin leaders were extending their reach to get their hands on the oil jugular from both directions.²⁰⁸

The taking of American hostages in Iran was also exploited, not without cynicism, as a target of opportunity. Shortly after the crisis erupted, the New York Times ran a front page story by Hedrick Smith headlined "Iran is helping the U.S. to shed fear of intervening abroad." Smith reported "an important shift of attitudes in Washington that many believe will have a significant long – term impact on the willingness of the United States to project its power in the third world and to develop greater military capacities for protecting its interests there." One policymaker said that we are moving away from our post – Vietnam reticence. Democratic National Chairman John White stated that "we may have reached a turning point in our attitude toward ourselves and that is a feeling that we have a right to protect legitimate American interests anywhere in the world". Senator Frank church indicated support for military intervention in the Middle East if our interests were threatened.²⁰⁹ According to Warriors, "the search for military bases in the Middle East and the general program of militarization of American society are defensive measures taken to protect potential victims of Russian aggression,"²¹⁰ And according to the Wall Street Journal, measures should include: establishment of U.S. bases in the Middle East, development of new weapon systems, unleashing of the CIA and to keep open the chance of covert aid to Afghan rebels. Brown's statement laid bare that the real reason behind the Carter Doctrine was not only invasion of Afghanistan but rather to continued expansion of U.S. private investments in this area of the world as well as protection against indigenous popular opposition movements fighting repressive U.S. backed regimes.²¹¹ When The Islamic states met in Islamabad to condemn the Russian invasion of Afghanistan, they did not fail to warn against U.S. intervention as well, the Gulf countries were more worried about the potential reaction of the U.S. to the crisis than they were about Soviet intervention itself.²¹²

The Americans who were aware of their criminal role in the usurpation of Palestine wanted to usurp the Islamic will and to distort its aspirations by dragging it into the American fold and exploit it to serve American policies and goals. The American game of instigating the Soviets to intervene militarily in Afghanistan was completely exposed when it was ascertained how they tried to exploit their fabricated crisis with Iran in an ugly, opportunist and vulgar manner. In addition, to Brown's revelation about the real aims of U.S. foreign and military policy, it was the case that month before Soviet troops entered Afghanistan, Zbigniew Brzezinski and the National Security Council proposed to Carter that a new security framework be established in the Middle East.

Even without a Soviet invasion of Afghanistan the Carter Doctrine was needed to maintain U.S. imperialism in the Middle East. When the Shah of Iran was toppled from his throne on January 4, 1980, President Jimmy Carter denounced the presence of Soviet troops in Afghanistan as "hazed aggression" and as a "deliberate effort of a powerful atheistic government to subjugate an independent Islamic people". This speech launched a large scale media campaign which was marshaled to portray the events in Afghanistan in such a way that the "crisis" there can be used as a pretext for increasing U.S. military presence in the Middle East/South Asia region, and for creating an "interventionist mood" in the U.S. public given this governmental manipulation of the media.²¹³

The Carter Doctrine was a symbol of America's vital interest in the area. The establishment of the Rapid Deployment Force, the search for bases in Kenya, Somalia, and Oman; the modernization of the base on the island of Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean; the presence of sizable U.S. fleet in the Indian Ocean – Persian Gulf area; and the discussions of possible military cooperation with Egypt were part of an effort to establish an American presence and to balance Soviet power in the area.²¹⁴

Tucker states correctly that "it is the Gulf that forms the indispensable key to the defense of the American global position; in fact there is no doubt that U.S. global dominance in the postwar period has closely linked to control over the major energy reserves of the world, which must remain under U.S. control if this global position is to be maintained. The first priority then for a resurgent America is the restoration of American power generally and above all, in the Persian Gulf."²¹⁵

In the case of Gulf oilfield the Carter administration decided to establish a joint task force of 50,000 for safeguarding Gulf oil supplies, and to build up the American fifth fleet, operating from the Island of Diego Garcia, near Mauritius, in the Indian Ocean. Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, and the proclamation of the Carter doctrine, added urgency to the newly – formed force, now called the Rapid Deployment Force. There was plan to make it 300,000 strong by the mid – 1980 and increased efforts were made to secure American military bases in and around the Gulf.

The Reagan administration went a step beyond, as American Deputy Defense Secretary, Frank Carlucci asked NATO allies to station troops in the Gulf. He secured the immediate support of the British under Secretary of Defense. British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher also responded positively to this plan. And a few days later the U.S. Secretary of Defense publicly called for permanent American military bases in Egypt and Saudi Arabia. But Saudi quickly responded in negative. While, Oman's pro – west stance decided to form a joint task force for the Gulf with American.²¹⁶ Undoubtedly President Carter had no difficulty in rallying support for his policy statement, made in the aftermath of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan – and contained in his State of the Union message to Congress in January 1980 that America would act militarily to defend the Persian Gulf region if it became a target of external aggression. Carter's objective was to convince Moscow that America – with or without allies would respond militarily to any aggression that might threaten the Gulf or Arabians oil fields.²¹⁷

With these reason U.S. came to be involved in supporting Afghan Mujahideen to counter Soviet troops when Soviet invaded Afghanistan. As Afghanistan was located in frontier area or buffer zone state of Gulf countries, containing Soviet cross into Gulf country was important. Wall Street Journal, said: “clearly we ought to keep open the chance of covert aid to Afghan rebels.”²¹⁸ Thus Afghanistan became an important place for the U.S. in containing Soviet communist.

V. The U.S. backing of Mujahedeen against Soviet troops

In April 1981, after elections Reagan became the president of the United States. The basic outline of Reagan's foreign policy was also two fold: the

reestablishment of American economic and military strength and the roll – back of Soviet influence across the third world.

The second of these policies came to be known as the Reagan Doctrine, which sought to provide assistance to anti communist guerillas and government with arms, finance, training and facilities, to note a few examples, the Reagan's administration supported the Contras in Nicaragua, the anti- Marxist guerillas in Angola, the right – wing government in El Salvador, the Mujahideen in Afghanistan, and the guerillas coalition in the Cambodia.²¹⁹ The central tenet in his foreign policy was anti Sovietism and the imperative of standing up to the Soviet threat and take responsibility for containing Soviet expansionism in any part of the world.²²⁰ In addition, the Reagan Doctrine developed, as the basis, not only for taking a harder line on global containment, but going further than ever before toward roll – back, ousting communist who had come to power.²²¹ According to George Shultz, who saw Reagan foreign policy from the inside, records that he “changed the national and international agenda on issue after issue” notably by challenging conventional wisdom on the possibility of movement toward freedom in the communist – dominated world.²²² For Paul Nitze, former director of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, the “principal task” of America in the early 1980s was to “check, blunt . . . and frustrate . . . Soviet strategies,” which carry in their womb four foreign policy goals – the political separation of NATO Europe from the United States, Soviet influence and control over the Persian Gulf, and the encirclement and neutralization of China.²²³ Combined with effort to play the Beijing against Moscow, forcing the Soviet Union to build up its military defenses against NATO, Japan, as well as China, neo- conservatives hope to roll back, if not implode, the Soviet empire. Through a window of vulnerability during the 1980s, the committee for the free world (founded in 1981, now defunct) helped to lead anti – communist crusades in Afghanistan, Angola and in other countries in Africa, and in Central America.

In this regard, the Reagan Administration adopted the doctrine of “horizontal escalation” which was intended to roll back post – 1975 Soviet throughout the world. The strategy was based upon the concept that rough US – Soviet nuclear parity, with the US even turning toward superiority in delivery capabilities (but not necessarily in explosive “throw - weight”) would be able to match soviet threats across the board without escalating to nuclear war. Here, the Reagan administration

largely utilized surrogate fighters to beat back Soviet backed regimes or Soviet – supported movements. U.S. support for anti – Soviet movements would not so inadvertently set off a number of seemingly permanent brush fires throughout many regions even after the cold war was over.²²⁴ The implications of total confrontation with the USSR had generated a debate in the US foreign policy establishment on how much and what kind of confrontation should be practicable in the 1980s. Three positions seem to have emerged. The hardest position, represented by one of its protagonists, Norman Podhoretz, was that the current confrontation was, or must be one between two irreconcilable ways of human existence, two ideological universes that just cannot live together as equals. “In resisting the advance of Soviet power . . . we are fighting for freedom and against communism, for democracy and against totalitarianism,” while, Robert W. Tucker, who has been persistently pressing since the mid seventies for a formidable American military presence in the Persian Gulf, which would virtually amount to American military control of the region’s petroleum, called in 1981 for “a limited policy of containment” rather than a strategy of total confrontation in the present circumstance.²²⁵

With such policy there was no doubt that Afghanistan became buffer state for U.S. to block Soviet access into Gulf oilfield and South Asia. Carter’s advisers were asking themselves a question when Ayatollah Khomeini brought the Iranian revolution to a crescendo in early 1979 “how U.S. policy interest be preserved if the Shah Fall’s?” Anarid landlocked, and mountainous kingdom, Afghanistan had always been a buffer state, first between the expending British and Russian empires and then, after 1945 between the free world and the Soviet bloc. As was the case next door in Tehran, rapid modernization generated serious political turmoil in Kabul where Afghan communist seized power in a bloody coup in April 1978.

Nine months before the Red Army rolled into Kabul, Brzezinski had expressed “concern over the Soviets creeping intervention in Afghanistan” and insisted that Washington must be more sympathetic to those Afghans who were determined to pressure their country’s independence, the Pentagon’s Walter Slocomb agreed and wondered whether clandestine US support for Muslim guerillas might succeed in “sucking the Soviet into Vietnamese quagmire”. In April 1979 the special coordination committee an inter-agency group chaired by Brzezinski, instructed the CIA to develop a comprehensive plan for a secret war in Afghanistan backed by the

United States, ranging from indirect financial assistance to the insurgents “to weapon support.”²²⁶

The US policy of supporting the anti – Soviet resistance in Afghanistan represented revenge for Soviet support to Hanoi and the North Vietnamese; yet its implications have been even more far reaching. As an additional element of its cold war strategy of containment, the US effort to undermine the soft Islamic underbelly of the Soviet Union was in many ways, the key to not just rolling back Soviet global outreach, but also to impel the implosion of the Soviet empire itself.

The US clandestine support to Islamic Mujahideen in Afghanistan against the Soviet regime which came to be known as the Reagan Doctrine, echoed president Jimmy Carter’s post – Vietnam approach. The United States would not send troops around the world to fight in regional conflicts unless the United States faced direct threat. Instead, the United States would send guns and money to anti – communist “freedom fighters.” So among other actions, the Reagan administration – with the general support of both parties in Congress – armed Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan to fight a guerilla war against the Soviet Union. Once again top American policy makers decided that it was easier to see Red than try to gain a clear view of Islamic green.²²⁷

Evidences clearly show that US was backing Muslim insurgent to fight Soviet communist and spread the ideology of hates and anti-communism. This was an important factor in the development of today’s terror phenomenon. The Iranian revolution of 1979 brought to life a new breed of fanatical religious terrorists and the subsequent rise of fundamentalism, which spread rapidly across the Islamic world. The crucial pan Islamic movement, however, was the jihad against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 where, as was well known, U.S. and British intelligence services were working hand – in – glove with the Jihadists, all the while being well aware of the latter’s extremist tendencies.²²⁸ There are evidences to suggest that that U.S. tried to exploit the religion of Islamic against communist ideology in central Asian population after the outbreak of Iran’s Islamic revolution in 1978-79 which put an end to a decade of relatively stable relations between the Soviet authorities and Islam. The news of the Islamic revolutionary success in Iran seemed to have helped trigger a series of anti – Soviet demonstrations and riots in Dushanbe, Alma-ata, and other cities. Although not all disturbances had religious cause, Islamic ideology played a role in inciting the masses.

Soviet responded to the strengthening of security and law – enforcement aspects in the Muslim republics. The close proximity to Iran, quite expectedly, caused serious concern over the possibility of foreign ideological subversion destabilizing the region. The head of the Turkmenistan KGB, Major General Z, Yusef Zade, went so far as to blame the United States for “trying to exploit the Islamic religion – especially in areas where the Muslim population lives – as one factor in influencing the political situation in our country.” The first Secretary of the Turkmen communist party, Gapurov, is quoted to have warned the central authorities of the foreign propaganda activities being conducted by individuals who had exhibited pan – Turkish or pan – Islamic tendencies. He went to say: “Muslim pseudo confessors, champions of old, reactionary principles and rites, operating willfully in the so called ‘holy places, are trying to kindle religious fanaticism, fuel feelings of national narrow mindedness and instill in family relations harmful feudal survivals and rituals, consequently, extra security measures were taken along the southern borders with Iran and Afghanistan, and the KGB’s presence was substantially increased in the Muslim republics. This policy continued until the mid 1980s.²²⁹ Thus the Soviet action in Afghanistan was aimed at preventing a spill – over of Islamic revivalism to the Tajik and Turkmen republics of The Soviet Union.²³⁰

A. Who are Mujahedeen?

In this war against communist, the United States supported the Jihad spirit which led to the fall of Marxist regime in Afghanistan and the spectacular rise of the Taliban. The youth that the United States had helped were educated mostly in the madrassas of the NWFP and Balochistan. They had been well trained and motivated by the time the Taliban came to power.²³¹ But it was not all madrassas located along Pakistan’s border that were engaged in such work. Actually several of fighters were trained in simply makeshift schools intended to train fighters in the war against the Soviets, where Islam was taught simply in order to strengthen the spirit of Jihad against the Russians. These have been loosely and incorrectly described as ‘madrassas’. In actual fact, they were not even conceived of as religious schools. Rather from their very inception they were intended as militant training camps, but were sought to be passed off as ‘madrassas’ in order to legitimate their operations and to solicit funds from Muslim states. The rapid growth and spread of such

schools must be seen in the context of cold war rivalries, and it is obvious that they had the blessing of the Americans, who through the CIA, pumped in large amounts of weapons and cash to assist the Mujahideen.²³²


During the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, there were two types of madrassas that participated in the U.S. and Saudi backed jihad. One group of madrassas had been specifically established to produce jihad literature, mobilize popular sentiment, and provide a platform from which to recruit and train Mujahideen. An example of such madrassas is the Jama'at-i- Islami's Rabita madrassas. The Jama'at-i- Islami has never been a madrassa – based party. The madrassas that it did establish were predominantly a product of jihad in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. The second group comprises various independent associations of madrassas, such as those affiliated with Jamiat-e-ulama Islam. As an institution, JUI was a partner in Afghan jihad. There were also some foreign Mujahideen who came to participate in the Afghan effort. Such as Arab volunteers who come to study in Karachi and Muslim males from Central Asia, North Africa, the Caucasus,²³³ and from Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia, and Mindanao. Osama bin Laden, together with the radical Palestinian preacher Abdallah Azzam, founded the Maktab al- Khidmat (office of service), through which they recruited and controlled foreign Mujahideen volunteers.²³⁴

Madrassas such as those of Haqqaniya at Akora khattak particularly benefited from Middle Eastern funding because these madrassas had long – established ties with the University of Madina. Moreover, Saudi Arabia had a deep stake in promoting the jihad effort in Afghanistan.

The message that was disseminated at the various madrassas was originally intended to be anti – communist. The intention was to encourage a supply of recruits to the Afghan conflict. Madrassas and makeshift schools were established within the proliferating refugee camps in Pakistan. Notably, it were these camps and schools that became the cradle of the Taliban. International patrons (the United States, Saudi Arabia, and others) supplied the camps and affiliated schools with arms and text books.²³⁵

B. Sources of finance and arms

As stated earlier nine months before the red Army rolled into Kabul in April 1979, the special coordination committee, an interagency group chaired by



Brzezinski, instructed the CIA to develop a comprehensive plan for a secret war in Afghanistan backed the United States, ranging from “indirect financial assistance to the insurgents to weapons support”²³⁶ President Carter had clearly stated that the US had “a moral obligation to help the Afghan resistance.” The US Congress in a rare show of bi- partisanship, and promoted by friends of the Afghan resistance such as Charles – Wilson, Gordon Humphrey, Orrin Hatch and Bill Bradley, also took the lead in voting more money for the Mujahideen than the Reagan administration requested, sometimes by diverting funds from the defense budget to the CIA. Its director, Bill Casey, was also able to persuade sympathetic Arab governments to contribute to a reserve fund that could be kept secret from Congress and the State Department. According to Arney, Saudi Arabia funneled more than half, a billion dollars to CIA accounts in Switzerland and the Cayman Islands. One of the biggest operators was the Saudi businessman, Adnan Rashoggi, who openly helped in procuring and distributing weapons and munitions to the Mujahideen through the ISI. He was an agent of the head of the Saudi intelligence agency, Prince Turki, and also acted as a watchdog on the expenditure of Saudi funds.

The CIA’s as well as Saudi payments for the arms supplied by the various leaders were made out of special Afghan war account managed by the Geneva based Bank of Credit and Commerce International (BCCI). Its head was a Pakistani banker from Karachi, Abedi. BCCI’s major owners were Saudi and Arab Emirate political and banking figures. Abedi had close ties with President Zia and the ISI’s General Akhtar who handled the whole supply network to the Afghan resistance on the ground.²³⁷

The US and Pakistan were also backed by the efforts of Osama bin Laden who was primarily a financier of the Afghan resistance, Makhtab –al- Khidmat (MAT).²³⁸ He was among the first to put those dollars to good use against the Red Army. In late 1982, deputy national security adviser Robert McFarlane asked Prince Bandar bin Sultan, the House of Saud’s representative in Washington, and they channeled almost \$ 30 billion into the CIA’s covert crusade in Afghanistan.²³⁹ In addition, the U.S. sponsored Mujahideen who fought against the Soviet Union supplemented the funds they received from the U.S. and the Gulf Sheikdoms with production and sale of heroin to the tune of \$ 20 billion annually, a large network of heroin factories cropped up in the North West frontier province, Balochistan and even Karachi.²⁴⁰

With the cold war in full swing, Washington was anxious to check Soviet expansionism, and the fall of the Shah of Iran left Pakistan as its only ally in the region. Under the Reagan administration that the Mujahideen cause was really embraced and in the autumn of 1981 a six – year package of \$ 3.2 billion in economic and military aid to Pakistan was agreed. As it was a covert war against the Soviet Union, the massive CIA weapons pipeline that was put in place to arm the Mujahideen was completely managed and supervised on the ground by the ISI, giving the agency enormous power. The weapons came from China, Israel, Egypt, Poland, and factories set up to copy Soviet arms to disguise their provenance.²⁴¹ And CIA put through a program of funneling Soviet – made arms, purchased from Egypt and Somalia.²⁴²

In the beginning of the year 1979, Zia Nassery, as representative of the “Committee for Struggle” visited New York and Washington and met with two American Senators, Frank George and Jacob Frantz. After the meeting Zia Nassery said: “I have come to the USA for receiving political and financial support for resisting the Afghan authorities. We need money to buy enough quantities of weapons.”

The procurement of weapons was entrusted to the American company called “Interarms” based in Manchester, Britain, and headed by Samuel king. The time magazine reported in 1980 that the main supplier of armaments for the Afghan counter – revolutionaries was a company named “Interarms” which possessed stocks of arms in different places in the world, and had been operating under the chairmanship of Samuel king, a former employee of the CIA. Such kind of job was possible only with the help of agencies like the CIA and the Pentagon. According to a report he got a part of the armaments from Pentagon and with the certification of Pentagon he sold them in different part of the world.²⁴³

Much of the controversy about the covert American role centers around the quality as well as the quantity of CIA weapons actually reaching the Mujahideen. Some accounts of CIA successes in this regard have been overblown. But according to a reliable Washington, D.C. – based source Sam – 7s and 82mm medium range Soviet – made mortars, the later “Stinger,” or British “Blowpipe” surface to – air missiles and the longer, range British or Finnish 81 mm medium rang mortar were supplied. Furthermore, such weapons as anti – tank and anti – personnel mines had also reached into the hands of Mujahideen.

While some western supporters have called for widespread introduction of the "stinger" a more advanced shoulder fired heat seeking missile a few of these weapons had reportedly found their way to the Mujahideen. According to the *Times*, however, a new version of the Soviet weapon, the Sam -7, was created by forces sympathetic to the resistance, paid for by the United States. Anti – DRA forces in late 1984 were reportedly being trained in Egypt on the missile's use²⁴⁴. The acquisition of the better weapons was directly linked to the provision of aid by Western and Arab countries. Between 1980 and early 1992, when military aid officially ceased, the United States gave \$ 2-3 billion to the Mujahideen, to which can be similar sum from the Arab countries. However, President Reagan had been highly cautious during his first term, in spite of his anti – communist rhetoric. For 1983 the CIA asked for a budget of \$ 30 million for the Mujahideen (compared to \$ 24 million for the contras in Honduras). Charles Wilson, a Democratic Senator, obtained an additional \$ 40 million and some Swiss anti tank guns. In 1985 a distinct turning – point was reached, with a budget of \$ 200 million, which was to reach \$ 280 million by 1989. The other western countries, especially France and Britain, did not publicized the level of their military aid to the Mujahideen, but fighters were trained in Europe and Pakistan, while equipment such as radios, missiles and anti – tank weapons were distributed to the parties. Around 80,000 Mujahideen were reported to have been trained in Pakistan, mainly by Pakistani officers, as well as more unusually by Americans.²⁴⁵ However, U.S. was aware of the fact that factions within these forces of jihad would soon thereafter turn their fury on the United States.²⁴⁶ As Congressional debate over the sale of shoulder – held stinger ground to air launched missiles, for example, was symbolic of fears that US military support for a radical pan – Islamic factions might ultimately turn against American interests.²⁴⁷ But US chose to give military support to Mujahideen because of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. At the end of 1979 US made a long – term policy response to Islam as a geopolitical reality in the region more difficult yet, American policy makers still focused on the cold war threat of the Soviets. That is why they chose to arm the Islamic fundamentalists fighting Soviet troops in Afghanistan.²⁴⁸

It was clear that the Soviet presence in Afghanistan was coming to an end due to pressure from the Mujahideen forces operating from within Afghanistan and from bases in Pakistan.²⁴⁹ In February 1989 the Russian army withdrew from

Afghanistan, having failed to get control of the first third world country it occupied.²⁵⁰ A turning point came in mid 1986, when the United States began to supply the Afghan rebels with surface – to – air stinger missiles, which forced Soviet aircraft and helicopters to suspend their low – level raids on rebel villages and strongholds. In January 1987 Najibullah announced a cease – fire, but the rebels refused his terms, and the war continued. In February 1988 Gorbachev conceded the need to extract Soviet forces from the stalemated conflict. In April 1988 Afghanistani, Pakistani, and Soviet representatives in Geneva agreed to a disengagement plan based on Soviet withdrawal by February 1989 and non-involvement in each other's internal affairs.²⁵¹ But Soviet refused to halt its own military supplies to Kabul, arguing with some plausibility that its own obligations dated back to the Soviet Union's treaty of peace and friendship with Afghanistan concluded in 1920. On 14 April 1988, just before the signing ceremony at the Palais de Nations in Geneva, the UN Secretary General received a formal notification that the United States reserved the right to continue supplying the Mujahideen, although it could meet with Soviet restraint.²⁵² The United States and the Soviet Union pledged to guarantee the settlement in a separate document. The Accords were universally acclaimed by the international community and many exaggerated claims were made regarding their significance – but they guaranteed the continuation of the Afghan civil war.²⁵³ Afghan academic Amin Saikal has rightly viewed the Afghan crisis more as a proxy conflict between the super powers than as one with political and social origins within Afghanistan itself.

During the operation over the past eight years, the United States had sent hundreds of millions of dollars in covert operation. This not only created the possibility of rolling back a forward position of the Soviet empire but also inflicted such cost on the Kremlin that its leaders will have to think twice before again embarking on such an adventure in the future.²⁵⁴ Brzezinski wrote that “our ultimate goal is the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan . . . Even if this is not attainable; we should make Soviet involvement as costly as possible.”²⁵⁵

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CHAPTER- 2

The U.S. and Afghan Civil War

I. The U.S. and Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal

The conflict in South Asia in the last two decades of the 20th century witnessed the emergence of holy war - *jihad* against the Russian invaders of 1979. As a result the invaders were defeated and sent back home in 1989. At home Russia faced a collapsing Soviet society and break down of empire. And in the United States President Reagan's Vice President George Bush, won the Presidential elections held in November 1988, and his administration was installed on January 1989.¹ But new actor did not bring about any radical changes in U.S. policies towards Afghanistan.² According to one analyst "in its contemporary version, the Reagan Doctrine, the West should be encouraged by the success of the Mujahideen and the change in the Soviet stance towards the third world more generally, to press more vigorously its support for anti - communist or anti - Soviet forces in other third world troubled spots, in the name of self determination and democratic values".³ The Reagan administration adopted the doctrine of "horizontal escalation" which was intended to roll back post-1975 Soviet gains throughout the world. The strategy was based on the concept of U.S.-Soviet nuclear parity along with of U.S. venturing in delivery capabilities (but not necessarily in explosive "throw-weight") would be able to match Soviet threats across the board - without escalating to nuclear war. The Reagan administration largely utilized surrogate fighters to beat back Soviet-backed regimes or Soviet-supported movements. The U.S. support for anti-Soviet movements would not so inadvertently set off a number of seemingly permanent brush fires throughout many regions (as in Angola) that would be difficult to put out, even after the cold war was over.⁴

A totally different course was pursued by the then ruling circles of the imperialist states, above all the U.S. who were trying to use the developments occurring in the Moslem world to their advantage. Holding forth the common values of the Christianity and Islam against the atheistic Communism and flirting with the political and religious leaders of the Moslem world. Western strategists were meant to

create a wave of controversy between Moslems and the Soviet Union to half circle the USSR with 'crescent of instability'. International reactionary circles spearheaded Moslem movements against the progressive forces within the Islamic world, and also against the socialist states, particularly the Soviet Union.⁵

The outcome in Afghanistan reflected certain of those wider influences which resulted out of universal application of the Reagan Doctrine. It prompted support for hard line anti- Soviet factions in the Afghan resistance. This line was favoured by President Zia of Pakistan. A policy which on the one hand sought to ease the way for Soviet acceptance of self- determination in Afghanistan, and on the other hand it was likely to go along with a global policy which looked towards a reciprocal reduction in pressures for competitive interventions. It was only this way that one could envisage an early breakthrough to a political settlement in Afghanistan. The alternate Western (and Mujahideen) strategy pointed towards protracted violence and political stalemate.⁶

With the collapse of bi-polar world and the contours of a multi polar world order yet to attain definite shape the role of the U.S. as the sole superpower in any area of the world gained added importance. In most states, especially developing ones, American entry and continued presence has been guided by its long term national interest. And that overriding interest appears to be continuation of a uni- polar world order, where United States is the sole and ultimate power influencing not only the course of international politics but also having a crucial say in the international developments among countries across the world. This grand strategy of U.S. foreign policy to dominate the world may not be blatantly apparent in all its foreign policy moves because foreign policy of any states is shaped at a given moment by multiplicity of factors but that does not negate its existence. By backing the Afghan Mujahideen it achieved its prime cold war objective of rolling back communism and containing the Soviet Union till its final disintegration in December 1989.⁷

Although, after an accord (Geneva Accord of April 1988) signed between Afghanistan and Pakistan, guaranteeing non – interference and non – intervention in each other's affairs; a similar agreement was signed between the United States and the Soviet Union in which both promised about non – intervention in Afghanistan and to act as guarantors of the Accord. This Accord paved the way for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, which was completed in February 1989.⁸ But a friendly pro –

Soviet Government had remained in power in Kabul after Soviet troops had left. Najibullah was Gorbachev's chosen leader who announced his programme of 'National Reconciliation' comprising three key elements; a six- months unilateral ceasefire, the formation of a government of 'national unity' and the return of over 5 million refugees from Pakistan and Iran.

But Najibullah's proposals were turned down with disbelief and contempt by members of the seven- party alliance in Peshawar.⁹ As the Soviet Union tried to adopt a two- fold strategy, one dimension was to deliver things possible to unify the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) under Najibullah. And the other was to engage in an accelerated scheme to strengthen the PDPA's military capability. The Soviet Union helped not only in setting up an elite presidential guard under Najibullah's direct command and tightening the efficiency of the regime's brutal secret police and the special militia of Sarandoy, but also supplying the regime with three to four times more weapons than its standing army required. Some of the arms supplied were among the most sophisticated ones in the Soviet inventory. Thus the Soviet Union laid the groundwork for the war to continue after their withdrawal.

Moscow's efforts, nonetheless, exacerbated two pre-exist schisms within the Afghan resistance. They not only intensified divisions in the resistance along leadership on traditional ethno- tribal and linguistic lines, but also aggravated the sectarian Sunni-Shiaite split, which could easily be manipulated by the element from inside and outside Afghanistan for self- serving purposes. Furthermore, they brought to the fore the rival and conflicting interests of the Mujahideen's regional supporters.¹⁰ Whereas, the Islamic parties forged together into an 'alliance' by the ISI at the behest of General Zia to fight jihad, the parties also owed their 'influence' to the fact that they served as somewhat porous conduits for the US and Saudi funds and weapons channeled to the resisting fighters inside Afghanistan by Pakistan's ISI.¹¹ Saudi Arabia augmented her support for their favorite Mujahideen leaders. From amongst the seven Pakistan- based Sunni resistance groups, Iran sought to single out the Shiite Mujahideen group of wahdat (unity) as its preferred platform for exerting greater influence than the total demographic strength of the Shiites would warrant in the politics of post- Soviet Afghanistan.¹²

Factionalism had resurfaced again and became one of the important challenges faced by Najibullah government. Coup attempt made by General Shahnawa Tanai the

then Defence Minister with the support and use of air force, in March 1990, was the most important threat faced by Najibullah. This threat came from within the government from Khalq faction because of the Khalq - Parcham rivalry which caused the fall of Najibullah regime in April 1992.¹³ This also became inevitable with the Soviet Union consigned to history in early 1992 and no further aid flowing from Russia to support pro- Soviet regime in Afghanistan.¹⁴ There were many reasons for the Soviet Union to withdraw the force out. The worsened situation in the Soviet Union and the anti communist revolution taking place in East Europe threatened the disintegration of the Soviet socialist system. This compelled the Soviet Union to pull out the forces from Afghanistan at any cost. The fall of Najibullah regime in April 1992, put an end to the communist era in Afghanistan.¹⁵ However, the power vacuum resulting from the quick Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan resulted into not only human tragedy but fierce regional struggles between tribal lords for influence. The Americans first used the Afghan people as a cannon fodder against their arch rival and then left them.

In 1979, when the Afghans had declared jihad against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan it was transformed overnight to a cold war battle ground. The Afghan anti-Soviet fighters became the American heroes and America started giving economic and military aid to Afghanistan and actively encouraged the influx of foreign volunteers to join forces with the Mujahideen. A trend set which it found detrimental to its national interest in fundamental way.

In September 1988, Geneva Accords were signed between Bush and Gorbachev, whereby they pledged to terminate assistance to Mujahideen and government forces respectively. United States became increasingly preoccupied with the post- Soviet scenario that presented unlimited opportunities for it to explore and influence in the European part of the world. As winds of change swept through Eastern Europe and violent conflicts erupted in the Caucasus and Balkans, Afghanistan was pushed into oblivion.¹⁶ However, according to John J. Marshier, “the basic structure of the international system did not change with the end of the cold war, and that there is little reason to think that change is in offing”. He attempts to show the considerable evidence from the decade 1991-2000, that security competition among the great powers is not obsolete, either in Europe or in Northeast Asia. And he

also argues that a rising China is the most dangerous potential threat to the United States in the early twenty- first century.¹⁷

The process of reassurance was essentially completed in 1989. However, after George H.W. Bush took office in January, his administration initiated a “pause” while it reviewed its policy towards the Soviet Union. The new National security Adviser, Brent Scowcroft was especially skeptical of the recent arms control treaties, however, the new Secretary of State, James Baker, favoured a more active policy. A new policy document, NSD-23 drafted in March 1989, coined the phrase ‘beyond containment’ to summarize the new U.S. policy. The document suggested that it might be possible to shift to a strategy which “actively promotes the integration of the Soviet Union into the international system.”¹⁸ According to Dominic Lieven, “the grand alliance of Western states which far out-weighted and finally defeated the Soviet Union in the cold war remains basically united and would stand together against any Russian attempt to regain its former empire.”¹⁹

The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan left with divergent results flowing from the geopolitical end-game in Afghanistan. The U.S. could get an unsurpassed opportunity to redress U.S. overextension in parallel fashion or alternatively, it could construed as an unprecedented opening to push ahead spread of Western values, as well as to deliver a knockout blow to godless communism, enabling the United States to fulfill Henry Luce’s vision of an American century. While the unfinished business of the war remained, there were a number of elements that constituted unfinished task. It was possible that other form of Soviet intervention could remain or even increase as troops were withdrawn. One should not forget that the horrifying legacy of superpower intervention which consist of a disrupted political, economic, cultural and social order continue even after the end of the intervention.²⁰

The U.S. foreign policy had been shaped during half a century of cold war. A generation of diplomats had been raised in the shadow of ‘soviet containment’. The disintegration of the Soviet Union left them in a political vacuum, without specific guidelines to fill it. American diplomacy turned to business. The political elite became ambassadors and diplomats of the strong Washington lobbies. Almost overnight, it became apparent that U.S. foreign policy had turned into powerful vehicle for American cooperation, seeking opportunities everywhere instead of promoting

international stability. Sadly, this imperialist approach is still the engine powering the foreign policy of George W. Bush.

In the early 1990s, impelled by the oil lobby, George Bush had underestimated the consequences of the disintegration of the equilibrium in Central Asia, a balance of power forged in 1945 at Yalta. The dismantling of Soviet power was perceived as the beginning of a lucrative period of exploitation, with U.S. oil companies controlling the vast energy fields of the region. So confident was the White House in this context that Washington even did not bother to create a political framework for the region, or even could issue guidelines for the post Soviet era.²¹ America's interest in the Afghanistan crisis had been by and large driven by hard economic interests in the Soviet days. It was bitter super power rivalry that brought the Americans to Afghanistan. With the Soviet break up the immediate compulsion for intimate involvement in Afghanistan had been removed and America had indeed moved away. But soon the possibility of the power vacuum being filled by actors totally beyond US control would push Afghanistan back into the forefront of US foreign policy.²²

Following the collapse of the USSR, the oil reserves of the Caspian region were initially estimated at around 150 billion barrels, half of Saudi Arabia. The new states in the region after Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan felt uncertain where to anchor their security. The commonwealth of independent states (CIS) was important to maintain the links with the Russian economy. The US government was slow to pick up the importance of the region. The private western entrants into the 'new great game' included well placed individual's maverick companies and large oil companies in that order. It was not until Clinton's globalization offensive of 1994 that the US developed its own geopolitical offensive to wrest control of the region from Russia.²³

The independence of Central Asian Republics of the former Soviet Union added a new factor to the vortex of regional power rivalries in which Afghanistan found itself. Tajikistan, Uzbekistan, and Turkmenistan share not only borders but also ethnic, cultural, and religious affinities with Afghanistan and its people. The role of the Central Asian states may acquire greater significance if the ethnic split between Afghanistan's Uzbek and Tajik groups, on the one hand, and the Pushtun on the other hands, became unmanageable. Ethnic bonds, with family and blood ties, may push the Uzbek and Tajik minorities of Afghanistan toward their co- nationals across the border in the event current power struggle in Kabul results in resurgence of the

Pushtun element. Thus there may be considerable opportunities for trade and the Central Asian states may pay increased attention to political events in Afghanistan. With the barriers previously erected by Moscow now fallen, one might see the transformation of the entire region of Central Asia, Afghanistan, Iran, and Pakistan into a zone of economic and political cooperation. Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan had already joined the Economic cooperation organization formed by Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. The consensus on economic and political forms and on states identity was yet to emerge in all of those states, but the need for economic reconstruction in Afghanistan and Central Asia in line with regional and global trend toward marketization and liberalization may bring these countries closer to one another.²⁴

However, regional powers including the Russian Federation were more active. Afghanistan became an arena in which regional rivals were competing for influence, with some regional powers favoring certain groups involved in the struggle to influence favorite group as stage to preserve its geopolitics and its interest in Afghanistan.²⁵ For the United States probably Pakistan would play important role again as it used to play in the cold war year. It could quietly fit into American political and strategic objective in Central Asian region which would provide vantage ground for preventing Russian hegemony in the region, containing Iran and playing a balancing role against emerging powers like China. The control over the Pakistan Afghanistan corridor and creating an opening from the south would be vital for the West in gaining access to the oil and natural gas resources of the region, probably in this context with large support to Pakistan it could be frontline state again.²⁶ There is no doubt that in 1995 the Afghan civil war became a mini-great game for regional powers. Their policies were influenced not only by developments in Afghanistan but also by one another's actions as competition among them had increased. For some, the war became in part a proxy fight. Pakistan was the most important outside player in Afghanistan but Iran- whose relative importance grew during the year Saudi Arabia, Uzbekistan, Russia and India were other important players.²⁷

To complicate the situation further, the USA had its own regional and international interests. Since Washington's counter-interventionist policy had all along been guided more by how it could benefit the USA against the Soviet Union rather than by what might be conducive to bring peace and stability to Afghanistan. In

the process Washington neglected to give sufficient thought as to what could become of Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal. This was evident in its policy priorities and distribution of weapons to the Mujahideen. It channeled arms through Pakistan more specifically through Pakistan's military intelligence (ISI) to those Afghans who received ISI endorsement.

Immediately after the Soviet withdrawal, little attempt was made to focus US energy and aid either on creating the conditions and mechanisms for ensuring a relatively bloodless transfer of power to the Mujahideen or on catering the Afghan's humanitarian needs during a transitional phase.²⁸ There is no doubt why a successful guerilla movement could not turn into a cohesive political force. The designs and agendas of external powers coupled with the ambitions of self-serving Mujahideen warlords and leaders effectively blocked any attempt at national consolidation. In short Soviet invasion not only strengthened the old tribal and ethnic loyalties, but helped ethnic solidarity to be used for inter-ethnic wars. This would have significant bearing on the period following the soviet withdrawal.²⁹

II. Afghan Civil War –The Key Factors

During the anti –Soviet war in Afghanistan and later the guerrilla war against the pro-communist regime in Kabul, the frontline divided almost all ethnic groups and the larger tribes. In all those groups there were collaborators of the socialist regimes and some fierce enemies of these regimes; and people who decide to wait and see who would prevail. Some family fever to communist some fever to Mujahideen of favorites. Some hoped for the achievements of socialism and for the brotherly help of the USSR to transform Afghanistan into a supra-ethnic class society and eventually into a harmonious socialist union; the others expected that grand jihad against the formidable common enemy to do the job of creating one Afghan nation. As the war dragged on, it became obvious that the Kabul regimes and the Mujahideen were divided into numerous hostile factions. It also became obvious that ethnicity and tribalism were contributory factors to this process, but not the most important ones.³⁰

A. Internal factors

The present civil war in Afghanistan has frequently been analyzed as an ethnic war: the *Pushtuns* against the Tajiks, Hazara and Uzbek or others. Each of these

groups fighting separately under its own commanders and military structure, the predominantly Pushtun Taliban are believed to aim at printing their ethnic stamp on all other ethnic groups of the country, and non-Pushtun are supposed to fight against Pushtun dominance and against their ethnic marginalization.³¹ Pushtun ethnic groups are estimated to account for between 40 per cent of Afghanistan nationals and the Pushtun themselves subdivided into thousand of tribes. There is no doubt that the Taliban polarized the country between a predominantly Pushtun south and east on the one side, and the other one.³²

Hazara, is an ethnic group whose members play a major role in the civil war. Groups live in various part of northern Afghanistan, and in the major cities, particularly in Kabul as well as in Quetta (Pakistan) and mashad (Iran). An unifying factor is the popular dislike of Pushtun. In the post 1992 civil war pressure from Iran drove them together politically. Only of the pro-Iranian Hezb-e-wahadat (party of unity). The Hazara may become the first major ethnic group and strong unit against Pushtun (Taliban).³³ Iran and Hazara ethnic relations not motivated by ethnic solidarity but rather by religious connection.³⁴

Uzbek speak their own Turkish language, adhere to Sunni Islam, their number equal roughly those of the Hazara living in North Afghanistan for centuries. During the Soviet-Afghan war, some of the Uzbeks sided with pro-Soviet government or rather with pro-minority policy of the new government and were militarily organized under Rashid Dostum's Jawani militias: others sided with the Mujahideen mainly under the Harakate-e-Enqelab of malawi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi whose leaders, but not commanders, were almost exclusively Pushtun.

None of these groupings had ever developed a decision making institution which could express the will of the whole ethnic group or at least larger part of it, and which could lead such people to any concerted political or military action. The Pushtun are said to have ruled the country for 250 year. In fact it was not the Pushtun, but Pushtun rulers, who governed a wide range of different people, but never the Pushtun, not even a majority of them. Such a simplification is of little help in evaluating the prevailing situation in Afghanistan. The civil war in Afghanistan will rather depend on whether the protagonists continue using ethnicity as a psychological weapon which invariably backfires against those who use it. It will also depend on Afghanistan's neighbors and on the regional powers who not only continue to fuel the

Afghan civil war but also make things worse by applying ethnic criteria while choosing their friends.³⁵

B. Regional Powers and their Rivalries

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan the neighboring powers - Iran, Pakistan, and Uzbekistan became more important. Each of these three countries is linked to one of the parties in Afghanistan: Pakistan with the Hezb-i-Islami, Iran with the Hezbe-i-wahdat and Uzbekistan with the Jumbesh. Their relations are a matter of reciprocal manipulation: each tries to command the other to further its own interest. The three neighboring powers all opposed the rebuilding of the Afghan state by the coalition, led by the Jamait-i-Islami, but they could not agree on a common course, the division among the three states correspond to those between their client parties; one can see the assumption that eliminating certain actors in the new- regionalized conflict in Afghanistan will automatically ensure stabilization.

The basic objective of Pakistan's policy toward Afghanistan is to weaken the Afghan state, which since 1947 has favored an alliance with India.³⁶ As India's approach overlooked the probability that the future politics of Afghanistan would be more complex than the simple alternatives between secularism and fundamentalist Islam. The fall of Marxist regime and formation of the Mujahideen government in Kabul may influence the political and psychological dynamics of on going conflict in Kashmir, where India and Pakistan have fought three costly wars. Long before capturing power in Kabul, the Mujahideen leaders supported the liberation of Kashmir.³⁷ In addition, India's policy was based on the principle of opposition to all religious fundamentalisms which was espoused by most of the Indian nationalist leaders. Some American analyst feel that India was watching and waiting in order to be sure that Soviet intervention in Afghanistan would be successful. Had it happened, it could lead the formation of an independent Pakhtoonistan or could put pressure on Pakistan to change its policy toward India.³⁸ While, Pakistan's military and political support for the Hez-bi-Islami is thus partially attributable to the Hezb's lack of nationalist rhetoric (the party even went far as to advocate confederation between Pakistan and Afghanistan). This consistent backing of one party has in practice contributed to destabilization which, incidentally, undermined Pakistan's pretensions to play an important role in post-communist Central Asia, since Afghanistan is a

crucial passageway to that region.³⁹ Further more, the permanent strategic goals of Pakistan in Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal are:

- to have a friendly government in Kabul to prevent the reconstruction of a Kabul – New Delhi axis
- To establish strategic depth against India, by using Afghanistan territory a corridor towards Central Asia this could be used to import gas and oil.
- To enact a Sunni Islamic policy which is the very basis of Pakistan's legitimacy, secular Pakistani government to enlist the support of the increasingly effective and numerous militant religious networks inside Pakistan and divert them from domestic politics to regional militancy.⁴⁰

In addition, Pakistan now lacked a viable Afghanistan policy to enable it to secure a receptive government in Kabul to settle once and for all the long Standing Afghan – Pakistan border dispute in line with Pakistan's interests. After the Soviet withdrawal, Islamabad essentially would have liked to see an enmeshing of the identity of Pakistan's and Afghanistan into a Pakistan influenced Pushtun ruled enclave to assist it with wider objectives.⁴¹ And Pakistan also fitted in American's new political and strategic agenda in the region – that of preventing Russian hegemony, containing Iran and playing a balancing role against ambitious powers as China.⁴² Stability in Afghanistan was the main variable in this strategy. Domination in Afghanistan was important to exercise powerful control over the Southern corridor to Central Asia. This was the only way to enhance Pakistan geopolitical standing with the West in shaping the future evolution of Central Asia. This by itself would get Pakistan economic and political rewards 'by creating a regional dependence on Islamabad to ensure safety for traffic - in other words, the international acceptance of Islamabad's hegemony over the Southern approaches to Central Asia and the Western gateway to China'. The control over Pakistan-Afghanistan corridor and creating an opening from the South would be vital natural gas resources of the region, probably in this context one may see the Brown Amendments largesse, as US's subtle renewal of support to Pakistan as a frontline state again.⁴³

Iran chose to support Hez-Be-Wehdat. Since the Soviet withdrawal, Iran's policy toward Afghanistan has been to avoid establishment of a Saudi-backed Islamic regime in Kabul which would mean the isolation of Afghanistan's Shiites, who

T. Zaidi

constituted the only card Iran now holds in the country.⁴⁴ The Saudi funding for the Afghan faction of Mujahideen came primarily due to its desire to have a dominant influence in the Islamic world, undermining Iran and to establish a Sunni fundamentalist movement in Afghanistan. Saudi's political and religious motives went beyond Afghanistan and it was making of efforts to expand influence in Central Asia as well. Saudi money and Afghan Mujahideen were believed to be behind Tajik civil war also.⁴⁵ Furthermore, the Islamic revolution in Iran had challenged Saudi Arabia's pre-eminence. Indeed Tehran argued that monarchy was incompatible with Islam and that Saudi Arabia's close relations with the United States were against the interests of the Moslems. Saudi believed that Iran will pose a great threat to them. Saudi Arabia also promoted the Sunni Islamic fundamentalists within Afghan resistance and deliberately emphasized the Sunni and Shiite division in Islam. During 1988-1992, Saudi Arabia wanted to consolidate the influence by insisting on the establishment of a pro-Saudi Arabia and pro-Pakistan Islamic government in Kabul after withdrawal of Soviet. In the rise of Taliban it was believed that Saudi's supported financially to the Taliban. When Taliban entered Mazari's Hezb-e-wahdat forces both allies of Iran in the Southern and Western outskirts of Kabul, murdered Mazari and threatened to capture Kabul from Rabbani and Massoud. It was at this juncture that the Taliban movement emerged as a serious contender for national power. Iran started seeing Taliban as an anti-Shia and anti-Iran force.⁴⁶ Iran strong suspicion for the Taliban tied not only to Pakistan but to Saudi Arabia and the United States. It feared that the US might be planning to turn Afghanistan into an anti-Iranian state.⁴⁷ Tehran attached greater importance to the interests of the state and nationalism in its foreign policy. Iran also emphasized on the rights of the Afghan Shiites. During period 1988-1992, Iran encouraged the Iran-based Shiites organizations in Afghanistan to demand 25 per cent of the representation in the institutions and in any future government in Kabul. The Shiites demand was forcefully rejected by the pro-Saudi and pro-Pakistan Sunni resistance organizations in Peshawar.⁴⁸ Whereas, the formation of the Hez-Be-Wehdat in 1990, was largely Iranian initiative, aimed at bringing together all Shiites in Afghanistan, or at least the Hazaras. But the Hez-Be-wehdat's departure from the government alliance had indirectly weakened Iran's grip on the party.

The *Uzbek* government key external objective was to guarantee all international frontiers to prevent the destabilization of Central Asia. The border with Afghanistan is particularly important; President Islam Karimov's secular regime feared an Islamic contagion emanating from Afghanistan (or, indirectly, from Tajikistan, where an Islamic insurgency rages). Uzbekistan backed the *Jumbesh* in Afghanistan in the quest for a reliable ally to guard its Southern border-not because of ethnic solidarity with Uzbeks in Afghanistan. So long as the *Jumbesh* controlled an important piece of the border, Uzbekistan's border was assured. The risk for the *Jumbesh* was that it would remain confined to a small part of Afghanistan. For Uzbekistan the danger was being shut out of future political developments in Kabul.⁴⁹

Russia - The down fall of pro-Soviet regime (Najibullah) followed by the disintegration of former Soviet Union,⁵⁰ posed new challenges to Soviet military establishment. The conditions of Afghan war worsened by the ethnic conflicts within the military, the Afghan war not only exacerbated the ethnic conflict, but it also jeopardized the assets of the Soviets structure in Central Asia. The impact to Afghan war was more prominent on Central Asians countries due to the similarities in culture, religion and ethnicity of their Afghanistan counterparts. Therefore, the Central Asians countries were not comfortable with the Soviet Afghan policy. Apart from the Central Asians countries the Afghan war created anti-Soviet and anti-Russian sentiments among other ethnic minorities. What Soviet wanted after its withdrawal from Afghanistan was first, Afghanistan would be an independent non-align country, friendly toward USSR. Secondly, it would have a government of national reconciliation in which the Marxist PDPA would share substantial power with non-Marxist groups including resistance groups⁵¹ that might join the process of national reconciliation but to no gain as many hard line Pushtuns reduced their offensive against these states. But by and large the country remained divided, even at the height of the Mujahideen offensive against the Soviet forces.⁵²

The Soviet feared the spread of 'fundamentalism' (a word that was closely identified with Western fears) and the instability in the Ferghana valley, and the near civil war conditions in Tajikistan. The instability in Afghanistan boded ill for the Russian first circle of security the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States). As far as that country was concerned, the borders of CIS were to be protected as before, a

policy that was reinforced after Tajikistan's conflict flared after 1993.⁵³ Since the USA was trying to use the developments occurring in the Moslem world to its advantage. Holding forth upon the common values of the Christian and Islamic civilizations as opposed to atheistic communism and flirting with the political and religious leaders of the Moslem world, Western strategists tried to drive a wave of controversy between Moslems and the Soviet Union, to half circle the USSR with crescent of instability: the American 'aim' could only be countered by those who were prepared to give up their principles to suit Washington's interests.

International reactionary circles were trying to point the spearhead of Moslem movements against the progressive forces within the Islamic world, and also against socialist states, particularly the Soviet Union,⁵⁴ (though the CIA had launched the jihad in the then Soviet territory as early as 1987). The border, (especially towards the mountains) proved to be ideal guerrilla territory with opposition forces given shelter mainly by the Tajik groups led by Massoud (though initially they seemed having been patronized by all groups).⁵⁵ It was argued stridently and frequently in Central Asia as well as in Moscow that Tajikistan's civil war originated and continued so long basically because of interference from Afghanistan.⁵⁶

For Russia, Tajikistan was its only remaining foothold in Central Asia: Moscow maintained the 20th division and border guards, where the rank and file were usually locals under Russian command, while it had neither troops nor even military advisers in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. Despite so called 'Islamic threat' Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan refused to allow Russian troops to be in their countries and stayed away from any practical military co-operation with Moscow. Russia did not have any strategic interests inside Afghanistan, but wanted to keep Tajikistan outside Uzbek influence and pressure. Hence, the use of the 'Islamic threats' made sense as Russia had a pragmatic approach to the Afghan conflict: its only goal was to maintain its military presence in the area at the lowest possible cost.⁵⁷ It became obvious that ethnicity and tribalism were contributory factors to this process, but not the most important ones.

The future of Afghanistan will rather depend on whether the protagonists continue using ethnicity as a psychological weapon which invariably backfires against those who use it. It will also depend on Afghanistan's neighbors and on the regional

powers who not only continue to fuel the Afghan civil war but also make things worse by applying ethnic criteria while choosing their 'friends',⁵⁸

C. The Discovery of large Sources of Energy; The Oil and Gas in the Newly Emerged Central Asian Countries

After the end of the cold war, Afghanistan had lost its strategic importance. But the break down of the Soviet Union, the emergence of Central Asian states, the discovery of large quantities of oil and gas in the Caspian area, Afghanistan possibility could be an alternative gateway to Central Asia, that revived Afghanistan's strategic importance for Iran, India, and Russia on the one hand, and Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the United States on the other. This did not bode well for peace and stability in Afghanistan. The conflict continued for quite a while, not only because of dispute among Afghanistan's but also because of intense rivalry among foreign powers.⁵⁹

There were thus considerable opportunities for trade; the Central Asian states could pay increasing attention to political events in Afghanistan. With the barriers previously erected by Moscow once fallen, one might even see the transformation of the entire region of Central Asia, Afghanistan, Iran and Pakistan into a zone of economic and political cooperation. Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan have already joined the economic cooperation organization formed by Iran, Pakistan, and Turkey. Consensus on economic and political forms and on state identity has yet to emerge in all of these states. But the need for economic reconstruction in Afghanistan and Central Asia in line with regional and global trends toward marketization and liberation may bring these countries closer to one another.⁶⁰

The Central Asian states with the rich resources are looking for a way to escape the Russian stranglehold on their economy and communications. They welcomed Pakistani overtures to economic cooperation, just as they welcomed Iran's hand of friendship. However, both countries were left without doubt that none of these states welcome either one's brand of political Islam, nor did they evince an interest in a bloc based on religion or ethnic communality. The chief concern here was for economic outlets – pipelines, roads, railways, all leading to the markets of the world, an access denied them by circumstance and geography. What was assessed to be the next largest oil and gas reserves, the region did not suffer unduly from lack of foreign interests.

Western oil men were soon to be seen in all the newly independent states, but problem that confronted them was the lack of a reliable access.⁶¹

III. The U.S. Involvements in Afghan Civil War

A. The U.S. Bid to Contain Iran's Involvement in Afghanistan's Affairs

The problems between US and Iran started as early as in 1953 when the Americans intervened in the internal affairs of Iran by overthrowing the democratic government and reuniting the Shah. However, in late 1970s, the two countries had managed to clear up a lot of misunderstanding,⁶² followed with the split between the modernist forces and those favouring Islamic regime. Islamist groups and organisations were in existence in nearly every Muslim country. The struggle between the two forces was going on with the vision of their countries' progress. In Iran, things began to change and the balance began to shift in favour of the Islamist organisation from the mid-1970s. The Saudis, flushed with petrodollars, after the oil crisis of 1973 began to support the Islamist groups and organisations in Muslim countries to spread their own version of Islam. This evidently weakened the modernist. The US was ambivalent towards this because Saudi Arabia was one of the two pillars of American policy in the Middle East. Iran's effort to spread its own version of Islam after its revolution was bound to result in fierce competition with the Saudis and consequent deterioration in their relations and rise in tension in the Islamic world. As Iran posed a frontal challenge to the existing order and to the United States' hegemony in the region in particular, Iran's defeat became the focal point of the American policy.⁶³ After the fall of Pro-American regime (Shah) to the anti-American Islamic fundamentalist revolution led by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, not only the United States lost a strategically located ally, but the whole American psyche was deeply shaken by the November 1979 seizure of the US embassy in Tehran and the taking of more than seventy Americans as hostages. Ayatollah Khomeini justified the hostage-taking as action against the great Satan-America.⁶⁴ Pro-Iranian Shiites militant beholden to revolutionary and clerical regime which had overthrown the Shah were bombing US marines and kidnapping Americans and others Westerns in Lebanon.⁶⁵ Those developments were quite traumatic for Americans, unaccustomed to

sense of vulnerability that the Iranian hostage crisis evoked. Thus shock waves were felt – strategic and politically.⁶⁶ It caused US lost of friend in helping stabilizing the entire oil-rich Persian Gulf region.

The United States had secretly setup a number of intelligence posts along Iran's northern border with the Soviet Union.⁶⁷ In addition, what America faced as a severe blow by the changes in Iran was that the American influence had to retreat from Iran – Soviet border down the Southern shore of Persian Gulf. The lost of its control over the strait of Hormuze which is the strategic passage for the Persian Gulf oil transport route. A US ally and gendarme, who used to guard the American interests in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, turned into its foe; the US companies were forced to withdraw from Iran, and the US traders had to evacuate the Iranian market.⁶⁸ And more important thing was that US lost its monitoring sites. They monitored Soviet communications and missile telemetry emitted from the Soviet missile and space base at Tyaratam, in Central Asia.⁶⁹

During this period America was facing with Arab (OPEC) embargo on their oil to America, the only Persian Gulf producer (Iran under Shah Period) was to defy the OPEC embargo and ship oil to the United States after the October war. The Iranian crisis of 1978 stunted Washington, where the Nixon, Ford, and Carter administrations had applauded the Shahs efforts to modernize his realm through a top-down white revolution financed by petrodollars. Although the most obvious short-term impact of the Islamic upheaval that swept the Shah from power in January 1979, the rejection of modernization and Westernizations by Ayatollah Khomeini, whose theocratic worldview was antithetical to the secular democratic creed that the United States had been preaching in the third world since early 50s. Because free elections, free markets, and free people had long been articles of faith among US policy makers and the social scientist who frequently advised them, their rejection by Islamic radicals constituted a fundamental challenge to the core beliefs that shaped American relations with the Middle East. By the late 1980s the conflict between traditional Islam and modern America had become so intense that some pundits spoke of 'a clash of civilizations'.⁷⁰ But in others views, the taking of the American hostages in Iran was also exploited, not without cynicism, as a target of opportunity in the process of overcoming the 'Vietnam syndrome' shortly after the crisis erupted, the New York

times ran a front-page story by Hedrick smith “ Iran is helping the US to shed fear of intervening abroad”. Smith reported “an important shift of attitudes in Washington that many believe, will have a significant long-term impact on the willingness of the United States to project its power in the third world and to develop greater military capabilities for protecting its interests there”.⁷¹

However, US regarded Iran an important location to maintain her geo political strategy and economic interests there. The Carter doctrine was required to maintain U.S. imperialism in the Middle East. When the Shah of Iran was overthrown, and US military and intelligence installations were put out of order as Pentagon official worded it “the US government was left without any coherent imperialist strategy in the Middle East”; and there was no immediate surrogate who could take over the Shah’s role. Therefore, the US government had to reassert a stronger military presence.⁷²

After the Islamic revolt against Reza Shah Pahelvi’s regime in Iran which was considered as pro American, Khomeni Ayatullah the spiritual leader had argued that ‘the imperialism, the oppressive and treacherous rulers, the Jews, Christians, and materialists are all attempting to distort the truth of Islam and turn the Muslims astray ‘he cautioned’. . . the entire contemporary international system are totally illuminate, for they perpetuate an unjust order imposed on ‘oppressed’ Muslim by the ‘oppressive’ great powers. Muslims are therefore obliged to ‘overthrow the oppressive governments installed by the imperialists and bring into existence an Islamic government for justice that will be in the service of the people’. An Islamic world order would see the territorial state transcended by the broader entity of the umma.⁷³ Further more, After Khomeini riding victoriously it was necessary to eliminate all things western. He said it was time to launch a holy war against the West and the traitors of Islam.

Robin Wright (1986) makes this point in her examination of Shiite Islam titled *Sacred Rage*. According to Wright, the Ayatollah Khomeini was guided by the message of *Karbala*. Along with the Shiite clergy of Iran, he believed the Iranian Revolution was the first step in purifying the world. Israel must be eliminated and returned to Islamic rule. The west had become the handmaiden of the Jews, but the west was and remains the source of imperialism. Its influence is satanic and must be

destroyed. Holy warriors were called to battle. Wright says Iran exported terrorism in this vein with revolutionary zeal.

The primary target of Iran's external religious zeal has been Lebanon. Shiite fundamentalists began to flock to Lebanon in 1982 after the Israeli invasion, and Iran helped establish two terrorist organizations to support them, the *Islamic Jihad* (Islamic holy war) and Hizbullah (party of god). By 1996, both groups, though still supporting terrorism, were capable of acting as autonomous militias.⁷⁴

In addition, Khomeini made his God promise of exporting the struggle. In November 1979 and February 1980 wider spread riots erupted in the Shiites towns of the oil – rich Saudi province of Hassa, in Bahrain, while Kuwait became the target of a sustain terror and subversion campaign. In June 1979, the revolutionary regime began publicly urging the Iraqi population to rise up and overthrow the socialist and secular Ba'th regime. Tehran escalated its campaign by resuming support for the rebellious Iraqi Kurds (which had been suspended in 1975), and initiating terrorist attacks against prominent Iraqi officials. These pressures eventually led the Iraqi invasion on Iran in September 1980.⁷⁵ The US having long record of Iran backing terrorist groups to further its perceived strategic interests, containing Iranian influence in West Asia became major U.S. foreign policy objective, and there was increasing evidence that covert war was growing in scale.

Media reports suggest the US was making use of the Mujahideen-e-Khalq – a far-right organization complicit in the 1991 anti-Shia massacres in Iraq, and designated a global terrorist organisation in 1997 – for attacks inside Iran. US covert support was also thought for a Kurdish terrorist group that had executed strikes against Iran. On April 13, Iran announced the arrest of 90 Jundulloh cadres, who were reported to have created stockpiles of weapons and explosives. Iran's Intelligence Minister, Mohseni Ejeie, also pointed to the threat from the west.⁷⁶ The United States itself was willing to back "radical" Sunni Moslems as well as Saudi-backed, Wahabist movements against pan-Shiites Iran, which was regarded as the "greater" of two "evils." By 1982-83, the US along with Saudi Arabia, fully supported Saddam Hussein's war with the ayatollah Khomeini, which was instigated in reaction to Iranian support for Shiites and Kurdish faction in Iraq, while Washington looked the other way, Saddam Hussein engaged in horrific war crimes in fighting Iran and against Kurdish and Shiites factions, and other groups regarded as aligned with Iran'

in the war of cities, (a war resulting in the loss of over a million people).⁷⁷ From other point of view, Saddam Hussein had hoped to take advantage of Iran's revolutionary state; it's extremely weakened military capabilities, and its international isolation, and further more he was supported by the United States, which had welcomed Iraq's invasion as an increased pressure on Iran to release the embassy hostages. War was launched against Iran to bring an end to any threat to Iraq from the export of the Islamic revolution; and possibly to overthrow the clerical government.⁷⁸

After eight years of bitter fighting with Iraq, Iran accepted United Nations Security Council resolution to ceasefire with Iraq, and soon after international Isolation, it mended fences with the Gulf States, re-established diplomatic ties with the major West European powers, and even eluded with the United States, the 'Great Satan'. When a combination of international and regional developments offered new opportunities in the early 1990, the Ayatollah's imperialist ambitions were quickly enforced and expansion of the country's military arsenal was accompanied by sustained efforts to project Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, as well as in Central Asia and the Trans Caucasus.

While, Iran renewed and substantially accelerated it's nuclear development programme. There was a strong concern among intelligence services and arms control agencies around the world that Iran was seeking nuclear weapons. Iran was known to have been shopping for nuclear know how and material in the West, the successor states to the Soviet Union, especially Russia – from which Iran had acquired two reactors of four hundred megawatts thermal each and selected third world countries, such as Brazil, North Korea, and China, which had long been involved in the Iranian programme. On their part, the Ayatollahs made no secret of their interest in the bomb, at least until they came under heavy American pressure to bridle their nuclear ambitions following the 9/11 attacks.⁷⁹

The question of US interest fit in factional rivalries in Afghan's civil war to contain Iran was seen in the background of Iran-Iraq war explosion, where 'the United States itself was willing to back "radical" Sunni Muslims as well as Saudi –backed Wahabist movements against pan-Shiites Iran'.⁸⁰ And during Gorge Bush regime where he himself denounced Iran's oppressive regime for Middle East⁸¹ and again during Clinton administration after Gulf War, he denounced "dual containment

policy” against Iran and Iraq.⁸² Speaking at conference of former American and Soviet officials involved in the Afghan crisis in Norway in September 1995, General Valentin Varennikov said that Soviet leaders feared and were militarily prepared for US invasion of Iran to overthrow Khomeini regime, however, according to KGB defector, Vasily Mitrokhin the KGB was alarmed by the prospect of improvement of relations between Iran and Afghanistan or taking place of an Islamic revolution in Afghanistan.⁸³

With the growing Iranian influence in Afghanistan affairs, in the absence of major powers involvement in the Afghanistan’s conflict, Iran assumed a larger role by backing the government of Burhanuddin Rabbani.⁸⁴ During the war of resistance to Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, Shi’a Hazaras group was largely dismissed by fellow Mujahideens belonging to the non-Shiait camp. But the external donors such as the United States, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan excluded Hazaras from receiving any military and financial aid. The contrary they promoted Pushtun Mujahideens over their Hazara counterparts. Caught in this internal sectarian and external ideological divide the Hazaras were left confined to rely upon Iran for their cause.⁸⁵ Iran’s involvement in the Afghan conflict primarily to secure the interests of the Afghan Shiites as particularly the Hazaras went through two distinct phases. In the first phase during the resistance to Soviet occupation, Iran selectively helped only the Hazaras. Iran’s ability to arm and fund the eight Afghan Shia groups was officially recognized by Tehran. In 1988 with the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, Iran immediately worked to unite those recognized groups into a single Hizb-e-wahdat party. It then pressed for the Wahadat’s inclusion in the international negotiations to form a new Mujahideen government. As the Afghan war intensified between 1992 and 1995 so did the rivalry between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Pakistani attempts to bring all those factions together always had sidelined the Hazaras and Iran. In the Peshawar Accord (between the groups of Mujahideen on power sharing in Kabul) or the Jalalabad Accords to end civil war, this trend prevailed. Iran over the years came to realize that its exclusive focus on the Shiites factor had left it with little effective say in Afghanistan developments. This caused Iran shift in its policy on Afghanistan, Iran started backing not just the Afghan Shias but all the Persian speaking groups who were resisting Pashtun domination Iran has natural link with the Tajiks, they originate from the same ancient race and spoke the same language. In late 1991 Iran signed an

agreement with Tajikistan and Afghanistan's Jamiat-e-Islami to strengthen its influence on Persian speaking Sunni Afghans. Iran also contacted the Ismaili Shiites and Uzbeks in Afghanistan.⁸⁶ Their effort was to combine together to oppose Pushtun hegemony. As a strategist, they were most organized and effective. Their motivation and dedication to their resistance movement was spurred by their vision of having a central role in post-Soviet Afghanistan and replacing the rival Pushtuns.⁸⁷ In addition, as Professor James Clad of the Georgetown University pointed out that "... Iranian meddling in religious disputes within Pakistan (which pitted Shia against Sunni) there was the vexatious Iranian patronage of ethnic Tajiks combatants in Afghanistan, partisans war against Islamabad's preferred factions in that country's civil war."⁸⁸

Iran's interest in Afghanistan was to counter the interests of the Saudi – Pakistan – US combine for obvious reason. USA refused to accept the Islamic revolution in Iran; the Saudi's used their money power to foment counter revolutionary forces that would dislodge Iran from the high pedestal it gained after the revolution and Pakistan joint its interest with these two.⁸⁹

The Clinton administration, which was following a policy of dual containment of Iran and Iraq, saw the increasing Iranian role in Afghanistan as a disturbing one in the ground of rising Iranian influence in Central Asian republics as well.⁹⁰ After the collapse of Soviet Union, the birth of five Central Asian states gave Iran a new impetus to end its international isolation. Iran moved to gain footing in Central Asia. In November 1991, an agreement to build a railway line between Iran and Turkmenistan was signed. In its Central Asian foray Iran was however, careful not to antagonize Russia. Tehran declined to support Azerbaijan in its war with Armenia even though 20 per cent of Iranian population is Azeri; Tehran also helped Russia and the UN to end the civil war in Tajikistan.⁹¹ One may see, the US approach to Central Asia was also driven by overarching geopolitical considerations, with an underlying goal of containing the influence of China, Iran and Russia. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent emergence of the newly- independent states in 1991, US policy toward Central Asia centered on security relationship with Kazakhstan. US focus to secure Kazakhstan's nuclear arsenal and in December 1993, resulted in the signing of a cooperative threat reduction (CTR) agreement to dismantle and destroy the country's more than 100 SS-18 missiles.

By 1994, the US cemented its bilateral security cooperation with Kazakhstan through a defense doctrine and training the neighboring states of Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan also joined Kazakhstan in entering NATO's partnership for peace program (PFP). Central Asian membership in the NATO (PFP) served as the main avenue for Western security engagement.⁹² As a result the United States gave Pakistan a free hand in Afghanistan and indirectly supported the Pakistani efforts to build up the Taliban militia as a counterweight to the Iranian – backed Rabbani regime.⁹³ The United States regarded Pakistan as a strong ally throughout the cold war then continued to act as a frontline state for America and America increasingly viewed Afghanistan through the Pakistani prism. One needs only to recall Robin Raphael's strong plea before the Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee to revise the 1990 Pressler Amendment which had ended all military and economic assistance to Pakistan. Pakistan however, always had its own axe to grind in neighboring Afghanistan. American interest in Afghanistan renewed only when it became increasingly clear that Pakistan's protégé Hekmatyar had failed to capture Kabul.⁹⁴ And because Hekmatyar was suspected of harboring Islamic terrorists who had carried out attacks against western targets and his increasing closeness with Iran was also viewed with alarm.⁹⁵ In 1990-91 he had backed Iraq in the Gulf war. The USA stressed to Pakistan that, in view of his divisive attacks on other Afghans, Hekmatyar was not to receive US aid. Hekmatyar's failure to support Saudi Arabia against Iraq after the invasion of Kuwait cost him heavily from a power that had seen him as their chosen instrument to combat Iranian power in Afghanistan.

The final step against Hekmatyar came from Pakistan. Pakistan (or more precisely, the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) agency of Pakistan) had also long seen Hekmatyar as their chosen policy instrument in Afghanistan. But his divisive ways hurt Pakistan's position in newly independent Central Asia and the desire to end war in Afghanistan led the Pakistan starting to cut off Hekmatyar from their support in late 1991. But he did not lose all his foreign supporters. Arab supporters, who agreed with his stand over the Gulf war, continued to provide suitcases of dollars. Libya provided both funding and terrorist style urban combat training; it remained an ally. There were even unconfirmed reports of an attempted Hekmatyar rapprochement with Iran's long

time opponent.⁹⁶ The Clinton administration was clearly sympathetic to the Taliban as they were in line with its anti – Iran policy,⁹⁷ as Taliban forces were supported by many Arab militants most of them were strongly anti-Shiite; they contributed accentuating the common prejudice among Afghan Sunni against the Hazara Shia, which led to various massacres of civilian Hazaras living in Kabul after the fall of the city in May 1992.⁹⁸ Fight fire with fire, was the US reasoning: combat the militant Shiaism of the Iranians with even greater militancy and violence by some groups which were considered as orthodox Sunni Muslims.

This served well the purpose of Saudi Arabia. The Saudis were troubled by Iran's power, even though that power had been reduced through Iran's virtual defeat by Saddam Hussein in the 1980-88 war in the Gulf. The Saudi rulers were also vexed by the 'heresies' of its own persecuted Shiites minority centered in the sensitive region of the eastern oil fields. Anti- Soviet and simultaneous anti-Shiite policies did suite Saudi objectives perfectly. Pakistan anxious to exclude both Russian and Iranian influence from its region and thus secured trade routes to the west markets of Central Asia.⁹⁹ And Taliban could be a counterweight for Pakistan for its keenness to achieve success depth in the strategic confrontation with India over Kashmir Issue, and Taliban as an alternative to the unreliable Hekmatyar, whom they had earlier selected as their point man¹⁰⁰ because Hekmatyar had failed to capture Kabul¹⁰¹ and later he jumped side, to be a client of Iranians.¹⁰²

The emergence of the Taliban was closely related to the balance of power and an evolution among the fundamentalist movements. While the Hezb had been supported by Pakistani Jamaat-e Islami, the Taliban had been helped by more conservative fundamentalist movement from Pakistan, namely the Jamit-e Ulema-I Islam. They received discreet support from Saudi Arabia, who became estranged from more radical Islamists like Hikmatyar. The Americans then strongly opposed to radical Islam, might have been in search of another Muslim card in line with Saudis, with the aim of not leaving Islamic fundamentalism with no other choice than to move closer to Iran. Pakistan was still playing the Islamic card in Central Asia and also needed Islamic leverage in its policy to establish a corridor from its territory to Central Asia through Afghanistan. This allowed Pakistan also to play on the Pushtun

connection (since many high –ranking military officers and civil servants in Pakistan were Pushtun).¹⁰³

The Taliban which took shape in mid-1994 and began to spread their influence in the large part of the country had backing of Pakistan and the Saudi governments. The US also had supplied Taliban with military equipments and weapons through Pakistan.¹⁰⁴ the US long supplied arms and training to the most ferociously reactionary fighting forces in the Islamic world, including those Mujahideen who spawned a second generation reform movement known as the Taliban to that extreme that Ayatollah Khomeini condemned them as a branch of *Islam-i limrikai*, “American Islam.”.¹⁰⁵ While, Saudis were betting heavily on the Taliban to eliminate all traces to Iranian influence, mainly in the form of the Shiite factions which the Saudis, as well as Zia al-Haq always opposed.¹⁰⁶ This effort suited Israel also, as some Jewish lobbies in the USA were not initially critical of the Taliban. In line with the US State Department Israel saw the Taliban as an anti- Iranian force which could be used to undermine Iranian influence in Afghanistan and Central Asia. Israel’s intelligence agency Mossad developed a dialogue with Taliban through Taliban liaison offices in the USA. Pakistan’s ISI supported this dialogue even though Pakistan did not recognize Israel. The ISI had developed links through the CIA with Mossad during the Afghan jihad. But as US policy toward the Taliban shifted so did Israel’s as the Taliban gave refuge to Bin Laden and encouraged the drugs trade. Turkey convinced Israel that the Taliban were a security threat to the region. Mossad opened contacts with the anti-Taliban alliance. Israel now had an interest in seeing that the Taliban did not take control of the whole Afghanistan, even though it remained suspicious of Ahmad Shah Masud’s support from Iran. Both the Taliban and the Northern Alliance were to accuse each other for receiving Israeli supports.¹⁰⁷

While, Iran perceived the Taliban to be a creation of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia with US support. It was also convinced that the Taliban was put together not just to contain the Iranian role in Afghan affairs, but the Taliban were perceived to be a ‘trap’ set up by the US, Saudi and Pakistan to drag Iran into war with Afghanistan. A ‘conspiracy theory’, sought to explain that since the Gulf war of 1991, the US was seeking to lure Iran into some war or the other that would serve as an opportunity to destroy its renovated military machine and further to exhaust its economy – with the

over all objective of restoring Iran to its former status as a piece of US strategic chess – board. And since the US would prefer to distance the war as far as possible from the Gulf region – to avoid repercussions that might prove hard to control later on – a war between Iran and Afghanistan would be ideal.

Iran shares a 900 km long border on the east with Afghanistan. The relations between the two slipped to lowest point in late 1998, when ten Iranian diplomats and journalist in Mazare Sharif went missing and were presumed to have been killed.¹⁰⁸ After the Taliban stormed Mazar- i-Sharif, it was later reported that 2,000-6,000 Shia Hazara civilians had been systematically massacred by the guerillas after recapturing the city¹⁰⁹ Iran amassed 70,000 Revolutionary guards and conducted the largest ever ground and air exercise on its Afghan border.

However, in mid-October the Taliban agreed to free all Iranian prisoners who were held in Afghanistan and to punish only those found responsible for the killing of the Iranian diplomats (or military advisors, according to Taliban). By the end of the year the situation became calmer, with the Taliban having expressed regret for the deaths of the Iranian nationals, and Iran too having scaled down its border forces and announced that it had no intention of invading Afghanistan.¹¹⁰

B. The U.S. Attempt to Prevent Iran from being Alternate Oil Pipeline Route

Apart from political aspect, the Taliban were also used as a southbound route of the Central Asian oil and gas, a route that would be projected and promoted in lieu of the Iranian route.¹¹¹ Certainly the Taliban appeared to serve the US policy of isolating Iran by creating a firmly Sunni buffer on Iran's border and potentially providing security for trade routes and pipelines that would break Iran's monopoly on Central Asia's southern trade routes,' wrote Reuters.¹¹²

Such a project was aimed to deprive Iran of transit fees: it also aimed to deprive Iran of South Asian markets for its oil and gas. And most importantly, it aimed to deprive Iran of a potential political and trade influence in South Asia. Technically speaking, Iran would be the cheapest long-term export route option for the Caspian Sea Republic. Moreover, Iran was interested in playing an active role in solving the problem of transportation of oil and gas resources of the Caspian republics of the CIS to world markets. Russia could gain if they would support project meant to transport oil and gas of Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan through Iranian territory onwards to

potential markets of South and South-East Asia. Iran was also keen to export natural gas to Pakistan and India. Both South Asian countries could benefit from the proposed \$ 5 billion Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline project, which was expected to cost around \$700 million revenue per annum to Pakistan - \$500 million as annual transit fee and additional \$200 million saved through cheaper gas. Pakistan is geo-strategically located as a transport corridor for supply of gas and also in a position to obtain it at cheaper prices from Iran, Qatar and Turkmenistan. This pipeline holds greater prospects than the Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan pipeline. Originally, the Iranian Gas company planned to deliver 2 billion cubic feet of gas daily to Karachi and Multan with an option to extend it to India and onwards to some countries in the Far East. However, Indian had reservations about this land route as in their view it would pass through 'hostile' Pakistani territory. This India looked for an alternative sea route being developed by the Russian company Gazprom that has a 10 per cent share in the South Pars offshore gas fields of Iran.¹¹³ In addition, in the first phase of its programme, Iran proposed swapping its crude oil with Central Asian crude. Since 1998 crude oil from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan has been transported across the Caspian Sea to Iran's Caspian port of Neka, where it is refined and consumed in Iran. In exchange Iran allowed companies to lift oil from Iranian ports on the Gulf. With pipeline projects indefinitely delayed, this appealed to the oil companies who, despite US pressure not to do so, began to negotiate further swaps with Iran. Two US companies, Chevron and Mobil who had oil concessions in Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan applied to the Clinton administration in May 1998, for a license to carry out swaps with Iran – a move that created a major policy headache for Washington and would become a test case for the future of US sanction against Iran.¹¹⁴

Whereas, the west had tried to exclude Iran, having influence in this region since post-Soviet era by encouraging the politics of pan Turkish ideas. It received boost from western policies that supported pro-Turkish tendencies against reemergence of Iranian interest in the Turkish region of the former Soviet Union. Turkey herself was not reluctant to adapt itself to this new international atmosphere and forged new links with the countries in this region. The Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSEC) was found in 1992. The BSEC handled small projects and sought to develop transportation, communication and environmental projects. The BSEC, initially founded by Turkey, Pakistan and Iran during the late

1960's was expanded by the addition of five Central Asian States, Azerbaijan and Afghanistan in 1993. This became a catalyst for building private sector banking for building infrastructure and scientific technical cooperation. The Turkish world was expanded from Europe to Eurasia.¹¹⁵

One could notice that US did not want energy resources pipeline go through Iran. A serious conflict between China and the US rose over this, as China's support for the extension of pipeline routes from Central Asia through Iran had the potential to generate conflict between Beijing and Washington. China's oil agreements with Kazakhstan included a Chinese pledge to help construct pipeline from Kazakhstan to the Kazkh-Turkman border with the goal of eventually extending it through an Iranian port. This could run counter the US policy of denying Iran access to Central Asia oil.¹¹⁶

In the months before the Taliban came to power, the then US Assistant Secretary of State for South Asia, Robin Raphael, waged an intense round of shuttle diplomacy between the powers with possible stake in the UNCAL project. 'Robin Raphael was the face of the UNCAL pipeline; said an official of the former Afghanistan government who was present at some of the meetings with her. In addition tapping new sources of energy, the project also suited a major US strategic aim in the region: isolating its enemies Iran and stifling a frequently mooted rival pipeline backed by Iran. It would eliminate the need to deal with Iran, a country towards which Washington nurtured deep antipathy and resentment, and gave the US and its partner's control of the new supply of energy.'¹¹⁷

Pipelines through Afghanistan would exclude the possibility of direct supply by Iran of resources to meet Pakistan's energy needs, and the consequent flow of foreign exchange earnings into Iran's coffers. The Isolation of Iran was not especially an obsession of the State Department, but there were such strongly anti-Iranian attitudes in sections of Congress, reinforced by the lobbying of pressure groups such as the America-Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), that a President had little incentive to take his political life in his hands by exploring the possibility of a less antagonistic relationship with Iran. The policy of 'dual containment' of Iran and Iraq, initially articulated on behalf of the Clinton Administration by Australian born former lobbyist Martin Indyk, was providing increasingly creaky. The Irony in the case of Afghanistan was that the attempt to exclude Iran by means of the expansion of

Taliban power had adverse effects on Afghanistan.¹¹⁸ The war in Afghanistan revived the Iranian suspicion regarding the pipeline; it feared long term US hegemony in Afghanistan and a fierce competition for Central Asian energy resources among American multinational companies. In view of the US determination to block the route through Iran, the Afghanistan – Pakistan corridor could emerge as the only alternative to unleash Central Asian energy potential.¹¹⁹

C. The U.S. Support to Afghan groups in order to secure oil and gas pipeline route through Afghanistan.

The post-cold war model of war was seen as quite a less threatening, more diffused, and less intense. The military and intelligence posture were to deal with the Soviet threat as unnecessary. Indeed, the fundamental threats to American national security no longer arose from military challenges but from economic challenges. The entire sphere of military challenge was degraded to the level of subsidiary threat, while the perceptions of national interest shifted to the economic sphere.¹²⁰ The defeat of America's cold war enemy blinded the US political elites to the extent that US policy failed to adapt the new world order.

America's foreign policy had been shaped during half a century of cold war. A generation of diplomats had been raised in the shadow of Soviet containment; the dismembering of the Soviet Union left them in a political vacuum, without specific guidelines. To fill that vacuum, American diplomacy turned to business. As such they became ambassadors and diplomats of the strong Washington lobbies that backed their own parties. Almost overnight, it became apparent that US foreign policy had turned into powerful vehicle for American cooperation seeking opportunities every where instead of promoting international stability. This imperialist approach was an engine powering the foreign policy of George W. Bush.

In the early 1990s impelled by the oil lobby, George Bush Sr. underestimated the consequences of the disintegration of the economic equilibrium in Central Asia. The dismantling of Soviet power was perceived as the beginning of lucrative period of exploitation, with US oil companies controlling the vast energy fields of the region.¹²¹ After Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, little attempt was made to focus on US energy.¹²² Even though after the collapse of bipolar world and the contours of

a multi polar world order American continued entry and continued presence in any region was guided by her long-term national interest.¹²³

The United States was actively involved in the region since early 1990s. Beginning in the 1970s the US government and private Foundations funded detailed research on the region. From the late 80s the regions newspaper and journals were regularly collected translated and analyzed. At the time of the independence of the Central Asian Republics (CARs) the United States was among the first to set up well-staffed embassies throughout the region.

One of the key concerns for the American policymakers was how to secure access to the oil and natural gas reserves in the first half of the 21st century. The answer laid in the Central Asia and Caucasus. This was the primary reason why the United States was among the first to engage with these states soon after they declared independence. The Caspian Sea reserves were estimated to hold 100 billion to 200 billion barrels of oil. Natural gas reserves were estimated at 7.9 trillion cubic meters.¹²⁴ According to Kees Van der pijl, the oil reserves of the Caspian region were initially estimated at around 150 billion barrels, half that of Saudi Arabia or equals to the reserves of Iraq and Iran combined.¹²⁵ Western experts believed that the untapped hydrocarbon resources of the Central Asia Republics could make the region the Persian Gulf of the next century. Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan oil fields are believed to have significant amount of oil reserves and the largest gas reserves are believed to be in Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan¹²⁶ (see annex-1).

In the earlier phase of its engagement with the region, the United States encouraged the newly independent states (NIS) to adopt western style economic reforms. Economic growth and the integration of the CARs was to serve a very important purpose: ensuring the economic sovereignty of the NIS, and the eventual elimination of the Russian and Iranian influence, while at the same time securing lucrative markets for US goods and services.¹²⁷

The end of the confrontation with the Soviet Union created opportunities for the United States to redeploy as effectively as possible the considerable resources these were no longer needed to deter or counter Soviet aggression those resources included not only steel and coal, oil and food, and fibers and plastics, but also the effort and

talent of scientists, engineers, and many other people at the skill level in both public and private sectors.¹²⁸

After the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan and following the collapse of the USSR, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was formed. While the Central Asian states were eager to invite the overseas oil companies for commercial deals because they hoped that the export earnings would then put substantial funds at their disposal for reconstructing their post-Soviet economics. They also considered that as a way of reducing their dependence on Moscow which, in spite of their independence cornered them in a tight noose. The Central Asian states also required an access to the sea for their trade. The existing routes involved long distances, and were prohibitively expensive. Just by way of illustration, Dushanbe, capital of Tajikistan as located by road some 3,200 km from Bandar Abbas in Iran, 3,400 from Odessa in the black sea and some a 500 km Vladivostok in the pacific. In this regards the Pakistani ports in the South Karachi, port Qasim, Pasni, Gwadar, Jewani and Ormara in the Arabian Sea – was thought to be an alternative proposition. In comparison Karachi being around 2,720 km from Dushanbe and from Ashkabad, capital of Turkmenistan, about 2,000 km. These attractions had opened up the possibilities for the Central Asian states to avoid dependence on any one state for ports and pipelines. Therefore, they were opened to options and follow policies which would allow them to deal with anyone. This was demonstrated in Turkmenistan's broader policy of 'positive neutrality' which had allowed it to build political and economic interests with Iran on the one hand and the US on the other. For Central Asia states the location of Iran was very useful. It could help them by providing access to the sea. Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan viewed Iran as a better route through which its gas and oil could be exported to western markets (see annex-2). Notwithstanding its espousal of Shia fundamentalism, Iran was accepted as a more stable economic partner by all Central Asian states. In this regards Russia and India were also not opposed to the engagement with Iran and viewed this possibility in their own economic and strategic interests. However, the US in furtherance of its containment policy on Iran was determined to shut Iran out of the emerging oil game in Central Asia¹²⁹ With these reasons the US government was slow to pick up on the importance of the region (and those former Soviet republics) forged relations with US business.¹³⁰ The US approach to Central Asia was also driven by overarching

geopolitical considerations with an underlying goal containing the influence of China, Iran and Russia.

Another US policy was even more ambitious with long term goals of democratization and marketization, a consolidation of regional security and cooperation and an open unfettered environment to allow the development of the regional energy resources.¹³¹ The private western entrants into the new great game included well – placed individuals, maverick companies and large oil companies – in that order. It was not until Clinton's globalization offensive of 1994, that the US developed its own geopolitical offensive to wrest control of the region from Russia.¹³² The discovery of new hydrocarbon reserves led Central Asian region to gain in importance as it could serve as a replacement once the oil reserves in the Gulf start depleting seriously by the Middle of the next century. The assessment of the hydrocarbon reserves of the region had been speculative, but in anticipation of the potential oil and gas resources, a subtle yet big battle had started to establish control over these energy resources. The export routes out of Central Asia had then become one of the central issues in post cold war politics. It was in this context that Central Asia was again emerging as a murky battleground among big powers. The agenda was being set by geopolitics and oil.

The object of the revived game was twofold: firstly, to establish friendly relations with the leaders of the Central Asian republics controlling the oil and gas resources. Secondly, to secure alternative pipeline routes to world markets. The landlocked nature of the Central Asian states created obstacles to proposals for creating new alternative routes. The major existing pipeline systems ran north through Russia. Both passed through Chechnya where one system serves Russia and the other the export market, via the Russia black sea port of Novorossisk. But at present there is no pipeline heading south.¹³³

While, Turkmenistan as a gas-rich country avoided its dependence on Russia which was keen to export it to Pakistan and India and then onwards to South-East Asia. The proposed \$2 billion trans-Afghanistan pipeline covering 1,464 kilometers was a 48-inch diameter pipeline that was proposed to connect the Daulatabad gas fields in Southern Turkmenistan to Multan in central Pakistan. It was proposed that it may be extended 600 km into India after traversing 750 km in Afghanistan. Reportedly, the expected supply of gas would be at the rate of 2 billion cubic feet per

day. The Turkmenistan government on its part had guaranteed deliverability of 25 trillion cubic feet of natural gas exclusively for the Central Asian gas pipeline. It had signed a deal with the consortium comprising UNOCAL, Turkmenistan government, Delta of Saudi Arabia, Stochu of Japan, Gazprom of Russia, Inpex of Japan, Hyundai of South Korea and Crescent of Pakistan. Talks on the above proposal between Turkmenistan and Pakistan had gone on for many years but had been hampered by the then ongoing war in Afghanistan. For countries like Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan, the preconditions for societal uplift were to build gas and oil pipelines as soon as possible for transportation of their hydrocarbon assets to the outside world.¹³⁴

While, the US oil production began to decline and the American companies began to plan for replenishing reserves by investing in friendly countries, the Central Asian republics looked more lucrative than even the Middle Eastern allies due to their refusal to 'countenance foreigners running their oil industries in 1993, the American oil company Chevron concluded a deal worth \$ 40 billion to develop Tengiz oil field on the north eastern shore of the Caspian sea. However the deal required construction of oil pipelines which in turn depended on regional stability. Peace and stability in Afghanistan was a prerequisite to the construction of pipelines through alternative routes other than through Iran. Subsequently, when the Central Asian republics became a hunting ground for the international companies with their governments looking for ways to break the Russian monopoly to lower the cost of delivering their oil to the outside world by construction of alternative oil pipelines the American companies also stood in the queue. One of the US companies, UNOCAL had planned for the construction of an oil pipe line through Afghanistan at a cost \$ 8 billion. The Clinton administration had openly applauded the UNOCAL project¹³⁵ (see map-1).

The United States was by then, after a period of neglect, trying to revise its contacts in Afghanistan with the new foray into the former Soviet republics in the Caspian area. Afghanistan became important once again.¹³⁶ During the first presidency of Bill Clinton Afghanistan was conspicuous by its absence. It would however, be incorrect to state that Washington had nothing to do with Afghanistan after Soviet withdrawal. On the contrary Pakistan which was a strong ally through out the cold war now continued to act as a frontline state for America and America increasingly viewed Afghanistan through the Pakistani prism. After the end of cold war US had halted it's military and economic assistance because of its breaching

nuclear proliferation issue. But later US had to turn to Pakistan again when US found its interests in Afghanistan, because Pakistan always played important role in neighboring Afghanistan. American interest in Afghanistan renewed only when it became increasingly clear that Pakistan's protégé Hekmatyar had failed to capture Kabul and America's calculation of gains from Central Asia's oil and gas transportation appeared to be in jeopardy. But by and large America's understanding of the area continued to be influenced by Pakistan's reading of the situation. Thus, when Pakistan created and promoted the Taliban, America went along with the exercise sharing Pakistan's belief that they would be able to provide some governance and stability in Afghanistan that would allow ambitious oil projects to take off.

Oil has been a major US concern. America was in serious search to set itself free from 'OPEC tentacles'. Refusal of Middle Eastern allies to agree to foreigners running their oil industry forced US to look around for alternative sources. Newly independent states of Central Asia provided a willing alternative avenue.¹³⁷ As Massoud the leader of a group rival to Taliban defined the goal of Taliban and their foreign patrons in the following words- "As always, it is the question of money. Western companies are interested in resources-rich territories of northern Afghanistan. They also want to penetrate the adjacent countries of Central Asia: Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan for Gold and aluminum but most importantly-oil and gas. All theses, according to the plans of the true instigators of war, must go by the shortest route-through Afghanistan – to the Pakistani seaport of Karachi. This is the essence of the war, not the struggle for the 'true faith'. The Holy Quran and jihad are, unfortunately, only cover in this rather dirty affair".¹³⁸

The Clinton administration, writes Ahmad Rashid, 'was clearly sympathetic to the Taliban, as they were in line with its anti-Iran policy and were important for the success of any Southern pipeline from Central Asia that would avoid Iran. Turkmenistan would be the supplier of the gas.'¹³⁹ In fact from the Iranian coast oil and gas could be shipped via the existing Iranian network. But US companies were prevented from using this route by the Iran-Libya sanctions Act (ILSA), which prohibited commercial ventures with those two countries. The cost of longer route through Afghanistan to the Pakistani was more expensive but considerably more advantageous for the US. It would eliminate the need to deal with Iran, a country towards which Washington nurtured deep antipathy and resentment, and gave the US

and its partner control of the new supply of energy. Since the mid-1990s the Americans had been pursuing that avenue. The US government was impressed by the ruthlessness and willingness of the then emerging Taliban (movement) to cut a pipeline deal. The state Department and Pakistan's inter services intelligence agency agreed to funnel arms and funding to the Taliban in their war against the ethnically Tajik Northern Alliance. Until 1995, US taxpayers paid the entire annual salary of every single Taliban government official.

The UNOCAL deal was also regarded as the jewel in the crown of what was known in Washington as the strategy of the silk route this policy pursued the exclusion of Russia from the Asian pipelines: the energy highway that travel from the basin of the Caspian Sea westwards and from Central Asia, South and eastwards. Finally, by establishing a strong presence in these areas, the US wanted to lock Iran and China out of the energy business in the region, since Washington feared they could assist the Central Asian republics in setting up their own oil companies.¹⁴⁰

*The award-winning Journalist, described that: When the Taliban took Kabul in 1996, Washington said nothing why? Because Taliban leaders were soon on their way to Houston, Texas, to be entertained by executives of the oil company offered them a generous cut of the profits of the oil and gas pumped through a pipeline that the Americans wanted to build across Afghanistan. This was going to be an underground highway that would connect the rich energy fields of Turkmenistan with the coastal shores of Pakistan and India. Naturally, the US would have had full control upon it. The Taliban will probably develop like the Saudi did, commented a US diplomat; summarizing in this sentence the hopes of the white House Washington envisaged Afghanistan as an American oil colony.*¹⁴¹ As pointed out by Professor William O. Beeman, an anthropologist specialist in Middle Eastern studies at Brown university, "US support for the Taliban had nothing to do with religion or ethnicity, but only with the economics of oil the UNOCAL consortium which feared that as long as the country was split among squabbling warlords, the pipeline would never be built. Political stability was required to implement the \$ 4.5 billion project and the US believed that the Taliban regime would be the most suitable government to achieve such a goal. Thus, in the aftermath of the Taliban's conquest of Kabul in 1996, the State Department avoided criticizing the methods the Taliban used to establish control over the country".¹⁴² John K. Cooley writes that "by 1989, the US having at first

sympathetically watched (if not helped) the rise of the Pakistani created Taliban, was observing with a mixture of sympathy and trepidation, the US oil company, UNOCAL, as it sought to negotiate with the Taliban authorization for energy pipeline from the ex-Soviet now independent, republic of Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan. If successful such agreements would probably be viewed by Brzezinski the multi-national energy firms and like – mined economic and political strategists as one of the positive long-range outcomes of the Afghanistan conflicts”.¹⁴³ It could therefore, be argued that the US administration’s endeavor to secure its oil base led it to support the UNOCAL project and the Taliban advent on the Afghan scene with a promise of stability in 1994. When the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996 Chris Targert, a UNOCAL executive said that pipeline project would now be easier to implement. The US administration was not far behind to appreciate the development within hours of Taliban capture of Kabul. US State Department announced that it would establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban by sending an official to Kabul. State Department spokesman Glyn Davies said that the US found nothing objectionable in the steps taken by the Taliban to impose Islamic law, to him; the Taliban appeared to be anti- modern rather than anti-western which was not perhaps as worrisome. Senator Hank Brown who favored the UNOCAL project also assessed the advent of the Taliban as a positive development in Afghanistan. The good part of what had happened was that one of the factions at least seemed capable of developing a government in Afghanistan. Assistant Secretary of the State for South Asian Affairs Karl Inderfurth testimony before the Senate Committee in July 2000 which recalled the high hopes that greeted the Taliban movement in 1996 clearly indicated the US line that time.¹⁴⁴

D. The U.S. policy of containing Russian dominance in oil rich Central Asia

The US approach to Central Asia was also driven by overarching geopolitical considerations with an underlying goal containing the influence of China, Iran and Russia¹⁴⁵ It was not until Clinton’s globalization offensive of 1994, that the US developed its own geopolitical offensive to wrest control of the region from Russia¹⁴⁶

In the earlier phase of its engagement with the region, the United States encouraged the newly independent states (NIS) to adopt western style economic reforms Economic growth and the integration of the CARs was to serve a very

important purpose: ensuring the economic sovereignty of the NIS, and the eventual elimination of the Russian and Iranian influence, while at the same time securing lucrative markets for US goods and services.¹⁴⁷ One might see that US involvement with factional rivalries in Afghan's civil war fit with US strategy to contain Russia, in Cogan's analysis of American motives, and their possible consequences including the alliance with the Islamists than senior figures like Brzezinski. As some very senior CIA and other administration officials had serious reservations and apprehensions. Cogan acknowledged that the Americans, as well as the Soviets, had already in 1979, become victims of the tide of Islamic revivalism sweeping the Muslims world. Main antagonists of the Americans were the Shiites Muslims, followers of the Ayatollah Khomeini of Iran; whereas the main adversaries of the Soviets were the Sunni Muslims – doctrinally and in many other ways quite different from the Shiites of South and Central Asia. Cogan quotes "an unnamed CIA colleague, still active in the Agency's clandestine operations in 1993, describing the CIA – Islamist partnership; "we took the means to wage war, put them in the hands of people who could do so, for purposes for which we agreed."

Brzezinski's goals were, and remain for more grandiose and truly strategic. Asked whether he regretted favoring extremist Islamism or arming and training future terrorists, his reply was, "which was more important in world history? The Taliban or the fall of the Soviet empire? A few over - excited Islamists or the liberation of Central Europe [Brzezinski's original Polish homeland was of course in Eastern Europe; perhaps this is what he meant] and the end of the cold war?"¹⁴⁸

No super power could afford to ignore a region which held immense energy potential further, it would not be in its own strategic interest to allow any other power to gain influence on the region. US interests in Central Asia were keen similar to Russia's. While, like Russia, it could not lay historical claims but it definitely had the capacity and make every effort to insinuate itself as the principal power broker for the region on the line of the role it had defined for itself in the Gulf. It would not only like the export routes to be controlled by any one other than itself but also the control over the oil reserves that would help the US to perpetuate its influence over Russia.

But what those states regarded as hardheaded commercial interests was viewed by Russian as incipient interventionism. Russia was worried about theses developments and the possibilities of hostile hands on pipeline taps. Russia had

historic and legal claims to the Caspian Sea and had insisted that it must be made a party to any agreement on sharing oil and natural gas resources of the region. Russia had attempted to have a finger in the pie. But the Russian ambition and determination to control the flow of oil and gas from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan had been viewed in western perceptions as attempts by the Russian security establishment to impose a single direction for the pipelines north via Russian territory. This would give Russia tremendous control over the flow of oil and gas to western markets and would make the west vulnerable to Russia's political whims. Russian energy policy could also be part of an overall policy which aims to keep the west out of the Central Asian states preserving it under an exclusively Russian sphere of influence.¹⁴⁹ With this scramble over energy resources in Central Asia Afghanistan became a rivalry place again.

Like before, as the battle between British India Empire and Tsar's Russian empire over communication links as both empires indulged in massive railway projects. The Russian built railway lines across Central Asia to their border with Afghanistan, Persia and China, while the British built Railways lines across India to their border with Afghanistan. The centre of gravity for both powers was Afghanistan. The British feared that a Russian thrust on Herat from the Turkmen region could threaten British Baluchistan, while Moscow gold could turn Kabul's rulers against the British. Russians feared that the British would undermine them in Central Asia by supporting revolts by Muslims tribes and the rulers of Bukhara and Kokand against Russia. In another replay in the 1980s, the USA encouraged the Afghan Mujahideen to cross into Central Asia and attack Soviet army posts. And in replay Soviet troops in Afghanistan frequently called the Mujahideen 'Basmachis'.

The current great game was between expanding and contracting empires. As a weakened and bankrupt Russia attempted to keep a grip on what it still viewed as its frontiers in Central Asia and controlled the flow of Caspian oil through pipelines that traverse Russia, the USA was thrusting itself into the region on the back of proposed oil pipelines which would bypass Russia. Iran, Turkey and Pakistan were building their own communication links with the region and wanted to be the preferred route of choice for future pipelines heading east, west or south.¹⁵⁰ The strategic interest of Washington and the US oil companies in the Caspian was growing and Washington began to snub Russia. Turkmenistan's economic plight was worsening due to its

inability to sell its gas. For the USA the prospects of a gas pipeline through Afghanistan was not only attractive because it avoided Iran, but it would signal support to Turkmenistan, Pakistan and Taliban while clearly snubbing Russia and Iran.¹⁵¹

From a geopolitical point of view, Afghanistan formed a potential 'land bridge' for bulk trade or oil and gas pipelines to be constructed from the Central Asian states to markets in Pakistan, India and elsewhere in the world via Karachi or another Pakistani port on the Arabian sea. Irrespective of which government was in place in Kabul, Afghanistan's territory could provide access to world markets and an alternate to total dependence upon Russia's monopoly on trade routes.¹⁵²

The civil war (1992-97) between the neo-communist government and an array of Islamist forces devastated the country of Tajikistan. Once again thousands of Tajik rebels and refugees found refuge in northern Afghanistan, while Tajik government forces were backed by Russian troops. President Boris Yeltsin declared in 1993 that the Tajik-Afghan border was in fact Russia's border and the 25,000 Russian troops stationed there would be defending Russia. It was a reassertion of Moscow's role in Central Asia. And another change to be as a pretext for Russia to influence in this region that found some groups of Islamic movement which linked Taliban against the secular government of Karimov. This underground radical Islamic groups some of them Wahabist, entered in the Ferghana valley. Many of those Uzbek militant trained in Afghan Mujahideen camps in the 1980s.¹⁵³ In addition, the Kremlin's senior planners had plenty of reasons to fear the backlash of the Afghanistan war in Chechnya. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Grozny, the Chechen capital, became a transit point for the Afghan veterans, especially the Arab ones. In August 1995, a spokesman of the Russian federal security service reported that units from Afghanistan and Jordan – which had a large and influential Chechen community in residence – were fighting on the side of Chechen. There were said to be about 300 foreign mercenaries at that time, out of total Chechen guerilla force of 6,000. Shamil Basayev, the leader of the seizure of the Buddenovsk hospital and a right hand man of Dudayev, was reported by the Russians to have been trained in Afghanistan by none other than the disciples of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

A diffused anti – Russian terrorist organization in Chechnya was believed by Moscow to have links with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia.¹⁵⁴ The Russians had a much

more serious Islamist problem in Chechnya. In the Russian view, the main problem in Chechnya was “*Wahabi* outsiders” shorthand for Islamist Saudis. The Russians also regarded the *Wahabis* as behind the Taliban regime.¹⁵⁵ Chechen fighters were a very serious unit, very well –trained, very well prepared possibly by Pakistan’s ISI and American CIA during the 1979-89 jihad.¹⁵⁶ The Russians believed that the United States was backing the Chechen rebels in order to get a lock on regional oil supplies. The United States had extremely close relations with Edvard Shevardnaze, president of Georgia. The arms were being smuggled into Chechnya from Georgia and that this was one of the main supply routes to the Chechen rebels. The Russians also believed that the Americans knew this and supported it because the Americans wanted an independent Chechnya.¹⁵⁷

The USA could not develop strategic clout in Central Asia without Uzbekistan, the largest and most powerful state and the only capable of standing up to Russia. Both cautiously wooed each other. Karimov became supportive of NATO plans to build a Central Asian NATO battalion, a move that was vehemently opposed by Russia. ‘We don’t accept NATO in our backyard. The US must recognize that Central Asia will remain within the near a broad Russia’s sphere of influence. By late 1995 the West and most notably the US had clearly chosen Uzbekistan as the only viable counterweight both to renewed Russian hegemonies and to Iranian influence; wrote Dr Shireen Hunter.

Thus there were the makings of two coalitions emerging in the region. The US lining up alongside Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan and Azerbaijan and encouraging its allies - Israel, Turkey and Pakistan – to invest there, while Russia retained its grip on Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. The USA was now prepared to confront Russia as the battle for the Caspian’s resources escalated. While US policy makers certainly did not want to see a hegemonic Russia, the potential costs of such hegemony became far greater if Russia was able to dictate the terms and limit western access to the world’s last known oil and gas reserves. Even minimum US involvement there provided for maximum Russian suspicions; said Dr Martha Brill Olcott, a leading US academic on Central Asia.¹⁵⁸ US oil companies were faced with what they could not do, rather than what they could do since they were forbidden to build pipelines through Iran and Russia. When Washington finally articulated its policy of transport corridor from the Caspian to Turkey (avoiding Russia and Iran) the oil

companies were reluctant to oblige, given the costs and the turbulence in the region. The essential issue which the USA declined to tackle was peace-making in the region. Until there was an end to the civil wars in Central Asia and the Caspian (Afghanistan, Tajikistan, Georgia, Chechnya, Nagorno Karabakh, the Kurdish issue) and there was a broad consensus with Iran and Russia, pipelines would neither be safe to build nor commercially feasible, as every step of the way Iran and Russia would block or even sabotage them.¹⁵⁹ As said by President Boris Yeltsin in 1998, by keeping the conflict in Afghanistan on the boil Russia kept the region unstable and has the excuse to maintain a military presence in the Central Asian Republics.¹⁶⁰

It was in the interest of Iran and Russia to keep the region unstable by arming the anti-Taliban alliance.¹⁶¹ Russian also reportedly had a hand in backing northern alliance when Taliban forces assaulted on the Shias of Hazara. They saw that Pakistan interference in Afghanistan through the Taliban provided an opportunity for American influence in the region. Its political and economic interest lied in denying the Americans presence in Kabul. Russia was backing Iran in that design. Russia also sent military supplies to northern forces through Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan by road.¹⁶²

Russia had built a bridge over the Amu Darya in Tajik controlled Takhar province to provide a land route through Badakshan. This allowed Russian trucks by passing Mazar-e-Sharif and the Salang highway which had always been prime Dostum territory. US satellite pictures were claimed to have shown Toloqan being developed as a strategic rear base for Massoud, in an effort that seemed to replicate his moves in the beginning of the war.¹⁶³ With this effort US pipeline plans could never succeed. Even today the USA is muddled on the critical question of whether it wants to save Central Asia's depressed economies by letting them export energy any way they like to keep Iran and Russia under blockade as far as pipeline are concerned.¹⁶⁴

It became apparent that the strategy over pipelines had become the driving force behind Washington's interest in the Taliban, which in turn was prompting a counter-reaction from Russia and Iran.¹⁶⁵ The old associations between the intelligence agencies continue, Harrison said, 'the CIA still had close links with the ISI' that money and those weapons had helped built up the Taliban, Harrison said, 'the Taliban are not just recruits from madrassas but are on the payroll of the ISI' Harrison further

said that UN Security Council Resolution Number 1333 called for an embargo on arms to the Taliban 'but it is a resolution without teeth because it does not provide sanctions for non-compliance; he said 'the US is not backing the Russians who want to give more teeth to the resolution.'

Now it is Pakistan that 'holds the key to the future of Afghanistan, Harrison had said 'the creation of the Taliban was central to Pakistan's pan-Islamic vision'. The creation of the Taliban had been actively encouraged by the ISI and the CIA.¹⁶⁶ As Pakistan looked across the frontier to Afghanistan, they saw a nation that had been occupied by the Soviets, thereby putting Pakistan into a buffer between Soviet and Indian forces – making Pakistan heavily dependent on United States. Pakistani military and intelligence leaders wanted to secure their western flank. They saw in the Taliban movement the only tool available to unify Afghanistan into a long-term buffer for Pakistan. Moreover many ISI leaders, who had worked under CIA control during the Afghan war, were close to leaders of the Mujahideen who were advising and fighting alongside the Taliban. There was much history there. Therefore, Pakistan did everything it could, to bring the Taliban to power in Afghanistan.¹⁶⁷ Behind the scenes in the United States, however, there were even then some fairly obvious clues. Americans then also thought they would serve as a bulwark against Russia.¹⁶⁸ In fact, the Taliban movement was the only contemporary Islamic movement whose basis was a network of rural madrassas. Afghanistan was also one of the few countries where the Islamist fought mainly against communist or at least pro-Soviet forces.¹⁶⁹

In addition, there was one point of major subsequent difference. As the captured US classified documents published in Tehran in 1979, it was an integral part of the US design that the Mujahideen (Taliban was a factional group of Mujahideen) could not form their own government after the eviction of the Soviets¹⁷⁰ and the US administration fundamentally came around to the view that it was important to secure first of all the withdrawal of Soviet troops as the precondition for any settlement of the Afghan problem, and in the process also to try to moderate the Islamic tone of the Afghan resistance so that a Mujahideen – led government should it eventuate after the Soviet pull out, would not be as extreme as that of the anti-American Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran.¹⁷¹ In contrast, the Taliban not only succeeded in attaining their aforementioned objective by evicting different factions and in the process also

serving the (actual) major US interest – eviction of the Moscow-Kabul-Tehran nexus under the Rabbani / Massoud government in Kabul and eviction of the pro-Iranian warlord controlling Western Afghanistan. But unlike the Mujahideen, even after the capture of Kabul (September 1996), the Taliban showed no signs at all of any internal disunity or disarray. In fact, unity of their political and military command kept getting stronger day by day. Besides, their success in bringing peace and order to the territory under their control attracted volunteers from other factions including even the former communists. All these factors clearly showed that the grass root support and organizational competence of Taliban enabled them to establish a durable government in the country.¹⁷²

However, the policy of making Taliban strong appeared broken down shortly after the seizure of Kabul. The Taliban proved markedly less sensitive to US political interests than some one in Washington had hoped. The most mortifying example of this was the hospitality which the Taliban provided to the Saudi billionaire Osama Bin Laden, who was suspected by US agencies of having financed anti-American outrages, such as the bombing of a barracks in Saudi Arabia, in which US military personnel were killed. The report by Steve Levine that Bin Laden had been a significant source of the monies which funded the Taliban's final thrust to Kabul helped explain the hospitality, but did not lessen the American mortification given Washington's strong stance against sponsors of terrorism. More seriously, some of the Taliban's powerful Pakistani supporters also adopted a hostile stance towards Washington, notably Maulana Fazlur Rahman of the Jamiat-e Ulema –Islam, who made a vituperatively anti-American speech following the murder in Karachi in mid-November 1997 of four staffs of US Oil Company.¹⁷³

It was at this juncture that the US Taliban policy underwent a visible change in 1997, applying various modes of coercion and sanctions to pressurize Taliban into political subordination, if not subjugation; albeit, also ensuring at the same time not to completely lost them. And this time there was a lobby especially comprising the Afghans settled in the West which is presenting serious misperceptions about the Taliban, persuading the US policymakers to adopt a completely anti-Taliban policy.¹⁷⁴

US policy took fresh direction with appointment of Madeline Albright as Secretary of State in early 1997, and the replacement of the entire chain of command

responsible for Afghan affairs at the State Department by experienced staff, who had little experienced staff, which had little experience about Afghan realities. The new Assistant Secretary for South Asian Affairs, Karl Inderfurth, made a clear policy statement to the US Senate in October 1997. He said that Washington's objective was 'an Afghan government that is multi-ethnic, broad-based, and that observed international norms of behaviors. The reasons that made US not to recognize the Taliban was that suppress on women rights, as Albright replied when she was asked about the reason that US opposed Taliban, by a local reporter during her visited to an Afghan refugee camp in Peshawar ". . . because of their approach to human rights, their despicable treatment of women and children, and their general lack of respect for human dignity". While, the Clinton administration was no doubt also beginning to feel the pressure in an election year of American feminist groups that condemned the Taliban for their treatment of women.¹⁷⁵

The Taliban's treatment of women, widely publicized following the fall of Kabul, was a provocation to key values, for which the United States avowedly stood. Women's groups which previously had not been involved with the Afghanistan issue voiced their solidarity with Afghan women, and in the run up to presidential election. This effectively blocked any rapprochement with the Taliban for which the oil companies and their bureaucratic sympathizers might have hoped.¹⁷⁶ Albright statement was seen as a significant indicator of the US distancing itself both from the Taliban and Pakistan's support for them. Yet the Taliban appeared least concerned about these international pressures and in fact generated greater anti-western feeling. The Ulema in Pakistan and Kandahar told Omar that he should throw all aid agencies out of Afghanistan because they were spies and the enemy of Islam.¹⁷⁷

However, Gill Dorronsoro writes "the split with the United States was precipitated more by the presence of radical groups (which Taliban had inherited the networks and training camps which had been established in the 1980s when collaboration between Islamic movements and the Afghan parties had been actively encouraged by the United States) on Afghanistan soil rather than human rights violations or drudges."¹⁷⁸

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Sarandoy was a brutal secret police and special militia that was created by People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) and was aided by Soviet Russia in (1979-89) The Soviet military intervention in Afghanistan was a conspicuous element in the long civil war in Afghanistan which began about 1974 and grew intensity after the Saur (April) revolution of 1978 The military coup of 27 April 1978 brought to power the People's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), a small group of leftwing intellectuals and military officers who embarked upon a programme of radical reform Of this, the central feature was a comprehensive land reform intended to break the power of the notables and enlist peasants for the revolution, but which instead unleashed a series of rural disturbances which the PDPA found it difficult to contain Moreover, the PDPA was divided and struggle for power led in September 1979 to the victory of the leader of the radical Khalq (People) faction, Hafizallah Amin And later Soviet found that Amin ran policy which did not go through what Soviet wanted Consequently, in 1979 between September and December Soviet intervened with military forces, overthrow Amin, and establish a broad-based government under Babrak Kamal, leader of the Parchami faction of the PDPA

It seemed the USSR hoped that new government would shortly stabilize the situation and Soviet troops could be quickly withdrawn In fact Karmal proved unable to form a broadbased government or to offer a sufficiently conciliatory programme And unable to face with heavy resistance of a group of seven Islamic parties (Mujahideen) based in Peshawar in Pakistan supported by overwhelming international condemnation of the Soviet action, gained in strength In 1980 there was very little attempt by the Soviet and PDPA forces to do more than try to protect the resistance had a free run in much of Afghanistan In many areas they fought little but conducted their own affairs when they did fight they usually fought from ambush It caused difficulties for Soviet forces to deal with this problem New tactics were developed involving the use of helicopter-borne troops to seize commanding heights and to cut off the retreat of the Mujahedin In the meantime the PDPA improved its intelligence and gradually rebuilt its forces, training new officers, extending conscription and developing new forces such as the *Sarandoy*, a heavily armed militia, Revolutionary Defence Forces to guard installations, commando brigades for strike action, and much later irregular militias recruited from ex-resistance fighters In the late 1980s these last units undertook an increasing amount of the fighting and they became dominant in certain localities Also with Soviet aid, the air forces were greatly improved (Malcolm F

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CHAPTER-3

U.S., Afghanistan and the Problem of Terrorism (1996-2001)

I. History of U.S. involvement with Islamic radicals/Al-Qaeda in Afghanistan

We have tried here to understand the nature and dynamics of contemporary Islamist movements, in order to comprehend the basis, structures and strategies of these movements from localized and regional manifestations of protest and confrontation to an international phenomenon of rebellion and terror.

Broadly, these movements may be placed in three different phases of history. The first phase may be located in the break – up of Ottoman Empire after World War I and the subsequent period of struggles for colonization. The second phase may be located in the post-colonial period and the emergence of Muslim countries as independent sovereign states. The third and most crucial phase starts off from the time of convergence of global Islamist groups in Afghanistan against Soviet occupation and ultimate break – up of Soviet Union and the collapse of communism. It is equally important to note that during this phase which is still continuing, the Islamist movements shifted their main operational bases from the boundaries of Arab Muslim world to none Arab Muslim world in a big way.

During the colonial phase instances are available which indicate that Islamist movements did organize themselves to challenge imperialism and colonialism directly. The slogan of *Jihad* raised by Jamaluddin Afghani against British imperialism in the nineteenth century, the Mehdist movement in the nineteenth century in Sudan, the participation of Islamists in the struggle for independence in Algeria, and the active participation of Islamists belonging to the *Deobandi* sect of Muslims in Indian national freedom movement against the British colonialism are some examples of such movements. The Islamist which evolved during the twentieth century acquired varied experiences of assertion and operation until they joined the Afghan war against Soviet occupation in the 1980s. These movements in different regions of the world lead to an international coalition during the Afghan war.¹

The root cause of Islamic radical movement in Afghanistan could be traced back to 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan in December 1979, partly to settle in fighting between rival factions in the communist leadership in Kabul.² With

the proclamation of the democratic Afghan Republic the PDPA assured the Afghan people that the states would protect their religious faith and they would be free to observe their religious. Nevertheless, as the radical reforms began to be implemented in October 1978, the clergy rose in protest, and by January 1979, the traditional ruling elements, the property holders and the clergy, joined together to mobilize large segments of the urban – rural people in all Afghanistan to offer armed resistance to the Marxist regime.³

This situation gave a change to US to carry out its foreign policy to contain the spread of communism. Since World War II, the United States had to assume leadership of the “free world” in order to contain the communists. The United States did everything in its power to prevent the spread of communism in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America, as well as in Europe. It included the formation of alliances on the perimeter of the communist bloc, generous military and economic aid to allies, vigorous measures to maintain a favorable climate for American investment abroad and covert operations to prevent communist and other anti – American leader from coming to power.⁴ The primary goal of neo-conservative agenda during the cold war was to impel democratic change in the Soviet system and among other communist states.⁵ During Reagan Administration the basic outline of US’s foreign policy was reestablishment of American economic and military strength and the roll – back of Soviet influence across the third world⁶ and standing up to the Soviet threat and to take responsibility for containing Soviet expansionism in any part of the world.⁷ It sought to provide assistance to anti communist guerillas and government with arms, finance, training and facilities, to note a few examples, the Reagan administration supported the Contras in Nicaragua, the anti-Marxist guerillas in Angola, the right-wing government in El Salvador, the guerillas coalition in the Cambodia and the Mujahideen in Afghanistan.⁸

In the Muslim world, particularly Middle East, Islam was utilized by US in collaboration with its allies to deal a deadly blow to communism and its adversary, Soviet Union.⁹ USA was trying to use the developments occurring in the Moslem world to their advantage holding forth upon the common values of the Christian and Islamic civilizations as opposed to atheistic Communism and flirting with the political and religious leaders of the Moslem world. Western strategists were trying to drive a

wedge of controversy between Moslems and the Soviet Union, to half circle the USSR with crescent of instability. Internationally reactionary circles were trying to point the spearhead of Moslem movements against the progressive forces within the Islamic world, and also against the socialist states, particularly the Soviet Union.¹⁰

In this regard the Reagan administration adopted the Doctrine of 'horizontal escalation' which was intended to roll back communism. Reagan administration largely utilized surrogate fighters to beat back Soviet-backed regimes or Soviet supported movements.¹¹ Nine months before the Red Army rolled into Kabul Brzezinski had expressed 'concern over the Soviets creeping intervention in Afghanistan' and insisted that Washington must be more sympathetic to those afghans who were determined to pressure their country's independence. the Pentagon's Walter Slocomb agreed and wondered whether clandestine US support for Moslem guerillas might succeed in "sucking the Soviets into Vietnamese quagmire". On April 1979, the social coordination committee an interagency group chaired by Brzezinski, instructed the CIA to develop a comprehensive plan for a secret war in Afghanistan backed by the United States ranging from "indirect financial assistance to the insurgence " to weapon support.¹² The *jihad* against the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979 – where, as was well known, US and British intelligence services were working hand – in-glove with the *Jihadists*, all the while being well aware of the latter extremist tendencies. By the time that the Soviet Union withdrew from Afghanistan in 1989, whole generations which were radicalized by Islamic indoctrination and militarized training of religiously inspired terrorists had been produced and subsequently dispersed across the globe.¹³

When the Soviet Union took control of Afghanistan and the United States decided to support Ziaul Haq, a natural ally, to engage the Soviet Union in a proxy war in Afghanistan, the United States received powerful support from its ally, Saudi Arabia which provided funds to establish a wide network of *Madrassas* in the country and to the Mujahideen in their *Jihad* in Afghanistan. Saudi Arabia, along with the United States financed the ISI in training and arming the anti- Soviet '*jihadis*' in Afghanistan.¹⁴ US Casey committed CIA support to along – standing ISI initiative to recruit radical Muslims from around the world to come to Pakistan and fight with the Afghan Mujahideen. The ISI had encouraged this since 1982, President Zia aimed to

cement Islamic unity, turned Pakistan into the leader of Muslim world and foster an Islamic opposition in Central Asia. As Lieutenant General Hameed Gul, (the head of the ISI of Pakistan) replied to Ahmed Rashid in his interview about the future dissention of Islamic radical “we are fighting a jihad and this is the first Islamic international brigade in the modern era. The communists have their international brigade, the West has NATO, why can’t the Muslims unite and form a common front?”¹⁵ In addition, Zia claimed shortly before his death, as part of a strategic realignment, an Islamic state and an Islamic confederation, part of a pan – Islamist renaissance. It would comprise – apart from an Afghan Pakistani federation – Tajikistan and Uzbekistan and possibly Iran and Turkey.¹⁶ While, Washington wanted to demonstrate that the entire Muslim world was fighting the Soviet Union alongside the Afghans and their American benefactors. And the Saudis saw an opportunity both to promote Wahabism and get rid of its disgruntled radicals.

Pakistan already had standing instructions to all its embassies abroad to give visas, to any one wanting to come and fight with the Mujahideen. In the Middle East the Muslim brotherhood, the Saudi – based World League and Palestinian Islamic radicals organized the recruits and put them into contact with the Pakistanis. The ISI and Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami set up reception committees to welcome, house and train the arriving militants and they encouraged them to join the Mujahideen groups, usually the Hizb-e- Islami. The funds for the enterprise came directly from Saudi intelligence. French scholar Oliver Roy describes it as a joint venture between the Saudis, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Jamaat-e-Islami, put together by the ISI.

Between 1982 and 1992 some 35,000 Muslim radicals from 43 Islamic countries in the Middle East, North and East Africa, Central Asia and the Far-East¹⁷ came there as the Afghan war was a jihad, pure and simple logical coexistence with other battle fields-Kashmir, Chechnya, Bosnia or Mindanao¹⁸ would pass their baptism under fire with Afghan Mujahideen. Tens of thousands more foreign Muslim radical came to study in the hundreds of new Madrassas that Zia’s military government began to fund in Pakistan along the Afghan border.¹⁹ As Soviet invaded Afghanistan Pakistan became a “frontline” state. The United States along with Gulf States such as Saudi Arabia was keen to invest in the Madrssa infrastructure to churn out Mujahideen to fight in Afghanistan. During the subsequent six years, as the US backed Mujahideen

effort in Afghanistan continued to gather momentum, 1,000 new Madrassas were established. There were two types of Madrassas that participated in the US and Saudi backed jihad. One group of Madrassas had been specifically established to produce jihad literature, mobilize popular sentiment, and provide a platform from which to recruit and train Mujahideen. An example of such Madrassas is the Jama'at -i-Islami's Rabita Madrassas. The JI has never been a Madrassas-based party. The Madrassas that it did establish were predominantly a product of the Jihad in Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation. The second group comprises various independent associations of Madrassas, such as those affiliated with Jamiat-e-Ulama Islam as an institution.

The message that was disseminated at the various Madrassas was originally intended to be anti-communist. The intention was to encourage a supply of recruits to the Afghan conflict. Madrassas and makeshift schools were established within the proliferating refugee camps in Pakistan. Notably, it is these camps and schools that became the cradle of the Taliban. International patrons (the United States, Saudi Arabia, and others) supplied the camps and affiliated schools with arms and text books.²⁰ Eventually more than 100,000 Muslim radicals were to have direct contact with Pakistan and Afghanistan and be influenced by the Jihad.²¹ In the contrary, wrote Yoginder 'it is important to remember that not all schools in the Pathan borderlands that took part in the Afghan jihad and later associated themselves with militant activism and terrorism elsewhere were actually established traditional Madrassas. Several of them were simply makeshift schools intended to train fighters in the war against the Soviets, where a mattering of Islam was taught in order to strengthen the spirit of jihad against the Russians. These have been loosely and incorrectly described as 'Madrassas' in actual fact, they were not even conceived of as religious schools. Rather from their very inception they were intended as militant training camps, but were sought to be passed off as Madrassas in order to legitimize their operations and to solicit funds from Muslim states. The rapid growth and spread of such schools must be seen in the context of cold war rivalries, and it was obvious that they had the blessings of Americans, who through the CIA, pumped in large amounts of weapons and cash to assist the Mujahideen.²²

In camps near Peshawar and in Afghanistan, these radicals met each other for the first time and studied, trained and fought together. It was the first opportunity for

most of them to learn about Islamic movements in other countries and their forged tactical and ideological links that would serve them well in the future. The camps become virtual universities for future Islamic radicalism.²³

During the Afghan war, the Reagan administration supported the activities of Usamah Bin-Laden's mentor, Abdullah Azzam. Azzam himself toured the US in the early and mid 1980s to recruit fighters.²⁴ Former Associate deputy FBI Director Oliver B. (Buck) Revell, interviewed on Emerson's PBS program, agreed with Emerson's assessment. Revell stated that once the Mujahideen and their associates came to the United States, they found a hospitable environment. They could raise money, film videos, run printing presses, and eventually attack the very country whose freedom they enjoyed. Revell said that for the first time in American history, the United States housed a terrorist infrastructure that stretched from the American heartland all the way through the Middle East to Southeast Asia. Revell stated that it was the most global network of terrorist the United States ever faced

Emerson credits Abdullah Azzam for completing the most important infrastructure. Azzam left his homeland to join the Mujahideen in the early 1980s. Centering his activities in Pakistan, Azzam soon came to understand the vast amount of support the United States was funneling through the area. Leaving Pakistan he helped establish the Alkifah Refugee center in New York. According to Emerson, American officials did not realize the Alkifah Refugee center was the front for another organisation, an organization calling for jihad. Infact the Alkifah Refugee center's Arabic letterhead called for holly war.

In 1989, with the Soviets in disarray and their political system on the verge of collapse, Azzam turned his attention to the United States. According to Emerson, Azzam spread his jihad network through 38 states, with multiple bases in Pennsylvania, Michigan, California, Texas, and the New England states. Azzam returned to Pakistan in 1989, only to be killed by an assassin, but his work was completed by several supporters, including his cousin Fayiz Azzam.

Emerson names several prominent officials working in various radical groups in the domestic jihad. Tamim al-Adnani was the most vigorous recruiter and successful fundraiser among all the leaders. Emerson says Tamin al-Adnani has assisted in domestic terrorist incidents, including the world trade center bombing.²⁵ Azzam founded the Maktab al-Khidamat (office of services) through which they

recruited and controlled foreign Mujahideen volunteers. But few years later reportedly Azzam wanted to take the jihad from Afghanistan to the oppressed Muslims worldwide, especially in Kashmir and Chechnya, whereas Bin Laden wanted to concentrate on attacks on the United States and the destruction of pro-Western Arab regimes.²⁶ However, after the death of Azzam in 1989, Osama bin Laden took over Azzam's organization and set up Al-Qaeda or military Base as a service centre for Arab – Afghans and their families and to forge a broad – based alliance amongst them. With the help of Bin Laden several thousand Arab militants had established bases in the provinces of Kunar, Nuristan and Badakhshan.²⁷

The US long supplied arms and training to the most ferociously reactionary fighting forces in the Islamic world, including those Mujahideen who spawned a second – generation reform movement known as the Taliban. As journalist Ahmed Rashid, observes that the Clinton Administration was clearly sympathetic to the Taliban, as they were in line with Washington's anti – Iran policy and were important to the success of any southern pipeline that would avoid Iran." He also speaks of "the CIA – ISI (Interservice Intelligence, Pakistan) pipeline" that supported the more radical Islamic parties" moreover, "what Washington was not prepared to admit was that the Afghan jihad, with the support of the CIA, had spawned dozens of fundamentalist movements.

It was likely that Bin Laden had much cozier ties with the ISI than the CIA itself; this should hardly give US intelligence a solution for its role in strengthening both the ISI as well as jihad international. Even Bin Laden gave US operatives credit for their helping hand in constructing his Afghanistan operation "I set up my first camp where these volunteers were trained by Pakistani and American officers. The weapons were supplied by the Americans, the money by the Saudis."²⁸ According to Amin Saikal, after coming into close contact with a number of Pakistani radical Islamists, it was in Peshawar that bin Laden set up the original cell of his al-Qaeda network.²⁹ According to a policy brief prepared for the Kennedy school of government, concurred with bin Laden's version of events: "the US provided the weapon's and the know – how, the Saudis provided the funds, and we provided the training camps and operations base for the Islamic legions in the early 1980s and then for the Taliban." In contrast to the tendency of Huntington's followers to see Islamic militancy as part of the religion's own inner dynamics, Rashid carefully sketches the sequence of events that facilitated

its triumph, including the CIA – ISI nexus. Beyond Southwest Asia Washington had given valuable support to rightist Islamic forces throughout the Middle East in often successful efforts to smash once powerful socialist movements and ideologues of pan-Arabism.³⁰

However, following the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan in 1989, Yael Shahar (1998) says the Mujahideen saw the fall of the Soviet Union as a sign of total victory. The Soviet Union had not collapsed under the weight of political, economic, and military factors but in the mind of the Mujahideen, it fell by the hand of God. The Soviet retreat was a sign of God's power, and if God could bring down the Soviet Union through the work of the Mujahideen, other evil nations were doomed to destruction. The primary targets of the Mujahideen were Israel and the United States.³¹

Following the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan, Bin Laden turned to Saudi regime for being corrupt and against the USA for maintaining such a regime and enabling Israel to maintain its occupation of Jerusalem (Islam's third holiest city after Medina and Mecca) and its brutal suppression of Palestinian resistance. When the Saudi authorities stripped him of his citizenship, he first moved to Sudan but, by 1996, he had returned to the country that he knew best: Afghanistan yet this time he returned to an Afghanistan where a new ISI – run militia – that is the Taliban, which was ideologically very amenable to Bin Laden's brand of Islam – had seized power in Kabul. The ISI wanted to use his wealth and Arab connections in support of the militia's adventures and also therefore in support of Pakistan's expanded regional policy goals.

Bin Laden forged an organic alliance with Mullah Mohammad Omar, based on the Saudi dissident providing the Taliban with money and Arab fighters and the Taliban giving the Saudi dissident and his supporter's sanctuary, aid and all the basic support that they needed to set up terrorist training camps and expand al-Qaeda into a trans-national network.³² Islamist extremist from around the world – including North America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Central, South and South East Asia – continued to use Afghanistan as a training ground and base of operations for their world wide terrorist activities in 1999. The Taliban, which controlled most Afghan territory, permitted the operation of training and indoctrination facilities for non-Afghans and provided logistic support to members of various terrorist organisations

and Mujahideen including those waging jihads in Chechnya, Lebanon, Kosovo, Kashmir and elsewhere.³³

Later, Al-Qaeda reshuffled the entire understanding and assessment on terrorism by creating a complex “confederation” of militant groups and aggregating support networks” of Al-Qaeda and its leader, Osama bin Laden brought disparate Islamist groups from the Middle East, Asia and the Horn of Africa together by creating by common platform and a common agenda. Al-Qaeda’s rallying point revolves around the call for universal jihad against the United States, its allies and regimes, including moderate Muslim governments, accused by the group of imposing dysfunctional and immoral ways of life across the globe.³⁴

A. Al-Qaeda’s Ideology

The *Jihadist* stream gathered momentum in the Afghan war during the 1980s when it found a new champion in Abdullah Azzam³⁵, a Muslim Brotherhood³⁶ Palestinian propagandist for the Afghan cause.³⁷ That time the process for recruiting Mujahideen around the world to come to fight with Afghan Mujahideen, in Middle East was opened mainly channeled through the Muslim Brotherhood. The hub of these informal networks was established in Peshawar through the office of services (Mektab al-khadamat), headed by Abdullah Azzam, in close conjunction with the Saudi activist and tycoon Osama Bin Laden who founded the ‘House of Auxiliaries (Baytul-ansar).³⁸ And through the Saudi based World Muslim League and Palestinian Islamic radicals organized the recruits and put them into contact with the Pakistanis. The ISI and Pakistan’s Jamaat-e-Islami set up reception committees to welcome those and train the arriving militant and encouraged them to join the Mujahideen groups.

The ideology of using violence to oppose oppressive government has already been in Salafism³⁹ where *jihadi* ideology gradually gained ground in Afghanistan and eventually merged with Salafism. Its chief proponent was Abdullah Azzam who in 1984 founded the Maktab al-Kidmat (MAK) an office for recruiting Arabs to fight against the Soviet in Afghanistan. Azzam had a decisive influence on Osama bin Laden. In his work, *the main obligation of Muslims is to defend the land of Islam*. Azzam writes that *jihad* is moral obligation for all Muslims, the sixth pillar of the faith. Using epic and mystic language he sets out a vision of the world based on strict Salafism and calls for martyrdom stressing the permanent state of humiliation

suffered by the *umma*, as a result of the actions of “crusaders and Zionists”. His work had a decisive influence on the *jihadi* radicalism of the 1990s.

The global proliferation of fighting Salafism and its fusion with *jihadi* ideology were further consolidated under Bin Laden. His declaration of war on the West - backed by the creation in 1998 of the World Islamic front for jihad against Jews and crusaders – caused groups that had originally been set up to provide logistical support to Al-Qaeda and had originally sought to purify and punish society, to now set their sights on the West. The struggle was no longer confined to the nearest enemy but also to those further away fighting Salafism assumed the role of globalizing the *jihad* born out of the Afghan experience and became the core ideology of the new radical Islamism.⁴⁰

Militant Islamists hate the United States primarily for its secularism. Within the Islamic fold the Salafis have been a religious movement committed to returning Islam to a pure form as practiced by Muhammad and his early followers. The Salafis have been strong in Egypt since the Second World War and include the Wahhabis, a puritanical Sunni sect and the official religion of Saudi Arabia. The most important theorist of the extreme Salafis, Sayyid Qutb,⁴¹ an Egyptian, recognized the threat that the West’s secularism posed to the Middle East. Qutb believed that only a revolution against the secular regimes of the Middle East could prevent the corruption of Muslim societies, and he advocated a vanguard movement in theory to lead the revolution.⁴² Qutb’s ideology that was written in the book name *Milestones*; this book was dedicated to the exposition of his vision of the necessity for revolution in order to create a truly Islamic society ruled by Islamic law. This revolution was to be carried out via *jihad* as holy war, which was declared to be the ongoing permanent duty of Muslims as they engaged in the cosmic battle of good versus evil, played out in everyday life in the struggle of Muslims against non – Muslim governments and ideologies.⁴³ This ideology Sayyid Qutb elaborated from Ibn-i-Tammiya,⁴⁴ where he propounded the ideological underpinning which created a moral and political space for radical Islamists to operate. In this context, Fiyaz identifies that two concepts, Hakmat-i-illahya (Sovereignty of God) and Takfir(committng sin in violation of Islamic tenets) propounded by Ibn-i-Tammiya and generally relied upon by the extremist Islamists the world over to justify their actions need to be revised and

related forcefully. These concepts were also elaborated by Abdul Ala Maududi in Pakistan providing intellectual base for extremism.⁴⁵

The involvement of Egyptian and Saudi extremists in 9/11 has set off a debate on the ideological foundations of extremist Islamists. According to Wael Al-Abrashi: the extremist religious groups had moved from the stage of Takfir to the stage of annihilation and destruction in accordance with the strategy of Al-Qaeda.⁴⁶

However, Qutb's vision of global *jihad* was developed at a time of conflict within a specific environment - Nasser's secular Egypt and its persecution of the Muslim Brotherhood, yet it was precisely because of this context that his work has been taken as an inspiration for contemporary jihad. Oriented organisations see themselves in similar battles against secular ideologies and repressive authoritarian governments from North Africa to the Middle East to Central and South Asia. The experiences of many of the adherents of these movements fighting for the Mujahideen against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan during the 1980s resulted in practical experience and victory in the cosmic battle of good (Islam) versus evil (atheist communism). Osama bin Laden has emerged as the most prominent warrior of this type.⁴⁷ In due respect to the complexity of the concept: if one substitutes secularism for capitalism, Qutb's revolution would be quite different in many ways from Leninist-style revolutions of an early age.

A founder of Egypt's Islamic Jihad, Muhammad Abdel-Salam al-Farq⁴⁸ stressed the importance of *jihad* as a pillar of Islam. Pure Muslims must promote *jihad* for its own sake. Believing that the American creed entails private property, and the globalization of the American creed strikes at the core of their identity. In their eyes, the United States caused a triple whammy (an unpleasant situation or event that causes problem for somebody/something). Many Jihadists believe in the superiority of Islamic civilization and justifies violence against both "infidels" and "apostates", since Islam makes no distinction between the religious and political realms.⁴⁹

Bodansky says Bin Laden was influenced by the Pan – Islamic movement and the role of Iran. Putting aside differences between Shiites and Sunnis, radical Muslims found *Satan* arrayed against Islam: *Satan* came in the form of the United States. Bin Laden worked with the Iranians to bring Sunnis and Shiites together in organisation called the International Muslim Brotherhood, but he wanted to go further. By training

and financing terrorist groups and calling for overthrow of sympathetic Muslim governments.⁵⁰

In the same. Khomeini Ayatollah who led Islamic revolution in Iran also was influenced by Qutb's ideology when he was exiled in Iraq in 1970. 'After Khomeini riding victoriously it was necessary to eliminate all opposition if the Islamic revolution was to succeed. The starting point was to attack all things western. He said it was time to launch a holly war against the West and the traitors to Islam.' Robin Wright (1986) makes this point in her examination of Shiite Islam in 'Sacred Rage'. According to Wright, Ayatollah Khomeini was guided by the message of Karbala. Alongwith the Shiite clergy of Iran, he believed that the Iranian Revolution was the first step in purifying the world. Israel must be eliminated and returned to Islamic rule. The West had become the handmaiden of the Jews, but the West was and remains the source of imperialism. Its influence is *Satanic* and must be destroyed. Holly warriors are called to battle. Wright says Iran exports terrorism in this vein with revolutionary zeal.⁵¹

According to Dor Waxman (1998), Iran has moved from a post revolutionary nationalist phase to the real politics of Pan – Islam. That is Iranian leaders slowly moved away from their blind allegiance to Shiaism and began supporting Militant Sunnis and Shiites. Revolutionary Iranians began sending money and support to Sunni terrorist groups in Lebanon, believing Iranian Shiites and Lebanese Sunnis were working for the same cause. Osama bin laden a Saudi Arabian was one such Sunni.⁵²

Khomeini's own interest in creating an Islamist International – it would later be known Hezbollah (party of God) apparent in August 1979, in Lebanon. The head of Iran's Revolutionary Guards once boasted about having sponsored the attack against French and American peacekeeping forces in Lebanon. Western intelligence agencies suspect that Hezbollah has been working with Bin Laden on international operations since the early 1990s. Hezbollah's terrorist network in Lebanon contains both Shiite and Sunni groups, and there is also a Saudi Arabian wing that was involved in the Khobar towers bombing which killed 19 U.S. troops in 1996. Also inspired by the Iranian Revolution was the independent Sunni terrorist network that later became the basis of Al-Qaeda. However, Islamism is a self – consciously pan – Muslim phenomenon although Shiite and Sunni have differences along a series of traditional religious, ethnic, or political divides (Shiite versus Sunni, Persian versus Arab, and so

on). The reason is simple: in the eyes of the Islamist groups their common effort to strike at the West while seizing control of the Muslim world is immeasurably more important than whatever might be seen as "dividing" them from one another.⁵³

Furthermore, Al-Qaeda regards that the secular revolutions backed by the Soviets, such as Al-Fatah and the Baath party governing Iraq and Syria, and the monarchies, such as the Saudis, backed by the United States had to be destroyed.⁵⁴

However, The Afghan's militant Mujahideen (who struggle in the name of Islam) from various Arab and Islamic states who had fought the Soviet forces in Afghanistan, and who are now ready to continue the struggle against every 'un-Islamic' regime in the region, believe that they are warriors for the Islamic faith in opposition to forces that seek to threaten or destroy their religious belief. They are convinced that their great honour will be to die in battle defending Islam. Indeed, martyrdom is intertwined with Islamic teaching: no greater martyrdom is possible than that achieved by giving one's life in armed conflict while defending the religious order. The *mujahid* believes he is performing the highest service for God, and that he need not fear the consequence.⁵⁵

B. Al-Qaeda's political objectives and its strategy

Following the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan, Bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia, where he soon made a public stand against the Saudi regime for being: corrupt and against the USA for maintaining such a regime and enabling Israel to maintain its occupation of Jerusalem (Islam's third holiest city after Madina and Mecca) and its brutal suppression of Palestinian resistance.⁵⁶ In addition, Bin Laden's organisation Al-Qaeda's goals, in his own words, are to 'unite all Muslims and to establish a government which follows the rule of the Calips.' Bin Laden has stated that the only way to establish the Caliphate is by force.⁵⁷ But it was simply a means to an end. Afghanistan was a useable base because it was so remote and primitive. The Mujahideen did not believe that the Caliphate could govern from Kabul, Kandahar, or Jalalabad. Afghanistan was useful as a base, but it could not serve as the core of an international Islamic revival. It provided refuge; and facilities for training and planning, but the foundations of the Caliphate would have to be established elsewhere.⁵⁸ Al-Qaeda's goals therefore, are to overthrow nearly all Muslim

governments, which Bin Laden views as corrupt; to drive Western influence from those countries, and eventually to abolish state boundaries.⁵⁹

In addition, Al-Qaeda was trapped between the secular revolutionaries backed by the hated Soviets, such as Al Fatah and the Baath party governing Iraq and Syria, and the monarchies, such as the Saudis backed by the United States. The Saudis themselves were religious of the conservative Wahabi school. But sheikdoms had developed a heavy dependency on the United States. They had become complicit with the United States in the same way that the Nasserites had become complicit with the Soviet Union. In their analysis both had to be destroyed.⁶⁰ Al-Qaeda had a much more sophisticated understanding of the Islamic world than did the left – wing movements in the 1970s and 1980s. These were not Qaddafi or Assad – financed groups, trained by communist bloc personnel. Those groups were alien transplants into Arab culture – along with the idea of pan-Arabism. Al-Qaeda grew from the natural soil of Islamic – not Arab – culture and had roots going back centuries. Its dreams were alien to Americans but far more natural to Muslims than the ideologies of groups like the popular front for the liberation of Palestine. Put bluntly, Al-Qaeda's message had legs, and the likely effect of its actions was much more threatening to the United States than that of previous terrorist groups.⁶¹ However, by the time the Afghan war ended, the Soviets had been defeated, the Iraqis had been run back from Kuwait, and the dynamism of the secularists had declined tremendously. By the early 1990s the pendulum had swung toward religious regimes. The Mujahideen put them as hypocrites. And the greatest hypocrites were the Saudi Royal family, which had allowed the United States to use holy ground for its war against Iraq.⁶²

Anti American feeling had been endemic in the Islamic world. It had been preceded by anti-British feeling. Waves of aggression from inside and outside the Islamic world had created a sense of victimization that had penetrated the marrow of Muslims. There were reasons for anti-Americanism, raging from US support for Israel,⁶³ the Arab world has long felt betrayed by Europe's colonial powers, and its disillusionment with American begins most importantly with the creation of Israel in 1948. The anger deepened in the wake of America's support for Israel during the wars of 1967 and 1973, and ever since in its relations with the Palestinians. The daily exposure to Israel's ironfisted rule over the occupied territories has turned this into the

great cause of the Arab - and indeed the broader Islamic – world elsewhere. They look at American policy in the region as cynically geared to America's oil interests, supporting thugs and tyrants without any hesitation. Finally, the bombing and isolation of Iraq have become fodder for daily attacks on the United States. While many in the Arab world do not like Saddam Hussein, they believe that the United States has chosen a particularly inhuman method of fighting him - a method that is starving an entire nation.⁶⁴

Had resentment been a sufficient driver, the Islamic world would have boiled over centuries before. The reason it hadn't was that there were two scales operating. One was the resentment scale – which had already swung into the red centuries earlier and had stayed there. The other measured the sense of helplessness. What had kept the lid on the Islamic world as a whole was not a lack of anger but the sense of Islamic impotence, the sense that Islam's enemies were overwhelmingly powerful. The sentiment for an Islamic renaissance was there. What was missing was any hope for effective action.

This was the perception of Osama Bin Laden – who tried to turn general principles into a working organization – and his fellow Mujahideen gathered together in Al-Qaeda. From there he set the fuel for an Islamic rising against their own corrupt governments. What had to be generated was a sense of hope. The key to this did not lie in attacking the existing governments in the Islamic world. The only strength and resilience that they had came from their association with the current great power – the United States. Therefore, if the United States could be shown to be weak and vulnerable, the credibility of Islamic states would be completely undermined, this, coupled with built – in resentment, would set the Islamic world on fire and open the door to reestablishing the Caliphate.

This is the key strategic point. Al-Qaeda was not motivated by hatred of the United States, American popular culture, or American democracy. Focus, instead, was on the Islamic world and its governments. Al-Qaeda viewed the United States as the main Christian global power. As such, it had assumed a position as guarantor of existing regimes in the Islamic world. Put differently, even if the United States wasn't directly responsible, it was viewed as the protector of these regimes by the Islamic masses.

Already in the Islamic world, there was a latent sense that the United States lacked both the power and the moral character to impose its will in the long run. A series of incidents had made this point. The US defeat in Vietnam; the humiliation of the Iran hostage crisis; the withdrawal from Beirut in 1983 after the Marine barracks were destroyed; the withdrawal from Somalia after a handful of Americans were killed; the failure to destroy Saddam Hussein in 1991 – all combined to create a perception of the United States as having tremendous potential power to strike a hard first blow but an inability to force a conflict to successful conclusion. From Al-Qaeda's point of view, the latent perception of the United States in the Islamic world had to be turned into a self-evident truth. The United States had to be struck by a blow that was both enormous, easily understandable by the Islamic masses, and against which there was no ready defense.

Al-Qaeda rejected the secular Arab movements while adopting its operational style terrorism. The essence of terrorism is this in a society with many ungarded targets a group and explosives is extraordinarily difficult to stop the fewer operatives, the harder it is to find them. It is this combination of the sparseness of groups and the richness of targets that has traditionally made combating terrorists a nightmare. The material damage caused by terrorists was trivial compared to the psychological and therefore political effect. The terror could strike where and when they wanted – that they were in control and held life or death in their hands. The psychological strength of terrorism rested in the idea that no one was safe anywhere – that death was omnipresent. You could not protect yourself, and more important the state could not protect you. The frequency of attack was less important than their effectiveness.

In war, the enemy's next move is usually predictable. War is a game played with most of the pieces on the table most of the time. A general can understand and predict the behavior of his opponent. What gives terrorism its strength is its extraordinary unpredictability. In a world of many targets and very few terrorists, the terrorists always hold the advantage.⁶⁵ Kropotkin wrote; revolutionary terror is propaganda by the deed. A terrorist crime is a crime for publicity. When a bomb explodes, people take notice, and the explosion may draw more attention than a thousand speeches or pictures. If the terror is sustained, more and more people become interested. Many wonder why the atrocities occurred and if the "cause" seems plausible. The perpetrators ultimately may gain sympathy, because citizens, although initially

repelled by the act of terrorism, may also feel that the desperation of the weak must have been generated by monstrously unjust circumstances. Terror publicizes grievances, which the terrorist believes would have been unnoticed without his act. All things being equal, the more spectacular the outrage, the more likely it is that the rest of the world will discuss the grievance and perhaps in time recognize the terrorist as the most suitable spokesman for those aggrieved.⁶⁶ This was what Al-Qaeda wanted to exploit in the United States, but to a degree of effectiveness not hitherto achieved. This was the strategic origin of September 11. Al-Qaeda needed to strike a blow that would be devastating leaving no doubt as to American vulnerability.⁶⁷

II. The U.S. and Al-Qaeda operations beyond Afghanistan

Osama's experiences during the Afghan jihad had a profound impact on him: apart from him and Mujahideen who came from Arab and Muslim countries to counter these atheist Russians, "Osama discovered that it was not enough to fight in Afghanistan but that we had to fight on all fronts, communist or western oppression."

It was in Afghanistan while fighting the Soviets that Bin Laden heard the call to global jihad because it was there that he, along with his Arab Afghans, experienced first hand the battle between Islam and atheism, making the cosmic conflict of good versus evil. It was in Afghanistan that Bin Laden came to believe that the acme of this religion is jihad. For him as for many of the Mujahideen who fought there, Afghanistan was not about geopolitics. It was about Islam fighting against unbelief.

The fact that the Soviet Union was ultimately defeated by forced withdrawal in 1989 led the Arab-Afghans to interpret their victory as a sign of God's favour and the righteousness of their struggle. They believed that the victory over the Soviets was due to their efforts alone and ignored the other international and domestic issues that contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991. The result was a sense of vindication – and the belief that this jihad against atheism and the forces of evil had to move next onto the global scene in order to establish a truly global community of the faithful.

It was therefore in 1989 that Al-Qaeda was founded in order to continue the jihad against infidels beyond the border of Afghanistan.⁶⁸ According to Tim Weiner, in those nine years since the Soviet withdrawal thousands of Islamic outcasts, radical and visionaries from round the world came to the borderlands of Afghanistan to learn

the lesson of war from the Mujahideen. In an interview in 1994, Noor Amin a commander loyal to Mr. Hekmatyar told Wiener that the whole country (Afghanistan) is a university for jihad or holy war, there are many formal training centers. We have had Egyptians, Sudanese, Arabs and other foreigners trained here as assassins.⁶⁹

Al-Qaeda is multi - national, with members from numerous countries and with a worldwide presence. Senior leaders in the organisation are also senior leaders in other terrorist organisation. Al-Qaeda seeks a global radicalization of existing Islamic groups and the creation of radical Islamic groups where none exist.

Bin Laden advocated the destruction of the United States, which he sees as the Chief obstacle to reform in Muslim societies. Since 1996 his anti – US rhetoric has escalated to the point of calling for worldwide attacks on Americans and its allies including civilians. In February 1998, Bin Laden announced the creation of a new alliance of terrorist organisations, the International Islamic Front for jihad against the Jews and crusaders' the front included the Egyptian Al-Gama and Al-Islamiya, the Egyptian Islamic jihad, the Harakat ul-ansar and two others groups. The front declared its intention to attack Americans and its allies, including civilians, anywhere in the world.⁷⁰

Bin Laden established recruiting offices in thirty five countries. There were thirty offices in US cities alone – and this large network later became crucial when he created Al-Qaeda in 1989. He had training camps in Afghanistan, the Philippines Sudan, and Somalia over a period of time. Religion was the principal reason foreigners volunteered. Initially, they were fighting a jihad against communism, but later they evolved into an international brigade espousing a distinctive synthesis of extreme Islam and violence that pitted them after 1989 against the existing Muslim states and the United States. The Afghanistan war was the key incubator of Muslim fundamentalism and was crucial in establishing extremist Islamic movements in a number of nations. Many thousands - about 2,000 in Bosnia alone – subsequently fought in Chechnya, Algeria, Somalia, Kosovo, The Philippines, and elsewhere. Some remained in Afghanistan joined later by many others. and were crucial in the formation of the Taliban regime. Al-Qaeda may have trained up to 70,000 potential fighters and terrorists and created cells in at least fifty countries.⁷¹

The Arab-Afghan and the other Mujahideen, most notably those from Central Asia, therefore returned to their respective homes with their own agendas. Global

jihad continued to provide ideological and religious inspiration but each society had its own specific issues that had to be addressed. The common points were the goals of overthrowing existing infidel governments via armed jihad and creating Islamic states to take their places. It was the global vision not the missionary activities of Saudi Wahhabis, which resulted in the civil wars and armed insurrections ranging from Algeria to Uzbekistan and Chechnya. These wars have at their roots the common perception of unjust, un-Islamic governments repressing religion in the public sphere. This combined with the dire socio economic conditions and repressive and authoritarian governments in these societies is at the root of the rise of radicalism in these countries.⁷² While, extremist violence has proved to be exceptionally dangerous and destabilizing it faces some level of internal and external threat from such movements, whether in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) and reaches for outside the MENA area involving Central Asia, South Asia, and the Islamic countries of Southeast Asia, Europe and North America.

While militarism and proliferation pose potential threats to the region's development and energy exports, the most active threat of violence now comes from this violent extremism. It does not however, have one source or represent one cause; some movements have arisen in response to state terrorism. Some movements have arisen in response to regional conflicts like the Israeli – Palestinian war and other elements have developed more in response to the pressures of social change. The end result is a complex mix of threats including national movements, regional movements like AL-Qaeda.

The ideology and goals of these movements differs from group to group, but there are often loose alliances of groups with different goals. What most do have in common is that their ideology is based on extremist version of Shiite, Sufi, Salafi, and Wahhabi Islam and that the religious goals of each movement are mixed with an anti secular political agenda and rejection of modern economic priorities and reform. So far they are all small extremist groups that do not represent the views and hopes of the vast majority of the people in the MENA region but several have already proven to be dangerous both inside and outside the Middle East.⁷³

A. Middle East

Bin Laden's goal in the early 1990s was to force the United States out of various countries in the Middle East. Given the increase in violence by militant Islamists in several Arab states, Bin Laden shifted his goals by the mid-1990s to seeking the overthrow of secular and moderate governments in the region. By hoping that after eliminating the "hypocrites" and "apostates" Islamists would reconstitute the *Umma* (nations of believers) along pure Islamic lines and reestablish the Caliphate (the civilization institution). In contrast to national revolutions, this would be civilizational revolutions. Islamists regard the *Umma* in transnational terms as opposed to the order of nation – states foisted on Muslim by the Western "infidels" given the nature of trans-nationalism and the historical legacy of empire in the Middle East. However, moderate regimes might not have to be toppled if they and the masses become subservient to a defector Caliph. Thus, the Declaration of war on America in 1996, he in effect called for the overthrow of the Saudi regime, not just the removal of US military forces from the Arabian Peninsula. In interviews he said: "if the US is beheaded the Arab kingdoms will wither away and the Saudis would suffer the same fate as the Shah of Persia" ⁷⁴

Saudi Arabia - By 1990, Bin Laden was disillusioned by the internal bickering of the Mujahideen and he returned to work in the family business. He founded a welfare organization for Arab-Afghan veterans some 4,000 of whom had settled in Mecca and Medina alone. After Iraq's invasion of Kuwait he lobbied the Royal family to organize a popular defense of the kingdom and raise a force from the Afghan war veterans to fight Iraq. Instead King Fahd invited the Americans. This came as an enormous shock to Bin Laden as the 540,000 US troops began to arrive. Bin Laden openly criticized the Royal family, lobbying the Saudi Ulema to issue *fatwas*, religious rulings against non-Muslims being based in the country. ⁷⁵ While, the Saudis understood the political risks they faced by having US troops on their soil, but they also understood the risks they faced if the US did not send troops. The Saudis decided to permit the United States to launch first Desert shield – the defensive operation – and then Desert storm.

To Wahabis in the kingdom the decision was outrageous. The Arabian Peninsula was the birthplace of Islam where Muhammad launched the campaign that created the Islamic empire. It is the home of Mecca and Medina, the holy cities of Islam. The

presence of Christian troops on this soil – at the invitation of the Royal family, no less – was a fundamental violation of the law. Moreover, regardless of Saddam's foul nature allowing Christians to invade Muslim lands from Saudi Arabia was unacceptable. Those Afghan-veterans who were arriving home in Saudi Arabia and elsewhere they did not share their elder's sense of vulnerability and dependency on the United States. They believed they could deal with this matter themselves.⁷⁶ Believing that, this was an appropriate time and place to reunite the Saudi - Afghans for jihad in defense of the homeland and particularly the holy cities of Mecca and Medina. However Bin Laden's offer was turned down by Royal family, and they invited American troops to protect Saudi Arabia instead. Bin Laden was furious. Bin Laden therefore ended his support for and service to the Saudi regime at this time and declared himself an opponent to and critic of its rule.

Consequently, following his exile to the Sudan in 1992, Bin Laden began to regroup Arab-Afghan veterans who were disgusted with both the American victory over Iraq and the support of Arab governments for the Americans in this – inter – Muslim conflict.

Bin Laden's opposition to the Royal family led him to create the Advice and Reform Committee (ARC) as an umbrella organisation for several opposition group in Saudi Arabia, the ARC was founded neither as a revolutionary organization for global jihad nor in opposition to the United States. It was founded to call for domestic change.⁷⁷ It was not Bin Laden alone doing this job but many Islamists mounted the most serious opposition beginning in spring of 1991. After the gulf war Islamists took the bold step of sending a letter to the king, urging him to implement several reforms, the most important being the creation of an independent consultative council responsible for making domestic and foreign policy. With tensions rising between the opposition and established clerics (Ulema) Islamists wrote the highest cleric, Shayk bin Baz, a 45-page "memorandum of advice" in September 1992 that demanded opposition clerics in effect be given a veto over government policy and judicial actions.⁷⁸

In its early years the committee was dedicated to reform through education. Some of the proclaimed goals of the organization were (A): to achieve the Islamic justice and eradicate all aspects of injustice; (B) to reform the Saudi political system and purify it from corruption and injustice; and (C) to revive the hezba system (the

right of citizens to bring charges against state officials), which should be guided by the teachings of the top Ulama.

Yet the repeated using of the word eradicates left open to interpretation now that these goals were to be achieved. Although the goals proclaimed the desire to reform and purify the Saudi system the use of terms and concepts associated with more radical interpreters of Islam, the eradication of ignorant (*jahiliya*) rule espoused by Sayyid Qutb and the right of citizens to bring charges against states officials, reminiscent of Ibn Taymiyya's call for the overthrow of un-Islamic governments suggested that the committee was not dedicated to the use of peaceful methods alone to achieve its goals. The increasingly militant stance of the committee over time particularly its calls for war against the 'American – Israel alliance and its local supporters suggests that it always recognized the eventuality of armed rebellion.⁷⁹ However, the conflict between the government and dissident Islamists came to climax in September 1994 at Burayda, following a mass protest movement led by the radical cleric Salman al-Awdah. Days later the Saudis arrested hundreds, Bin Laden has made frequent references to the dissident Islamist movement in Saudi Arabia and has felt a strong identification with its leaders such as Al-Awdah.

Although those who rallied at Burayda were arrested, the Saudis could not prevent organized opposition outside the country. Creating the committee for defense of legitimate rights (CDLR) with five other prominent Islamists, Muhammad al-Mas'ari, a physics professor fled to London in 1994, from where he began sending tapes and faxes back to Saudi Arabia that denounced the regime.⁸⁰

In addition, after his departure from Sudan to Afghanistan in 1996, he announced a new phase in his mission when he issued his 'declaration of war against the Americans occupying the land of the two holy places, Bin Laden recited the same litany of grievances expressed in Saudi religious dissident letters and petitions of the early 1990s; mismanagement of the economy resulting in inflation, unemployment and poverty; calibrating oil production and pricing to suit the interests of Washington rather than Muslims and inept handling of national defence. The material policy dimension of these issues hardly stems from a Wahhabi critique but stand firmly in the Muslim brotherhood tradition. Likewise, the declaration echoes the Islamic revivalist depiction of traitorous, hypocritical Muslim rulers beholden to the West. Thus, Bin Laden asserted that Al-Saud had been betraying Muslim cause for sixty

years. Abd-al-Aziz-ibn-Saud allegedly helped the British quell the Arab revolt in Palestine in 1936 by calming the Mujahideen with false promises. Likewise, King Fahd lied when he declared in 1990 that American military forces would stay for a very brief time. The religious objections to Al-Saud in the declaration echo Sayyid Qutb's accusation that Muslim rulers governed through man-made laws rather than the divine law of Shari'a and that they allied with infidel powers against Muslims. therefore. Al-Saud had fallen into apostasy.⁸¹ However, by 1997 Bin Laden was no longer calling for a resignation. He was calling for an end to the rule of the Royal family.

Between 1995 and 1997, Bin Laden shifted his focus from domestic Saudi issues to broader international concerns, particularly American foreign policy in the Middle East and issues of concern to the broad Muslim community. Most notably the ongoing devastation of Iraq and never ending plight of the Palestinians, Bin Laden's critiques changed from targeting the Saudi Royal family to targeting the United States and Americans everywhere. The reason for the shift was the growing secularity and criticism of Bin Laden by both the Royal family and the United States.⁸² This could be important strategy for Bin Laden to use Saudi oil as a weapon against American. Bin Laden's publicly stated strategy may ultimately increase the price of oil and deny easy access to Saudi oil for the United States if the current Saudi regime is destabilized and replaced by a less cooperative one. The use of oil as a foreign policy weapon could have devastating economic costs.⁸³

However, bombing also entered Bin Laden's arsenal of mayhem. In 1995, his Afghans killed five American service personnel and two Indian soldiers with a truck bombing in Riyadh Saudi Arabia. In 1996 with another truck bomb in Dahrn, killing 19 Americans.⁸⁴ Even after 11 Sept the extremist Islamist confederation pursued their agenda, when there was suicide attack in Riyadh on 12 May 2003, breaching the security, killing thirty-four people. In this attack the residential compound and the offices of Vinnell Corporation were the main targets killing nine of the company's employees and injuring several others. Ironically, the attack coincided with the visit of the US Secretary of State Collin Powell to Saudi Arabia. This attack was the response of extremist Islamists towards American presence in Saudi Arabia and in fact, they have been publicly expressing their hostile sentiments in this regard. However, there is also another angle of it. The Vinnell Company has been training Saudi National

Guards (Hirs-ul-watani) for international security of Saudi Arabia. The primary mission was protecting the ruling Saudi Royal family from peacetime internal political unrest. In another incident, a commercial officer of British BAE systems, a leading technology company in defence and civil aviation sectors, (BAE has been providing technical training program and producing qualified Saudi aviation technicians for the last thirty five years) was gunned down in February 2003 in Riyadh.⁸⁵

Yemen become a target for Al-Qaeda as by the end of the year many of the original Afghan Arabs had left Peshawar, including Bin Laden who had returned to Saudi Arabia. Before leaving he had formed his fledgling al Qaeda organization to coordinate jihad activities beyond Afghanistan. At his home in Jeddah, he tried to organize an insurgent army to fight the Marxist government in South Yemen.⁸⁶ Recent group of Mujahideen Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) a.k.a. Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (AAIA) the Islamic Army of Aden (IAA) emerged publicly in mid 1998 when the group released a series of communiqués that expressed support for Osama Bin Laden and appeal for overthrow of the Yemeni Government and operations against U.S. and other Western interests in Yemen. Al-Qaeda engaged in bombings and kidnappings to promote its goals, kidnapped 16 British, U.S. and Australian tourists in late December 1998 near Madiyah in Southern Yemen.⁸⁷ In December 1992, a bomb exploded in a hotel in Yemen, a hotel that had been housing American troops. U.S. intelligence linked the attack to Bin Laden⁸⁸

Turkey- The Riyadh bombing were followed by two car bomb attacks on two synagogues in Istanbul, Turkey on 15 November 2003 which left twenty-four persons dead and injured 146 people. Reuters reported that a radical Turkish Islamist group known as IBDA/C the Islamic Great Eastern Raiders /Front- claimed responsibility in a call to Turkey's semi-official Anatolia news agency. The Turkish interior minister did not rule out the involvement of Al Qaeda. The attacks on synagogues were followed by two other gruesome truck bomb explosions which wrecked the British Consulate and a British Bank, HSBC killing twenty seven people including the British Consul General in Turkey and injuring 450 persons in Istanbul on 20 November 2003. According to *New York Times*, Turkey had not seen anything like these bombings in its eighty years history as a secular Muslim state, in which more Muslims died than either Christians or Jews.

During the early 1990s, two main Islamist extremist groups, Hizbollah (not related to Lebanese Hizbulloh) and the IBAD/C or the Islamic Great Eastern Raiders/front emerged in Turkey. However, Turkish analyst maintained that many of the members of these groups were trained in Iran, Pakistan and Afghanistan in the past decade and they could have developed ties to Al-Qaeda. According to Turkish terrorist expert, Faik Buluk, 'we know that they went to areas where Al Qaeda groups were active and ideologically they are with them. Experts on terrorism in Turkey also pointed out that suicide attacks were not the tradition of Turkish terrorists.'⁸⁹

Another group fighting between Turkish armed forces and Kurdistan workers party (PKK) separatists heated up in 2005. In April, 21 PKK fighters and 3 Turkish soldiers were killed near the border with Iraq in the biggest clash in the area since the PKK declared a unilateral truce in 1999. Almost 6,000 PKK guerillas were thought to be based in Iraq.⁹⁰

Iraq- Ansar al-Islam (AI) a.k.a. partisans of Islam, Helpers of Islam, supporters of Islam, is a radical Islamist group of Iraqi Kurds and Arabs who have vowed to establish an independent Islamic state in northern Iraq. It was formed in September 2001, and is closely allied with al-Qaeda. Its members trained in al-Qaeda camps in Afghanistan and now provide safe haven to Al-Qaeda fighters fleeing Afghanistan. The group receives funding, training, equipment, and combat support from Al-Qaeda.⁹¹

Lebanon- The problem of terrorism in Lebanon is not new thing but it started since the creation of Israeli state in Middle East. From 1947 to 1967, the Middle East was dominated by a series of short conventional wars; Arabs states that stay around Israel state often maintained an anti-Israeli stance. The amount of tension led to blow between Arab country and Israel in 1967 six day War. This time terrorist group emerged in this region against Israeli-the Palestine Liberation organisation (PLO) began a series of terrorist attacks against civilian Israeli position. It was a turnaround from the old tactics of the stern gang and the Irgun and it served to define Israeli relation with its Arab neighbors. Even Israel struck back against the PLO.

In the meantime, some Arab countries after Six Day War, such as Iraq, led by Ba'ath party, group of Arab Socialists called for both Arab unity and the destruction of Israel. Along with several terrorist groups, they formed a rejectionist front,

rejecting any peace with Israel. And again in 1982, Israel launched a major invasion of Lebanon followed by a full-scale attack in 1982.

In the melee of the 1980, middle Eastern terrorism fell into several broad categories including suicide bombing and other attack on Israel and Airplane were hijacked, airport were attacked: various militants fighting other militants in Lebanon and abroad countries came to play the key roles with different group in Lebanon such as Libya, Syria, and Iran.⁹²

Iran established itself as the patron of Hizbullah whose principal military activities target Israeli occupation forces in Southern Lebanon. Iran's ability to influence radical Islamic groups derived legitimacy in Arab eyes to the extent that it concentrated on promoting anti-Israeli operations. Beyond this Iran had little influence on militants in the Arab East, the two Palestinian radical Islamic groups, Al-jihad-al-Islami and Hamas, cooperated with Iran in view of the latter's willingness to support their operations against the Hebrew state. Hizbullah leaders do not conceal that they receive military and financial aid from Iran, this aid is normally channeled through Syria.⁹³ According to Laden Boroumand and Roya Boroumand: Western intelligence agencies, suspected that Hezbollah has been working with Bin Laden on international operation since the early 1990, Hezbollah's terrorist network in Lebanon contains both Shi'ite and Sunni groups and there is also a Saudi Arabian wing that was involved in the Khobar towers bombing which killed 19 U.S. troops in 1996.⁹⁴

Furthermore, the struggle for position in regional politics, not ideology, explains why Iran gives material aid to the radicals while Syria provides their leaders with shelter Tehran aspires to convince the skeptical United States which seeks to contain Iran and weary Gulf Cooperation Council states, that its regional interests threaten none of theirs. Iranian support for the radicals serves as a retaliatory message to those who attempt to block what Iran regards as its vital regional interests. Similarly, Syria attempts to use the radicals as bargaining chips in peace negotiations with Israel, and to reserve a place for Damascus in Middle Eastern affairs.⁹⁵

Another group of Islamic militants which is linked to Al Qaeda is Asbat al-Ansar, its members are primarily Palestinians and associated with Osama Bin Laden and receive money through international Sunni extremist networks and Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda network.⁹⁶

B. Africa

Egypt- In Egypt Osama Bin Laden does not hold a monopoly on religion and violence, Egypt has become the center for two such terrorist organisations. The Islamic Groups (IG) and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. The Islamic group is a loose confederation of militants who follow the teaching of Sayyid Qutb, a militant who was executed in 1966. According to the Institute for counter – terrorism (ICI) (2000), the IG grew after many Islamic radicals were released from Egyptian prisons in 1971, they created cells with many names throughout the country and bound themselves in a theological confederation. Fanatics from the IG assassinated Egyptian President Anwar Sadat in October 1981.

ICI experts estimated that they have been the culprits behind bombing and assassination attempts in the 1990s, in 1997 they murdered 58 people who were touring Egypt to view the Pyramids. In 1999 the IG declared a cease – fire in the wake of over 1,000 victims since 1992.⁹⁷ It has external wings with supporters in several countries, its senior member signed Osama Bin Laden's fatwa in February 1998 calling for attacks against the United States. The Egyptian Government believes that Iran, Bin Laden, and Afghan militant groups support the organization.

Another group is Al-jihad a.k.a. Egyptian Islamic jihad, jihad group, Islamic jihad, Vanguard of conquest. This group active since the late 1970s, merged with Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda organization in June 2001, but may still retain some capability to conduct independent operations. Its primary goal is to overthrow the Egyptian Government and replace it with an Islamic state and to attack U.S. and Israeli interests in Egypt and abroad.⁹⁸ According to ICI (2000) the group also operates in Sudan, Albania and Azerbaijan. The US Department of State says Islamic Jihad is divided into two segments. One segment works primarily in Egypt, focusing on individual assassinations, it is particularly known for its attacks on Coptic Christians. The other segment operates under Osama Bin Laden in Afghanistan.⁹⁹ The Egyptian government and U.S. intelligence services claimed that Iran supports the jihad and its merger with Al-Qaeda also boosts Bin Laden's support for the group.¹⁰⁰

Algeria- The Salafist Group for call and combat (GSPC), an outgrowth of¹⁰¹ Armed Islamic group (GIA) an Islamic extremist Group, is composed of radical

Islamists and Algerian veterans of the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan.¹⁰² It appears to have eclipsed the GIA since approximately 1998, and is currently the most effective armed group inside Algeria. Its operations are aimed at government and military targets, primarily in rural areas. According to press reporting, some GSPC members in Europe maintain contacts with other North African extremists sympathetic to Al-Qaeda. In late 2002, Algerian authorities announced they had killed a Yemeni Al-Qaeda operative who had been meeting with the GSPC inside Algeria. Algerian expatriates and GSPC members abroad many residing in Western Europe, provide financial and logistic support. In addition, the Algerian government has accused Iran and Sudan of supporting Algerian extremists in past years.¹⁰³

Sudan- Many of the original Afghan Arabs have left Peshawar, including Bin Laden who had returned to Saudi Arabia. Before leaving he had formed his fledgling Al-Qaeda organisation to coordinate jihad activities beyond Afghanistan. He had already sent people to Sudan to set up operations based there.¹⁰⁴ Before he was expelled to Sudan, in Saudi Arabia, Bin Laden opposed the presence of U.S. troops in Saudi Arabia, consequently he was expelled by Saudi government and left to Sudan. There he found friends in the radical government of Sudan.¹⁰⁵ Infact historical background of the development of the Islamist movement in the Sudan dates to 1946. This date was the beginning of a political process inside the Sudanese Muslim Brethren party that transformed it from an elitist group into an Islamist popular movement known as the Islamic Charter front, the front under the leadership of Hasan al-turabi.¹⁰⁶ And in Sudan he expanded his operations, by the end of 1992. Bin Laden had nearly 500 Afghans working for businesses that he established in Sudan. He also saw internationalism as the best means for striking the United States, and he refused to base his operations in any single country.¹⁰⁷ The Sudan under Sheikh Hassan Al-turabi's overall influence cooperated closely with Bin Laden during his stays there and was suspected of complicity in many terrorist acts and conspiracies, including the attempted murder of President Mubarak in Ethiopia and New York bombing conspiracies in 1993.¹⁰⁸

In Sudan, Bin Laden went on offensive in 1993. Using his contacts in Sudan, he began searching for weapons of mass destruction. His Afghans sought to purchase nuclear weapons from underground sources in the Russian federation, and he began

work on a chemical munitions plant in Sudan.¹⁰⁹ The Al chifa plant, reported the New York Times of August 25, was presumed to be cooperating with the Iraqi chemical weapons program and producing an important ingredient of VX nerve gas ethyl methylphosphothionate. It was attacked by US missiles after truck bombs divested the area around the American embassies in Nairobi, Kenya and Dares Salaam, on 7 August, 1998. This time Washington, where President Clinton was under heavy fire because of his sexual scandal and the perjury accusation against him by independent persecutor Kenneth Starr over his affair with former White House intern Monica Lewinsky, was galvanized by the attacks.¹¹⁰

Libya - Libyan Islamic fighting group, a.k.a., Al-Jama' al-Islamiyyah al-Muqatilah, Libyan Fighting Group or Libyan Islamic Group emerged in 1995 among Libyans who had fought against Soviet forces in Afghanistan. It declared the government of Libyan leader Muammar Qadhafi un-Islamic and pledged to overthrow it. Some members maintained a strictly anti-Qadhafi focus and organized against Libyan Government interests, but others are aligned with Osama Bin Laden's Al-Qaeda organization or are active in the international Mujahideen network.¹¹¹

Morocco - Islamic combatant group (GICM), the goal of which reportedly include establishing an Islamic state in Morocco and supporting Al-Qaeda's jihad against the West. The group appears to have emerged in the late 1990s and comprised Moroccan recruits who trained in armed camps in Afghanistan. GICM members interact with other North African extremists, particularly in Europe. Its location/area of operation includes Western Europe, Afghanistan, and possibly Morocco.

Tunisia - The Tunisian combatant group (TCG), also known as the Jama'a combatant Tunisian, reportedly is seeking to establish an Islamic regime in Tunisia and targets U.S. and Western interests. Probably, founded in 2000, by Tarek Maaroufi and Saifullah Ben Hassina, the loosely organized group has come to be associated with Al-Qaeda and other North African extremist networks that have been implicated in terrorist plots during the past two years. Tunisians associated with the TCG are part of the support network of the broader international jihadist movement. According to European press reports, TCO members in the past have engaged in recruiting for terror training camps in Afghanistan. Some TCG associates were suspected of planning an attack against the U.S., Algerian and Tunisian diplomatic missions in

Rome in January 2001. Some members reportedly maintain ties with the Algerian Salafi Group for preaching and combat (GSPC).¹¹²

C. East Africa - Conditions in the East African countries are ideal for conducting terrorist operations. African government officials have correctly characterized as part of the soft underbelly of global terrorism. Porous borders, pervasive corruption and the lack of police capacity allow terrorists to move about freely, they find safe haven and establish logistical hubs, small arms and other weapons are readily available on black markets. A wealth of American, British, and European soft targets, large expatriate communities', tourists, and non-governmental organizations, make these countries attractive arenas for terrorist operations. Kenya shares a border with Somalia, a lawless and disorderly failed state that is widely believed to be a terrorist safe haven. Kenya has been a venue for international terrorism since 1980, when a Palestinian liberation organisation sympathizer bombed a tourist hotel, killing 16 people. In recent years, Al-Qaeda has been the international terrorist organization with the most significant presence in the region. In August 1998, Kenya and Tanzania was the scene of one of Al-Qaeda's most audacious pre-9/11 operations, when terrorists carried out near – simultaneous suicide attacks on the U.S. embassies in Nairobi and Darussalam, killing 303 people and injuring more than 50,000. In November 2002 near the coastal Kenya city of Mombassa, terrorist fired surface to air missiles at an Israeli jet packed with passengers. Although the missile missed the plane a subsequent Al-Qaeda suicide bombing at a resort near Mombassa popular with Israeli tourist killed 15 people. According to published accounts, Al-Qaeda has established terror centers in the region. "Sleeper cells" are alleged to exist in Kenya today. Some of the cells appear to be active.¹¹³

Somalia - Al-Ittihad al-Islami (AIAI) a.k.a. Islamic Union, Somalia's largest militant Islamic organization rose to power in the early 1990s following the collapse of the Sad Barre regime. It aims to establish an Islamic regime in Somalia and force the secession of the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Some elements associated with AIAI maintain ties to Al-Qaeda, conduct terrorist attacks against Ethiopian forces and other Somalia factions.¹¹⁴ In addition Al-Qaeda was active in Somalia when American troops joined an endemic civil war to bring food to the area. In October 1993, a U.S. army black hawk helicopter was downed while on patrol in Mogadishu. U.S. army rangers went to the rescue, and a two-day battle ensued in which 18 Americans lost

their lives. In an interview with ABC news reporter John Miller, Bin Laden claimed that he trained and supported the troops that struck the Americans.¹¹⁵

It was the Bush administration's September 2001 national security strategy declaration; in the wake of overthrowing the Taliban, stated that weak state can pose as great a danger to our national interest as strong states that most strongly raised the possibility that Africa could be the source of considerable international terrorism or at least provide sanctuary for those engaged in nefarious acts against other nations. Five years after 9/11 Washington planned to create AFRICOM which could have counter – terrorism as one of its central missions.¹¹⁶

D. Central Asia and Caucasus

In the newly independent republics of Central Asia, Islamist movements existed much before the collapse of Soviet Union¹¹⁷ where Tajikistan, had been a centre of the Basmachi movement in the early years of Soviet rule. The Basmachis were local guerilla groups led by mullahs, tribal chiefs and landlords who had resisted Soviet rule across the whole of Central Asia and continued their unequal struggle until the 1930s, after the ruthless suppression of the Basmachis, who like the Afghan Mujahideen, were inspired by Islam. In 1993 Tajikistan fell in the trap of civil war again where it was commonly perceived that the Tajik Islamic Renaissance Party (IRP) was a fundamentalist party inspired and sustained by their Afghan counterparts. The leader of the Tajik IRP, Mohammad Sharif Himatzade, had fought with other IRP leaders in the Afghan Mujahideen. The IRP received support from Hekmatyar's Hizbi-i-Islami and from Massoud, who had become a national hero to the Tajiks.¹¹⁸ In addition, the translations of the works of Maulana Abdul Ala Maududi (founder of Jamaat-i-Islami in Pakistan) were being smuggled and distributed in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and northern Caucasus for a long time. The ideological inputs to rise in rebellion against the Soviets were augmented by a campaign of distribution of literature prepared by CIA-ISI during the war in Afghanistan. In the early 1990s the Islamists had established their bases firmly in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. In 1992, Islamist rebels, in whose ranks Pakistan's Afghans Mujahideen from other Islamic countries were represented, seized the regional town of Tavildara 145 km east of the capital Dushanbe.

In Uzbekistan, Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) has been conducting an armed struggle to remove the secular states in the entire Central Asia and replacing them with an Islamic caliphate in the region. The leader of the movement, Takhir Yuldashev, is based in Kandahar and has close links with Al-Qaeda.¹¹⁹

Afghani brigade or Afghan-veterans turned to violence against their former paymasters. There were four reported coup attempts against President Gaidar Aliev in October 1994, March 1995, July 1995 and one that had been planned in early 1997. Plans to blow up a bridge over which President Aliev was to pass and other plans to shoot down his plane with a stinger missile were discovered. No group or individual ever claimed these attacks or attempted attacks. The war between Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh lasted in its acute phase from 1988 to 1994. Besides the direct action of the Afghan brigade on the Azeri side, there was terrorism inside Armenia which smacked of Afghani activity.

Russia, The Kremlin's senior planners had plenty of reasons to fear the backlash of the Afghanistan war in Chechnya. Immediately after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Grozny, the Chechen capital, became a transit point for the Afghan veterans, especially the Arab ones. In August 1995, a spokesman of the Russian Federal Security Service reported that units from Afghanistan and Jordan – which has a large and influential Chechen community in residence – were fighting on the side of Chechen President Joukar Dudayev. There were said to be about 300 foreign mercenaries at that time, out of total Chechen guerilla force of 6,000. Shamil Basayev, the leader of the seizure of the Budenovsk hospital and a right – hand man of Dudayev, was reported by the Russians to have been trained in Afghanistan by none other than the disciples of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar.

Anti-Russian terrorist organisation in Chechnya was believed by Moscow to have links with Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. They have also supplied with arms, stolen from or sold by the Russian military. Aided by the Hizbullah organization in Iran and in Lebanon – Dudayev visited Lebanon at least once Afghan war veterans and Iranian volunteers entered Chechnya through Dagestan and Azerbaijan. Mikhail Barsukov chief of the federal security service in charge of the special units admitted that “the Chechen fighters were a very serious unit, very well trained, very well – prepared” – possibly by Pakistan's ISI and American CIA during the 1979-89 jihad, or afterward by the jihad's many alumni.¹²⁰

The Russian army's war against Chechen secessionists remained at a stalemate in 2001. Tens of thousands of Russian troops stationed in the mountainous republic were unable to eliminate the rebels, whose sporadic attacks against Russian forces and pro-Russian Chechens resulted in a steady flow of fatalities. Moscow claimed that the Chechen rebels had links with Afghanistan's Taliban regime and Bin Laden, which made it all the more palatable for Russian press. Vladimir Putin pledged support for U.S. President Bush's call for a war on global terrorism. In December Russia stepped up military operations in response to Chechen raids on its forces.¹²¹

E. South Asia

Kashmir - The root of jihad ideology in South Asia started in the mid-1920s, Maulana Sayyid Abu A'la Maududi, the founder and head of the Jamaat-e-Islami in India (and following partition in Pakistan), began to articulate an ideology of political Islam that gave primacy to jihad over and above all the other duties imposed by Islam. The four pillar of Islam (prayer, fasting, alms giving and pilgrimage), Maududi said: were "acts of worship" ordained to prepare us for a greater purpose and to train us for a greater duty. Jihad of Islam was in this conception, in, irreducible conflict with all nationalisms, as well as with every form of governance – whether authoritarian or democratic other than Sharia (Islamic law).¹²²

But the true mobilization of the Mujahideen in Kashmir started converging in Kashmir in early 1990s. After Soviet troops withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, and in 1990 many South-East and West Asian and worth African Mujahideen had returned backed to their bases in their own countries particularly in Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Algeria, Sudan and Somalia, most of them stayed back in Afghanistan. These people were later described as Arab Afghans. It is around this time, as maintained by noted Pakistani scholar Pervez Hoodbhoy, that around 1990, Pakistan's military embarked upon a covert war in Kashmir (in India) using radical Islamist proxies trained and based in Pakistan. It was an effort to replay the strategy used by the U.S. in Afghanistan against the Soviets in which Pakistan's military had played a central role.

The foreign militants who participated in Afghanistan's jihad started converging in Kashmir in early 1990s. In September 1992, Voice of America (VOA) broadcast the interviews of an Afghan, an Indonesian, a Malaysian and a Sudanese, who had

joined militant ranks in Kashmir. In an interview to a local *Urdu daily newspaper*, an Afghan, a Sudanese and an engineer from Bahrain said that after accomplishing the task in Afghanistan they had moved towards Kashmir.¹²³

More evidence showed that Pakistan continued support for a wide range of jihadi groups in its covert war against India. Most prominently, no action whatsoever has been taken against the fifteen constituents of the united Jihad council (UJC) which is responsible for a major proportion of terrorist crime in Jammu and Kashmir: the UJC continues to operate openly from Muzzafarabad in Pakistan – occupied Kashmir, and receives visible support from the state and intelligence structures there, with regard to other terrorist organizations. Nine of these Pakistani groups are currently on the US list of terrorist organisations. Harakat-ul-Mujahideen (HUM), Jaish-e-Mohammed(JEM), Lashkar-e-Toiba (LET) and Lashker-e-Jhangri (LeJ) are listed as foreign terrorist organisations. The Al-Badr Mujahideen, Harkat-ul-Jehad-e-Islami (HUJI), Hizbul-Mujahideen (HM) Jamait-ul-Mujahideen and Sipah-e-Sahaba Pakistan (SSP) are identified as other selected terrorist organizations. Five of these – the HUM, HUJI and JEM (collectively known as the Harkat traid), The JeM and LeJ - are members of Osama Bin Laden's international Islamic front.¹²⁴

The Islamic agenda in Kashmir was articulated by the prominent militant group Hizbul Mujahideen, by asserting that – our aim is the establishment of an Islamic Caliphate world over, the other militant group, Jamaitul Mujahideen, asserted that the demand of the right of self – determination (in Kashmir) was distorting the image of the ongoing movement. It is a struggle for the establishment of Caliphate.¹²⁵

Bangladesh - The extension of jihad in the neighboring countries became gradually visible. The competition for assertion and ascendancy between Bangla nationalists and Islamists had started with the assassination of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the founder of Bangladesh. The strength of Islamists grew gradually; the Islamists now assert that they would change the democratic system in Bangladesh because they hold existing democracy responsible for anti-Islamisation. The formation of Harkat-i-Jihad-i-Islami, Bangladesh (HUJI-BD) in 1992 was a significant event. This group is believed to have been founded on the financial support of Al-Qaeda. The 1990, Maulana Azizul Haq set up Bangladesh Khilala majlis which aimed at establishing a global state of Islam (Khilafat). He later set up Islami Oikya Jote by incorporating eight Islamist organisations of Bangladesh. According to a

report, there are thirteen Islamist extremist organisations operating in Bangladesh. The objectives of these groups are Taliban style of government in Bangladesh and assisting the Islamist movements in their resistance in the entire Asian region.¹²⁶

Myanmar - Al-Qaeda has been long established in neighbouring Bangladesh, where thousands of Muslims have taken refuge due to Myanmar's military government systematic repression of its Muslim ethnic minorities. The Bengalis, Rohingas, and Kashin. Muslims account for roughly 4 percent of Myanmar's population. Whenever there are aggrieved people who are persecuted relentlessly, they will look to any means to fight back. Currently, there are three Muslim – based guerrilla movements in Myanmar: the Ommat Liberation Front, the Hawthoolei Muslim Liberation front, and the Muslim Liberation organization of Myanmar. The government has waged a harsh counter insurgency war against these groups and has at times tacitly supported local militias to engage in communal violence against Muslim communities.

Al-Qaeda has recruited Myanmar Muslims from the border region and sent them for training in Afghanistan. HUJI (Harakat-ul-Jihad-al-Islami found in Bangladesh in 1992, led by an associate of Osama Bin Laden. The organization is closely tied to one of the Al-Qaeda linked groups in Pakistan/Kashmir. Several HUJI leaders are veterans of the Soviet – era Mujahideen. They also recruited Rohingas from Myanmar and sent them to fight in Kashmir, Afghanistan and Chechnya.

It is not for the first time that Muslims from Myanmar have been trained in Afghanistan. In the 1980s, there were Muslims from Myanmar in Afghanistan fighting with the Mujahideen. Networks of people and groups already exist. According to Lintner, the foremost expert of insurgent politics in Myanmar, the Muslim Liberation organization of Myanmar, 'maintains some contact with Islamic circles in Pakistan.' On January 19, 1999 for example the police arrested seven Al-Qaeda members (one of whom was a Myanmar national) who were plotting to blow up the U.S. embassy in Delhi. More recently, leaflets calling on Muslims to join the Jihad against the Americans were reportedly found in Myanmar.¹²⁷

F. South-East Asia

In South-East Asia, the process of violent expression of Islamist agenda has been quite gradual and the protest movements which were organized on different

issues, corruption, authoritarianism and restricted form of civil liberties etc., ultimately adopted the radicalized Islamist idiom and utilized the same for mobilization and assertion of the war in Afghanistan which attracted volunteers from the South-East Asia gave impetus to the process of protest movements transforming into Islamist movements. By the time of Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, the South-East Asian Islamist groups had forged closed links with the groups operating in Afghanistan.¹²⁸

In addition, South-East Asia was appealing to the Al-Qaeda leadership in the first place because of the network of Islamic banks, business-friendly environments, and economics that already had records of extensive money laundering. Al-Qaeda saw the region first and foremost, as a back office for its activities (especially to set up front companies, fund-raised recruit, forged documents and purchase weapons) and only later became a theater of operations in its own right. And to using South-east Asia as a back office for its operations, Al-Qaeda set out to accomplish three major goals, first, it sought to draft onto or co-opt preexisting radicals, movement and groups.

The second, goal was to link these groups into a truly transnational network. The hall mark of Al-Qaeda activities in most instances the existing radical groups focused primarily on their domestic grievances and objectives and tended to have little contact with one another. The introduction of Al-Qaeda into the region in the early 1990s changed that completely. Suddenly, network between once unconnected groups were established as Al-Qaeda understood the benefits in educating law enforcement when working across borders.

The third goal was for Al-Qaeda to establish a regional arm of its own that would be able to become financially independent and technically proficient enough to plan and execute terrorist attacks. The organisations become known as Ja-maah-Islamiya.¹²⁹

On 9 January 2003 the Singapore government released a white paper on Jamaah Islamiya, maintaining that its goal was to create a Daulah Islamiyah (Islamic State) comprising Malaysia, Indonesia, the Southern Philippines Singapore and Brunei.

Jamaah Islamiya (JI) which had been active since the dependence of Indonesia and had established a network throughout South-East Asia had sent its cadres to

participate in Jihad in Afghanistan. The JI leader Hambali, who was captured in 2003, in Thailand, had forged close links with Al-Qaeda.¹³⁰

Malaysia - The problem of Islamic militancy is one that plagued Malaysia long before the September 2001 world trade center and Pentagon terrorist attacks. As early as the 1970s, radical and extremist groups had already started surfacing in this Muslim-majority country. The Penang – based movement formed in 1977 claimed that the Malaysian government was not giving Islam its proper due and aimed to set up a theocratic order by means, of violent jihad. It was only in 1992 that the Malaysian government took action to clamp down on the movement. Another group whose interpretation of Islam threatened the incumbent regime was the Koperasi Angkattan Revolusi Islam Malaysia (KARIM or Malaysian Islamic Revolutionary Front) formed in 1974 in Kuala Lumpur, KARIM preached the overthrow of the government through violence. It was later banned its leaders detained under the internal security Act.

In fact, there are many groups of Islamic movement in Malaysia but the group which was joined by Afghanistan-veteran that is PAS party¹³¹ (the parti Islam se Malaysia), had many supporters who grew disenchanted with Malaysian politics and the democratic process that they felt would continue to maintain the national front monopoly of power.¹³² The Malay identity, represented by United Malays National Organization (UMNO) and defined by democratic pluralists in plural cultural terms is rejected by the Islamists represented by Partai Islam se Malaysia (PAS) the latter claims that Islam should be the main component of national identity. In November 2003, as reported by Reuters, PAS published a fifty-three-page document claiming that Islamic way of life was the only way to overcome the pitfalls of Western style democracy in Malaysia. The document unveiled plans to make Shariah law as the supreme law of the country.¹³³ A small number of PAS members began to advocate a violent jihad and established a covert group, the Kempulan Mujahideen Malaysia (KMM)¹³⁴ which is believed to be the armed wing of PAS,¹³⁵ this extremist group within PAS advocates jihad, and it has passed edicts that U.S. soldiers must be killed because they have repeatedly oppressed Islamic countries.

The Kempulan Mujahideen (some times called the Malaysian Mujahideen group) was founded on October 12, 1995, by a veteran of the Afghan Mujahideen,

Zainon Ismail. Between 1979 and 1989, two groups underwent military training with the Mujahideen; most of the trainers were religious students studying in Pakistan who heard the call of jihad. Afghanistan was the core of KMM, some forty-five members of the group, nearly half of the membership, had either fought against the Soviets or had trained in Al-Qaeda camps there in the 1990s. One of the most important veterans was Nik Adli Nik Aziz,¹³⁶ who has led the KMM since 1999, upon returning to Malaysia in 1996 from Afghanistan.

By 1999, Nik Adli had become committed to waging a violent jihad against the Malaysian state, which he considered to be secular and oppressive. In 1999 he purchased a large cache of weapons in Thailand, including twenty-four pounds of explosive, that same year he studied bomb-making with the Moro Islamic liberation front in the southern Philippines. He also began to link up with exiled Indonesian radicals such as Abu Bakar Ba'asyir, Abdullah Sungkar, Riduan Isamuddin (Hambali), and Mohammad Iqbal Rahman (Abu Jibril), Abdurrahman. The KMM dispatched its members to train in MILF camps as well as fight against Christians in the Maluku Islands in Indonesia starting in 1999.¹³⁷

In addition, the Islamist extremist groups Kumpulan Militant Malaysia (KMM) along with another group Al-Maunah are believed to be responsible for the attacks on the places of worship of minority groups.¹³⁸ The Deputy Home Minister Datuk Zainul Abidin Zin informed parliament that the government had detained some members of KMM for an attempted bombing of a shopping mall in Jakarta in August 2001.¹³⁹

After the attacks of 11/September, investigations by US intelligence agencies and their South-East Asian counterparts uncovered Malaysia's pivotal role as a rendezvous point for the planning and facilitation of terrorist attacks in New York and Washington DC. Indeed, it has been suggested that 'since the early 1990s, Al-Qaeda has found Malaysia to be a convenient base of operations, where militant Islamic ideology has been able to graft onto a small but growing community of Islamic radicals. In truth there were already indicators that Malaysia was proving to be a haven for international Islamic militants long before the 11 September attacks. Already in 1995, Wali Khan, Amin Shah an international terrorist and a known associate of Romzi Ahmed Youssef, the man who was responsible for the 1993 world trade center bombings in New York, was arrested in Malaysia. Another known

terrorist linked to Ramzi Youssef Khalid Shaik Mohammad, who emerged as a chief plotter of the 11 September attacks, was also believed to have operated out of Malaysia throughout the 1990s.

One of the suspects involved in the planning and implementation of the 11 September attacks Zacharias Massaoui who has been accused of conspiring with Osama Bin Laden and the Al-Qaeda network to launch the attack on civilians in the US was known to have entered Malaysia. During his stay, he was tracked by the Malaysian intelligence service and believed to have received assistance from a former Malaysian military officer, Yazid Sufaat. Yazid was also accused of providing shelter to two Yemeni hijackers who participated in the 11 September attacks, Khalid Al-Midhar and Nawaf Al-Azmi, as well as Taufiq bin Laden Atash, who were later identified as one of the masterminds behind the October 2000 bombing of the USS Cole in Yemen and according to authority of Malaysia's investigation also found that the chief of Jamaah Islamiya , Riduan Isamuddin or(Hambali) used Malaysia as a platform for orchestrating the activities of the terrorist organisation, known to be the South-East Asian arm of Al-Qaeda. Malaysia was apparently also the location for three meetings of the Rabitatul Mujahideen, a coalition of jihadist groups from Southeast Asia organized around the Ja-maah Islamiya. In 1999-2000 Malaysia's place in the web of international terrorism, could be because Malaysia provided free Visa to all Middle Eastern people, as Malaysian security officials do admitted in private that Kuala Lumpur's problems are rooted in its 'Visa free' policy towards most Middle Eastern states that enable Al-Qaeda operatives and sympathizers to enter the country in the guise of financials man and tourists.¹⁴⁰

Indonesia - The collapse of the authoritarian Suharto regime in May 1998 gave a fertile ground for resurgence. Islamic radicalism has been one of the important characteristics of post-Suharto Indonesia. Radical Islamic groups who were suppressed by the Suharto regime have found sufficient freedom to organize themselves consolidate their power and actively play roles in the dynamics of social religious and political affairs in post Suharto Indonesia.

Many names have emerged as leading figures in the rise of Islamic radicalism among them are Habib Rizieq Shihab of front of defenders of Islam or front pembela Islam (FPI), Abu Bakar Ba'asyir of Islamic congregation or Jamaah Islamiyah (JI) and the council of Jihad fighters of Majlis Mujahideen, Agus Dwi Karna of Lashkar

Jundullah, and other names from Darul Islam tentera Islam Indonesia (DI/TII) and Ja'far Umar Thalib of Jihad fighter of Lashkar Jihad. These names have attracted much public attention and made headlines in national and international media. They have emerged as one significant force in the dynamics of social, religious and political change in post Suharto Indonesia.

The most vocal and controversial groups in post-Suharto Indonesia is Ja'far Umar Thalib¹⁴¹ who used to join Afghan Mujahideen during Afghan-Soviet war 1979-1989. He was the founder and leader of Lashkar Jihad an organization established in January 2000 and disbanded in October 2002.

Indeed, Ja'far believes that the United States, Israel, and Christians are the master minds of religious violence in many parts of the world. One particular issue that significantly contributed to escalated and passionate public debate about Ja'far is an allegation that he has close connections with Osama bin Laden, the prime suspect; of the September 11, 2001 events, he also was alleged that he played a key role in the sending of jihad fighter to various areas in Indonesia where conflicts occurred between Christian and Muslims such as Ambon in Maluku and Poso in Sulawesi. Many suggest that Lashkar jihad worked hand in hand with Osama Bin Laden as part of his terror networks in South-East Asia. Such an allegation was deliberately made by foreign media. In a long article, *The Times* concluded that Ja'Far has a lot of power and influence and controls between 3,000 and 10,000 armed trained and loyal militiamen. *The Times* went on to suggest the U.S. government not take Ja'Far lightly. Collectively, it further suggests that Ja'Far must be taken very seriously by the U.S. government because he is as dangerous as Osama Bin Laden.

Indeed US policy makers expressed their deep concerns with the threat of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia; especially the threat of Ja'Far Umar Thalib "Ja'Far is a radical demagogue infused with a worldwide Islamic credo" said Peter Chalk, an analyst with the RAND corporation in Washington. "Lashkar Jihad" he adds, "is one group that might be prepared to aid the logistical relocation of Al-Qaeda forces. Larry Johnson, a former state Department counter terrorism official said " If these groups are allowed to grow unchecked by local authorities" he adds, " they could pose a threat."¹⁴²

Although Gerakan Aceh Merdeka or free Aceh Movement (GAM), the secessionist movement in Aceh formed in 1975, has never been publicly linked to Al-

Qaeda or other Middle Eastern-based Islamic terrorist organisations, it is suspected by US officials of having some ties. Many GAM members fought with the Mujahideen. So linkages are possible though none have ever been confirmed and the organization denies any: "we don't want to have anything to do with an organization that plays the religious card like Al-Qaeda, said a GAM spokesman; they are a nationalist not an Islamic movement."

In June 2000, two of the most senior leaders of Al-Qaeda, Mohammad Atef and Ayman al-Zawahiri, traveled to Indonesia, stopping in Aceh, where they reportedly met with Acehnese leaders hoping to establish a base area and training facilities in Indonesia, to complement Afghanistan. The two Al-Qaeda leaders were favorably impressed by the lack of central government control, the Islamic fervor of the people, and GAM's local support. Despite their favorable impression GAM resisted their overtures and Al-Qaeda did not establish a base in Aceh. GAM leaders, according to a senior U.S. official were extremely sensitive to the U.S. position on this issue and were courting U.S. support and recognitions. To date, only limited direct ties between GAM and Al-Qaeda have been uncovered.¹⁴³

Another group of Islamic militant in Indonesia is composed of Afghan-veterans where its leader Hambali¹⁴⁴ used to join Afghan Mujahideen during Afghan-Soviet war in 1979-1989. Younger radicals, notably Hambali wanted to bring the conditions on and have formed a cadre of jihadis to bring about the conditions for their political agenda.¹⁴⁵ Hambali is part of the JI faction that has conspired to take the struggle directly against Western interest.

JI has also been able to take advantage of communal conflicts in Ambon and Poso central Sulawesi. Neither was started by JI, but the organization and others sympathetic to jihadist goals have attempted to take advantage of both situations. JI and its affiliations were able to exploit – and provided further battle grounds for joining of Afghan-veterans who have experience in Afghan-Soviet war.

JI leaders are linked to the MMI (Majlis Mujahidin Indonesia; Indonesia Mujahidin Council) and MMI's para-military wing in Ambon known as Lashkar Mujahideen. The core of JI met and formed links with Bin Laden's network during the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan. The main tactic of Lashkar Mujahideen was hit and run raids against Christian leaders and structures, where Lashkar Jihad

was involved in the more “conventional” and high profile objective of taking and holding territory and attempting to force the expulsion of Christian residents.

And recent incident which was carried out by JI, where a major breakthrough for security forces, in undermining terrorist operations in Indonesia, was the arrest in June 2002 of senior Al-Qaeda operative Omar al-Faruq who was residing in Bogor. Omar al-Faruq's relations included involvement in the 2000 Christmas Eve bombings in which Churches were targeted in ten cities across Indonesia; an assassination attempt on Megawati, and plans for large scale terrorist attacks against U.S. interest, in Cambodia, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippine, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, and Vietnam, the goal of these plans, to be carried out by JI, was to create an Islamic state in insular South-East Asia.

The Bali blast represented a shift in JI's operations. Although the ultimate goal of JI is the creation of a region-wide Islamic state in Southeast Asia, the Bali blast represented more direct solidarity with Al-Qaeda's cause as Amrozi, one of the convicted bombers, stated that he hated Americans and expressed remorse that he got Australians instead. Other suspects have, however, confirmed that Australia was the target. A threat by Osama Bin Laden to Australia in late 2001, due to Australia's involvement in East Timor, adds strongly to the picture that Al-Qaeda and JI have found common ground.¹⁴⁶ However, in Anthony's conclusion there is also a sizeable element within the Indonesian public who are doubtful about the nature of JI threat, and many interpret the trial of Ba'asyir as an anti-Muslim act. Media reports suggest that many Indonesians believed that U.S. agents were behind the Bali attacks.¹⁴⁷

Thailand - There has never been strong ties between the Muslim insurgency¹⁴⁸ in Thailand and international terrorist groups. Although militants in Southern Thailand have long been a fact of life, for the most part they have given up their campaign to create an independent homeland, most have worked as a logistic operative for the Acehese rebels, GAM (Gerakkan Aceh Merdeka, Free Aceh Movement) and the MILF of the Philippines, serving as an important financial and arms conduit. It is clear that Al-Qaeda operatives have used Thailand as a base of operations since the mid-1990s. Thailand has been the target of international terrorism since March 1994, a plot by Bin Laden operatives to blow up the Israeli embassy in Bangkok went awry by chance¹⁴⁹ (where in 1994 Ramzi flew to Thailand and swiftly recruited a group of devout young Muslims in Bangkok for an attack on the Israeli

embassy there. When that failed, Ramzi fled back to Pakistan and then flew to Philippines).¹⁵⁰

Many members of Al-Qaeda operatives have passed through Thailand. After the September 11 attacks, the Thai Supreme Commander General Surayud Chulanont, admitted that military intelligence was monitoring a small number of Bin Laden operatives operating in Thailand and the government was aware that countries in the Middle East provide training, education and financial support for fundamentalist groups in the south of Thailand. Likewise, the Secretary General of Thai, NSC General Vinai Pattiyakul acknowledged that some southern Muslim radicals had been trained in Afghanistan and Libya.

There are two very small groups, the Wae Ka Kaeh (WKK) and the organisation Mujahideen Islam Pattani, that are thought to have some ties to Ja-maah Islamiya and Al-Qaeda; and the head of the WKK fought with the Mujahideen in Afghanistan. It is evident from the confession of Omar al-Faruq (Omar al-Faruq is one of the senior most Al-Qaeda leaders in Southeast Asia, the Ja-maah Islamiya had tried to establish links with Muslim militants elsewhere in the region, including Thailand and Myanmar) that the JI was rapidly trying to expand its contacts with the Guragan Mujahideen. Another Thai-Muslim militant group Pattani United Liberation Organization (PULO), is suspected of having ties to the Abu Sayyaf.

On June 10, 2003 Thai police arrested three JI members in Narathiwat province in Southern Thailand. The arrests were a joint operation between Thai and Singaporean authorities, following the May 16, 2003 arrest of a senior JI Singapore cell member in Bangkok, Arifin bin Ali (John wong Ah-Hung) who was rendered to Singapore, and the three others were planning to execute terrorist attacks against Western embassies and tourist venues in Pattaya and Phuket.¹⁵¹

Philippine - In the Southern island of Mindanao Moro National Liberation Front (MNLF) has been struggling for an independent state in the island. The Philippine government which recognizes MNLF as a representative organisation of Bangsamoro Muslims of Mindanao concluded a peace agreement with the front under the leadership of Nur Misuari in 1991. The group is also recognized by OIC. The peace agreement provided for autonomy and speeding up of the pace of development in the island. However, two other groups, the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) the later prefers to call itself AL-Harkatul Islamia, rejected

the agreement. Both the groups, which had considerable experience in Afghanistan, have been demanding the establishment of an independent Islamic state with a complete Islamic system of governance. Out of the two ASG has earned considerable international notoriety for its deadly bombings, assassinations and kidnappings for ransom. The US State Department has listed it as one of the world's most dangerous terrorist organisations.¹⁵²

G. Europe

The war in Afghanistan provided a stepping stone for escalating violence in the Middle East. Apart from the Afghan episode; direct Western aid proved vital for the escalation of the militants' operations. A Lebanese daily describes the evolving relationship between Islamic fundamentalists and the West as "yesterday's allies and today's enemies."

A report by an Arab magazine claims that at least fifty radical Islamic leaders sought and obtained political asylum in Europe, twelve in England alone. For Muslim radicals, Europe is not just a refuge from Arab states intelligence and security officers, but an important source of money, training and weapon supplies. In January 1995, German authorities revealed that some Arabs train in mountain camps on its territory. This announcement came after the discovery of traditional training camps in Sudan and Afghanistan. Similarly, in March 1994, Algerian security forces seized a large shipment of military hardware loaded in a cargo ship originating from the Netherlands. Some shipments destined for certain Arab countries were intercepted at the French – German borders. Swiss authorities discovered other shipments bound to the Middle East. Arrested Muslim radicals have admitted receiving weapons from the West through several mafia-type connections. Observers seem to believe that wealthy Arab living in Europe, who are sympathetic to the objectives of Islamic militants, contribute generous funds for clandestine arms purchases in the black market.¹⁵³

H. United States of America

Apart from US facing with Al-Qaeda's threats outside (as mentioned above), its homeland it still facing some group of Islamic militants which are suspected to have links with Al-Qaeda network within its homeland itself. As to how these Islamic militants reached America and when, has been studied by Steven Emerson (a network

news correspondent who has spent several years, covering the Middle East produced a PBS program entitled Jihad in America in 1994)

Emerson believes group of Islamic terrorists began building networks within the United States in the late 1980s, and they did so indirectly with American help. To understand this it is needed to briefly recall events in 1979. Former Associate Deputy FBI Director Oliver B. (Buck) Revel, interviewed on Emerson's PBS program, agreed with Emerson's assessment. Revel states that once the Mujahideen and their associates came to the United States, they found a hospitable environment.

Emerson credits Abdullah Azzam for completing the most important infrastructure. He helped establish the Alkifah Refugee Center in New York. According to Emerson, American did not realize that the Alkifah Refugee Center was the front for another organisation, an organisation calling for jihad. In fact, the Alkifah Refugee center's Arabic letter head calls for holy war.

In 1989, with the Soviets in disarray and their political system on the verge of collapse; Azzam turned his attention to the United States. According to Emerson, Azzam spread his jihad network through 38 states, with multiple bases in Pennsylvania, Michigan, California, Texas and the New England states. Azzam returned to Pakistan in 1989, only to be killed by an assassin, but his work was completed by several supporters, including his cousin Fayiz Azzam.

Emerson names several prominent officials working in various radical groups in the domestic jihad. Tamim al-Adnani was the most vigorous recruiter and successful fundraiser among all the leaders. Emerson says Tamin al-adnani assisted in domestic terrorist incidents, including the world trade center bombing. Fayiz Azzam, Abdullah Azzam cousin, gave rhetorical speeches calling for blood and holy war. Elsayyid Nossari who was charged with murder of militant Rabbani Kahane and convicted of lesser offenses, maintained a clearing house for terrorist literature before his arrest. Even in prison Emerson says Nossari helped plan the world trade center bombing.

Emerson also says well-known terrorist group have established bases in the United States. He claims the Islamic Association for Palestine (IAP) is Hamas's chief propaganda arm in the United States under the name Asqa vision. Based in Richardson, Texas, the IAP is one of several organizations with links to Hamas. Islamic jihad has a base in Tampa Florida. Hizbullah also has a network in the United States.

Emerson claims to have found over 30 radical Middle Eastern groups in the United States, adding that the FBI has confirmed that terrorist groups have command centers in California, Nevada, Texas, Florida, Illinois, and New Jersey. Buck Revell says the intention of these groups is to harm the United States and keep it from being able to take international action.¹⁵⁴

In addition, the making violence in the United States was done in response for the American political, economical and military support to Israeli, as one group had mailed letters to five news organisations, claiming responsibility over the incident of the bombing of world trade center's North tower killing six people, injuring 1,000 and causing \$300 million in damage. The letter received by the New York Times reflected this:

"We are the fifth battalion in the Liberation army; declare our responsibility for the explosion on the mentioned building. This action was done in response for the American political economic and military support to Israel the state of terrorism and to the rest of the dictator countries in the region. Our demands are:

- 1- Stop all military, economic, and political aid to Israel
- 2- All diplomatic relations with Israeli must stop
- 3- Not to interfere with any of the Middle East countries interior affairs.

If our demands are not met, all of our functional groups in the army will continue to execute our missions against the military and civilian targets in and out of the United States"¹⁵⁵

This action is a part of Al-Qaeda political objective, where Bin Laden justified these attacks in his formal declaration of war in February 1998 calling for a jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders and declaring that killing "American and their allies, civilians and military is an individual duty for every Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible to do it"¹⁵⁶

Bin Laden was indicted by the United States for allegedly masterminding the 1998 bombings of two U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Darussalam, Tanzania. The United States retaliated with missile strikes near Kabul, Afghanistan, destroying what was described by the Pentagon as an extensive terrorist training complex near there.

In November 1999 the United Nations imposed economic sanctions on Afghanistan in response to the Taliban's refusal to hand over Bin Laden. Gorge Bush

named Bin Laden and Al-Qaeda as the prime suspects in the September 11 attacks against the United States. Bush declared a war against terrorism worldwide and demanded that Afghanistan's Taliban rulers deliver Bin Laden and his lieutenants to the U.S. government but the Taliban refused.¹⁵⁷ Consequently Taliban regime was overthrown by The United States.

However, whether Osama Bin Laden was behind September 11 or not there is an analysis by Waleed El-Ansary about motivation of terrorist to do this thing. Bin Laden attempted to convey a message to the entire world in his first videotaped statement on Al-Jazeera after 11 September, reiterating his tit-for-tat terrorism strategy in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian issue. He opened by saying that Americans are now experiencing the fear that Palestinians and others have suffered for 80 years, and closed by saying that American will not feel secure until Palestinians and others feel secure:

"And this is America filled with fear from the north to south and east to West Thank god. And what America is facing today is something very little of what we have tasted . I swear by God the great America will never dream nor those who live in America will never taste security and safety unless we feel security and safety in our land and in Palestine "

In addition the United States will have an incentive to change its Crusader-Zionist foreign policy under the right combination of costs and benefits, and threaten the American people accordingly. He would certainly be familiar with cost-benefit analysis and the importance of "incentive system" because he (Osama) studied management and economics at King Abdul Aziz University in Saudi Arabia while obtaining degrees in public administration and civil engineering. He discussed the economic impact of military strikes against economic targets in his 1996 declaration of war as well as urging that the "economical boycotting of the American goods is a very effective weapon of hitting and weakening the enemy, and it is not under the control of the security forces of the regime".

Therefore, his publicly declared tit-for-tat strategy espousing terrorist attacks until the United States stops its current foreign policy is a public threat to induce U.S. to adopt a more cooperative foreign policy by changing the current policy's costs and benefits. As Bin Laden stated in his December 27, 2001 Videotape release:

"They (the 19 terrorist) shook American's throne and struck the U.S. economy in the heart this is clear proof that this international usurious, damnable economy-which America uses along its military power to impose infidelity and humiliation on weak people – can easily collapse . (The attacks) have inflicted on New York and other markets more than a trillion dollars in losses . If their economy is destroyed, they will be busy with their own affairs rather than enslaving the weak peoples "

William Beeman points out “. . . if the people of rogue nation experience enough suffering, they will overthrow their rulers or compel them to adopt more sensible behaviour. The terrorist actions in New York and Washington are a clear and ironic implementation of this strategy against the United States ” Indeed, Bin Laden claims the desire to “overthrow of special interest group that is creating the ‘war against Islam’ urging the American people to elect a government that acts in their interest.”¹⁵⁸

III. The U.S. policy towards Al-Qaeda and Afghanistan after 11 September 2001

A. U.S attack on Afghanistan – The terrorist attacks of September 11 in the U.S set off a chain reaction. A year that saw the rigid control of the Taliban on the verge of total victory also witnessed its military defeat and political marginalization.

Though humanitarian aid continued to reach Afghanistan, Taliban attitudes toward the public role of women and sensitivity to foreign influences frustrated the work of aid agencies. Its unyielding policies also provoked international condemnation and economic sanctions. In May the U.S. announced increased assistance for Afghanistan but in that same month the Taliban closed several UN political offices in the country. UN efforts to distribute food in Kabul were threatened in a dispute over the use of Afghan women in this work. In August eight foreign relief workers were detained on charges of promoting Christianity and threatened with the death penalty; after three months in custody, however, they were rescued by U.S. forces in November. In spite of this Taliban could eliminate opium cultivation as, UN Secretary – General Kofi Annan reported in August that opium poppy had almost completely disappeared from Taliban – controlled areas.¹⁵⁹

September 11, 2001, attack confirmed that the US homeland itself was vulnerable to the consequences of its foreign policies and that determined enemies could attack and inflict horrendous damage upon US cities. Terrorism replaced communism as the source of fear and loathing in the war the United States had been fighting abroad since 1947, and it had finally reached its shores.

President Bush immediately declared a war on terrorism and warned that more than sixty countries might be called to account for the war on terror. It begins with Al-Qaeda but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist group of global

reach has been found, stopped and defeated. There would be one battle but a lengthy campaign from this day forward, Bush stated, "Any nation that continues to harbour or support terrorism will be regarded by the United States as a hostile regime". The Al-Qaeda network was worldwide, and it would continue to exist even if Bin Laden was captured or killed. When pressed, the White House admitted that Al-Qaeda's links with other global terrorist organisations were "amorphous".

Al-Qaeda was "just one of the networks in forty or fifty countries, as the Defense Secretary argued and although the war in Afghanistan was "important to the credibility" of U.S. efforts, it by no means ended the Pentagon's ambition to root out terrorism. Even if Bin Laden were killed, it is more powerful than ever, its credibility has been enhanced and since it trained about 20,000 men in Afghanistan alone over the past decade; it now exists in many countries. And there are many Islamic Jihad groups everywhere that have no direct connection with it – only their aims are identical.¹⁶⁰

The terrorist network that the United States now seeks to eradicate is a product of the protracted conflicts in Afghanistan and Kashmir and on the West Bank and Gaza strip. The September 11 attacks on the United States might never have occurred had these violent struggles been resolved. Thus helping to settle protracted civil conflicts is not merely good for the world in general: it can also make the United States safer.

Although tragic in purely human terms, losses that the United States has suffered till date have not affected its material position or its core national interests. The United States is still the leading economic and military power in the world and the global consensus that terrorism is serious problem may have enhanced the U.S. influence in the short term. Basic U.S. foreign policy goals are also unaffected. The United States still wants to discourage security competition in Europe and Asia, prevent the emergence of hostile great powers and promote a more open world economy, inhibit the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and expand democracy and respect for human rights.

The campaign against global terrorism became the central aim of U.S. foreign and defense policy, and other international goals will be subordinated to this broad objective. In the short term the campaign has two main objectives, the first, goal is to eradicate Al-Qaeda both by attacking it in Afghanistan and by eliminating its cells in

other countries; the second goal is to replace the Taliban government, both to deny al-Qaeda a state haven and to demonstrate to other government.

Over the longer term, the United States must also take steps to ensure that new Al-Qaeda does not emerge and make it more difficult for potential enemies to acquire even more lethal means (such as nuclear weapons). To achieve these ends, U.S. foreign policy must focus on (1) managing the anti terrorist coalition;(2) enhancing control over weapons of mass destruction; (3) reconstructing Afghanistan; and (4) rebuilding relations with the Arab world and Islamic world.¹⁶¹

After the September 11 President Bush demanded that Afghanistan's ruling Taliban regime hand over Bin Laden to the United States¹⁶² but Mullah Omar reacted with outrage; his government was merely honoring the traditional Pushtun code of *milmastia* that demands protection for all Muslims who seeks shelter in their country. Even if such shelter means risking the safety of all inhabitants, to violate the code would constitute betrayal of a brother and a violation of Islamic teaching, "extraditing Osama Bin Laden, Mullah declared is tantamount to leaving a pillar of our religion."

Following the attack when prince Turki bin Faisal returned to Afghanistan to renegotiate the surrender of Bin Laden to Saudi officials, he found the one-eyed Mullah a changed man. "Mullah Omar was very heated" prince Turki later recalled in a loud voice he denounced "all our efforts and praised Bin Laden as a worthy and legitimate scholar of Islam. He told me we should not do the infidel's work by taking Osama from them"

The opportunity to separate the Taliban from Al-Qaeda had been lost, and with it the possibility of preventing future acts of terror. "Rather than trying to divide and conquer," Dr. Larry Goodson, professor of Middle East studies at the US army war college, said in the wake of the missile attacks "we adopted the approach to keep Afghanistan in a box we were not going to recognize them. We were not going to aid them in significant ways. In fact, we took a very hard line toward the Taliban regime,"¹⁶³

Addressing a joint meeting of Congress on September, 20, Bush vowed to direct "every means of diplomacy, every tool of intelligence, and every instrument of law enforcement, every financial influence and every necessary weapon of war . . . to defeat the global terror network". On Oct. 7, with Taliban leaders continuing to

stonewall the United States and its allies regarding the whereabouts of Bin Laden, the U.S. military launched air strikes against Taliban targets in Afghanistan.¹⁶⁴

Within days of the attacks on the world trade center, the Pentagon and NATO for the first time in its history invoked Article 5 of its charter declaring that the atrocities were an attack on the alliance. As a demonstration of support, Australia invoked the ANZUS Pact putting elements of its armed forces on high state of readiness in case they were called upon to assist the U.S. On September 19 the Organisation of American States (OAS) agreed by acclamation to invoke the Rio Treaty, also a mutual-defense pact.¹⁶⁵

On September 23, President Bush held a highly confidential telephone conversation with Russia President Vladimir Putin. The seventy minute conversation resulted in an earthshaking shift in the global balance of power that would have a profound impact on Bin Laden and the course of the war on terror. Putin gave the nod for US forces to enter Afghanistan and Central Asia with some condition. In exchange for his consent, Putin gained Bush's approval of the use of its forces to crack down on rebel groups in Chechnya.¹⁶⁶

China reacted to this development by moving their nuclear missile and aircraft capable of carrying nuclear bombs transported to bases in the Xinjiang region of northwest China bordering on the Central Asian states and Afghanistan.

As Americans sat glued to their television sets for the latest word on the war on terror few were aware that the doomsday card had been played and world's three great powers-the United States Russia, and China-were scrambling to get their nuclear weapons in place.¹⁶⁷

The week after the attacks was a period of shock and rage for most Americans but there was also a feeling of helplessness because of great uncertainty about who exactly had attacked, where precisely in the world they could be found, and how they could be punished. On September 19 the U.S. dispatched more than 100 combat and support aircraft to various bases in the Middle East and the Indian Ocean. A large naval task force was sent to join what was first called operation Infinite Justice but later, after complaints were received from Muslims, was renamed operation Enduring Freedom.

Allied air strikes in Afghanistan began on October 7 later U.S. Special Forces including Delta force and Rangers launched ground raids inside the country. The U.S.

enlisted as an ally the anti-Taliban Northern Alliance, the principal remaining opposition to the Taliban take over of the Afghanistan, relying on them to provide the bulk of ground troops for the campaign.¹⁶⁸ U.S. reluctantly decided to help the faction Northern Alliance, providing the Northern Alliance with guns, funds, and horrific air cover, as in Vietnam, the United States believed its credibility was at stake. But the Northern Alliance's principal sponsors after the mid-1990s were Iran and Russia, and the forces that comprise it have often fought each other. Some of its warlords, chieftains and factions took arms and money from others, from the Soviet Union, and Russia which at one time was its major backer.¹⁶⁹ Even India has aided it because of its hostility to Pakistan. Some of its most important leaders fought for the Soviet forces during the 1980s but others opposed them and in the fall of 2001 the Northern Alliance even hired dozens of former Soviet soldiers to advise them¹⁷⁰

The northern city of Mazar-e Sharif fell a month later, and on November 13 the Northern Alliance entered Kabul as Taliban forces fled the Capital on December 9, with the fall of the Taliban's principal city of Kandahar American B-2s began carpet bombing a network of caves in the Tora Bora Mountains of eastern Afghanistan, the last stronghold of forces loyal to Osama Bin Laden and the Taliban. On November 15 anti-Taliban Afghan troops backed by British and American commandos' surrounded a cave where they thought Bin laden and a dwindling forces of Al-Qaeda fighters were hiding but he was not found. His whereabouts were still unknown up to now.¹⁷¹ But according Jayanta Kumar Ray, the rapidity with which president Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan capitulated before American demands, in the aftermath of the episode on 11 September 2001, was indeed stunning. No less stunning was the three-way game of deception played by Musharraf after the commencement of the American war in Afghanistan. Musharraf went on deceiving the Americans the Pakistanis, and certainly the Indians. Pakistan offered shelter to 25000-30000 Americans soldiers, and permitted American forces to use some of its airports. The carpet bombing of some regions of Afghanistan by the United States air forces, combined with the ground assaults by the Northern Alliance, led to the fall of the Taliban government in Kabul. Meanwhile, Pakistan deceived America by using American planes to secure safe passage for thousands of Pakistani commanders and soldiers in Afghanistan. Undoubtedly, many Talibans and their leaders (perhaps even Osama Bin Laden) used these plans, disguising themselves as Pakistanis, and fled to

Pakistan, where they secured sanctuaries with the active assistance of Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence (ISI).¹⁷² Recently Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden's right-hand man, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has issued a vehement video calling for attacks on western interests world wide and regime change in Egypt and Saudi Arabia "the struggle against the corrupt regimes and the corruptors in two phase . . . In the short term, one must take aim at the interests of the Crusaders and Jews," Al-Zawahiri said in the 95-minute video from Al-Qaeda's As-Sahab media.¹⁷³

B. U.S. and establishment of Afghan interim regime

After U.S. led coalition forces ousted Taliban regime international moves to solve the resulting political crisis focused on avoiding the chaos and destruction that had followed the Mujahideen (Taliban) takeover from the communist government of Mohammad Najibullah in 1992. On November 27, UN-sponsored conference in Bonn, Germany, was convened to settle for an interim government to replace the Taliban. The largest share of delegates represented the Northern Alliance, whose political leader Burhanuddin Rabbani had retained international recognition even after being driven from Kabul in 1996. Supporters of former king Zahir Shah also participated, the result was an agreement that Hamid Karzai, a Pushtun tribal leader and supporter of the former king, would lead an interim administration for six months, when a loya Jirga¹⁷⁴ a traditional Afghan assembly of notables, would choose a new government. On December 22 Karzai and cabinet that included two women were installed in a peaceful ceremony joined by outgoing president Rabbani and most of the country's ethnic and political factions.¹⁷⁵

Hamid Karzai, who was picked to head an interim authority in Afghanistan by a UN-sponsored international conference in Bonn, German in December 2001, sought to maintain balance among the country's ethnic and tribal groups while laying a foundation for national institutions. Although he was a Pushtun tribal, Karzai had an armed group of his own security in Kabul maintained by an international security. Assistance Force (ISAF) of 4,000 to 5,000 troops whose command was rotated among various participating countries.¹⁷⁶

However, there is scarcely any constancy in its views on the future of Afghan politics. The Pentagon was insistent that it would withdraw US soldiers entirely when the fighting ended and when they captured or killed the Taliban and Al-Qaeda leaders

on their list, which they never did. Bin Laden is still free as are most of his key aims. And although the United States was ready to see an international peace keeping force in Kabul under the British and Germans, it was also reluctant to see it established before fighting ended. To complicate the situation, the Northern Alliance opposed any extensive foreign peace keeping force. Russia believes the Northern Alliance alone is the legitimate government of Afghan, Iran agrees with it too.¹⁷⁷

U.S. Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited Kabul in May and declared that major combat activity by U.S. forces there was over. Still operation enduring freedom, a U.S.-led coalition of 12,500 soldiers, battled throughout the year against terrorist opposition thought to be grouped around al-Qaeda loyalists of Osama Bin Laden and followers of ousted Taliban leader Mohammad Omar, and Hezbi Isalmi forces of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. All three leaders continued to elude capture.

A separate International Security Assistance Forces (ISAF) of 5,000 troops contributed by 31 countries was the security guarantor for areas directly under the control of the central government. In August NATO assumed responsibility for ISAF, and in October the UN Security Council authorized NATO to send ISAF troops anywhere in Afghanistan. This was intended as support for President Karzai. Pakistan's President Pervez Musharraf had called for ISAF to end what he called a power vacuum in Afghanistan. In July an exchange of fire between Pakistani troops and Afghans had led to charges that Pakistan had violated the Afghan border. After a mob ransacked Pakistanis embassy in Kabul, relations between the two countries became tense.

Reports of raids and bomb attacks by Taliban fighter increased throughout the year although the degree to which they were coordinated was uncertain. In the summer the Taliban reportedly set up a new command structure for southern Afghanistan, its traditions base of support, and week's later establishment of another Taliban command for northern Afghanistan was claimed.¹⁷⁸

Vishal Chandra's conclusions in his book about the role and response of the West remain exceedingly crucial in the changing scenario. The ongoing US military operations against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban along the Durand line, (see Chapter I) which is backed by the NATO's expanded role in Southern Afghanistan, are significant to the survival of the Kabul government. But the key question here is for how long can West sponsor Afghanistan? Keeping in view the fact that Afghanistan is

almost decades away from security and stability, are U.S. and NATO prepared for that long haul in Afghanistan? U.S. forces in Afghanistan are said to be over stretched, and the NATO's third phase of expansion at best remains an ambiguous half-hearted mission. There any long-term commitment of the International community towards an externally sponsored security and the political process in Afghanistan remains suspect.¹⁷⁹

Notes and References

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- ² Kees Vander pijl, *Global Rivalries from the Cold War to Iraq* (New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 2006), pp.346-347.
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- ⁴ Ralph B. Levering, *The Public and American Foreign Policy, 1918-1978* (New Delhi: Ambika Publications, 1978), pp.99-101.
- ⁵ Hall Gardner, *American Global Strategy and the War on Terrorism* (England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), p.26.
- ⁶ Steffan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, *American Alone: The Neo-conservatives and the Global Order* (UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), pp. 162-163.
- ⁷ Ibid, p.69.
- ⁸ Ibid, pp.162-163.
- ⁹ Riyaz Punjabi, *Introduction*, in n.1, pp.11-13.
- ¹⁰ Lyudmila Polonskaya and Alexei Malashenko, *The Soviet Union and the Moslem Nations* (New Delhi: Panchsheel Publishers, 1988), pp.67-69.
- ¹¹ Hall Gardner, n. 5, pp.33-34.
- ¹² Douglas Little, *American Orientalism: The United States and the Middle East Since 1945* (London: Tauris, 2003), pp.152-153.
Among the other actions, the Reagan administration took with general support of both parties in Congress –armed Islamic fundamentalists in Afghanistan to fight a guerilla war against Soviet Union.(David Farber, *Taken Hostage:The Iran Hostage Crisis and America's first Encounter with Radical Islam*(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), p.187.
- ¹³ Steffan Halper and Jonathan Clarke, n.6, pp.276-277.
- ¹⁴ M. Asghar Khan, *We've Learnt Nothing from Histor: Pakistan politics and Military Power* (Oxford: New York University Press, 2005), pp. 232-234.
- ¹⁵ Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban, Islam, Oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia* (London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2000), pp. 129-130.
- ¹⁶ Kees Vander Pijl, n.2, pp. 346-347.
- ¹⁷ Ahmed Rashid, n.15, pp. 129-130.
- ¹⁸ Angle M. Rabasa, et al., *The Muslim World after 9/11* (USA: Rand Project Air Force, 2004), p.47.
- ¹⁹ Ahmed Rashid, no.15, pp. 129-130.
- ²⁰ Angle M. Rabasa, et al., n.18, Pp.274-278.
- ²¹ Ahmed Rashid, n.15, pp. 129-130.

- ²² Yonginder Sikand, *Bastions of the Believers- Madrassas and Islamic Education in India* (New Delhi: Penguin books, 2005), pp.260-261.
- ²³ Ahmed Rashid, n.15, pp. 129-130.
- ²⁴ Babak Ganji, *Politics of Confrontation- The Foreign Policy of the USA and Revolutionary Iran* (London & New York: Tauris Academic studies, 2006), pp. 239-240. Azzam was also a founder of the Palestinian radical Islamist group Hamas.
- ²⁵ Jonathan R. White, *Terrorism: An introduction*.3rd ed., (Australia: Wordsworth Thomson Learning, 2002), pp.214-217.
- ²⁶ Angle M. Rabasa, et al., n.18 p.47.
- ²⁷ Ahmed Rashid, n.15, pp.131-132.
- ²⁸ John Trumbour, "The Clash of Civilizations: Samuel P. Huntington, Bernard Lewis, and the Remaking of Post – cold War World Order", in Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells (Eds). *The New Crusades: Constructing the Muslim Enemy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2003), pp.102-103.
- ²⁹ Amin Saikal, et.al., *Modern Afghanistan: A History of Struggle and Survival* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), p. 225-227.
- ³⁰ John Trumbour, n. 28, pp.102-103.
- ³¹ Jonathan R. White, n. 25, p.162.
- ³² Amin Saikal, et.al., n. 29, pp.225-227.
- ³³ US Department of State, "Patterns of Global Terrorism:1999 – Asia Overview" in A Wordsmiths Compilation (Ed). *Afghanistan: Things fall apart*, (Delhi: Wordsmiths, 2002), pp. 172.
- ³⁴ Barry Desker and Arabinda Acharya, "Cooperation issues in the global war on terror" in Peter Katona, Michael D. Intriligator and John P. Sullivan (Eds), *Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter – Terrorism Network* (London: and New York: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2006), pp. 160-162.
- ³⁵ Azzam born in 1941 in Jenin Palestine on the West Bank was a product of the Palestinian diaspora, steeped in Islamic learning and politics. He answered his first call to battle in the 1967 six-day war, after which he joined the Palestinian resistance, and later left because it was he said merely a political cause insufficiently rooted in Islam. He joined the Muslim Brotherhood and later helped found Hamas as an Islamic alternative to the Palestinian Liberation Organization. He resumed an academic career that earned him degrees in Jordan and Damascus and eventually a Ph.D. from Cairo's Al Azhar, the high temple of Islamic learning. When the USSR invaded Afghanistan in 1979, Azzam was among the first of the non-Afghan Muslim sympathizers to join the cause against the Soviet. He set up his base in Peshawar, capital of Pakistan's untamed Northwest frontier province, Azzam found his cause: Afghanistan would be the incubator for a new muscular Islam, a religion of warriors like that of the prophet's time. (Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers: The Hijackers who they were, why they did it*, New York: Politico's Publishing, 2005, pp.93-95).
- ³⁶ The Muslim Brotherhood was founded in Egypt in 1928 by Hasan Al Banna and has been the model for many later organisations. Al Banna saw the Brotherhood not as engine of radical revolution but of gradual Change, and regarded Westerning influence and intellectual emancipation as weakening Islam, while seeking a return to pure Islam and Sharia (Islamic law). In 1994 a secret apparatus of the Brotherhood was formed, rationalized as for the jihad in defense of Islam but mainly used to defend the movement against the government.

The Brotherhood has also established itself in other countries, including Jordan where it had been for some time the biggest single party in the parliament, Syria where it was crushed by the government army in 1982, and the West Bank and Gaza strip in the form of Hamas. And also in Lebanon, the radical Iranian –backed Hizbulloh (party of God).(Naji Abi – Aad and Michel Grenon, *Instability and Conflict in the Middle East: People, Petroleum and security Threats*; Britain: Macmillan Press LTD, 1997, pp.26-27).

- ³⁷ David Commins, *The Wahhabi Mission and Saudi Arabia* (London I B Tauris, 2006), pp 156-157
- ³⁸ Oliver Roy, 'Has Islamism a future in Afghanistan?' in William Maley(ed) *Afghanistan and the Taliban The Rebirth of Fundamentalism*, (New Delhi Penguin books 2001), pp 201-203
- ³⁹ Some Salafi scholars, engrossed in political pietism turned radical the fight against the non-believers (Kafir) became a religious obligation and the main leitmotiv of this sect the concept of Takfir (declaring someone to be non-believer) became the major source of conflict among Salafis causing a rift in the movement throughout the Arab world Reformist Salafis consider that all applications of Takfir require a clear and proven violation Muslim leaders they argue cannot be declared to be non-believers, because there is no clear evidence proving that they have ceased to be Muslims Consequently, a jihad against Arab regimes is not permitted The most radical Salafis base their interpretation of jihad on the writings of Ibn Taymiyya and like him, they consider that actions by governments that are contrary to Islamic Law can be considered proof in order to declare them non-believers The Takfir thus became an instrument that could be used to oppose any regime whatsoever through armed struggle (Juan Jose Escobar Stemmam, "Middle East salafism's influence and radicalization of muslim communities in Europe", in Barry Rubin (ed), *Political Islam Critical Concepts in Islamic Studies*, London Routledge Taylor Francis Group, 2007, pp 83-84)
- Ibn Taymiyya** lived during the times of the Crusader and Mongol invasions, a circumstance that conditioned his theories on the jihad When the Mongols invaded Dar al-Islam they eventually converted to Islam The dilemma arose as to whether the war against them should be considered a jihad or a war between two Muslim entities In his *fatwa* on the Mongols, Ibn Taymiyya acknowledged that they practiced the five pillars of Islam, but this did not automatically make them true Muslims The mainstream view was the under the *Shari'a* they were Muslims, but Ibn Taymiyya introduced a new evaluation criterion whether or not they respected the five pillars, if someone did not follow one of the precepts of the *Shari'a*, they ceased being Muslim and could therefore be declared *Kafir* (Juan Jose Escobar Stemmam, "Middle East Salafism's influence and radicalization of muslim communities in Europe", in Barry Rubin(ed) *Political Islam Critical Concepts in Islamic Studies*, London. Routledge Taylor Francis group, 2007, p 93) For further detail about the role of Salafi ideology to Mujahideen see also, Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers The Hyackers who they were, why they did it* (New York Politico's Publishing, 2005), pp 101-102
- ⁴⁰ Juan Jose Escobar Stemmam, "Middle East Salafism's influence and radicalization of Muslim communities in Europe" in Barry Rubin (ed), *Political Islam Critical Concepts in Islamic Studies*, (London Routledge Taylor Francis Group, 2007), pp 83-84
- Azzam viewed the Afghanistan war veterans as a mobile strike attack force that could operate anywhere in the Arab world His work goes beyond the political and ideological radicalism of Qutb (who inspired organizations like *Takfir wa Hyra* or the Islamic jihad in Egypt) and calls for the construction of a radical utopia in which violence is religious obligation, part of an international and pan-Islamic jihad against oppression Azzam was one of the first authors to include Andalusia among the Muslim lands to be retaken through the jihad See Jason Burke, *Al Qaeda Casting a Shadow*, (London Tauris, 2003), P 72, and (Juan Jose Escobar Stemmam, "Middle East salafism's influence and radicalization of muslim communities in Europe" in Barry Rubin (Ed) *political Islam critical concepts in Islamic studies*, London Routledge Taylor Francis group. 2007, p 93)
- ⁴¹ Sayyid Qutb (1906-66) he joined the muslim brotherhood – an Islamist organization dedicated to the Islamization of Egyptian society As the tension between Nasser (Arab nationalism) and brotherhood came to head in 1954, Nasser used the attempted assassination as justification for crushing the Brotherhood He thereafter engaged in open

persecution, oppression, imprisonment and even execution of those affiliated with it. Because Qutb was one of its major leaders and its most influential ideologue by this point, he was particularly singled out by Nasser for harassment, incarceration, and ultimately execution.

Qutb's experiences of repression, authoritarianism, imprisonment, and torture by his own government led to his radicalization. During his ten years in prison he wrote prolifically. While some of his works, particularly his Quranic commentary, were spiritually attractive to mainstream Muslims. The most influential and widely read of these prison writings for radicals was *Milestones*. This book was dedicated to the exposition of his vision of the necessity for revolution in order to create a truly Islamic society ruled by Islamic law. This revolution was to be carried out via jihad as holy war, which was declared to be the ongoing permanent duty of Muslims as they engaged in the cosmic battle of good versus evil, played out in everyday life in the struggle of Muslims against non-Muslim governments and ideologies. (Natana J. Delong – Bas, *Wahhabi, Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2004, pp.256-265).

In addition it is said that the West used to support Brotherhood through Saudi Arabia to counter Nasser's Arab nationalism. As cited in *Al Ahram weekly* (24-30 November 1999): . . . through Saudi Arabia the United States provided direct support to the Muslim Brotherhood the oldest movement in the area. The idea was to counter the rising tide of Arab nationalism and Arab unity championed by Nasser and by the Ba'ath party in Syria and Iraq. The West became more and more convinced that Islam was the weapon to fight communism. (Fatema Mernissi, "Palace fundamentalism and liberal democracy", in Emran Qureshi and Michael A. Sells (Ed). *the new crusades: constructing the Muslim Enemy*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2003, pp. 58-59).

⁴² Robert S. Snyder, "Hating America: Bin Laden as a Civilizational Revolutionary", in Shahram Akbarzadeh (ed.) *Islam and Globalization: Critical Concepts in Islamic Studies*, (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2006), p.171.

⁴³ Natana J. Delong – Bas, *Wahhabi, Islam: From Revival and Reform to Global Jihad* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2004), pp.256-265.

⁴⁴ Juan Jose Escobar Stemmam, n. 40, p.93.

⁴⁵ Riyaz Punjabi, *Introduction*, in, n.1, pp.21-22.

⁴⁶ Riyaz Punjabi, n.1, pp. 103-106.

⁴⁷ Natana J. Delong – Bas, n. 43, pp.256-265.

⁴⁸ Muhammad Abd Al-Salam Faraj, an Egyptian fundamentalist ideologue, carries the idea of jihad to the point of regarding it an absent obligation, or a forgotten pillar of Islam. Clearly motivated by messianic projections, Faraj believes that jihad is an absolute Muslim duty for reinstating rule by Sharia. Jihad is so central to Faraj's thinking that he calls it the sixth pillar of Islam. (Hilal Khashan, "the new world order and the tempo of militant Islam", in Shahram Akbarzadeh (ed.), *Islam and Globalization: Critical Concepts in Islamic Studies*, London: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2006, p.266).

⁴⁹ Robert S. Snyder, n. 42, p.171.

⁵⁰ Jonathan R. White, n. 25, pp. 162-164.

⁵¹ Ibid, pp.109-110.

⁵² Ibid, pp. 162-164.

⁵³ Laden Boroumand and Roya Boroumand, "Terror, Islam, and democracy", in Council on Foreign Relations(Ed), *America and the World: Debating the New Shape of International Politics* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 2002), pp.306-310.

⁵⁴ Gorge Friedman, *America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America And its Enemies* (New York: Doubleday, 2004), pp. 30-32.

There was some proof that Saudi is among infidel. According to one of Salafis writing, Islam al-Barqawi, better known as Abu Muhammad al-Maqdisi, a Jordanian who-during his stay in Afghanistan in 1984-published a book entitled the creed of Abraham (Millat Ibrahim) in which he outlined the doctrine of jihad based on the Wahhabi tradition.

- Radical Salafism merged with ultra – intransigent Wahhabism. In 1991 al-Maqdisi, who had links with the most radical circles’ of Saudi Islamism, published a book called *proof of the infidelity of the Saudi state*, which was distributed widely in the Arabian Peninsula. In 1992 he left Peshawar for Jordan, where he headed the Salafi organization *Bayat al-Imam* until he was detained by the Jordanian authorities in 1996 and accused of plotting to kill the negotiators of the peace treaty between Israel and Jordan. His work influenced the principal ideologists of fighting Salafism in Saudi Arabia during the 1990s. (Juan Jose Escobar Stemman, “Middle East salafism’s influence and radicalization of muslim communities in Europe” in Barry Rubin (Ed). *Political Islam: Critical Concepts In Islamic Studies* London: Routledge Taylor Francis group, 2007, pp.83-84).
- ⁵⁵ Naji Abi – Aad and Michel Grenon, *Instability and Conflict in The Middle East: People, Petroleum and Security Threats* (Britain: Macmillan press Ltd. 1997), pp.26-27.
- ⁵⁶ Amin Saikal, et al., n. 29, pp. 225-227.
- ⁵⁷ A Wordsmiths Compilation, *Afghanistan: Things fall Apart* (Delhi: Wordsmiths, 2002), pp. 171-172.
- ⁵⁸ George Friedman, n.54, p.30.
- ⁵⁹ A Wordsmiths Compilation, n. 57, pp. 171-172.
- ⁶⁰ George Friedman, n. 54, pp.30-32.
- ⁶¹ Ibid, pp.57-58.
- ⁶² Ibid, pp.30-32.
- ⁶³ Ibid, pp.32-34. See also, Barry Desker and Arabinda Acharya, “Cooperation issues in the global war on terror” in Peter Katona, Michael D. Intriligator and John P. Sullivan (eds), *Countering Terrorism and WMD: Creating a Global Counter – Terrorism Network* (London: Routledge Taylor Francis group, 2006), pp. 164-167.
- ⁶⁴ Fared Zakaria, “Why do they hate us?”, in Council on Foreign Relations (ed), n 53, p. 272.
- ⁶⁵ George Friedman, n. 54, pp.32-35.
- ⁶⁶ David Rapoport, *The politics of atrocity*, in, Yonah Alexander and Seymour Maxwell finger, forward by Hans J. Morgenthau (Ed). *Terrorism: interdisciplinary perspective*, (New York: the John Jay Press and McGraw – Hill book company (UK) limited, 1977), p. 49.
- ⁶⁷ George Friedman, n.54, pp.32-35.
- ⁶⁸ Natana J. Delong – Bas, n. 43, pp.266-271.
See also, George Friedman, *America’s Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America and Its Enemies* (New York: Doubleday, 2004), pp.27-29.
- ⁶⁹ Riyaz Punjabi, n.1, pp.78-79.
- ⁷⁰ US Department of Defence, “US government fact sheet on Osama bin Ladin” in A wordsmiths Compilation, n. 57, pp. 171-172. See also, Natana J. Delong – Bas, n. 43, pp.274-277.
- ⁷¹ Gabriel Kolko, *The Age Of War: The United States Confronts the World* (New Delhi: Viva Books Private Limited, 2007), pp.51-56.
- ⁷² Natana J. Delong – Bas, n. 43, pp.266-271.
- ⁷³ Anthony H. Cordesman, *The Military Balance in the Middle East* (Westport Connecticut London: Praeger publishers, 2004), pp.388-389.
- ⁷⁴ Robert S. Snyder, n.42, pp. 163-164., See also, Paul L. Williams, *Osama’s Revenge the Next 9/11* (New Delhi: Viva books Private Limited., 2005), pp.52-58.
- ⁷⁵ Ahmed Rashid, n.15, pp.133-134.
- ⁷⁶ George Friedman, n.54, Pp.21-24.
- ⁷⁷ Natana J. Delong – Bas, n.43, pp.266-271.
- ⁷⁸ Robert S. Snyder, n.42, pp.165-166.
- ⁷⁹ Natana J. Delong – Bas, n.43, pp.266-271.
- ⁸⁰ Robert S. Snyder, n.42, pp.165-166. See also, John K. Cooley, *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), pp. 228.
- ⁸¹ David Commins, n.37, pp.188-189.

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- ⁸² Natana J. Delong – Bas, n.43, pp.266-271
- ⁸³ Waleed El-Ansary, “The economics of terrorism: how Bin Laden is changing the rules of the game” in Joseph E.B. Lumbard (ed). *The Library of Perennial Philosophy Islam, Fundamentalism, and The Betrayal of Tradition*, (New Delhi: Pentagon Press. 2005), p.205.
- ⁸⁴ Jonathan R. White, n.25, pp.165-166 See also, George Friedman, *America's Secret War Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America and Its Enemies* (New York. Doubleday, 2004), pp.235-237
- ⁸⁵ Riyaz Punjabi, n.1, pp. 96-98.
- ⁸⁶ Terry McDermott, *Perfect Soldiers The Hijackers, Who They Were, Why They Did It* (New York: Politico's publishing, 2005) p.130
- ⁸⁷ Anthony H. Cordesman, n.73, p.410
- ⁸⁸ Jonathan R. White, n. 25, p. 164.
- ⁸⁹ Riyaz Punjabi, n.1, pp.99-100.
- ⁹⁰ Peter Saracino, “Military Affairs”, in, *Britannica Book of the Year 2006*, (Chicago Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc, 2006), p 248
- ⁹¹ Anthony H. Cordesman, n.73, p. 410.
- ⁹² Jonathan R. White, n.25, pp.100-104. See also, Anthony H. Cordesman, no.73, pp 392-393.
- ⁹³ Hilal Khashan, “The new World order and the tempo of militant Islam”, in Shahram Akbarzadeh (ed.), *Islam and Globalization Critical Concepts In Islamic Studies*, (London: Routledge Taylor Francis group, 2006), pp.268-269.
- ⁹⁴ Laden Boroumand and Roya Boroumand, no.53, pp. 308-309.
- ⁹⁵ Hilal Khashan, n.93, pp.268-269.
- ⁹⁶ Anthony H. Cordesman, n.73, Pp. 397-399.
- ⁹⁷ Jonathan R. White, n.25, pp.167-168
- ⁹⁸ Anthony H. Cordesman, n.73 ,pp.399-400.
- ⁹⁹ Jonathan R. White, n. 25, pp.167-168
- ¹⁰⁰ Anthony H. Cordesman, n.73, p.403
- ¹⁰¹ Ibid, p.408.
- ¹⁰² Ibid, pp.397-399.
- ¹⁰³ Ibid, pp.408-409.
- ¹⁰⁴ Terry McDermott, n.86, pp.127-133
- ¹⁰⁵ Jonathan R. White, n. 25, P.164.
- ¹⁰⁶ Abdullah A. Gullab, “The insecure rendezvous between Islam and totalitarianism: the failure of the Islamist state in the Sudan” , in Barry Rubin (ed.) *Political Islam Critical Concepts In Islamic Studies , Vol 3*, (London: Routledge Taylor& Francis group, 2007), pp. 11-13.

Where he has explained that “Characterized by education and reform” leaders of such a model the evolutionary path, have always argued that ruling an Islamic government should be the step that follows preparing most of the society for accepting the Islamic Sharia.

In the aftermath of the 1964 October revolution in the Sudan that ousted General Ibrahim Abboud's military dictatorship (1958-1964) from power through civil disobedience, the Islamists emerged as a small political entity led by Hassan al-Turabi and some of his western educated colleagues from that time until Lt General Umar al-Bashir expelled him from his post as Secretary General of the National Congress Party in may 2000, Al-Turabi has been the supreme leader of the Islamists in Sudan and one of the most notable Islamists worldwide. He led the movement into a series of transformations, alliances, collaboration and developments over the years starting from the Muslim brotherhood (1964) to the Islamic Charter front (1964-69) to National Islamic Front (1985-98)

Al-Turabi and other Islamists have promoted their own version of modernization theory that has used the state as its central focus. The Islamists theorists by contrast, have

employed an Islamic discourse that attacks vigorously other modernization political theories and practices such as the Marxists, Arab and African socialists, and other elitist schools of thought.

¹⁰⁷ Jonathan R. White, n.25, p.164.

¹⁰⁸ John K. Cooley, *Unholy wars: Afghanistan America and International Terrorism* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), pp.218-220.

¹⁰⁹ Jonathan R. White, n. 25, Pp.165-166. For further detail about Osama seeking to get nuclear weapon see also, Paul L. Williams, *Osama's Revenge the next 9/11* (New Delhi: Viva books Private Limited., 2005), pp. 41-47, 60-61.

¹¹⁰ John K. Cooley, n.108, pp. 218-220.

¹¹¹ Anthony H. Cordesman, n.73, p.411.

¹¹² Ibid, p.412

¹¹³ William Rosenau, "Al-Qaeda recruitment trends in Kenya and Tanzania", in Barry Rubin (ed.), *Political Islam: Critical Concepts in Islamic Studies*, Vol.3, (London: Routledge Taylor& Francis group, 2007), pp.44-46.

¹¹⁴ Anthony H. Cordesman, n.73, P.409.

¹¹⁵ Jonathan R. White, n.25, P.165.

¹¹⁶ Greg Mills and Jeffrey Herbst, "Africa, Terrorism and AFRICOM", (*Rusi*, April 2007, Vol.152, No. 2, pp. 40-44).

¹¹⁷ Riyaz Punjabi, n.1, pp.83-87.

¹¹⁸ Angelo Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan: A Modern History* (London: I.B. Touris, 2003), pp.163-167.

¹¹⁹ Riyaz Punjabi, n.1, pp.83-87.

¹²⁰ John K. Cooley, n.108, pp.181-182.

¹²¹ Peter Saracino, "Military Affairs", *Britannica Yearbook 2002*, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc, 2002), p.279 .

¹²² Ajai Sahni, "The dynamics of Islamist terror in South Asia" in Barry Rubin (ed.), *Political Islam: Critical Concepts in Islamic Studies*, Vol.3, (London: Routledge Taylor& Francis group, 2007), pp. 141-142.

¹²³ Riyaz Punjabi, n.1, pp.79-80.

¹²⁴ Ajai Sahni, n. 122, p. 145.

The fall of Kabul in 1992 deprived the commitment of foreign militants of much of its point, but also opened the door to various organisations to install themselves on Afghan territory, particularly in the east, thus enabling them to escape the influence of Pakistan. In particular, some Pakistanis set up camps in Afghanistan to train their Mujahideen for service in Kashmir. This applied particularly to Hezb Ul-Majahidin, the military wing of Jamaat- I Islami, and to Harakat ul-Ansar, which was still known by this name after it officially resettled itself Harakat ul-mujahideen.this camp underwent a six-month military course in .the camp initially set up by Hekmatyar for the Arabs, and then closed by the Taliban.(Gills Dorronsoro, *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan 1979 to the Present* ,London: Hurst Company, 2005, pp.302-303).

¹²⁵ Riyaz Punjabi, n.1, pp.80-81.

¹²⁶ Ibid, pp.83-87.

¹²⁷ Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror* (New Delhi: Viva Books Private Limited, 2005), pp.173-175.

¹²⁸ Riyaz Punjabi, n.1, p.87.

¹²⁹ Zachary Abuza, no.127, pp.121-122.

The origins of the Jamaah Islamiya (JI) network are found in Indonesia, dating back to the 1960s. In the 1960s, the radical clerics Abdullah Sungkar and Abdil Bakar Ba'asyir, both of Yemeni descent, established a private radio station that advocated the importance of Sharia, which got them into trouble with the Suharto regime. The two considered themselves the ideological heirs of Sekarmadji Maridjan Kartosuwirjo – the founder of the Darul Islam. The two met when were both leaders and the Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia, an Islamic youth movement.

Caused them fled to Malaysia with the help of Abdul Wahid Kadungga, a radical Muslim who had fled to Europe in 1971 and formed the Muslim youth Association of Europe – which put Kadungga into close contact with Muslim leaders from around the world, and especially the Muslim brotherhood there. The preachers lived in a small town on the Malacca strait, which had ferry service to Indonesia. They served as a way station for Indonesians and Malaysians who were on their way to Afghanistan and Pakistan to study and fight the Soviet or train in one of the forty Al-Qaeda camps that were established in the 1990s. Sungkar traveled to Pakistan and the Afghan border region in the early 1990s where he met Bin Laden and other senior Al-Qaeda members and where he pledged bayat, a form of allegiance to Bin Laden.

In their work of preaching literal interpretation of Islam, Ba'asyir and Sungkar buildup a loyal following of supporters and disciples, one of their disciples was Ridwan Isamuddin, known commonly as Hambali, a young Indonesian from west Java, born in 1966. In 1987, he traveled to Afghanistan and became a member of the commando Jihad. He was trained in the camp of Abdul Rasul Sayyaf, leader of Ittihad-I-Islami, the Islamic union for the liberation of Afghanistan, one of the seven Mujahideen forces fighting the Soviet. He was trained in bomb-making and combat, but Hambali's real skills were in organization and management. Hambali became an important figure in the Mujahideen's back offices, responsible for bringing in foreign jihadis from Southeast Asia and managing logistic, it was in this capacity that he came into close contact with Osama Bin Laden.

Ba'asyir and Sungkar also linked up with another radical Indonesian cleric, Mohammed Iqbal Rahman (Abu Jibril). Abu Jibril, the son of a man imprisoned by the Suharto regime for his commitment to establishing an Islamic State, was himself imprisoned in the early 1980s for his radical Islamic activities, upon his release, he went into self – exile in Malaysia, and from there he was recruited into the ranks of the Mujahideen and fought in Afghanistan. Jibril was not only a capable fighter but a charismatic leader and became a trainer in Afghan camps. He returned to Malaysia and worked closely with Sungkar and Ba'asyir developing the Ja-Maah Islamiya and became the head of training for Al-Qaeda in all of Southeast Asia. They began to espouse the doctrine of *Nusantara Raya* the establishment of a pan-Islamic republic, in cooperating Malaysia, Indonesia, Southern Thailand, and the Southern Philippines. (Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror*, New Delhi: Viva Books Private Limited, 2005, Pp 125-128)

¹³⁰ Riyaz Punjabi, n 1, pp.87-88 , See also, Zachary Abuza, *Militant Islam in Southeast Asia: Crucible of Terror* (New Delhi: Viva Books Private Limited, 2005), pp 153-156

¹³¹ Joseph Chunyong Liow, "The Mahathir administrations war against Islamic militancy: operational and ideological challenge", in Barry Rubin (ed), *Political Islam: Critical Concepts In Islamic Studies* , Vol 3, (London: Routledge Taylor& Francis group, 2007), pp 193-195

¹³² Zachary Abuza, n 127, pp 122-125

¹³³ Riyaz Punjabi, n 1, pp 91-94

¹³⁴ Zachary Abuza, n 127, pp.122-125

¹³⁵ Riyaz Punjabi, n 1, pp 91-94

¹³⁶ See also, Joseph Chunyong Liow, n 131, pp 193-195

¹³⁷ Zachary Abuza, n 127, pp 122-125

¹³⁸ Riyaz Punjabi, n 1, pp 91-94

¹³⁹ Joseph Chunyong Liow, n 131, pp 193-195

¹⁴⁰ Ibid, pp 196-197

¹⁴¹ Mohammad Sirozi, "The intellectual roots of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia: Ja'Far Umar Thalib of Lashkar Jihad (Jihad fighters) and his educational background", in Barry Rubin (ed), *Political Islam: Critical Concepts In Islamic Studies* , Vol 3, (London: Routledge Taylor& Francis group, 2007), pp 152-155

In 1986, with the help of the LIPIA (lembaga ilmu pengetahuan Indonesia, Arab or the Institute for Islamic and Arabic studies) Director, Ja'Far was awarded a scholarship for continuing his study at the Maududi Institute in Lahore, Pakistan, to do advanced Islamic studies. The scholarship came from the U.S. and Saudi Arabian governments. In those days Muslims from different countries were funded by the U.S. and Saudi Arabia to support a jihad (holy war) against the Soviet occupiers of Afghanistan. The jihad concept appealed to Ja'Far, while a student at the Maududi institute he attended a Mujahideen training camp that reportedly included Afghans, Pakistanis, Egyptians, Burmese, Sudanese, Thais and Filipines besides, he often visited Peshawar where studied Islamic Salafi together with many young activists of the Salafi movement. Being in Peshawar with these young Salafi-Wahhabi activists accelerated the growth of Ja'Far knowledge and interest in the vision and mission of the Salafi Wahhabi movement and gave him the chance to further learn the works of Salafi-wahhabi scholars who were critical of the work of the Muslim brotherhood thinkers, such as Sayyid Qutb, whom he previously admired. (Mohammad Sirozi, "The intellectual roots of Islamic radicalism in Indonesia: Ja'Far Umar Thalib of Lashkar Jihad (Jihad fighters) and his educational background" in Barry Rubin (ed.), *Political Islam: Critical Concepts In Islamic Studies*, Vol.3, (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis group, 2007), p 165.

¹⁴² Ibid, pp.158-160.

¹⁴³ Zachary Abuza, n.127, p. 176.

¹⁴⁴ Ibid pp.125-128 and Anthony L. Smith, "The politics of negotiating the terrorist problem in Indonesia", in Barry Rubin (ed.), *Political Islam: Critical Concepts In Islamic Studies*, Vol.3, (London: Routledge Taylor & Francis group, 2007), p.218.

¹⁴⁵ The JI ideology underlined that genuine Muslims should establish a Pan-Southeast Asian Islamic state or Daulah Islamiya Nusantara. Since it was not possible to set up an Islamic regime peacefully within established national frame works because regional governments were worldly and western oriented. Hence JI was committed to overthrowing the secular regimes in Southeast Asia. See Riyaz Punjabi, n.1, pp.89-90

¹⁴⁶ Anthony L. Smith, n. 144, pp. 217-221

¹⁴⁷ Ibid, p.221.

¹⁴⁸ In Thailand, the Malay Muslim population in the three provinces of Pattani, Yala and Narathiwat have been involved in separatist movements since 1960. The prominent separatist group Pattani united liberation organisation has been articulating the separatist sentiments. However, the emergence of Mujahideen Pattani National Liberation Front has changed the complexion of these separatist movements. The Mujahideen Front is seeking the establishment of an independent Islamic State. (Riyaz Punjabi, n.1, p.95).

¹⁴⁹ Zachary Abuza, n.127, Pp.171-172.

¹⁵⁰ Jason Burke, *Al-Qaeda: Casting a Shadow of Terror* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), p 101.

¹⁵¹ Zachary Abuza, n.127, Pp.171-172.

¹⁵² Riyaz Punjabi, n.1, Pp.94-95.

¹⁵³ Hilal Khashan, n. 93, pp.270-271.

¹⁵⁴ Jonathan R. White, n.25, Pp.214-217

¹⁵⁵ Terry McDermott, n. 86, P 133.

¹⁵⁶ Samuel P. Huntington, *Who Are We? America's Great Debate* (New Delhi: Penguin Books, 2004), p.358

¹⁵⁷ M. Charles Miller, "Bin Laden, Osama", in, Danbury(Ed). *Encyclopedia Americana-International, Vol 3*, (Connecticut: Glolier, C, 2002), p 751

¹⁵⁸ Waleed El-Ansary, n. 83, pp.200-205

¹⁵⁹ Stephen Sego, "World Affairs", in *Britannica Book the Year 2002* (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc, 2002), pp 384-385

¹⁶⁰ Gabriel Kolko, n. 71, pp. 103-104.

¹⁶¹ Stephen M. Walt, "Beyond Bin Laden: Reshaping U.S. Foreign Policy", in Council on Foreign Relations, n. 53, pp.328-331.

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- ¹⁶² Mark J. Rozell, "Bush George Walker", in Danbury (Ed). *Encyclopedia Americana* – international edition, Vol.5, (Connecticut: Glolier, C, 2002), pp. 44-45.
- ¹⁶³ Paul L. Williams, *Osama's Revenge the next 9/11* (New Delhi: Viva books Private Limited., 2005), pp.58-59.
- ¹⁶⁴ Mark J. Rozell, n.162, pp. 44-45.
- ¹⁶⁵ Peter Saracino, "Military Affairs", *Britannica book of the Year 2002*, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc., 2002), p. 278.
- ¹⁶⁶ See also, George Friedman, *America's Secret War: Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America and Its Enemies* (New York: Doubleday, 2004), pp. 144-145.
- ¹⁶⁷ Paul L. Williams, n. 163, pp. 65-67.
- ¹⁶⁸ Peter Saracino, n.165, p. 278.
- ¹⁶⁹ The Russians had covertly armed major components of the Northern Alliance after 1996, in the hope it would create a buffer along its borders and prevent Islamic extremism from spreading to the new independent former Soviet republics (now is Central Asia) (Gabriel Kolko, no. 71. pp. 121-122).
- ¹⁷⁰ Ibid, pp.109-111.
- ¹⁷¹ Peter Saracino, n.165, p. 278.
- ¹⁷² Jayanta Kumar Ray, "India, Pakistan and the United State", in Mahavir Singh (ed)., *Asia Annual-2003*, (India: Shipra Publications, 2003), pp. 126-127.
- ¹⁷³ "Osama deputy calls for more attacks", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 6 July 2007, p. 14.
- ¹⁷⁴ The Loya Jirga is the national Council in which all matters of national importance are discussed. All communities in Afghanistan are presented in this body. The first Loya Jirga was held in 1907, and others have been convened at times of national importance ever since; for this reason representation is based on both geography and ethnicity, with some members elected and others appointed.
- The concept of the Loya Jirga is considered crucial to the establishment of representative and stable government in Afghanistan after the fall of the Taliban. The agreement setting up the Afghan interim government, signed at Bonn, Germany, on 5 December 2001, provided for a special commission to be appointed to organize the calling of an emergency Loya Jirga that would be able to revise the appointed interim cabinet and create two-year transitional government. To ensure that a consensus acceptable to the Afghan people is reached, the agreement also laid out details of representation to encompass Afghan refugees, people in the Afghan diaspora, Islamic scholars and intellectuals, and women.
- The Karzai cabinet that was finally approved by the Loya Jirga represented a compromise between the ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks of the Northern Alliance and members of the majority Pashtun ethnic group, who had felt sidelined by the interim government set up in December 2001.(Frank A. Clements, *Conflict in Afghanistan: A Historical Encyclopedia*, Santa Barbara: ABC-CLIO, Inc., 2003, pp.157-159) .
- ¹⁷⁵ Stephen Sego, n.159, pp. 384-385.
- Russia believes that the Northern Alliance alone is the legitimate government and its best-known warlord Abdul Rashid Dostum, is a corrupt leader who fought for the Soviets for nearly decade, Iran agrees with it. At the end of 2001 Dostum also became the Pentagon's military vehicle, but he (as well as other crucial Northern Alliance leaders) refused initially to accept the interim agreement the anti-Taliban parties reached in Bonn in December 2001. Thus the US military opportunities in supporting the Northern Alliance turn out to be consummate political folly. (Gabriel Kolko, n.71, pp.112-113).
- ¹⁷⁶ Stephen Sego, "World Affairs", *Britannica book of the Year 2003*,(Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc, 2003), pp. 390-391.
- ¹⁷⁷ Gabriel Kolko, n.71, pp.112-113.
- ¹⁷⁸ Stephen Sego, "World Affairs", *Britannica Book of the year 2004*, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc, 2004), pp.358-359.

¹⁷⁹ Vishal Chandra, "The Taliban resurrection and the changing course of Afghanistan civil war", in K. Warkoo (ed) *Afghanistan The Challenge*, (New Delhi: Pantagon Press, 2007), p.246.

CHAPTER- 4

U.S.'s New Strategy in Afghanistan after 11 September 2001

I. Post September 11 Challenges to the U.S. Foreign Policy

The events of 11 September 2001 are often seen as a watershed for the U.S. foreign policy towards Afghanistan where U.S. declared war on terrorism as Afghanistan was accused to be a rogue state and a thriving base for promoting terrorism. The September 2001(9/11) events became a focal point and the U.S. led its forces to attack the Taliban regime in an attempt to destroy the foundations of Al-Qaeda. This was the first time since the Vietnam War that the U.S. led its military to attack sovereigns' country under the war on terrorism. After U.S. achieved success in toppling the Taliban regime by launching a massive crackdown on Al-Qaeda's network, the U.S. was able to replace the Taliban's regime with a puppet government in Afghanistan led by Hamid Karzai.

However, behind and beyond war on terror U.S. emphasis on new threats, "weak states and rogue states" is an integral part of Washington's attempts to fusion new institutional arrangements at the global level that can more effectively deal with any present or future challenges to its hegemonic power.¹ The U.S. National Security Strategy released in 2002, endorsed preventive war as a replacement for the cold war strategy of containment, employing classic 'preventive war' logic.² In the words of a former Deputy Secretary of the U.S. Department of Energy, Edward Morse 'along with the American campaign against terrorism another battle is being waged, perhaps no less important, the battle for supremacy in the energy sector between the two largest oil exporters – Saudi Arabia and Russia'.³ By selling its response to the 9/11 strategy as part of a global war on terrorism, the United States managed to receive unprecedented international backing for its projection of military power in the heartland of Asia,⁴ in the Caucasus and in the Middle East.⁵ After the discovery of a large energy resource in Caspian Sea and Central Asia, as the geography of a land lock country makes it imperative that it must depend on another country to run its petroleum energy resource through a pipe line route to the world market. Due to theses type of geographical difficulties, countries of the Caspian Sea and Central Asian region come to play a big role in the energy transport routes of land lock

countries. One of these countries is Afghanistan whose topography is such that it could become an alternative route for an oil pipeline. Afghanistan could provide a land-bridge from Central Asia and South Asia by running through to Pakistan and Indian ports for the world market.⁶

Since 2003, the U.S. has sought to recover some lost ground by using new strategic diplomacy threat discourse to provide a spring-board for a new hegemonic multilateralism of promotion of democracy ~to curbing proliferation and terrorism.⁷ While U.S. is faced with new threats which challenge its energy security wherever and in whichever country US interests exist, for instance, Saudi Arabia the main oil exporter to the U.S., is facing various factions of Islamist groups who are opposed to U.S.'s hegemony in the Arab world and these groups try to pressurise Saudi government to keep distance from the U.S. as they feel disappointed due to the US stance on Palestinian-Israel dispute.⁸ Another threat perception to the US hegemony could be the Iran factor which is on the verge of developing nuclear technology which, in the judgment of the United States government would create an imbalance in the region. In addition, it is believed that Iran was backing Islamic groups (Hizbullah and Hamas) in this region to counter aggressive Israeli behaviour towards Palestinians. Iran was viewed by US as a state that would harm its political and economic interests with some of the Central Asian states if they develop relations with Iran because its location can help the landlocked Central Asian states by providing them with access to the sea. They consider Iran to be a better route through which its gas and oil could be exported to Western markets.⁹ The U.S. administration is also worried about the growing instability in Pakistan where Islamic fundamentalist groups are posing a stiff challenge to the Government. The U.S. is aware that if political power in Pakistan is captured by a group as a party which is opposed to the U.S. and if Pakistan's nuclear arsenal falls down in their hands or if Al-Qaeda expands its influence in Pakistan, it will be a serious danger to the interests of United States in the region. In addition to this, the United States is also aware of the fact that Pakistan government has not been watchful of the activities of its nuclear scientist, Abdul Qadir Khan, who could again try to sell nuclear technology to Iran, Libya or an Al-Qaeda group, which would be a disaster for the United States.

The emergence of China as a big economic and military power with its fast growing industrial base and China's aggressive campaign for searching an alternative

energy resource to fuel its industrial needs. China has surpassed the U.S. as the biggest exporter of goods in many areas such as in Iran and Africa and some Arab countries have started looking toward east for their oil export markets, especially in Central Asia and Caspian Sea region China had entered into an agreement to import energy from this region through its pipeline in west of China. As china has close proximity with Central Asian states, it is more convenient and economical for it to transport it both by rail and through a Pipeline. In addition, China has allegedly played a key role in developing lethal weapons and civilian nuclear projects of Iran, because China think that Iran could play a key role in countering U.S. hegemony in this region, and also to make the US aware about China's role in this region.¹⁰ It seems that 'war on terror' is just a plan, in reality; the U.S. establishment is more concerned about the possible threats from its major rival states, notably China and Russia.¹¹

Moreover, after the break-up of USSR, the re-emergence of Russia as a major economic and military power after a decade of instability has further compounded US woes. Russia has a huge reservation of energy resources which could be used as a weapon to play a key role in the European market. In addition, Russia is also known to have devised a plan to play a key role by transporting its energy resources to Central Asia and through the Caspian Sea to Europe.¹² Moreover, Russia has recently been the moving spirit behind the idea of a Gas OPEC, an organisation of natural gas producing nations. The new body was formalized at a meeting of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) in Doha, Qatar, on 9 April 2007. It will unite Russia, Iran and Qatar, which between them account for 60 per cent of global gas reserves, with Algeria, Venezuela and Central Asian gas exporting countries. Russia has swapped energy assets and developed joint upstream and downstream projects with all of these countries. The idea of a Gas OPEC has rattled the U.S and Europe as it would shift the alignment of forces in the energy markets and leave them out in the cold. Russian politicians admit that the Gas OPEC will be called upon among other things, to offset Western efforts to control the energy markets. Russia is expected of using energy resources and arms export potentialities to project its influence across the world.

Moscow defied U.S. efforts to isolate Iran by supplying \$ 700 million worth of Tor M 1 advanced air – defence missile systems to Tehran last year (2006). It was the biggest of several defence contracts between Moscow and Tehran since 2000, when

Putin lifted an arms embargo imposed on Iran during Yeltsin's rule. Notwithstanding the nuclear controversy, Iran armed with Russian weapons and pursuing a common energy strategy may emerge as Russia's strategic partner in West Asia.¹³ The post cold war model of war was seen as much less threatening, more diffusive, and less intense.

With little doubt it can be said that after the 9/11 events the U.S. has been able to set up its military base in Afghanistan. Probably, it could be a long term plan for staying in this region to contain Iran, Russia, India, and China. Afghanistan has been well-known to be the base for containment and to act as the buffer state for the former empire power. Afghanistan is strategically located in the centre of the heart land and has also border connections with all these countries, 'where its borders on the north are with the Soviet Union, (now Central Asian countries) on the west with Iran, on the South east with Pakistan and on the east with China (Sinkiang)¹⁴ In accordance with these considerations, Afghanistan once again seems to have become an important factor in the strategy of the U.S., to control this region. A scholar has pointed out that 'Afghanistan has become a symbol of monumental tragedy of geography. Its location has been the cause of misery for its people. Afghanistan lies in the region between the seats of historical empires in India, Persia and Central Asia. It has been a traditional invasion route for the subcontinent. It has been on the path of numerous invaders since ancient times.'¹⁵ As quoted by Sreedhar the growing US interests in Afghanistan today will create the ground for an emerging cold war. This time it will not be over ideology but over economic interests. Unfortunately, Afghanistan will again become the battleground for the emerging confrontations¹⁶ of resource wars, that is the emergence of giant energy producers and consumers on the one hand and on the other, what Michael Klave calls, "energo - fascism" in which, he avers, the Pentagon has increasingly become a global oil protection service".¹⁷

II. The Oil and Natural Gas Factor

The September 11, 2001(9/11) events in United States and the resulting conflict in Afghanistan signified not only the beginning of a new epoch in world politics, but also a new stage in the struggle for influence in Central Asia. The 9/11 attacks on World Trade Centre and Pentagon and the subsequent US led war against terrorism radically changed the equation. These events have involved the United States deeply

in this region which was previously treated as marginal to core American interests. Therefore, it can rightly be said that: "The world once again cares about the region... because it has oil and gas. . ."¹⁸ The events of 11 September, provided an excuse to the U.S. for attacking Afghanistan and moving its forces to settle its military base there with a long term plan. It is now increasingly questioned by the rest of the world whether war on terror was just a façade for its more sinister designs. It is now being claimed that this strategy was not planned after 9/11 but it was actually getting shaped since the beginning of the end of cold war. The gaining of independence of some of the Central Asian countries from Soviet Union and after few years they discovered the hub of energy resources in these countries and the states around the Caspian Sea, so Afghanistan whose function as an energy pipeline conduit from Central Asia to the Indian Ocean was mapped out some years ago by a major U.S. oil and gas multinational.¹⁹

The post cold war model of war was seen as much less threatening, and less intense, therefore, the military and intelligence posture of the US designed to deal with the Soviet threat was unnecessary. Indeed, the fundamental threats to American national security in the post cold war period no longer arose from military challenges. They arose from economic challenges from countries that could compete with American production machine. The entire sphere of military challenge was degraded to the level of subsidiary threat while the perception of the national interest shifted to the economic sphere.²⁰

After the major disruption in oil supplies that occurred twice in the last quarter of the twentieth century, the Arab oil embargo of 1973 and the Iranian upheaval in 1979, the risks of overdependence on energy resources from an unstable and politically volatile region were driven home once again by Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. In addition the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf countries are not inexhaustible: at current levels of production they are estimated to last up to the end of 21st century at best.²¹ As Carter Said: "the U.S. will become perilously dependent on increasingly costly imported oil we could no longer enjoy our freedom as a sovereign nation if we act in our foreign relations in this manner, and we would constantly live in the fear of embargoes." There was no doubt in the Carter admission. He had proposed a broad national energy policy.²²

Before the 1970s when the major oil companies still had access to the almost limitless reserves of Middle East oil adding new proven reserves was just a question of drilling some extra adjacent acreage. After the 1970s when these huge reserves of oil were removed from their control and nationalized by the OPEC revolution, the major oil companies concentrated their search for new oil fields; to replace those they had lost, in what were deemed to be politically safer areas, free from the threat of expropriation and nationalization.

Failing to find any oil field within America itself, major U.S. oil companies began to move their upstream operations abroad. A study carried out by the US Department of Energy Information Administration (EIA) in 1995, noted that since the oil price collapse of late 1985 and early 1986, the U.S. oil and gas industry has changed dramatically. The major oil companies have shifted much of their exploration and development efforts to targets outside the United States. This process continued throughout the 1990s. In 1991, the group of 20 largest US oil – producing companies designated as ‘Majors’ by the U.S. Department of Energy accounted for 55.7 per cent of U.S. domestic oil production. But, by 2000, this figure had fallen to 45.2 per cent. This movement, away from the USA, was reflected in the geographical distribution of the US ‘Major’ oil reserves in 1985.

In the beginning of the twenty – first century and with the competition of small and medium sized U.S. oil companies to acquire new oil reserves hitting up, and the extraordinarily profitable opportunities in the Persian Gulf still out of bounds, the jostling crowd of multinational companies were forced to seek out opportunities in the so-called, new frontiers of oil exploration, ‘the deep waters of oil exploration’ the deep waters of Africa’s Atlantic coast and the Atlantic west of Shetland, Vietnam, Egypt, Malaysia and the Caspian and Central Asian states of the former Soviet Union.²³ Especially, the available energy reserves in the Central Asian region offer a viable alternative with energy production poised to increase sharply after 2010. But the geographical location of the landlocked nations of Central Asia reduces the alternatives for transportation of oil and gas to reliance only on the pipe line route, which in turn offers three difficult choices: the Chinese route with its construction difficulties; the India-Pakistan- Afghanistan route through the Caspian Sea.²⁴ Though Russia is also a possible outlet to the sea; the first was through Russia and the network of Soviet era pipelines. This overland system was extensive, could deliver oil and gas

to Western Europe, and was already linked to the rich Tenghiz oilfield in Kazakhstan and to the Daulatabad gas field in Turkmenistan and to the gas fields in northern of Afghanistan developed by the Soviets. But at that time the internal situation in Russia was chaotic, and the transit taxes payable to the Russian state monopolies made the route expensive, therefore, the most feasible and economical outlet was though Iran, as the oil and gas could be delivered through existing pipelines to the Persian Gulf. But Iran was closed for U.S. oil companies because of the U.S. - imposed sanctions.²⁵ But, according to Magsudul Hasan: there are other alternative route which Central Asian states could possibly bypass the Russia route; these could be:

(A) Western route via Georgia to the Black Sea and onto Europe either across Ukraine, via Romania or via Bulgaria and Greece.

(B) Southern – Western route from Azerbaijan to Georgia and onto the Mediterranean via Turkey.

(C) To the Persian Gulf or via Afghanistan and Pakistan.

(D) Eastern routes from Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to China²⁶ (see map-8).

Despite geopolitical and security challenges, the third option to the Caspian Sea demonstrates the maximum potential at present. The Central Asian energy resources are mostly concentrated in the nation states adjoining the Caspian Sea – Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan. Statistics indicate that the Central Asian region accounts for only 2% of global oil reserves and 5% of proven gas reserves. However, the potential for the availability of natural gas is much greater. Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan jointly account for around 92% of the region's reserves. The Republic of Turkmenistan possesses over 40% of the region's reserves of natural gas followed by Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan with 27% each. Kazakhstan thus possesses a substantial amount of the region's oil and natural gas reserves.²⁷ According to U.S. Government's Energy Information Administration (EIA) their first estimated total of oil resources of the region were put at 218 billion barrels, of which 32.5 billion were already said to be proven. After the building of a pipeline through Turkey to the Mediterranean which would come on stream 'after the turn of the century, Caspian oil production was forecast to reach around 3.3 million barrels per day by 2005, 4.5 million barrels per day by 2010, and 5.8 million barrels per day by 2015. In other words, within seven years, the Caspian would be producing as much as Venezuela, within twelve years its production would rival that of Iran and Qatar combined, and in twenty two

years its production would be nearly as much as Iran and Iraq combined. According to the EIA's 1998 International Energy outlook Turkmenistan had the largest proven reserves with 101 trillion cubic feet (TCF) in energy terms equivalent to around 17 billion barrels of oil. Uzbekistan had 66 TCF and Kazakhstan 65 TCF. Together these three new states held more gas than the USA and Canada combined although, as in the case of oil, new pipelines would have to be built to transport the gas to markets outside the former Soviet Union. Overall, it seemed that at last the USA had found a major source of additional oil and gas supplies which would give it powerful motivation to take control of the region and possibly even a new Middle East ²⁸ (see annex-1 and 2).

A reduced level of Russian support in the post - 1991 period led to a temporary downturn in the oil and natural gas production. However, this trend has been reversed in the post-1995 period with accelerated Western investment in the oil and natural gas sector. The politics of oil and natural gas in the region has been tilted in favour of exploration in preference to territorial dominance by either the concerned regional or global state actors or the involved commercial interests. This scenario may change if the volatility of the political situation in the Middle East impacts on the long-term supply of either petroleum or natural gas. Current trends indicate that the region's visibility as an energy supplier at the global level will only grow incrementally after 2010. Even this will be dependent on the stabilization of regional and geopolitical rivalries in the area making movement of energy via cross border pipelines a cost effective and secure process. ²⁹

The pipeline politics in which the Central Asian Republics (CARS) and Afghanistan were caught up have to be seen in the larger context of the quest for alternative energy sources by the industrial countries of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). ³⁰ The United States has actively been involved in the region since the early 1990s. Beginning in the 1970s the U.S. government and private foundations funded detailed research on the region. At the time of the independence of the Central Asian Republics (CARS), the United States was among the first to set up well-staff embassies throughout the region.

One of the key concerns for the American policymakers has been how to secure access to the oil and natural gas reserves in the first half of the 21st century. ³¹ As quoted by Sreedhar: the object of the revived game is two fold: firstly, to establish

friendly relations with the leaders of the Central Asian republics controlling the oil and gas resources. Secondly, to secure alternative pipeline routes to world markets. The landlocked nature of the Central Asian states creates obstacles to proposals for creating new alternative routes.³² Caspian Sea had become strategically important for the United States. In the words of Richard Cheney, speaking to an audience of U.S. businessmen in Washington in 1998, "I can't think of a time when we've had a region emerge as suddenly to become as strategically significant".

Initially U.S. policy towards the Caspian and Central Asian States since the break up of USSR, USA had no vital national interest in either the Caucasus or Central Asia. Indeed, as Fiona Hill pointed out, had it not been for the rediscovery of the energy resources of the Caspian Sea, and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the regions would have likely remained a marginal backwaters of U.S. foreign policy. She also pointed out that it was not until major oil contracts were signed between U.S. oil companies and the governments of Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan in 1993-1994 that the region really began to register on the radar screens of the American public, it was the commercial interests of U.S., oil companies in exploiting new energy reserves that gave U.S. policy makers specific interest to protect in the Caucasus and Central Asia. 'the U.S. has come to see Caspian resources as one of the few prospects for diversifying world energy supply away from the two Clinton administrations between 1993 and 2000 these two, primarily oil-related U.S. objectives, protecting the interests of U.S. oil companies in the Caspian Sea, and diversifying oil supply sources became entangled with a third, geo-strategic objective: that of detaching the newly formed Caspian and Central Asian states from both the Russian and Iranian spheres of influence. Growing U.S. pessimism about the likelihood of Russia restructuring into a US-style 'model' economy and society appears to have prompted a new, more antagonistic attitude towards that country during the mid-1990s. Similarly, President Clinton's 1995 Executive order prohibiting U.S. companies from conducting business in Iran, followed by the passing of the Iran - Libya Sanctions ACT in 1996.

Zbigniew Brzezinski³³ a key figure was highly influential in directing the Clinton Administration's attention towards the alleged geo-strategic importance of the Caspian and Central Asia. In the early 1990s, Brzezinski made extensive visits to the region as a consultant to the U.S. oil company AMACO. He had long been a mentor to Clinton's Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright and he warned the White House

that the USA would be making a serious mistake if it ignores, what he claimed, were its crucial strategic interests in the region. Consequently, coveted CIA officers, some of them well-trained petroleum engineers, were dispatched, to travel through Southern Russia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan in order to gain further understanding of both their oil potential and their general political situation. In August 1997, Albright and her state Department colleagues received a full CIA briefing on the Caspian/Central Asian region after which Albright concluded that working to mould the area's future was one of the most exciting thing that we can do'.

Possibly, the most important outcome of these discussions in the State Department was the decision about the role which future oil-and gas-pipeline construction would play. The Department acknowledged that some new pipelines from the region would probably have to pass through Russia, but insisted that 'Russia should not be able to turn a valve and shut off all or most of the Caspian flow'. Above all, there was to be no weakening in the USA's determination to block any pipeline construction southwards, through Iran, 'the last thing we need; White House aids observed, is to rely on the Persian Gulf as the main access for more oil'.

Little wonder then that Cheney³⁴ viewed the Caspian region as strategically significant and by 1998, the strategy was becoming clear to incorporate the inhabitants of the Caspian, Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus (with the exception of Armenia) into a vast US dependency, anchored upon the construction of a massive new oil and gas pipeline infrastructure stretching along an East-West energy corridor that linked Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and ultimately Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.³⁵

The story of seeking to build pipeline projects across Afghanistan (see map-1, 2, 3, 4 and 5) to Pakistan port and from there to the world market did not actually begin after 11 Sept. 2001, but it has been tried by Bidas an Argentinian oil company³⁶ long time ago. Bidas was the first western company that was given access by Turkmenistan Government to drill its energy resources. In January 1994, Bidas was awarded the Yashlar block in the eastern part of the Karakum desert, with a 50-50 share of the profits, with even more favorable terms of 75 to 25 when it was awarded the Keimur block near the Caspian. Bidas spent a large sum of \$400 million in exploring its leases, and began exporting oil from its Keimur field in 1994. The year later it tracked gold in Yashar, with estimated reserves of 27 trillion cubic feet of gas,

or more than double of Pakistan's total reserves. Unlike oil, gas needs an immediate and accessible market, and Bidas set about devising one with aplomb.³⁷ As pipeline project that would pass from Central Asia to South Asia rested on ending of the Afghan Civil War, so the security needed to be built first. The Central Asian states feared that Afghanistan was still a fragile country and that the Afghan conflict cannot be contained for ever within its borders. They are looking South for oil and gas pipelines and communication routes. They want a government in Kabul which is responsible and is a good neighbor for them.³⁸

In November 1994, Bidas persuaded Niyazov to set up a working group to study the feasibility of a gas pipeline to Pakistan through Afghanistan. In March 1995, Niyazov signed a memorandum with Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto of Pakistan commissioning Bidas to prepare a pre-feasibility study of the proposed pipeline. Bidas spent nine months in 1995 and 1996 flying in its executive jet from warlord to warlord in Afghanistan, and to Islamabad, Ashkabad, Moscow and Washington to persuade leaders of the feasibility of the project. This project suited to Pakistan's interest also, Pakistan wanted a pipeline to pass its port on the Arabian Sea and bring financial benefits, such as transit fees, but also to provide strategic and commercial links with the Central Asian states. The project was also attractive to the United States as the pipeline would bypass Iran which was being subjected to sanctions. In February 1996, Bidas signed a 30 year agreement with the Rabbani government in Kabul for the construction and operation of a gas pipeline by Bidas and an International consortium that it would create, the same month, he reported to Niyazov and Bhutto that he had signed agreements with the warlords, and now with the Taliban, (during Taliban regime ruled Afghanistan).³⁹ As pointed out by Professor William O. Bee Man, an anthropologist specializing in Middle Eastern studies at Brown University, US support for the Taliban had nothing to do with religion or ethnicity, but only with the economics of oil. The UNOCAL consortium feared that as long as the country was split among squabbling warlords, the pipeline would never be built. Political stability was required to implement the \$ 4.5 billion project and the US believed that the Taliban regime would be the most suitable government to achieve such a goal. Thus, in the aftermath of Taliban's conquest of Kabul in 1996, the State Department avoided criticizing the methods the Taliban used to establish control over the country.⁴⁰ John K. Cooley writes that by 1989, the US having at first

sympathetically watched (if not helped) the rise of the Pakistani – created Taliban, was observing with a mixture of sympathy and trepidation. The US oil company, UNOCAL, as it sought to negotiate with the Taliban authorization for energy pipeline from the ex-Soviet now independent, Republic of Turkmenistan through Afghanistan and Pakistan. If successful such agreements would probably be viewed by Brzezinski, the multi-national energy firms and like minded economic and political strategist's as one of the positive long-range outcomes of the Afghanistan conflicts.⁴¹ It could therefore, be argued that the US administration's endeavor to secure its oil base led it to support the UNOCAL project and the Taliban advent on the Afghan scene with a promise of stability, in 1994. When the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996 Chris Targert, a UNOCAL executive said that pipeline project would now be easier to implement. The US administration was not a behind to appreciate the development within hours of Taliban capture of Kabul. US State Department announced that it would establish diplomatic relations with the Taliban by sending an official to Kabul. State Department spokesman Glyn Davies said the US found nothing objectionable in the steps taken by the Taliban to impose Islamic law, to him the Taliban appeared to be anti-modern rather than anti-Western which was not perhaps as worrisome. Senator Hank Brown who favoured the UNOCAL project also assessed the advent of the Taliban as a positive development in Afghanistan. The good part of what has happened is that one of the factions at least seems capable of developing a government in Afghanistan. Assistant Secretary of the State for South Asian Affairs, Karl Inderfurth's testimony before the Senate Committee in July 2000 which recalled the high hopes that greeted the Taliban movement in 1996 clearly indicate the US line at that time,⁴² giving right of way through the territories they controlled. For Pakistan, the Bidas project offered the greatest opportunities: an 875 miles gas pipeline from the Yashlar field, crossing Afghanistan to Sui in its Baluchistan province where its gas reserves and pipeline network originates, could be extended to the even bigger market of India via Multan in Sind province. Bidas proposed an open access pipeline so that other companies and countries could eventually feed their own gas into it. This was of particular interest to whoever controlled northern Afghanistan, where the gas fields developed by the Soviets, now inoperative, had once supplied to Uzbekistan.

But Bidas did fall victim to the vicious international competition that these pioneering efforts had engendered. It had opened negotiations with other oil

companies such as UNOCAL, the 12th largest in the U.S. With experience in Pakistan under Bidas sponsorship, Turkmen officials visited Houston in April 1995, and a UNOCAL delegation visited Ashkabad and Islamabad to discuss the Bidas proposals. But Bidas was running into problems with Niyazov, who was being advised by his aides that they were being exploited under the Bidas contract, blocked oil exports from Keimar. After the Yashlar discovery, Niyazov insisted on re negotiating both the Keimar and Yashlar contracts. But Bidas would not budge when UNOCAL expressed an interest in building its own pipeline from the existing Daulatabad gas fields, the profits from which would accrue to Turkmenistan. Niyazov, ignoring his contractual obligations with Bidas, saw both the financial and political advantage of engaging a major U.S. company, and with it, the U.S. government, in his impoverished country's development.

Niyazov needed the U.S. and the U.S. was supportive if this was a way to prevent him from being dependent on Iran. During a visit to New York, Niyazov summoned both Bidas and UNOCAL executive, and on 21 October 1995 signed an agreement with UNOCAL and its partner, the Saudi owned Delta oil company, to build a gas pipeline through Afghanistan. "We were shocked; said Bidas executive quoted by Ahmed Rashid, 'and when we spoke to Niyazov, he just turned around and said, "Why don't you build a second pipeline". Henry Kissinger, one of many former U.S. officials whom UNOCAL had engaged as consultants, quipped at the signing ceremony that the deal was 'a triumph of hope and experience'. With the Taliban in control of both Kabul and the provinces through which the gas pipeline would pass, Bidas and UNOCAL wooed them assiduously. Bidas sponsored a visit by a Taliban delegation to Buenos Aires in February 1997, and a Bidas office was set up in Kabul soon afterwards. Bidas envisaged a partnership with a Saudi Company for the funding of the Afghan portion of the pipeline, and set up a separate consortium with western companies to build the Turkmen and Pakistani ends of the pipeline. It offered to start work immediately, without preconditions. On the other hand UNOCAL which handled public relations for the Taliban and sponsored visits to Washington and Houston had its hands tied by U.S. policy on Afghanistan. No pipeline could be built nor commercial terms discussed with the Taliban by U.S. companies until there was a functioning government in Kabul that was internationally recognized. The Taliban themselves were non-committal. While they favoured Bidas as a politically neutral company, the UNOCAL project carried the possibility of U.S. recognition for which

they were desperate. The competition also made them more demanding: they were not merely interested in receiving a rent for the pipeline route estimated at US \$100 million a year, but wanted the oil companies to build the infrastructure along the route, such as roads, water supplies, telephone and power lines.⁴³ In addition, as western exploitation of eastern natural resources tainted relations between emerging states such as Afghanistan, and western companies, business with oil companies was characterized by deep mistrust and manipulation. Thus, the Taliban exploited the rivalry between UNOCAL and the Argentinean oil company Bidas, over the construction of the pipeline, to lobby Washington for political recognition and to extort large sums of money. UNOCAL alone was believed to have spent up to \$20 million, unsuccessfully, to win over the Taliban. Niyazov, the dictatorial president of Turkmenistan, was engaged in a similar game, granting Bidas the rights of exploitation only to rescind them soon after in order to give them to UNOCAL, which had offered a much higher price.⁴⁴

In September 1997 Bidas sold 60 per cent of its company's stake in Latin America to the U.S. oil giant AMACO, in the hope that a U.S. company could influence Niyazov to cease off on its frozen asserts in Turkmenistan. UNOCAL had meanwhile become the target of attacks from its shareholders and from feminist groups in the U.S. because of its relations with the Taliban. By 1998 both the Bidas and UNOCAL projects had become dead letters.⁴⁵ As U.S. relations with Afghanistan were inflamed by the bombing of U.S. embassies in Kenya and Tanzania for which Osama Bin Laden was held responsible. In August 1998, the Clinton administration launched cruise missile attacks on alleged Bin Laden training camps in eastern Afghanistan. The U.S. government demanded that the Taliban hand over Bin Laden and imposed economic sanctions, the pipeline talks languished.⁴⁶

As soon as George W. Bush was elected president UNOCAL and BP-ARAMCO which had in the meantime bought Bidas, the Argentinean rival stated once again to lobby administration among whom were several of their employers. UNOCAL knew that Bush was ready to back them and resumed the consortium negotiations. In January 2001, it began discussions with the Taliban, by black members of the Bush administration⁴⁷ among whom was Under Secretary of State Richard Armitage, who had previously worked as a lobbyist for UNOCAL. The

Taliban for their part employed as their PR officer in the US Laila Helms, niece of Richard Helms, former director of the CIA and former US ambassador to Iran. In March 2001, Helms succeeded in bringing Rahmatullah Hashami, Mullah Omar's adviser to Washington. Apparently, he even brought a carpet as a gift for George W. Bush from the Taliban leader. As late as August 2001, meetings were held in Pakistan to discuss the pipeline business. At one of these, which took place in Islamabad on 2 August, Christina Rocca, in charge of Asian affairs at the States Department, met the Taliban ambassador to Pakistan, Abdul Salam Zaeef.

While negotiations were underway, the U.S. was secretly making plans to invade Afghanistan, the Bush administration and its oil sponsors were losing patience with the Taliban; they wanted to get the Central Asian gas pipe line going as soon as possible. The 'strategy of the Silk Route',⁴⁸ had been resumed. U.S. academics, journalists and intellectuals denounced the White House's new approach. The U.S. had quietly begun to align itself with those in the Russian government calling for military action against Afghanistan and has toyed with the idea of a new raid to wipe out Bin Laden, wrote Frederick Starr, head of the Central Asian Institute at John Hopkins University, in December 2000. Paradoxically, 11 September provided Washington with a *casus belli* to invade Afghanistan and establish a pro-American government in the country. When a few weeks after the attack, the leaders of the two Pakistani Islamist parties negotiated with Mullah Omar and Bin Laden for the latter's extradition to Pakistan to stand trial for the 11 September attacks, the U.S. refused the offer. Back in 1996, the Sudanese Minister of Defence, Major General Elfatih Erwa, had also offered to extradite Osama Bin Laden, then resident in Sudan but the U.S. American officials declined the offer at that time as well. Instead, they told General Erwa to ask Bin Laden to leave the country. 'Just don't let him go to Somalia; they added. Because U.S. fears that Bin Laden will create further unrest, when Erwa disclosed that he was going to Afghanistan, the American answer was 'let him go' is it possible that the U.S. did not want to bring Bin Laden to 'justice'? Could it be because he has too many tales to tell?

For Goe Vidal, the conquest of Afghanistan had nothing to do with Osama. He was simply a pretext for replacing the Taliban with a relatively stable government that would allow Union Oil of California (UNOCAL) to lay its pipeline for the profit of, among others the Cheney-Bush Junta. Vidal's view might not be far from the truth.

Karzai's⁴⁹ role during the interim government is clearly that of a mediator of the interests of the U.S. oil companies in the pipeline business.⁵⁰ Kalizad⁵¹ has a similar task. Two small oil companies chase energy and Caspian Energy consulting have already obtained permission from the governments of Turkmenistan and Pakistan to resume the pipeline negotiations.⁵²

So the assumption that the US strategy to establish a pro US Afghan government was to secure a pipeline route through Afghanistan come to light. As Sreedhar pointed out that the discovery of the huge energy resources in this region (Central Asia Republics) makes the west believe that it could make the region the Persian Gulf of the next Century. The Central Asian region has gained in importance as it could serve as a replacement once the oil reserves in the gulf start depleting seriously by the middle of the next century. It is in this context that Central Asia is again emerging as a murky battleground among big powers. The agenda is being set by geopolitics and oil.

The object of the revived game is twofold: firstly, to establish friendly relations with the leaders of the Central Asian republics controlling the oil and gas resources. Secondly, to secure alternative pipeline routes to world markets. The landlocked nature of the Central Asian states creates obstacles to proposals for creating new alternative routes.⁵³ As insider accounts published in the British, French and Indian media have revealed that U.S. officials threatened war against Afghanistan during the summer of 2001. It is not an accident that these revelations have appeared overseas, rather than in the U.S. the ruling classes in these countries have their own economic and political interests to look after, which do not coincide, and in some cases directly clash, with the drive by the American ruling elite to seize control of oil – rich territory in Central Asia.

The official American myth is that 'everything changed' on the day four airlines were hijacked and nearly 5000 people murdered. The US military intervention in Afghanistan by this account was hastily improvised in less than a month. This is only one of countless lies emanating from the Pentagon and White House about the war against Afghanistan. The truth is that the US intervention was planned in detail and carefully prepared long before the terrorist attacks provided the pretext for setting it in motion.⁵⁴ Such events used to happen before also and can be compared with new

ones, as the attack comes in the wake of revelations by an author, James Bam Ford who wrote in his book, 'Body of Evidence,' of a secret plan for US military intelligence operatives to commit acts of terrorism against American targets . . . blow up buildings, shoot down civilian airliners, blow up American war ships, and assassinate American citizens . . . for political gains. Operation North Woods was signed off by all five Joint Chiefs of Staff under the Kennedy administration as a way to foment public support for a war against Cuba, who would be blamed for the terrorist acts. Rejected sternly by president Kennedy which, it is sometimes presumed may have contributed to his assassination, this 'Reich Tag Fire' approach to political gain may have been the model for September 11, shifting the blame this time to the Taliban homeland what would make a more irascible excuse for war?

In the aftermath of the horror of what many simply call 9/11 we find government investigators minting money. Now that strong evidence exists that the true reason for the war was oil, and it is certain knowledge that such a war could not have been sold to American people without some catastrophic catalyst event.⁵⁵

As energy of oil and gas becomes the blood stream of this century, the booming of South and East Asia market was but natural. While, the world's gas map depicts numerous gas pipelines moving across thousands of kilometers from Russia, Central Asia and the North Sea to Western Europe, hardly any pipelines move Eastwards' and South wards. This is now set to change due to two important factors:

- (i) The increasing Asian demand for gas; and
- (ii) The ability of Asia to transport gas economically from producers to consuming centers.

Gas is transported globally as LNG and through transnational pipelines. By 2020, one-third of the world output, i.e., 1.35 trillion cubic meters, will be internationally traded, of which 50 per cent will be transported as pipe gas and 38 per cent as LNG. Given rapidly increasing Asian demand and the availability of huge gas reserves in Asia, piped gas and LNG will both be utilized and indeed will complement each other in the energy-mix of the principal consumers. The Asian Gas Grid envisages the setting up of a series of pipelines that will carry natural gas to the various consumption centers in East and South Asia.⁵⁶

Now we could witness that Afghanistan still important for gas pipeline corridor for South Asia market, would be a major player for booming of India market. India is

vigorously pursuing gas pipeline project's both on its eastern and western land frontiers. The Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline is expected to bring to India nearly 90 mmcmd of gas which will be utilized as fuel power and fertilizer projects in north and north western India.

India has also agreed to participate in the Turkmenistan – Afghanistan – Pakistan pipeline project.⁵⁷ The project is backed by Asian Development Bank (ADB) that aims at importing natural gas from the Central Asian nations to meet the growing energy needs. The steering committee meeting was called by the project sponsor, ADB, between November 28 and 29, 2007 in Islamabad that witnessed India formally becoming part of the project and the four nations signing the project ahead of Agreement and a Gas pipeline Framework Agreement.

The proposed pipeline will have a capacity of 33 billion cubic meters of natural gas per annum. The 1,680 km pipeline will run from the Daulatabad gas field to Afghanistan. From there it will be constructed alongside the highway running from Herat to Kandahar and then via Quetta and Multan in Pakistan. The final destination of the pipeline will be the Indian town of Fazilka, near the border between Pakistan and India. The cost of this international infrastructure is estimated at \$4 billion. The deal on the pipeline was signed in December 2002 by the leaders of Turkmenistan, Afghanistan India and Pakistan (see map-1, 2 and 5).

As cited by Mr. Burns in his article is America's Expectations vis-à-vis a future Indian role in Central Asia. "We are working with Delhi to encourage energy rich Central Asian states such as Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to establish oil and gas trade with Afghanistan, Pakistan and India". He wrote, "Thereby reducing the lure of long term contracts with Iran." What he left unsaid is the expectation-now well amplified in American policy documents-that India would help the U.S. pull Central Asia away from Russian and Chinese influence under its "Greater Central Asia" and "Regional Energy Market Access Program".⁵⁸

Thus it is evident from the above analysis that there is no doubt that U.S. moved to invade Afghanistan after 11/Sept, and set up its military base there, was viewed as a step to secure energy pipeline route. Antony Hyman writes that from a geopolitical point of view Afghanistan forms a potential "land-bridge for bulk trade or oil and gas pipelines to be constructed from the Central Asian states to markets in Pakistan, India and elsewhere in the world via Karachi or another Pakistani port on the Arabian Sea.

Irrespective of which government was in place in Kabul, Afghanistan's territory could provide access to world markets and an alternative to total dependence upon Russia's monopoly on trade route.⁵⁹

III. Pakistan Factor in U.S' post-11 September Afghan Policy

The 9/11 terrorist attacks demanded the attention of all those who were interested in South Asian dynamics.⁶⁰ The attacks were a wake-up call for Washington and the West. The cost of abandoning Afghanistan to the Taliban and the growth of an extremist policy in Pakistan was too high a price for the U.S. to pay.

Apart from cracking down on Al-Qaeda and the Taliban, the U.S. after publicly busting the A.Q. Khan nuclear smuggling ring in January 2004 has shown that nuclear non-proliferation is a key objective of American policy towards Pakistan. Soon after 9/11, the then U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell, put Pakistan President Pervez Musharraf on notice – you are either with us or against us. The General had little choice in the matter. He had to be with the Americans. The ultimate fear that seems to be driving the U.S. is the following: what happens to Pakistani nuclear weapons in case an extremist, Islamist leadership was to capture power in that country. From time to time, there have been suggestions that the Americans want to be in a position to secure these nuclear weapons. Hillen's comments only go to confirm that the U.S. wants to be in a position to tackle any unauthorized proliferation in Pakistan.

The Americans are attempting to be in a position to take on a leadership role if a proliferation problem were to take place once again in Pakistan. Is this the price that Washington has been able to extract in lieu of letting off the Pakistani military in the nuclear supermarket run by A.Q. Khan? That certainly seems to be the case.⁶¹ As pointed out by a report in February 2004, Western defence allies have agreed to include India and Pakistan in NATO's Partnership for Peace Program (PFP) after concerted persuasion by the U.S. such an arrangement would allow the two nuclear rivals of South Asia to consult the alliance in the event of direct threats to their internal and external security. With the change in its geographic focus, NATO plans to take control of several international military peace keeping operations under the UN mandate and both India and Pakistan are seen as major contributors to such future operations. It may be a matter of time that NATO might extend its operations to Iraq

that in turn may require peacekeeping troops from both India and Pakistan. The decision to accord a non-NATO ally status to Pakistan comes at a time when the country is under pressure regarding its nuclear program.

However, from Najim Rafique's conclusion about strategic concept in 1999, provides the institutional justification and direction for NATO's further development, and is likely to remain the main blueprint for NATO's evolution during the next 10 to 15 years. As Zbigniew Brzezinski; who served as former US President, Jimmy Carter's National Security Adviser, in his book *The Grand Chessboard*, defined the NATO alliance as part of an integrated comprehensive and long-term strategy for all of Eurasia in which NATO would eventually reach Asia, and where another military alliance would connect the Pacific and Southeast Asian states.⁶²

If one agrees with the view point in an article about nuclear issue of Pakistan, could be an international issue in future. And with this issue linkage are found to events in Afghanistan that U.S. attacked Afghanistan after 11 September and set up its military base there to monitor Pakistan's nuclear proliferation issue. As U.S. fears that nuclear arsenal might fall in the hands of terrorist groups or rogue states as U.S. labeled it after few days of World Trade Center attack.

Since November 2003, two episodes have highlighted some of the existential dangers that threaten the safety and security of Pakistan's nuclear deterrent as well as the reasons that the country remains a source of serious proliferation concern. The first was an acknowledgement by the Pakistani government that it is conducting an internal investigation into the activities of some senior scientists at Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) the entity that produces enriched Uranium for Pakistan's nuclear weapons program - for possibly proliferating nuclear technologies, technical knowledge, and tactic know-how to Iran, in violation to Pakistani laws. And second there were two nearly successful assassination attempts on Pakistani President and Chief of Army Staff, General Pervez Musharraf.

This issue in brief is divided into three sections.

(i) The first review the controversy surrounding new disclosures that Pakistani nuclear entities and scientist constitute the hub of a clandestine international Cartel enrichment technologies. It analyses the likelihood and implications of the official involvement of the Pakistani government – or at least its military-in such activities, as well as the possibility that Pakistani entities and scientists have engaged in

proliferation activities unknown to state authorities. Rumors have long persisted that the Khan Research Laboratories (KRL) transferred drawings, designs, starter kits, and tacit knowledge for centrifuge-based uranium enrichment as well as information about procurement networks to Iran, Libya, and North Korea.⁶³ In addition, there was a set of documents obtained by United Nations (UN) inspectors in Iraq in 1995 that may indicate an effort by Abdul Qadeer Khan shortly before the start of 1991 Persian Gulf war to sell Iraq nuclear weapon design, drawings and gas centrifuge design information, and facilitate the procurement of equipment required to build them. These items have been provided for ongoing technological assistance. *Washington Post* reported on January 27, 2004 that Khan's middle man allegedly also offered the Pakistani scientist's services to Syria and Iraq. However, these offers were not accepted.⁶⁴ When Pakistan embarked on a nuclear weapons programme in the early 1970s, Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto framed his country's aspirations in civilizational terms: as the quest for an "Islamic Bomb." Since then knowledgeable observers of Pakistani politics have dwelt on the linkage between Libyan and Saudi funding for Pakistan's nuclear weapons programme and potential Pakistani nuclear technology transfers to regimes in the Middle East.⁶⁵ However, from the 1980s onwards, Pakistani government officials have denied Bhutto's formulation, and portrayed the nuclear weapons program as a national enterprise driven by the strategic necessity of safeguarding their country's security against a conventionally more powerful India.

Thus far the Pakistani government's official complicity in the nuclear trade with Iran, Libya, and North Korea remains unproven beyond doubt. But the evidence that Pakistani nuclear labs and scientists engaged in nuclear trades unknown to Pakistani military and intelligence agencies is equally murky.

(ii) Beyond Pakistan's role in nuclear proliferation to Iran, Libya, and North Korea, the two recent nearly successful assassination attempts on general Musharraf's life also raise serious questions about whether the Pakistan Army can ensure the safety of the country's nuclear arsenal and keep it from the covetous reach of terrorist groups and potential rogue collaborators within the military. After all, observers contend, if the army cannot guarantee the safety of its own chief-of-staff, what conceivable guarantees exist about its ability to ensure the safety of the dispersed and more numerous nuclear assets? The recent attempts on Musharraf's life suggest that

the President's inner security cordon may have been breached or that insiders within the army and its intelligence agencies could be collaborating with the Al-Qaeda and other disgruntled sectarian groups to eliminate him.

Most analysts draw analogues to the succession arrangements that followed General Zia's sudden demise in a mysterious plane crash in the summer of 1988 and believed that succession arrangements in the wake of General Musharraf's removal will be a relatively smooth affair as well. The consensus among most academic and U.S. government analysts is that the top leadership of the Pakistani Army is relatively moderate and, secular and generally pro-West. This is not to suggest that Islamists do not exist in army's ranks or that the entire officer Corps shares General Musharraf's domestic and external agendas. Indeed, the arrest of nearly 20 army officers for their alleged links with Al-Qeda and the Taliban in 2003 points in the direction of subversion and competing agendas within Pakistan's national security establishment.

(iii) The recent attempts on General Musharraf's life reminds of the threats to Pakistan's long-term stability from the forces of Islamic fundamentalism. Senior government officials and cabinet ministers and officials lower down have pointed fingers of suspicion at Al-Qaeda remnants and disgruntled Kashmiri and Afghan radical groups, which resent Gen. Musharraf regime's collaboration with Washington in its current war against terrorism. They suggest that Musharraf's decision to break with the Taliban and radical Islamist sectarian groups in the wake of the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the United States and the subsequent compound crisis with India has alienated these groups from their former patrons in the Pakistani Army and its intelligence agencies. As a result, the radical Islamists are now seeking to eliminate General Musharraf in a personal act of revenge and then replace him with military leaders who would limit or perhaps reverse the shifts in Pakistan's domestic and external policies.

Most independent observers of Pakistani politics believe that threats to General Musharraf's regime are largely the consequence of the nature of its break with the Islamic radicals, which is tactical and not strategic. But the fact remains that the Pakistani military maintains an unofficial alliance with Islamic religious parties and continues to pamper sectarian militant groups for domestic and external reasons. Domestically, it uses the Islamic fundamentalist parties to keep mainstream, secular and ethnic political parties in check and ensures its continued corporate dominance in domestic Pakistani politics.

However, domestic factors aside, the Pakistani military is also reluctant to stamp out the power of the Islamist Parties and sectarian groups for compelling external reasons. In the past, the army had subcontracted Pakistan's national security policies in Afghanistan and Kashmir to some of these groups, and views them as long-term allies. During the 1980s and 1990s, a large number of the Islamic religious parties controlled seminaries, served as a recruiting and training grounds for the Afghan Mujahideen and later the Taliban. The army and the Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) supported both successively in the elusive hope that a friendly regime in Kabul would ensure strategic depth for Pakistan against India. Similarly during much of the 1990s, and even to an extent today, the Pakistani Army relies on Islamists to wage a low-intensity war to tie down the Indian Army in Indian –Administered Kashmir (IAK).

Although General Musharraf changed track and joined the United States in its war against Al-Qaeda and the Taliban. This policy stems from Islamabad's long-term plans to play an influential role in Afghanistan's largest ethnic group. This duplicitous and contradictory alliance between the Pakistan army and religious political parties and other sectarian groups is the key reason that latter retains power and influence in domestic Pakistani politics. As long as the Pakistani army does not give up its ambitious plans to play a dominant role in domestic Pakistani politics or abandon its regional security agenda in Afghanistan and Kashmir, General Musharraf will find it impossible to take on the task of destroying the power of the Islamists or launching a serious domestic reform effort. To ensure that Pakistan is transformed into a modern and moderate Islamic state and as long as the military continues to rely on the Islamists to pursue its multiple agendas, the latter will continue to consolidate political power, hastening the day when they might effectively come to control Pakistan's nuclear arsenal.⁶⁶

In the immediate aftermath of attack on twin towers, the U.S. turned its policy towards Pakistan on its head and realized that it had to ensure Pakistan's support in its war on terror. As such, the US reversed its previous policy of applying sanctions on account of the nuclear tests and accorded the status of "major Non-NATO ally of USA to placate the military leadership in Pakistan. It has, ever since, turned a blind eye to the undemocratic policies of the Musharraf - led military administration in Pakistan. From 2002, Musharraf has put in place a sham system of democracy by allowing only yes – men to participate in elections. The US has allowed Musharraf to

continue the democratic facade and perpetuate his hold on power in Pakistan. It is largely because the US thinks that only alternative to Musharraf is chaos in Pakistan. There is an overblown apprehension in the US that if Musharraf goes then the Islamist opposition will take over and, as a result, a nuclear Pakistan in the hands of the Mullahs will be terribly unsafe for the world.⁶⁷

In addition, it was most likely that Pakistan could come close to China to enhance its cooperation in the field of nuclear energy, as recently, US dealing the civilian nuclear agreement with India and especially after it became clear that the U.S. would not extend the same kind of offer to Pakistan, President Musharraf has been working on concluding a deal with China along similar lines. The two countries signed a framework agreement on energy cooperation during President Musharraf's visit to Beijing in February, 2006.

During the celebrations to commemorate the 55th anniversary of Pakistan-China relations, Prime Minister Shaukat Aziz said that the two countries were working at enhancing cooperation in the field of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under international safeguards for the production of electricity. In addition, Pakistan is seeking Chinese assistance in developing its oil and gas sector. It is seriously pushing the idea of oil and gas pipelines from Gwadar in Balochistan to western China. At the same function, Aziz Said that such a facility would provide China with a shorter and more economical route for its oil supplies from the Gulf region. Aziz also spoke of setting up a mega oil refinery "at Gwadar to further facilitate China's oil imports from our region."⁶⁸

The war on terrorism is expected to be long drawn. The Pakistani military and intelligence services may retain strong ties with Taliban in Afghanistan. Like the Pakistani population, many among the Pakistani military or its nuclear establishment could be sympathetic to fundamentalist's causes and thereby, hostile to the United States. These sympathies could grow depending on the course of the war in Afghanistan or elsewhere. Such insider threats in Pakistan could pose one of the most vexing problems in the current crisis. Several observers have indicated that if Pakistan suffers a coup by forces hostile to the United States, the US military should be ready to provide security for the nuclear weapons or even to take the weapons out of Pakistan entirely without the permission of the Pakistani authorities, while other have

raised the possibility of asking President Mushrraf to allow the United States or China to take possession of Pakistan's nuclear weapons in such situation.

Although such responses appear possible in theory, their implementation could be extremely difficult and dangerous. US military actions to seize or cripple Pakistan's strategic nuclear assets may encourage India to take similar action. However, this job may not be easy for U.S. or for India.

Such harsh contingencies may be important to consider in order to protecting the vital interests of the United States and its allies. A better strategy, however, is to take appropriate steps to minimize the likelihood that such catastrophic scenario materializes.⁶⁹

This plan was attempted move along with the movement of NATO into Afghanistan, after the terrorist attacks on targets in the United States. For the first time in the history, NATO invoked Article 5 of the treaty (relating to joint defence clause). The US, recognized as the aggrieved party, did not make use of NATO's support and decided on an independent action against Afghanistan, freely shaping what it termed as the 'coalition of the willing. The anti-terrorist operations started by the U.S. intensified the process of further NATO expansion, at the same time reinforcing the international evolution of the alliance in terms of building more capabilities to meet the new security challenges of the 21st century.

The U.S. made it clear that without a fresh definition of its mission, NATO would not be able to efficiently oppose the new types of threats. The U.S. Defence Minister said that if NATO did not transform itself, 'it will not have much to offer the world in the 21st century'. Perhaps keeping this in mind the NATO took command of the 5,000 strong International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in August 2003.

The new U.S. defence concept articulated in the 2001 Quadrennial Defence Review Report' moved away from 'region based' scenarios to 'capabilities based' planning, and underlined the need for forces that can handle two major conflicts and multiple smaller military operations, simultaneously. This shift in strategy moved the NATO focus of defence planning from Southwest and northeast Eurasia to the southern and eastern region of the Eurasian landmass of North Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia. The review notes that while large US forces are likely to remain

stationed in Europe, they will be called upon to be deployed elsewhere and to serve as instruments of power projection.

Historically, NATO has followed America's military policies and security doctrines. In the context of the war on terror, the US has adopted fundamentally new security and military doctrines. In this regard, the new US doctrine of preemption will be decisive in the transformation of NATO. The US national security strategy unveiled in September 2002 says that while the US will seek allies in the battle against terrorism, it will not hesitate to act alone if necessary. The new US doctrine also calls for transformation and moderation of NATO to meet new security threats.

In Afghanistan, the US is pushing NATO but 'coalition of the willing' comprising some states of both the old and new Europe under US command, US relied on its CENTCOM instead the US is pushing NATO to deliver on an ambitious plan to extend its peacekeeping presence beyond Kabul and create links with American – led military operations in the South, in an effort to rout the remnants of Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

As mentioned above Western defence allies have agreed to include India and Pakistan in the NATO's PFP programme after concerted persuasion by the US that such an arrangement would allow the two nuclear rivals of South Asia to consult the alliance in the event of direct threats to their international and external security. With the change in its geographic focus NATO plans to take control of several international military peacekeeping operations under the UN mandate.⁷⁰

IV. Bringing Afghanistan into the “Bigger Central Asia” Project

From 2005, a new geopolitical project is being discussed in strategic circles in the US, the so-called project for “the Bigger Central Asia”. The core of this plan is to bring together Afghanistan and the Central Asian republics in a single military strategic and geopolitical whole, and possibly include some other neighboring regions.⁷¹ In fact, this project was started slowly in the period immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent emergence of the newly-independent states in 1991. Initially the US policy towards Central Asia centered on security relationship with Kazakhstan. This initial focus on Kazakhstan stemmed in large part from the need to secure the Kazakh nuclear arsenal and, in December 1993,

resulted in the signing of a Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Agreement to dismantle and destroy the country's more than 100 SS-18 missiles.

By 1994, the US cemented its bilateral security cooperation with Kazakhstan through a defence doctrine and training. The neighbouring states of Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan also joined Kazakhstan in entering NATO's Partnership for Peace Program (PFP). Central Asian membership in the NATO PFP served as the main avenue for Western security arrangement. The US approach towards Central Asia was also driven by over reaching geopolitical considerations, with an underlying goal of containing the influence of China, Iran and Russia.

Another US policy was even more ambitious with long term goals of democratization and marketization, a consolidation of regional security and cooperation and an open and unfettered environment to allow the development of the regional energy resources. This last goal effectively translated into an effort to bolster the territorial integrity and security of the Central Asian states mainly as a counterweight to Russian interference or manipulation. By 1999, the US Congress expanded a commitment to military agreement with Central Asia, to support the economic and political independence of both Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus.⁷²

Apart from isolating this wide region and bringing it out of the (mono politic), influence of other great powers-Russia and China, the project may have been dictated also by the necessity of bringing Afghanistan out of the destabilizing influence of such neighbors as Pakistan and Iran and binding this country to more stable and western-oriented region of Central Asia.

In general "the Bigger Central Asia" (BCA) project is in many ways a continuation of another geopolitical project – "the Bigger Near East" (BNE), and it has in principle the same strategic aims, diversification of strategic interests and stabilization of the territory under dominant influence of USA.

At the same time, according to this plan, Washington seeks to maintain an appearance of 'pluralism' by allowing Moscow and Beijing some role in the region by granting them the status (along with the West) of guarantors and donors in the modernization process attempted by the U.S. and giving them some illusion of control in the region. However, for the American strategists the role of China and Russia as 'benevolent observers' is quite acceptable. However, anything beyond that will be

countered by the U.S. It is also being predicted that the U.S. may facilitate the entry of India and Turkey into the region to balance out China and Russia. The developments in Andizhan in 2005 and the drastic change in foreign policy of Tashkent have jeopardized the prospect of implementation of the BCA project. The main aim of the BCA was to transform Uzbekistan into the center of the integration process by persuading it to sign special agreements with Pakistan, cooperate with Japan to build railways in Afghanistan to create transport corridor to the Indian Ocean and free trade zone around the Fergana Valley with participation of other countries of Central Asia.

This project proposes implementation of a number of organizational, technical and diplomatic measures to realize the American strategy. They concern strengthening of the role of the Pentagon and the State Department for more effective US presence in the region. It is also considered necessary to strengthen the role of NATO as one of the main instruments of the American strategy forming part of special BCA council, through which USA could coordinate and influence regional policies on a continuing basis.⁷³

V. Containment of Iran

Under the name of the war against terrorism, the United States has denounced Iran as part of the 'Axis of Evil; openly encouraging the overthrowing of the current regime.⁷⁴ Moreover, there was a talk within the Bush administration of invading Iran to depose the clerical government too.⁷⁵ According to the *Washington Post*, the full secret version of the doctrine "goes even further" and breaks with 50 years of U.S. counter-proliferation efforts by authorizing pre-emptive strikes on states and terrorist groups that are close to acquiring weapons of mass destruction or the long range missiles capable of delivering them. The idea being to destroy parts before they are assembled. The document's top secret appendix is reported to name Iran, Syria, and North Korea. That will be the central focus of this new approach and it pledges to "stop transfers of weapons components in or out of their borders."⁷⁶ A consequence of invasion of U.S. troops into Afghanistan and Iraq a year later caused Iranian government to take extreme caution.⁷⁷

The reason behind the new Bush approach was the heightened concern against terrorism following the September 11, 2001 attacks. One paramount American fear was that future terrorist attacks would employ chemical, biological, or, possibly, nuclear weapons. In the view of the Bush administration, Iran was linked to various terrorist groups.⁷⁸ In spite of Iranian government's strong condemnation of the 9/11 attacks, Iran responded positively to cooperation in the war on terror under the auspices of the UN 'Geneva Contact Group' provided a forum for United States and Iran to meet and discuss Afghanistan. Though the Geneva group lived through 18 months, with initial American success, the nurtured distrust and suspicions resurfaced.

In American perception, Iran was accredited with close supervision of Hamas Palestinian Islamic Jihad and Peoples Front for the liberation of Palestinian territories, and that Tehran continuously abets in Hezbollah's efforts of acquiring WMD. Iran was also accused of direct guidance to Abu Musab Alzarqawi, propping of Ansar-ul-Islam and of harboring 300 senior Al-Qaeda activists.

Hezbollah, over the years, has definitely evolved itself into an entity which imparts stability to the political divisions within Lebanon. Hamas too wants to emulate Hezbollah's success, provided they are allowed to enter the political mainstream.

During Clinton administration there was some breaking of ground in engaging the Iranians and Saudi Arabia in the spring of 1994, and produced evidence which implicated the Iranians in the Khobar Towers bombing, where 19 U.S. soldiers had lost their lives. Evidence collected by Saudi Arabia pointed towards some disgruntled Shia segments. Alkhobar bombings of 1995 were recently duplicated in Riyadh, on May 12, 2003, through Al-Qaeda machinations, with nothing in common ideologically; the incident was once again used to link Al-Qaeda and the Islamic Republic of Iran.

Karine A incident could be termed as the most suspicious. On January 3, 2002, accusation was made that involved Karine A, a ship purchased in Lebanon by Palestinians was intercepted in the Red Sea with eighty crates of weapons loaded at the Iranian Freeport in the Persian Gulf, the island of Kish. During this time, Iranian – US relations, in the post 9/11 environment, for better cooperation in Afghanistan were warming up, and therefore, to counter this, the interception by the Israelis in the Red Sea, was blown out of proportions. It was immediately followed up by Bush's state of

Union address, where Iran was included in the 'Axis of Evil' trio. Khomeini fired back with commensurate vitriol who said that the Islamic Republic is proud to be the target of hate and anger of the world's greatest evil: "we never seek to be praised by the American officials"⁷⁹

As per U.S. perception, Iran always supports terrorist groups. US was also aware about Iran's nuclear programme where, after eight years of bitter fighting with Iraq, Iran accepted United Nations Security Council resolution to ceasefire in the war, and shortly afterwards international isolation. It mended fences with the Gulf States, re-established diplomatic ties with the major West European powers, and even better relations with the United States, 'the Great Satan' yet, when a combination of international and regional developments offered new opportunities in the early 1990's, Ayatollah's imperialist ambitions were quickly reasserted as an expansion of the country's military arsenal accompanied by sustained efforts to project Iranian influence in the Persian Gulf and the Middle East, as well as in Central Asia and the trans Caucasus.

Iran renewed and substantially accelerated its nuclear development programme. There is a strong consensus among intelligence services and arms control agencies around the world that Iran is seeking nuclear weapons. Iran is known to have been shopping for nuclear know how and material in the west, the successor states of the Soviet Union, especially Russia – from which Iran has acquired two reactors of four hundred megawatts thermal power and from selected third world countries, such as Brazil, North Korea, and China, which have long been involved with the Iranian programme. For their part, the Ayatollah made no secret of Iran's interest in the Bomb, at least until they came under heavy American pressure to bridle their nuclear ambitions following the 9/11 attacks.⁸⁰

Currently, Iran seeks to develop a missile capability with a range of approximately 800 miles as well as at least the capacity to build nuclear weapons – the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has reached the conclusion that Iran has pursued both uranium enrichment related and reprocessing activities and a policy of concealment, although it did not conclude that Iran did have a nuclear weapons programme. Iran has subsequently signed a protocol to the Non-proliferation treaty that allows for "intrusive inspections" but has then objected to these, raising the likelihood that the diplomatic track has been exhausted and that Iran may now be set

on the development of nuclear weapons capability.⁸¹ There is apprehension that there could be a dominos effect and a nuclear test by Iran could prompt its neighbours to consider whether they should also pursue nuclear option. Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Syria, the United Arab Emirates, and Turkey are some time referred to as countries that could follow Iran and begin their nuclear ventures. Obviously, these countries may not pose immediate concerns, but all of them have once been suspected of acquiring nuclear weapons capabilities. For example, Saudi officials mentioned in early 2004, that they were interested in acquiring nuclear capability on lease from China or Pakistan.

Once any regional country succeeds in possessing nuclear weapons, it might feel tempted or even urged to go nuclear to ensure regional security balance. A nuclear Iran means the emergence of the single regional superpower, and it might harm strategic balance among regional powers, especially vis-à-vis the Arab countries. It is no wonder Arab countries may be tempted to correct this strategic imbalance against a Persian country, by pursuing their nuclear capabilities.⁸² Moreover, Israel has already warned that it will not tolerate an Iranian nuclear capability, and might well take preemptive action.⁸³

Moreover, Iran has reserved large energy resources which could play a key role in Indian subcontinent, such as, it could raise its influence over energy needs of South Asian countries especially, India. With the massive growth in Indian economy, it would need large amounts of energy resources, therefore Indian government has been initiating import of large-scale natural gas from Iran through cross border pipeline which is perceived as one of the best long term solutions to India's energy needs.

Iran, with over twenty-six million cubic meters of gas reserves (sixteen percent of the world's gas reserves) is naturally interested in large scale supply of gas to the Indian subcontinent. The geographical location of Iranian gas resources makes India the best market for country's gas export in the coming years and Iranian policy makers have studied the Indian market for exporting gas in the form of LNG via a pipeline, for over ten years. In November 2000, Iran and India agreed to launch yet another feasibility study on the land and deep sea option of gas transportation to India.⁸⁴ According to the project studies of supplying gas through a pipeline, there would be three countries involved who would also gain significant benefits from this project. India will get energy for its growing needs, Pakistan will get both gas and a

heavy royalty and transit fees, Iran of course, would stand to gain the most financially and it would be a respite for the nation that the U.S. is trying to isolate, politically.

Even though the recent advancement of the negotiations between India and Pakistan over security of oil pipeline which will be laid down in Pakistan's territory has been positive but the greatest impediment however, comes from the strong US opposition to this project and its determination to isolate Iran and cut off its investments. There have been reports that the U.S. government is reconsidering its opposition to the \$ 4.2 billion Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline⁸⁵ (see map-3). But, according Vladimir Radyuhin quoted, in *The Hindu* newspaper, while, Russian natural gas monopoly Gazprom is developing the Southern part of the field in Iran, and is also ready to help build the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline.⁸⁶ The Bush administration has been basing its opposition to the proposed pipeline on the argument that it would help Iran, a potential target of future U.S. military strikes. US corporations are also going to be involved in the consortium; these companies might put pressure on the White House to back the pipeline. The companies would need the approval of the US government to participate in the pipeline construction. The US is clearly trying to use its influence against the pipeline from Iran due to its differences over the country's nuclear programme. Indian Ministry of External Affairs has come out with a report on US policy that cautions India about the possibility of sanctions being slapped on it by the US under the Iran and Libya Sanctions Act of 1996.⁸⁷ Investment of over \$ 40 million and activities that directly enhance Iran's capacity to develop its oil and gas resources may attract sanction from the U.S.

The US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, during her visit to New Delhi in March, 2005, emphasized the need for energy dialogue between the US and India, the underlying idea was to dissuade New Delhi from going ahead with Iran pipeline. The emergence of Iran as of vital interest for India and Pakistan is extremely worrisome to the US. The recent announcement by India's petroleum Minister, that Iran has agreed to research the possibility of extending the proposed 2670 km Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline to China also. It only adds to the US concerns about the possibility of Iran playing a substantive role in the economic activities of the region. The US is deeply involved in China's economy and Iran's position being elevated to the extent of being a significant player in that economy is antithetical to American interests. Therefore, the US is trying to do everything to stop Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline

project. India-US Agreement on nuclear energy cooperation is seen as an incentive for India to withdraw from the pipeline project.

Pakistan realized that the US is not willing to provide nuclear power plants to Pakistan to meet its growing energy requirements, in spite of concerted diplomatic efforts by Islamabad in this regard. In this backdrop, the Pakistani Government has been stepping up its efforts to finalize the agreement on at least one of the gas pipelines from Iran, Qatar and Turkmenistan. However, any relenting to the American side on nuclear energy cooperation could be used as an incentive to pressurize Pakistan to retract from the Iran pipeline project.

Subsequent to the India-US agreement on nuclear energy cooperation as India noted that there were uncertainties in Iran and this has been interpreted as a demonstration of lack of confidence in International bankers, who are already reluctant to underwrite the project owing to the fear of U.S. sanctions, would tend to be further discouraged by this.⁸⁸

Another thing is that the rise of Iran's role in Middle East, whether in economic cooperation or improving relations despite old history of regional disputes with neighboring Arab countries would be in Iran's interests, and the most crucial thing is that Iran would really like these Arab countries to expel US hegemony out of Gulf countries.

As we have seen recently, there have been exchanges of high level visits of officials from Iran to individual Arabian Gulf countries on a bilateral basis which culminated with the signing of many trade and security pacts. Saudi Arabia moved ahead in 2000 with a series of trade and mutual cooperation pacts with Iran. Both the countries signed a security agreement in April 2001 and a judicial cooperation memorandum of understanding in July 2003. Another security cooperation agreement was signed between Iran and Qatar in October 2002, encompassing cooperation on various aspects of border security, including measures to counteract drug running and money laundering. Undoubtedly, the historic dispute between the UAE and Iran over the Abu Musa and Tunb Islands has continued to impact upon relations between the GCC and Iran, and UAE and Kuwait have been critical of Tehran's military buildup there, yet, both sides have emphasized on the peaceful solution of the outstanding issues.⁸⁹ In addition, the UAE has begun to explore joint projects that would help integrate their two economies, separated by only 180km. They are discussing the

possibility of laying under sea cables for transferring 1,000 MW of electricity. Iran is also offering Abu Dhabi gas supplies originating in Iran and Turkmenistan which straddles the Caspian Sea. Gas from Turkmenistan can be sent to the Gulf Shores across the Iranian transit corridor.⁹⁰ Recently, some regional experts argued that Iran is using the political tensions between Afghanistan and Pakistan in its favour, leveraging the fact that Iran is the only route by which Afghanistan can maintain foreign trade. Afghanistan is becoming increasingly dependent on Iran for its transit trade route as a result of the tense Afghan-Pakistan relationship. The Kabul administration has avoided speaking publicly about Iranian influence in Afghanistan, as they believe as a result of political tension with Pakistan, that Iran is Kabul's last significant open door to the world.⁹¹ Moreover, as Iran and Russia are the world's largest and second-largest holders of natural gas reserves, both support the idea of creating of a gas OPEC. Iran has an observer status in the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and is likely to be a member of an energy club Russia is planning for the CEO.

At the Second Caspian Summit, the leaders of the littoral states-Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan will sign a declaration identifying the areas of agreement for a proposed convention on the legal status of the Caspian Sea. Even though the Caspian nations have made little headway on the sticking point of sharing the Caspian seabed and its resources since their first summit in 2002, Russian foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed the hope that the summit would lay down guidelines for resolving the outstanding issues with Iran, whose coastline is a mere 13 per cent of the Caspian shore, advocates an equitable 20-per cent division of the seabed, while the littoral states favour a division along a medial line based on the length of their sovereign coastlines. The recent summit is expected to confirm the close positions Russia and Iran have taken against the presence of outside powers in the region and against the construction of underwater pipelines across the Caspian Sea, Ahmedinejad told the Russian media ahead of Mr. Putin's visit. Both Russia and Iran are more concerned with preventing the U.S. from straddling the Caspian Sea and the energy flows from the region. "We should not permit the Caspian question to turn into a challenge and a reason for anxiety of the Caspian states", the Iranian leader said.⁹²

While, historical factors continue to dominate the over all pattern of Iran –GCC relationship which is marked by suspicion and distrust towards Iran as well as the attitude of the United States towards Tehran.

It was most likely that the amount of tensions between US and Iran would be increasing day by day. Recently President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad visited to the United Arab Emirates and Oman in May 2007, where Ahmaddinejad had launched a fierce attack on the United States, demanding the withdrawal of American troops from the region. This was in country which is seen as a key U.S. ally. In calling for an American exit, Ahmadinejad entered into a war of words with U.S. Vice President, Dick Cheney, who was touring the region at the same time. Mr. Cheney had issued a strong statement that “Washington would not allow Tehran to dominate the oil-rich Gulf”, aboard the U.S. aircraft carrier John C. Stennis, that has been roaming the Gulf water for some time. Mr. Cheney said: “we will stand with others to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons and dominating the region”. He said, Iran would not be allowed to block the sea lanes, through which the bulk of the global oil supplies pass. While the tone and tenor of Ahmadinejad’s address was not unexpected, the UAE President’s remarks, as reported by a section of the Iranian media, certainly were, *The Tehran Times* quoted Sheikh Khalifa as saying : “the withdrawal of foreign fleets and armies from the region is one of our desires.”

Several factors are promoting a closer relationship between Iran and major Gulf countries, which have begun to drift away from the U.S. first, anti-American sentiments in the region is high. The spate of killings in Iraq, the seemingly endless sufferings of the Palestinians and the like are driving anger towards Washington to new heights. The leaderships of these countries can no longer ignore the popular mood. Ahmadinejad’s visit, which could go a long way in deepening Arab-Iranian ties, has brought the issue of the presence of foreign troops in the region more prominently on the agenda.⁹³

In fact the history of US-Iran rivalries did not begin after 11 Sept 2001, it actually began in 1978, when Shah of Iran, a pro-American was overthrown. United States security strategy in the Arabian Gulf has been dictated by its vital interests in ensuring the free flow of oil⁹⁴ at reasonable prices from the oil fields of that region, to ensuring the free flow of oil has also meant that the US had to develop a security policy that would preserve the independence of the Gulf Arab oil producers. This was

an inherently difficult proposition from the outset because they have never been able to develop an independent ability to defend themselves against Iraq or Iran; they have always required the United States to develop strategies for balancing or containing the potential threats of these regional powers.

Until the overthrow of the Shah in 1978, US strategy had come to depend on a relatively benign and status-quo oriented Iran to maintain the balance of power in the region in a way which helped preserve the independence of the gulf Arab states.⁹⁵

US grabbed Afghan's civil war as a means to counter Iran, as the US administration during Clinton era, which had been following a policy of dual containment of Iran and Iraq, saw increasing Iranian role in Afghanistan as a disturbing development in the backdrop of rising Iranian influence in Central Asian republic as well.⁹⁶ It was convinced that the Taliban was put together not just to contain the Iranian role in Afghan affairs, but the Taliban were perceived to be a 'trap' set up by the US, Saudi and Pakistan to drag Iran into a war with Afghanistan. A conspiracy theory sought to explain that since the Gulf war of 1991, the US was seeking to lure Iran into some war or the other that would serve as an opportunity to destroy its renovated military machine and further exhaust its economy – with the over all objective of restoring Iran to its former status as a piece of strategic chess – board. And since the US would prefer to distract the war as far as possible from the Gulf region – to avoid repercussions that might prove hard to control later on – a war between Iran and Afghanistan would be ideal.

Iran shares a 900 km long border on the east with Afghanistan with which its relations slipped to lowest point in late 1998, when ten Iranian diplomats and a journalist in Mazare Sharif went missing and were presumed to have been killed,⁹⁷ after the Taliban stormed Mazar- i-Sharif. It was later reported that 2,000 to 6,000 Shia Hazara civilians had been systematically massacred by the guerillas after recapturing the city.⁹⁸ Iran amassed 70,000 Revolutionary Guards and conducted the largest ever ground and air exercises on its Afghan border⁹⁹ as the relations continued to deteriorate.

Therefore, the question of U.S. setting up its military base in Afghanistan after 9/11 to contain Iran and preparing for a possible invasion of Iran could be viewed as a continuation of the unfinished job. Possibility of the U.S. using forces to engage Iran

looms over dangerously now.¹⁰⁰ One could discern that the neoconservative ideas surrounding US foreign policy in the academic writings of Condoleezza Rice, Robert B. Zoellick and Kenneth M. Pollack in *Foreign Affairs* journal before and after the election of Bush Junior for the first term, Rice, who later became National Security Advisor in the next term said that administration's foreign policies must help attain the American values that the Clinton administration could not attempt. Writing on the eve of presidential election in 2000, Rice argued for a strong military so that it can deter war, project power and fight in defence of American interests if deterrence fails. Having criticized Clinton's defence policy about military expenses and deployment of forces, she argued in favour of building the military of the 21st century rather than continuing to build the same on the structures of cold war. Secondly, the US military, she held must be able to meet decisively the emergence of any hostile power in Asia pacific region, the Middle East, the Persian Gulf . . .¹⁰¹ In spite of it, the realization grew that the global defeat of Al-Qaeda was not going to be possible, the issue turned out to be a long-term strategy. This new focus would not so much solve the Al-Qaeda problem but help create a process that would undermine the operational foundations of Al-Qaeda by forcing nations in the region to redefine their behaviour. From a purely military point of view, Iraq is the single most strategic country in the Middle East. Its borders are common with six other countries: Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Jordan, Syria, Turkey, and Iran. In other words, from Iraq-and with its forces in Afghanistan-the United States would influence events in countries that ranged from the Himalayas to the Mediterranean and from the Black Sea and the Caucasus to the Red and Arabian Sea. Like its predecessor Mesopotamia, Iraq is the pivot of the Middle East.¹⁰² As quoted by Aijaz Ahmad in *Frontline* the U.S. has waged a cold war against the Islamic Republic of Iran for almost 30 years now, and has threatened a hot war (outright invasion) for a full decade. The occupation of Iraq, is designed partly to compensate for the earlier loss incurred when the Shah was overthrown, and partly to regain access to Iranian resources, either by invading it or by imposing upon it a peace on terms favourable to the US., in the energy sector. An accommodation between the US and Iran in the energy sector is not inconceivable. The Security Council is ready with a draft for tighter sanctions against Iran. The U.S. navy has assembled a vast armada in the Gulf and positioned all kinds of military forces to surround Iran for psychological warfare and also for invasion, if necessary.¹⁰³

As quoted by Vladimir Radyuhin in *The Hindu* the Russian President, Vladimir Putin visited in the middle of October 2007, to reduce the danger of a US attack on Iran and consolidate the strategic relationship between Russia and Iran, as Russia saw that the threat of a US attack on Iran has grown all too big. The Pentagon has deployed the largest force in the region since the 2003 war, with half of the US navy's warships position within striking distance of Iran.¹⁰⁴ And it was likely that the U.S. was looking for more military bases to strike and encircle Iran, we could see from President Putin of Russia was trying to persuade states around Iran not to give bases for US to launch its military strikes on Iran. Putin tried to make the military option as difficult as possible for the U.S. the fact that Tehran was the venue of a five-nation Caspian summit, which was the formal reason for the recent Putin trip to Iran, served to deter U.S. warmongers. It destroyed the wall of isolation the U.S. had been building around Iran, improved the geo-strategic climate around that country, and demonstrated its neighbors' solidarity with it. The five Caspian nations Russia, Iran, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan pledged to deny outside countries the right to use their territories for launching military action. "The parties underline that under no circumstances would they allow other nations to use their territory for waging aggression or other military action against any of the parties."¹⁰⁵

After US Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice and Secretary of Defence Robert Gates during one of the trip's visited Moscow, were bluntly told to drop their "unilateral" approach and "periodic calls to use military force against Iran" as these undermine and impede our collective effort", but the momentum for war is building up. After two weeks, the Senate passed a resolution urging the administration to place Iran's Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps on the US blacklist as a 'terrorist organization'. Democratic Senator Jim Webb of Virginia, who voted against it, accused the White House of pushing through the resolution as "a back door method of gaining Congressional validation for military action." "It is, for all practical purposes, mandating the military option," he said.¹⁰⁶ Recently, in last week of October 2007, the US officially announced its draconian sanctions on Iran. It has also virtually branded the entire Iranian Army, a terrorist force; the draft of tough measures against Iran includes sanctions against the Islamic Revolution Guards Corps (IRGC),¹⁰⁷ the Iranian Defence Ministry and leading Iranian commercial banks. The elite Al Quds

force, which is part of the IRGC, has been accused by the U.S. of arming and training Shiite militias in Iraq and Hezbollah in Lebanon.¹⁰⁸

From the above it seems that the moving of NATO into Afghanistan was perceived as a long term-plan of the US to enhance the security in the Gulf and the Middle East. Hamid Ansari wrote: an option that has been explored as an alternative is that of broad-basing the responsibility and co-opting European members of NATO on the pattern of arrangements in place for Afghanistan. The European Union's involvement in the Middle East process is of older vintage and has been useful though, rarely decisive. In 2004, an exercise was undertaken to explore the role that NATO could play in enhancing security in the Gulf and the Middle East". By the end of 2005, the organization was asserting that it is interested in Gulf security because of: (I) the changing security environment, (II) the changing nature of NATO itself, and (III) the new dynamics in the Gulf region itself that has been unfolding over the past few years.

Three countries on the western, northern and eastern periphery of the region add a significant dimension to the security calculus of West Asia.¹⁰⁹ These are Israel, Turkey, and Iran. All are non-Arab countries, each has a distinct identity, has a distinct history of relations with the United States and is influenced by the security dynamics of West Asia. In case of Iran it has remained in the headlines for 27 years for having abandoned the Western alliance, disturbed the strategic balance in West Asia, and being an obstacle to an unquestioned American hegemony in the region. From Hamid Ansari's analysis and conclusion about this matter, the national security strategy of the United States of America, supplemented by the new NATO doctrine, provide the answer that 'West Asia is too precious not to be dominated, not to be reformed in terms of the Greater Middle East initiative'.¹¹⁰

VI. Containing the role of China in Central Asia and countries around Caspian Sea

One of the most important results of the 9/11 attacks has been a shift in the United States policy towards establishing its hegemony from that of maintaining status quo. This shift, and the establishment of clear-cut US priorities, result from the realization of the danger posed by Al-Qaeda and similar groups operating outside and

within the existing state systems-whereas prior to 9/11, most of the attention of the U.S. security establishment was focused on the alleged threats from major rival states (notably China and Russia).¹¹¹

The US policy to contain China has not actually begun after 9/11 but it began soon after the end of cold war, the theory put forward by John J. Mearsheimer, the author of the book *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* who made an analysis of the US foreign policy after the end of Cold War, on the question of the future perspective of US foreign policy in the 21st century. In his analysis he puts China as the new rising super- power. He pointed out that the basic structure of the international system did not change much with the end of the cold war, and that there is little reason to even think that change is in the offing. He has tried to prove his point that there is considerable evidence from the decade 1991-2000 that security competition among the great powers is not obsolete, neither in Europe nor in Northeast Asia. He finally concludes that the emergence of China is the most dangerous and a potential threat to the United States security in the twenty-first century.¹¹²

In the period immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent emergence of the newly-independent states in 1991, US policy towards Central Asia centered on security relationships. By 1994, with cooptation through defence doctrines and attempting to pursue Central Asian countries to enter NATO's Partnership for Peace Program (PFP), Central Asian membership in the NATO, PFP served as the main avenue for western security engagement. The US approach to Central Asia was also driven by over-acting geopolitical considerations, with an underlying goal of containing the influence of China, Iran and Russia.¹¹³ Once, during Afghan civil war, U.S. viewed stability in Afghanistan as the main variable in this strategy. Domination in Afghanistan was important to it to exercise power control over the Southern corridor to Central Asia. This was the only way to enhance Pakistan's geopolitical standing with the west in shaping the future evolution of Central Asia. This by itself would get Pakistan, economic and political rewards "by creating a regional dependence on Islamabad to ensure safety for traffic, in other words, the international acceptance of Islamabad's hegemony over the Southern approaches to Central Asia and the western gateway to China". It could quietly fit into American political and strategic objectives in the Central Asian region which provides ground for preventing Russian hegemony in the region, containing Iran and to play a

balancing role against emerging powers like China. The Control over the Pakistan-Afghanistan corridor and creating an opening from the South would be vital for the West in gaining access to the oil and natural gas resources of the region also.¹¹⁴ The plan of the U.S. was to keep its presence in this region to lock out China from the energy business in the region, since Washington feared they could assist the Central Asian republics in setting up their own oil companies.¹¹⁵

Although, Russia was considered to be a loser in the long-Cold War, but was still trying to back China to be a powerful state in order to provide a rival to balance the U.S. in this area. As, at present, the grand alliance of Western states which far outweighed Russia and was finally able to defeat the Soviet Union in the Cold War still remains almost united and it was expected that they would stand together again against any Russian attempt to regain its former empire. Though China and Russia might unite diplomatically and rhetorically against American global hegemony, it is hard to understand how Russia's interests and the security of its vulnerable far eastern possessions would benefit by backing a Chinese bid for hegemony in East Asia.¹¹⁶

As China was also developing fast its economy, it is imperative that it would need a lot of energy resources to fuel its industrial growth. With this reason, China entered into a war for energy with the west in many parts of the world over energy reserves.

A commentary in *China Daily* states that the current administration "no longer tries to hide China's growing economic weight in global affairs and the role it will have to play in order to sustain growth". This explanation is the key to the above philosophy in order to sustain its double digit economic growth. China has no choice but to become more active internationally. A major proportion of the oil and other natural resources that China needs to feed its growing economy are imported. Thus, Beijing has begun to aggressively woo energy and other raw material rich countries across Latin America, Africa and Central Asia. These countries also represent emerging markets for Chinese products, making them doubly valuable.

For Beijing, ensuring regional peace and stability is thus critical and it is aware that it must play an active role internationally to secure this. Demonstrating its new leadership in a variety of international and regional forums, China hosted three major international summits in 2006: the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO)

Summit in June, the China-Africa summit in November, and the China-Asian Summit also in November.

All three summit meetings underscored how Beijing is beginning to use multilateral forums as vehicles. The SCO, for example, binds the energy rich nations of Central Asia to China and represents a formidable alliance between Moscow and Beijing covering an area of 30 million square Kilometers or about three-fifths of Eurasia. The SCO controls a large part of the global oil and gas reserves and includes two of the world's five declared nuclear powers. For China, leadership of such an organization is not only prestigious but also helps it set up as an alternative to U.S. influence in the strategic Central Asian region.¹¹⁷ For the Central Asian republics, China's policy of studious non-interference in internal affairs of sovereign countries is a welcome change from America's prescriptive dictates. Moreover, Beijing provides these countries with economic development assistance and increased opportunities for trade and investment.¹¹⁸ Beijing has been adopting a more offensive economic diplomacy towards Central Asia with the aim of stabilizing the region politically, as well as to push China's own interests. In fact, as the competition among powerful countries for influence in central Asia, China has been more successful in commercially penetrating into the region, responding and fulfilling the immediate economic needs, especially the consumer goods requirements of these countries.

China also revived the ancient "Great Silk Route" and used the metaphor to open up China's northern land border for direct links with Europe and the Middle East via Central Asia. A number of Eurasian highways, including rail and pipeline construction, are being planned, which will ensure a long-term role for China in Central Asia. The opening up of the trans-Eurasian rail road through Central Asia in 1990 and the linking of Almaty and Urumchi by rail road in 1992 had brought in a dramatic change in the Sino-Central Asian frontiers. The triumphant tour by Prime Minister Li Peng to Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan in April 1994 gave a new impetus to China's campaign for its Silk Route promotion. Premier Li, while resurrecting the Silk Road, reached agreements with Turkmenistan and others on oil production and pipeline constructions (see map-8).

In an unprecedented move in June 1997, China's National Petroleum Company (CNPC) outbid US oil companies Texaco and Amoco and won a major oil concession, taking a 60 percent share of Kazakhstan's richest Aktyubinsk oilfield by

investing US \$4 billion dollars. Again in August 1997, CNPC won a tender giving it 60 per cent of developing Kazakhstan's second richest Novyuzen oilfield by investing US \$400 million out of a total projected investment of U.S. \$1.3 billion. The CNPC paid Kazakhstan signature bonus of US \$372 million for both the projects.¹¹⁹ China is also planning to build a 2,000 mile-long pipeline across Xinjiang at the cost of \$ 3.5 billion to carry oil and gas to Chinese industrial cities as well as for exports to Japan. It is expected that China's enormous inroads into Central Asia, particularly its involvement in what is shaping up as the last great oil rush of the 20th century will have great geopolitical implications in the years to come.

China is once again wielding influence upon the steppe Zone of the Eurasian heart-land. China's landward orientation assumes significance in the face of declining Russia's strategic proximity with India. It is also significant that the countries like Kazakhstan are talking about Central Asia as a bridge between Europe and Asia, therefore, creating a situation as well as establishing closer ties with China as an essential balance to offset pressure and renewed assertion from Russia in the future.¹²⁰

Apart from this, as western part of China was locked deep in the interior of Eurasia, suffered a distance market, to find a port to carry manufactured goods. Western interior provinces with strong support from Beijing attempted to mitigate this advantage by opening transport links with their neighbors. Yunnan province in China's southwest achieved considerable success in opening or improving road, river and rail links with and through Myanmar to ports (including several that were build by china) on the bay of Bengal. Myanmar's location in the southeastern foothills of the Tibetan Plateau had, through many centuries, made it a natural transit route between southwestern China and Bay of Bengal. In addition, recently, China is looking forward to connect its railway to Iran by passing through Pakistan, as Iran, along with Pakistan, plays an increasingly important role in providing western China access to the Oceanic. China's adoption in 2000 of a program to accelerate development of its western regions made development of transportation lines to the southwest even more important. Pakistan was China's major partner in this regard. China has given many millions to Pakistan to modernize its railway system. While China's major transportation investments in southwest Asia have been in Pakistan, Iran has played a role via several railways projects that dovetailed with China's efforts

in Pakistan. The first of these Iranian projects was construction of a rail line between Kerman in southeast Iran and Zahedan on the Iran-Pakistan border. Work on this line was under way in 2002. When complete, this rail line will link the Iranian and Pakistani rail systems for the first time. Work was also under way on a new rail line extending southwest from Mashad directly across northeastern Iran to Bafq. This line was to be operational by early 2005. The completion of these new lines will mean that Chinese cargo moving via the Tedzhen – Mashhad link can proceed directly to seaports without having to take the long circuitous and crowded but previously required via Tehran (see map-7).

While the major significance of these new, Chinese southwesterly lines of international transportation is commercial, they also have a strategic role. In the event of a U.S.-PRC military confrontation that became protracted and in which the United States used its naval supremacy to blockade China's coast, China's ability to continue prosecution of the war would be influenced by its ability to import vital materials overland. In such a situation it would be extremely useful to have robust transport links via Pakistan and Iran and to have long-standing, cooperative ties "tested by diversity" with both of those countries.¹²¹

In the end of 2004, Beijing also signed a \$ 70 billion energy agreement with Tehran, China's largest organization of petroleum Exporting countries energy deal to date. China's state Sinopec agreed to buy 250 million tons of LNG over 30 years from Iran as well as to develop the giant Yadavaran field. That agreement covered the comprehensive development by Sinopec of the giant Yadavaran gas field, construction of a related petrochemical and gas industry including pipelines.

The Iran-China strategic energy cooperation will involve constructing a pipeline in Iran to take oil some 386 kilometers to the Caspian Sea, then to link up with a planned pipeline from China into Kazakhstan. On signing the deal, Iran's petroleum Minister announced that Tehran would like to see China replace Japan.¹²² Moreover, China also involved the Project of pipeline building of Iran towards south, where this route would seem to provide the US with the best incentive to date to cooperate with Iran by, in essence, competing with proposed Chinese backed oil pipeline project (pipeline route runs for nearly a thousand miles along the Afghanistan border with Iran and Pakistan serving the same oil fields in northern Iran and points towards south, preventing China from obtaining a defector monopoly holder on oil supplies

for South East Asia. the Chinese began negotiating that project in 1997, causing a great deal of consternation for the Clinton administration and major US oil companies who stood to gain little in the project.¹²³

Apart from China playing a key role in energy resources field of these regions, China is still trying to woo Iran for its economic and military growth. After the Iranian revolution of 1979, U.S. influence over Iran came to an end. China came to replace U.S., Chinese efforts to strengthen Iran clashed frequently with U.S. policy.¹²⁴ The joint communiqué issued at the conclusion of President Khatami's June 2000 visit to China proclaimed that the two sides agree that the security and stability of the Persian Gulf should be safeguarded by the countries of the region free from outside interference. Beijing and Iran viewed that step-by-step, throughout the post-1979 era, the United States expended its military position in the Persian Gulf region. Jimmy Carter's 1979 announcement of U.S. assumption of direct military responsibility for Gulf security; Ronald Reagan's 1983 upgrading of Carter's Rapid Deployment Force to a full-fledged regional headquarters; expansion of Diego Garcia into a major forward support base; the prepositioning of supplies and equipment for combat in the Gulf construction or expansion of military use facilities in Egypt, Kenya, Saudi Arabia, and other countries in the region; and the development of Persian Gulf war plans and training of U.S. forces to operate in a desert environment. The existence of this newly developed U.S. military power in Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, and Iran in the 1980s, and against Iraq in 1991 and again from 1998 to 2003, began to shape events in the Gulf region.

Beijing and Tehran are in agreement that the growth of the U.S. military position in the Persian Gulf region is a manifestation of U.S. hegemony, inspired by a desire to control the region's oil resources as a step towards realizing the dream of global domination. They also agree that the U.S. push for hegemony over the Middle East is antithetical to the interests of both countries and of course, the vision of Persian Gulf without extra regional military forces and with regional security affairs managed by the countries of the region themselves, can be taken as an alternate course of development preferred by Beijing and Tehran.¹²⁵ Given the nature of the Bush administration's rush to war in Iraq in 2003, where China had a major stake in oil development, and the subsequent US blocking of other Chinese attempts at securing energy independence, including UNOCAL, it is not surprising that Beijing is taking

extraordinary measures to secure its long-term oil and gas supply resources. Energy is the Achilles Heel of China's economic growth.¹²⁶ This conflict was in areas where Sino-Iranian Cooperation threatened to diminish the military advantages the United States enjoyed vis-à-vis Iran and/or increased Iran's ability to threaten the sea-lanes and/or oil supplying states of the Persian Gulf. This conflict between Beijing and Washington was manifest in the areas of nuclear energy, guided and ballistic missiles, and dual-use goods relevant to production of chemical or advanced conventional weapons.

From Beijing's perspective, U.S. objections to China's nuclear and missile cooperation with Iran were at bottom manifestations of U.S. hegemony. It could be seen from its efforts to dominate the Persian Gulf, interference in the Persian Gulf and the bullying of Iran which created the problem. As Hong Kong's pro-PRC paper *Wen Wei Bao* commented in April 1995, 'during the 1980s U.S. military forces shot down several Iranian war planes. These U.S. moves prompted Iran to strengthen its strategic defence system. Therefore, if Iran is currently developing nuclear weapons as the United States has said, it probably is out of consideration of national defence strategy. Keeping Iran in a condition of military importance might be desirable from the stand-point of U.S. hegemonism.

China and Iran signed agreement on nuclear cooperation in June 1985, because of mounting U.S. concerns. In mid-1986 Iranian decision to buy Silkworm missiles from China caused Reagan administration officials to mobilizing pressure on China. Washington tried to persuade Beijing that Silkworm may close the Strait of Hormuz, severely disrupting the global economy.¹²⁷ The motivation that China was trying to initiate cooperation with Iran in the field of military development/modernization, Chinese objectives underlying its military cooperation with Iran was due to the fact that as Iran is a major regional power and it was in China's interests to gain influence with this power. China's assistance to IRI militarily modernization also rested on the belief that a military strong Iran served China's interests by containing the United States.¹²⁸

In addition, it is likely that China will play a key role in Afghan economy also as Afghanistan's economic situation in 2005 generated both optimism and alarm. Obvious enthusiasm from international investors focused on opportunities arising from the need for goods and services to satisfy the domestic demand and the promise

of traditional exports of agricultural products and minerals. President Karzai spoke of the positive effects of Afghanistan's role as a land bridge connecting the Middle East, China, and India and welcomed investments in transportation and power generation.¹²⁹

Apart from this, China's Africa push is already resulting in a sharp shift in the conceived geopolitical status quo. Beijing's influence is beginning to replace that of the United States and traditional European powers on the African continent.¹³⁰ The rise of China's role in African countries makes U.S. aware that oil energy resources would be grabbed by China. At the May Day gathering of African leaders in Shanghai, the Chinese government promised \$20 billion for the continent's development. Madagascar's President Marc Ravalomanana enthusiastically said "We in Africa must learn from your success". In January, the Chinese foreign ministry released a white paper that pointed out that unlike the U.S. and European investments, Chinese finance for Africa would be driven by equity and sustainable development. Technology transfer, the entry of African goods into the Chinese markets without barriers and the entry of Chinese finance for development projects are the main elements of the Chinese strategy. With the U.S. and European aid at a low point and with resistance from the U.S. and Europe to compromise on the debt burden of African states, the Chinese proposal was welcomed in many parts of Africa. For people in the Heritage Foundation and in the White House, AFRICOM is as much a response to China as it is to the increased anti-terrorist efforts in the continent.

As Energy Secretary Spencer Abraham said "Africa plays an increasingly important role in our energy security; since 9/11, the urgency of a stable source of oil has increased."

Eighty per cent of the oil reserves discovered between 2001 and 2004 come from West Africa, where the U.S. currently procure only 12 per cent of its total supply. West Africa is a crucial site for U.S. interests' to a great extent. For decades, the oil regions in West Africa have been "swamps of insurgency". As war over oil in West Africa have set the continent on fire, the US has thus far engaged with these conflicts through Africa's national armies, who have increasingly become the protector or guard of large corporations. None of this can be justified directly as protection of the extraction of resources, so it has increasingly been couched in the language of the war on terror. The Pan-Sahel Initiative (created in 2002), Mali,

Mauritania and Niger In 2004, the U.S. extended this to the major oil producing countries of Algeria, Nigeria, Senegal and Tunisia and renamed it the Trans-Sahara Counter Terrorism Initiative (TSCTI). After 9/11, the U.S. moved a special operations force into a former French foreign legion base, Camp Lemonier. In July 2003, the U.S. earned the right to deploy P-3 Orion Aerial Surveillance Aircraft in Tamanrasset, Algeria under the guise of the War on Terror. The U.S. government moved forces into various parts of Africa, where they trained African armies and have been able to intervene in the increasingly dangerous resources war.¹³¹

Following the revolution in the international system in 1989-91, China's leaders concluded that U.S. hegemony-no longer deadlocked as the Soviet Union-was now on a rampant offensive and constituted the most serious threat to China's security. Chinese analysis developed a long litany of U.S. moves in a purported drive for global domination, attempts to subvert Communist Party of China (CPC) via human rights," thereby replication in the PRC, the US success in disintegrating the USSR; maintaining NATO when it was no longer necessary and admitting the new ex-socialist states of Eastern Europe into the Western military bloc (a development which Chinese analysis styled the Eastern expansion of NATO"); encouragement of Japan to play a larger role in Asia and the world; encouragement of Taiwanese independence and separation from China; development of antimissile defences designed to nullify China's nuclear retaliatory capability; forging a strategic and military partnership with India; and drawing Central Asia into the U.S. military system. In the Chinese view of things, the Middle East constituted a crucial arena of the post-cold war U.S. hegemonic offensive. The aim of U.S. policy in that the region was to bring its rich energy resources under U.S. control as a stepping stone to global domination. This Beijing believed was the true rationale behind the 1991 war against Iraq and the dual containment of Iraq and Iran. Washington was determined either to compel those regimes to bend to U.S. will or to replace them and the energy resources of the entire Persian Gulf brought under secure U.S. control. The U.S. dream of global domination would come closer to realization. United States global domination was antithetical to China's interests since the closer the United States moved to apply pressure on the PRC.¹³²

Recently, U.S. tried pursuing India to sign nuclear agreement with U.S. was viewed that it was not all about energy as pointed out by Siddharth Varadarajan in *The*

Hindu; U.S. strategy after 9/11 was likely to make close ties with India to contain China as Mr. Burn's article provides clearly articulated deliverables that "India and U.S. can also do much more to create a stronger military partnership." He elaborates that the US and India need to complete a series of defence sales that would meet India's needs and complement India's overall defence relationship and build on an already impressive series of joint military exercises by improving the interoperability of our armed forces to respond to global contingencies. In the latter context, Mr. Burns mentions the post Tsunami quadrilateral naval effort involving the U.S. India, Australia and Japan. The post-Tsunami operation is the model on which the Bush administration would like to develop wider security cooperation between this group of four. The target of this gang-up is clearly, China.¹³³

From an evaluation of many events given above it could be seen that the U.S. was trying to build its military base in Afghanistan after 9/11 as a long-term plan to contain China. The movement of U.S. forces into Central Asian countries after 9/11 under the name of counter terrorism makes China suspicious that the U.S. is trying to contain them. The military exercise, Centraxbat-97, in which 500 paratroopers from the 82nd Airborne Division of the US Army flew 19 hours and 12,320 kilometers to join a week-long exercise in Central Asia, as a part of the NATO sponsored partnership of peace, has been viewed by Beijing as the US containment of China and a source, of great security concern for it.¹³⁴ China has been monitoring the presence of American troops very closely and Central Asian states have been attempting a delicate balancing act in their relations with Beijing and Washington. China's view was that, any military operations undertaken by Washington and its allies in Afghanistan should have specific objectives so as to reduce casualties of the innocent people. Beijing may not like the presence of American troops so close to its borders, but it does stand to gain from the additional fire power mustered against Islamist separatist movements in Central Asia. Since the politburo of Chinese communist party has identified separatism in Xinjiang as the main threat to the stability of the People's Republic, its members may consider the US presence a price worth paying.¹³⁵ China's concern in Xinjiang is not only about the ethnic and religious upsurge among the minorities but also about the protection of region's 30 billion tons of proven petroleum which are critical to China's energy security. Over the year, foreign oil companies have been exploring more oil in Tarim basin. China also can not afford the

situation to let loose in Xingjian as it may encourage the Tibetans and Mongols to intensify their struggle for independence.¹³⁶ The instability and ethnicity linkages between China and Central Asian Republics worked as a contributor to organize Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). The first meeting of what was to become a major regional grouping was held in Shanghai in 1996 and was attended by the foreign Ministers of China, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. An agenda was constructed around border security, combating insurgent Islamic forces and the smuggling of Islamic literature, weapons and narcotics.¹³⁷ This organization also could be viewed as a means for China's attempts to counter the hegemony of the US. As we have seen recently Anti-Terrorist war games organized by the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) got underway in Russia in August 2007, about 6,000 soldiers, 1,000 combat vehicles and scores of aircraft had joined in practice combat skills in "Peace Mission 2007" a week-long drill in the Chelyabinsk region of Russia in western Siberia.

It is the biggest military exercise staged by the SCO and the first one involving all the six member states – Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. The military exercises by the six-nation bloc will be followed by a bigger maneuver and expanded defence ties, the head of Russia's general staff said.¹³⁸

VII. A long term plan to counter Russia

The 9/11 events in United States and the resulting conflict in Afghanistan, not only changed world politics, but also brought a new angle to the struggle for influence in Central Asia. The energy war game makes the super powers to stay around Caspian Sea and Central Asia, such as Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and Turkey. After the 9/11 attacks, this area became strategically even more important.¹³⁹ The US now sought to reassert its own overt influence on global geopolitical developments with a view to ensuring its own security. Vijay Kapur has pointed out that the major shift in U.S. foreign policy in the post 9/11 period has been that the US now tries to increase its influence in the newly independent nations comprising the commonwealth of independent states (CIS) or Central Asia. A reflective article by Vadim Solovelev entitled *Washington Maintains the New World Order* (December 25, 1998) contended that "Washington would maintain the new world order and Moscow's influence

would be both limited and slighted". This assertion was particularly telling on a security establishment, which found itself suddenly irrelevant in the backdrop of NATO's relentless eastward expansion and budgetary difficulties, which further eroded the operational effectiveness of the Russian military set up. America's unilateral withdrawal from the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT) stocked more concerns in the Russian governmental set up, which felt that the US was also questioning its perceived 'military' primacy in the Near Abroad a Russian euphemism for the newly independent nations comprising the commonwealth of independent states (CIS).¹⁴⁰

Before the events of 11 Sept, one of the key concerns for the American policymakers has been as to find ways to secure access to the oil and natural gas reserves in the first half of 21st century. The obvious focus was, Central Asia and Caucasus. After they declared independence, the United States encouraged the newly independent states to adopt western – style economic reforms and the integration of these states and the eventual elimination of the Russian influence in this region. The year 1994-95 was the year when the US emerged as a major player in Central Asia when it rejected Russia's claims to an energy monopoly. In February 1995, the US decided to support an energy pipeline running through Turkey and not Russia. State Department sources told *Newsweek* that the endorsement reflects major shift in the US policy towards Central Asia. The new approach, coordinated by the National Security Council, is designed to break Russia's grip on Central Asia's oil export.

At the same time, the US was also playing a role in the Central Asian Republics (CARs) energy economy. It urged Turkmenistan to send gas to Ukraine and also offered Kazakhstan certain guarantees if Moscow turns off the oil tap. In May, 1995, the then under-secretary of energy, William White, toured Central Asia, urging the republics to regard themselves as important producers of oil and natural gas and to treat Russia and Iran as rivals. Also in 1995, Glen Rose, the head of the energy policy section of the State Department, said that Russian position must not be imposed on the states that prefer a more normal division of the Caspian. Washington does not recognise any spheres of influence. Till this time, denying Russia the right to influence the regional economy and politics seemed to be the major concern of the United States. Therefore, its commitment to multiple pipelines should also be seen as the continuation of the policy of denying Russia any significant role in the region. In

November 1999 Washington arranged for the signing of protocols on the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline for oil (See map-9). Washington has also told Georgia that any oil shipped out of the Caspian through its ports should go in part to Ukraine to alleviate its energy dependence on Russia.¹⁴¹

While Russia would not only like the export routes to be controlled by any one other than itself but also the control over the oil reserves will help the US to perpetuate its influence over Russia.¹⁴² These states, regard as hardheaded commercial interests, are viewed by Russian as 'incipient interventionism'. Russia is worried about these developments and the possibilities of hostile hands on pipeline taps. Russian has historic and legal claims to the Caspian Sea and has insisted that it must be made a party to any agreement on sharing oil and natural gas resources of the region. Russia attempts to control the flow of oil and gas from Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan has been viewed in western perceptions as attempts by the Russian security establishment to impose a single direction for the pipelines for the north via Russian territory. This would give Russia tremendous control over the flow of oil and gas to western markets and will make the West vulnerable to Russia's political whims. Russian energy policy could also be a part of an overall policy which aims to keep the west out of the Central Asian states preserving it under an exclusively Russian sphere of influence.¹⁴³ With this scramble over energy resources in Central Asia, Afghanistan became a hot-bed of big power rivalries. The US was trying to make Afghanistan as a land-bridge to build a pipeline route from Central Asia to the world market. From Afghanistan to Pakistan's ports and to Indian market from these ports could also present an alternative for Central Asian countries to export their natural resources, gas and oil to the world market. As we have seen during Afghan civil war that both U.S. and Russia had a hand in backing factional groups to preserve their interests. As in Ahmed Rashid's conclusion about US that it was backing the Taliban against Russia. The Americans were supporting the Taliban either directly or indirectly through UNOCAL or through its allies, Pakistan and Saudi Arabia. But Ahmed Rashid focused on whether there was a revival of the old CIA-ISI connection from the Afghan jihad era; it became apparent that the strategy over pipelines had become the driving force behind Washington's interests in the Taliban, which in turn was prompting a counter – reaction from Russia.¹⁴⁴ Russians were also reported as having a hand in backing northern alliance as a counterforce to

Taliban.¹⁴⁵ As President Boris Yeltsin said in 1998, 'by keeping the conflict in Afghanistan on the boil, Russia keeps the region unstable and has the excuse to maintain a military presence in the Central Asian Republics (CARs).¹⁴⁶ It was in the interest of Russia to keep the region unstable by arming the anti –Taliban alliance.¹⁴⁷

Today's great game is also between expanding and contracting empires. As a weakened and bankrupt Russia attempts to keep a grip on what it still views as its frontiers in Central Asia and control the flow of Caspian oil through pipelines that traverse Russia, the USA is thrusting itself into the region on the back of proposed oil pipelines which would by pass Russia, Iran, Turkey and Pakistan are building their own communication links with the region and want to be the preferred route of choice for future pipelines heading east, west or south.¹⁴⁸

An analytical article in *Frontline*, told us about a cold war which will emerge again between the West and Russia. The year 2007 will see the confrontation between Russia and the West over the energy resources of the former Soviet Union that gained new intensity throughout the past year. The west watched with mounting alarm as Russia skillfully used its vast oil and gas resources to set a new energy agenda that is not only reshaping the domestic and international energy markets but triggering shifts in global power equation, effectively eroding the West's post-cold war gains.¹⁴⁹

The placement of American troop contingents in nations likes Uzbekistan and Georgia in the aftermath of the events of 11 Sept, ostensibly to pre-empt the forces promoting terror and instability, reinforced this feeling of vulnerability within the Russian political establishment. American interest in oil and gas pipeline development extending through Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, among other nations in the Caspian Sea region enabled Russia to demand its share in the shape of continued influence on developments in the region to the exclusion of the American efforts at marginalization. This proactive approach motivated the Russian establishment to further reinforce and expand their economic and military relationship with the new nation states in Central Asia as a counterpoise to growing American influence, a scenario which saw growth of Russian military contingents in Central Asian nations like Turkmenistan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. These troop placements were ostensibly to provide a bulwark against the movement of Islamic fundamentalist groups into the region but also implicitly served to stabilize the undemocratic

autocracies; which became the norm for what passed for effective governance in the region

Under the name of war on terror, U.S. had a hidden plan related to the energy policy, especially in Central Asia and in the Gulf. In the words of a Former Deputy Secretary of the US Department of Energy, Edward Morse, 'along with the American campaign against terrorism another battle is being waged perhaps one no less important – the battle for supremacy in the energy sector between the largest oil exporters-Saudi Arabia and Russia'. In 2001, in pursuit of its national interests, Russia began a process of rapprochement with Saudi Arabia as the world's largest oil producer despite having labeled it as a country responsible for international terrorism. What Russia needs to determine is whether it should compete with the Gulf oil producers, that too, Saudi Arabia or, whether it should cooperate with them, and the profit made from supplying to the world energy market particularly the U.S. in competition with these states be worth the loss of influence in the region.

The United States, Britain and Russia have particular interests in the internal stability of the Gulf region nations and in the political reforms in these countries. Its principal concern goes beyond the intricacies of the world energy market to a factor that can destabilize not only Russia but also many of its neighbors. This concern, in the words of Dr. Zlobin, is "the inadmissibility of the expansion of politicized Islam, using terrorism as its method of struggle". With a large Muslim population of its own and several neighboring states with a majority Muslim population, Russia needs to support international policies that combat Muslim radicalism and its international manifestation in the form of terrorism. It has to walk the tightrope of managing an oil policy that will see it optimally exploiting its potential as an oil producer, while preserving political influence in the Gulf region and in international forums in defence of its national interests.¹⁵⁰

Although the USSR had theoretically no need for Middle Eastern petroleum, Soviet interests in the area's hydrocarbons lay in the possibility of preserving its own reserves by exploiting the low-cost resources of the region by denying them to the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) and to Japan in a prelude to ordering a general conventional war, and in contriving interruptions in supply that could be turned to the Soviet advantage by splitting allies from the USA in a divisive tactic to create oil shortages as a means of weakening allied commitments to US-led

security arrangements.¹⁵¹ In addition, according to Maqsdul Hasan Nuri that, of late, Russians are getting wary of the substantial increase in US-Turkish influence in the region and the resultant threat to Russian interests in the Caspian Sea. Strangely enough, the Russians do not follow a coherent and focused policy. Their foreign and defence ministries concentrate on security while those of fuel and energy are focusing on economic interests. Some of these objectives are to dismantle the US position of power in the region; and weaken the re-emergence of OPEC, and finally, strengthen ties with Iran and join the Caspian via pipelines with the Persian Gulf.¹⁵²

Russia assumed the presidency of the Group of Eight (G-8) in 2006, President Vladimir Putin called for redefining the concept of energy security so that it involved not only the security of oil and gas supplies for the consumer, but also the security of sustained demand for the producer. Putin's energy security model further threatens western interests because it replaces the so-called "liberal, open global oil market order" dominated by American companies with a network of long-term agreements and joint ventures with other energy-producing and energy – consuming countries in the developing world, such as China and India.

In 2006, the Russian and Iranian Presidents agreed to coordinate their gas marketing strategies in European and Asian markets. Gazprom signed a memorandum of understanding with the Algerian state company Sonatrach, the second biggest supplier of gas to Europe after Gazprom, to cooperate in upstream asset swaps, joint bidding for assets in third countries, and in the LNO business. In September the Gazprom chief paid the first visit to Qatar, another major gas producer, to discuss cooperation in the field of gas.¹⁵³

Recently, Russia has been the moving spirit behind the idea of a gas OPEC, an organisation of natural gas producing nations. The new body formalized at a meeting of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) in Doha, Qatar, on April 9, 2007. The idea was to unite Russia, Iran and Qatar, which between them account for 60 per cent of global gas reserves, with Algeria, Venezuela and Central Asian gas-exporting countries. Russia has swapped energy assets and developed joint upstream and downstream projects with all of these countries. The idea of gas OPEC has rattled the U.S. and Europe as it would shift the alignment of forces in the energy markets and leave them out in the cold. Russian politicians admitted that the gas OPEC will be called upon, among other things, to offset western efforts to control the energy

markets. In contrast to Europe and the US, India could benefit from the establishment of a gas OPEC. A priority task for the gas cartel would be to carve out gas exports markets to reduce competition among its members. This could lend greater momentum to plans to build the Iran-Pakistan-India (IPI) gas pipeline, which would help Russia avoid clashing with Iran on the European gas markets by sending Iranian gas to Asia. Putin has confirmed Russia's willingness to provide financial and technological resources for the project. Putin has used the knockout combination of Russia's energy resources and arms export potential to project its influence across the world. Moscow defied U.S. efforts to isolate Iran, by supplying \$ 700 million worth of Tor M1 advanced air-defence missile systems to Teheran last year. It was the biggest of several defence contracts between Moscow and Tehran since 2000, when Putin lifted an arms embargo imposed on Iran during Yeltsin's rule. Notwithstanding the nuclear controversy, Iran armed with Russian weapons and pursuing a common energy strategy, may emerge as Russia's strategic partner in West Asia.¹⁵⁴

Russia and Iran share strategic interests in Central Asia, the Caspian and the Caucasus. Putin pointed out during his visit to Iran recently that the two countries had jointly helped end the civil war in Tajikistan in the 1990 and were working to normalize the situation in Afghanistan. Moscow and Tehran are both opposed to western plans to build gas and oil pipelines across Caspian by passing Russia and Iran; both countries insisted at the Caspian Summit that such projects required the consent of all the five littoral states. Russia strongly supported Iran's initiative to set up an economic cooperation organisation of the Caspian nations and volunteered to host the first meeting of the new body in Astrakhan in 2008.

Putin's visit to Teheran strengthened an emerging strategic axis between Russia, Iran and Armenia as a counterbalance in the Caucasus to NATO-aspiring Georgia and Azerbaijan. Putin welcomed Iran's signing of an agreement with Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan on the sidelines of the Caspian Summit to build a railway line along the Caspian, linking Iran with Russia. It will be a part of the North-South Transport Corridor, a joint project of Russia, Iran and India. The Russian railways, the state-owned railway company of Russia, is already involved in a multinational project to build a 350-km railway between the town of Astara on Azerbaijan's border and Kazvin on Iran territory.

Russia's natural gas company, Gazprom, has already invested \$750 million in projects in Iran, and is planning to invest \$1.7 billion in building an oil refinery jointly with Iran in the neighboring Armenia. The plant will process the oil pumped from Tabriz in northern Iran. Iran's Deputy Oil Minister Hossein Noqrekar-Shirazi said that the two sides had discussed further projects involving refineries, pipelines and gas fields in Iran during Putin's visit. Teheran supports Gazprom's possible involvement in the construction of the Iran-Pakistan-India gas pipeline. Another aim of Putin's visit to Tehran was to strengthen bilateral ties and give them a strategic dimension. Reports said that the two countries were discussing 130 economic projects together, worth more than \$100 billion. During Putin's visit, both sides "agreed to increase the two nation's economic and business exchanges to \$200 billion within the next 10 years", the Iranian President's website said. This would mean a 100-fold jump in bilateral trade from the current level of \$2 billion. Putin is reported to have told Ayatollah Khomeini that Russia was ready to "expand ties without limitations" with Iran.

Russia is Iran's main arms and technology supplies, like combat planes, helicopters, diesel submarines, tanks and air defence systems. Teheran has given Moscow a long shopping list of weapon platforms it wants to buy. Russia has agreed to supply engines for Iran's new combat planes, Azarakhsh and Shafaq.

Putin's visit to Iran demonstrated Russia's new assertive foreign policy, which crystallized as the Russian economy bounced back from the crisis of the 1990s. The visit strengthened Russia's relations with Iran, raised its profile in the region, and undermined the U.S. bullying tactics towards Iran.¹⁵⁵ The rising tensions between US and Iran, and the U.S. threats to use military power to strike Iran made Russia issue several stern warnings to the US and its allies against using force in Iran. President Putin in his February speech in Munich, Germany, vowed to challenge Washington's policy of international dictates and unrestrained use of force.¹⁵⁶

Addressing the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) summit at Shanghai in June, 2007, Putin called for the setting up of an SCO energy club. In fact, Russia has come a long way towards forming such a club, having signed long-term oil and gas deals with China, and strategic pacts with Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan for the purchase and joint development of their hydrocarbons.¹⁵⁷ Recently, in May 2007 Russia signed two landmark pacts with Central Asian states to

build natural gas pipelines that would cement Moscow's control over the region's energy resources and thwart western efforts to divert their exports away from Russia. Meeting in Turkmenistan's city of Turkmenbashi on the Caspian Sea, the leaders of Russia, Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan agreed to construct a 1-billion 500-km gas pipeline to export Turkmen gas via Kazakhstan and Russia to Europe. Under a separate agreement signed in Turkmenbashi, Russia, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan agreed to overhaul and expand a soviet-era gas pipeline carrying Central Asian gas through Uzbekistan to Russia. The two proposed pipelines will carry up to 90 billion cubic meters of gas by 2028, Russia's Energy Minister Victor Khristenko said. This is a major success for Russia enabling it to retain control over the bulk of Central Asian gas exports. The deals are also a blow to an alternative plan lobbied by the United States to build a gas pipeline across the Caspian Sea to ship Central Asian gas via Azerbaijan and Georgia to Europe, by passing Russia. Mr. Putin's week-long tour of Central Asia was deliberately timed to coincide with an energy summit in Poland which invited the leaders of Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan to discuss oil and gas routes to Europe around Russia. Russia and Kazakhstan also agreed to expand a pipeline that carries Kazakhstan's oil to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk (see map-5). So far, Russia has been the sole re-exporter of Turkmen gas to the European markets. Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have rich oil and natural gas stocks which the U.S. and European Union were striving to divert through a pipeline linking them with Azerbaijan to bypass Russia.¹⁵⁸

European Union efforts to loosen Russia's energy grip by seeking alternative supplies from Central Asia via the Caucasus suffered a stunning setback. But even before President Vladimir Putin agreed to the deal, expanding his control of Kazakhstan's and Turkmenistan's gas and oil exports, Europe's drive to diversify was running on empty.

Russia supplies about 25% of Europe's gas and a growing proportion of its oil (see map-10). That is increasingly seen as a strategic weakness that could leave the continent vulnerable, to politically motivated energy blackmail. This was the fate that allegedly befell Ukraine and Belarus in 2006. Lithuania is currently under similar pressure after Moscow cut oil deliveries.

Energy security will figure high on the agenda at EU-Russia summit in Samara. A key aim is to induce Moscow to sign up to the energy Charter, a set of rules

covering trade investment and transportation of oil and gas. But experts predict the Kremlin will continue to resist the scheme. Russia is focusing instead on increasing its market dominance from production through to the point of sale, by expanding its investments in Europe (while denying European businesses reciprocal access). The state-controlled energy giant Gazprom now has a stake in 16 of the EU's 27 countries, while the remaining are divided on the question of how to respond, Gazprom is busy maximizing its advantage. "Gazprom already had direct access to end-consumers in three of the biggest EU gas markets: Italy, Germany and France," said Katinka Barysch, in a study published by the Centre for European Reforms. In the UK, it hopes to raise its market share to 10% by the end of the decade. Not content with controlling pipelines, Gazprom is building power plants and gas storage facilities in various EU countries".

Russia's other main tactic is its forging of bilateral deals that undermine a collective pan-European approach. Moscow's most spectacular success was the agreement with Germany on a Baltic pipeline that is to bypass Poland. But Mr. Putin has also dangled the prospect of individual supply and distribution arrangements with Slovakia, Hungary, Bulgaria and a host of other energy-hungry EU members.

Moscow's aggressive, and increasingly successful, attempts to entrench its dominant position have also undercut political and financial support for alternative European supply projects that would bypass Russia. One is the so called Nabucco pipeline to bring gas from the Caspian. Russia also deals with Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and has also raised possibly terminal doubts about the viability of US and European ideas for a Central Asia pipeline. While EU countries are looking for another route of pipeline energy to avoid dependence on Russia as EU foreign ministers agreed a counter offensive recently to intensify energy and other cooperations with Black Sea countries, including new neighbors Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Armenia and Azerbaijan. Acting unilaterally, Poland is leading the efforts to build East European links with Caspian Basin energy producers.¹⁵⁹

After the sudden death of Turkmenistan's long time autocratic ruler Saparmurat Niyazov in December gave the U.S. and the European Union a new chance to push through their strategic plan to build the Nabucco pipeline, which would run from Central Asia through the southern Caucasus¹⁶⁰ and Turkey to Europe, by passing Russia. The U.S will also lobby for the creation of an "Energy NATO" as against

Russia. The idea is to make Europe speak to Russia with one voice and force it to ratify the Energy Charter, which would give western companies free access to Russian energy resources and pipelines. "Energy NATO" would stop European nations from striking bilateral energy deals with Russia and prevent Russian companies from buying into downstream energy projects in Europe. Washington also seeks to block the construction of the Nord Stream gas pipeline, which would bring Russian gas directly to Germany across the Baltic Sea, and scuttle Gazprom's plan to expand the Blue stream gas pipeline – the Russian alternative to the Nabuoco project running from Russia to Turkey across the Black Sea.

In addition, India, China, Japan and South Korea are all looking to benefit from Russia's plans to diversify its energy export routes, which mostly go to Europe today. Moscow plans to increase exports of crude to Asia from 3 to 30 per cent and that of gas from 5 to 25 per cent by 2020.¹⁶¹ As Talmiz Ahmad pointed out that over the next 25 years, the energy requirements of Asia are expected to increase 2 ½ times. By 2020, one-third of the world output, i.e., 1.35 trillion cubic meters will be internationally traded of which 50 per cent will be transported as piped gas and 38 per cent as LNG. Given the rapidly increasing Asian demand and the availability of huge gas reserves in Asia, piped gas and LNG will both be utilized and indeed, will complement each other in the energy-mix of the principal consumers.

The Asian Gas grid envisages the setting up of a series of pipelines that will carry natural gas to various consumption centers in East and South Asia. According to current estimates, the additional pipelines required to be set up would be about 22,500 km., costing about 22 billion dollars. The Asian continent, particularly Russia, the principal Asian consuming countries and the major producing countries of the Gulf are readily able to provide the financial and technological resources for the project.¹⁶²

Further more; the SCO has also undercut the U.S. strategic position in Central Asia. It called on the U.S. to set a timetable for the withdrawal of its forces deployed in the region after 9/11 to support the anti-Taliban campaign in neighboring Afghanistan. It also encouraged Uzbekistan in 2005 to disallow a U.S. air base on its territory.¹⁶³

A confidential North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) report prepared in run-up to its summit in Riga, Latvia, in November, 2007, warned that Russia was out

to set up a gas cartel stretching from Algeria to Iran and central Asia, to use as a political weapon against Europe.

Putin's natural resources nationalism has spurred a global wave of nationalization and consolidation of state control over energy resources from Central Asia to West Asia, from Africa to Latin America. Russian supplies of weapons to energy – producing developing countries, such as Venezuela and Algeria, embolden them to challenge the dominance of the United States. Resources rich countries today control over 70 per cent of global energy resources, while the share of Western energy giants has shrunk to less than 10 per cent. This has thrown the West into a state of panic.

The mounting global energy leverage that is increasingly coming to reside in the hands of Russia and its strategic partners is an irresistible power, literally unequalled in all human history, for it is the power to throttle or even to credibly threaten to strangle the highly industrialized economies of the West”, warns W. Joseph Stroupe, a writer on energy geopolitics. Where has all the hype about the West's victory in the cold war gone? Marshall Goldman, associate director of the Davis center for Russian Studies at Harvard, U.S. claims that the U.S. is defenceless in the face of Russia's energy wealth which has made it more powerful now than at any time in its history. What drives the West especially mad is that its companies can no longer walk into the Russian energy supermarket and pick up assets as they like. Moscow has made it clear that foreign companies will only get access to Russian energy resources if they offer their own assets and technologies in return, and if Russian companies find these assets worth swapping. Explaining Gazprom's decision to develop Stockmen alone, Putin said that foreign companies had failed “to offer adequate assets” in exchange for a stake in the vast Russian field.

To add insult to injury, Putin in October, 2007, approved plans to promote Russia's own crude oil Mix REBCO (Russian Export Brand Crude Oil), which should eventually replace Brent as a pricing benchmark, and to set up the Russian fuel and Energy Exchange where the new mix will be traced in Roubles, rather than in dollars.

A month later, U.S. Senator Richard Lugar urged NATO to intervene to stop Russia from flexing its energy muscles. “The alliance must avow that defending against such attacks using as a weapon is an Article 5 commitment, “the outgoing chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee said on the sidelines of the Riga

summit, referring to the need to invoke the alliance's mutual defence clause. The comprehensive political guidance document adopted at the summit identified "the disruption of the flow of vital resources" among the main risks or challenges for the alliance for the next 10 to 15 years. While the NATO refrained from pointing the finger at Moscow, the U.S. has vowed to take on Russia in 2007. National Intelligence Director, John Negroponte, predicted a further worsening of relations with Moscow in the coming years. He accused Russia of attempting to exploit the leverage that high energy prices have afforded it, increasingly using strong-arm tactics against neighboring countries".

"Russian assertiveness will continue to inject elements of rivalry and antagonism into U.S. dealing with Moscow, particularly U.S. interactions in the former Soviet Union and will dampen U.S. ability to cooperate with Russia on issues ranging from counter-terrorism and non-proliferation to energy and democracy promotion in West Asia", the top U.S. intelligence official said in his annual review of global threats for the Senate Intelligence Committee on January 11, 2007. The statement amounted to be the declaration of a new policy for containment of Russia. U.S. media readily responded to the call; It's time we started thinking of Vladimir Putin's Russia as an enemy of the United States", the Wall Street Journal fumed "... It is because the foreign policy of Russia has become, openly and often gratuitously, hostile to the U.S."

Energy will be the main battle ground in a new cold war the U.S. is going to wage on Russia; and the direction of attack has been already identified. One is Georgia and the other is Ukraine, key transit countries for oil and exports to Europe, which the U.S. will try to put under its control by getting them admitted to NATO, the Baku-Tbilisi Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline, which transports Caspian Sea oil to Turkey, runs across Georgia, while Ukraine is the main transit route for Russian natural gas bound for Europe.¹⁶⁴ In 2006, Washington put Georgia on the fast track for admission to NATO, together with several East European countries that have been waiting for their turn since 2002. The U.S. Senate also voiced readiness "to support efforts by Ukraine to join the alliance even though Ukraine's Prime Minister said his country had no plans to apply."¹⁶⁵

Russia was convinced that it has already occupied the key global position and that it cannot be shifted out of that position no matter how vigorously the US and its

allies may try. Middle East instability is on the rise with no relief in sight. That solidifies Russia's new position, oil-rich Central Asia is moving firmly into alignment with both Russia and China. Europe is absolutely obliged to rely on Russia as regards energy, so is Asia. There is no way out in the near future, for at least a decade or two. Anyway, in that space of time, Russia easily could, if it were obliged by US unilateralism, apply tremendous economic and political pressure to severely damage, or credibly threaten to such damage, to the economies of the West.

The global order is re-dividing into roughly two de facto blocs-one has the US at its core and the other has Russia-China at its core. Energy is the major dividing line between the two blocs. As astronomers say that at the center of a galaxy there exists an energetic black hole that fuels the entire structure and keeps order, and that sometimes, if the black hole at the center weakens, the structure can begin to come apart. If America is likened to the black hole at the center of the American "galaxy" then Russia-China is the black hole at the Center of a new Eurasian "galaxy".¹⁶⁶

From the above evaluation, it emerges that this region has become a battle ground for super powers and also for nearly emerging powers. Afghanistan will be one of the more geo-strategically significant nation for this region as Cheney viewed "the Caspian region is strategically significant" and by 1998, the strategy was becoming clear, to incorporate the inhabitants of the Caspian, Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus (with the exception of Armenia) into a vast US dependency, anchored upon the construction of a massive new oil and gas pipeline infrastructure stretching along the East-West energy corridor that linked Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and ultimately Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.¹⁶⁷ But Afghanistan has become the ground for energy war game between Russia and the US even before 9/11 as Ahmed Rashid wrote that 'the battle of wills between the USA and Russia will dominate future pipeline competition. Russia remains adamant in keeping the USA out of its Central Asian backyard. "We can not help seeing the uproar stirred up in some western countries over the energy resources of the Caspian. Some seek to exclude Russia from the game and undermine its interests. The so called pipeline war in the region is part of this game', Said President Boris Yeltsin in 1998. By keeping the conflict in Afghanistan on the boil Russia keeps the region unstable and has the excuse to maintain a military presence in the Central Asian Republics (CARs).¹⁶⁸

Recently, the US accused Iran for helping the resurgent Taliban forces in Afghanistan.¹⁶⁹ Of course, there is no evidence to prove that Russia has its hand in this job, but it could be viewed that Russia seems to agree with Iran because both Russia and Iran have become close allies and working together to expel U.S. hegemony out of this region. Infact, after US toppled Taliban regime in 2001, Russia also has tried to have the role in Afghan's internal affairs, at least the government that will come to replace Taliban regime should be pro-Russia party/group. After Hamid Karzai, who was picked to head an interim authority in Afghanistan by an UN-sponsored international conference in Bonn, Germany in December 2001, his own security in Kabul was maintained by an International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) of 4,000 to 5,000 troops whose command was rotated among various participating countries.¹⁷⁰ But the Northern Alliance opposes any extensive foreign peace keeping force. Russia believes the Northern Alliance alone is the legitimate government of Afghan, Iran agrees with it to.¹⁷¹ As Gabriel Kolko wrote that 'after 11 Sept, US compelled to rely principally on the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan to provide the ground forces without which the Taliban would not have been driven out of the cities. But before Russian had covertly armed major components of the Northern Alliance after 1996 (many of whose leaders had earlier worked with the Soviets) in the hope it would create a buffer along its borders and prevent Islamic extremism from spreading to the newly independent former Soviet republics. After September 11, they supplied the Northern Alliance with a new infusion of tanks, artillery and other heavy equipment. If the Northern Alliance is oriented to any foreign nation, it is Russia.'¹⁷²

In our opinion, the events of September 11, 2001, led the US to invade Afghanistan to topple (Taliban) Afghan-government hostile to U.S. and set up a new regime which was pro-US and then followed it policy by putting with NATO forces to settle in Afghanistan, could be viewed as a long-term plan to contain Russia and exclude Russia from Central Asia and Caspian oil and natural gas rich region. As Vladimir Radyuhin wrote: "the top U.S. intelligence official said in his annual review of global threats for the Senate Intelligence Committee on January 11, 2007. His statement amounted to the declaration of a new Russian containment policy."¹⁷³

There is no doubt that the US is playing its cards closely riot, by cementing its ties with India and then moving NATO forces into Afghanistan. Siddharth Varadarajan wrote that: the controversy that nuclear negotiations between India and the United States tend to agree wholeheartedly, the nuclear agreement is not simply about energy. The real intention behind friendly gesture towards India came after 9/11 events. As said by Mr. Burns in his article about America's expectations vis-à-vis a future Indian role in Central Asia, "We are working with Delhi to encourage energy rich Central Asian states such as, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan to establish oil and gas trade with Afghanistan, Pakistan and India". He wrote, "Thereby reducing the lure of long term contracts with Iran." What he left unsaid is the expectation now well amplified in American policy documents, that India would help the U.S. take Central Asia away from Russian and Chinese influence under its "Greater Central Asia" and "Regional Energy Market Access Program".¹⁷⁴

The movement of NATO into Afghanistan, after the terrorist attacks on targets in the United States for the first time in history NATO, invoked Article 5 of the treaty, relating to joint defence clause. The US recognized as the aggrieved party did not make use of NATO's support and decided to take an independent action against Afghanistan, freely shaping what it termed as the 'Coalition of the Willing: the anti-terrorist operations started by the U.S. intensified the process of further NATO expansion, at the same time reinforcing the international evolution of the alliance in terms of building new capabilities to meet the new security challenges of the 21st century.

The U.S. made it clear that without a fresh definition of its mission, NATO would not be able to efficiently oppose the new type of threats the U.S. Defence Minister said that if NATO did not transform itself, 'it will not have much to offer the world in the 21st century'. Perhaps it was with this in mind that NATO took command of 5,000 strong International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) in Afghanistan in August 2003.

The new U.S. defence concept articulated in the 2001 Quadrennial Defence Review Report moved away from region-based scenarios to capabilities based planning, and underlined the need for forces that can handle two major conflicts and multiple smaller military operations simultaneously. This shift in strategy moved the NATO focus of defence planning from southwest and northeast Eurasia to the

southern and eastern region of the Eurasian landmass, North Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia.¹⁷⁵ The new US doctrine also calls for transformation and moderation of NATO to meet the new security threats.¹⁷⁶

Notes and References

- ¹ Siddharth Varadarajan, "A Willing Suspension of Disbelief", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 24 April 2007, p.10, See also, Chalmers Johnson, *America's Empire of Base*, available at : <http://www.northstarcompass.org/nsco403/bases.htm>, access on 15 September 2007.
- ² Andrew H. Kydd, *Trust and Mistrust in International Relations* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2005), p. 249.
- ³ The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research (ed.), *Major Powers and their Interests in the Gulf Region*, (UAE: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2004), pp. 5-6.
- ⁴ Siddharth Varadarajan, n.1, p. 10.
According to Mackinder's heartland concept, he made a bold statement regarding the superiority of land power to Sea power. Mackinder revised the Eurocentric vision of history, in favor of the geographer's vision where the pivotal role of Europe would be eclipsed by the ascendancy of the new geographical pivot of history, namely the heartland of the Euro Asia, the main geo-strategic advantage of this imaginary centre of a true world empire, that would be invulnerable to the direct application of sea power, he called 'the world Island'. Thus, in Mackinder's prophetic vision the fate of the future empire of the world would depend on the control of this central core, the "heartland". However, it has to be recognized at the outset that Mackinder had envisioned this invulnerability in a pre-missile technology age. (Mackinder's heartland concept was formulated in the course of a lecture given in January 1904, at the Royal Geographical Society, entitled: the Geographical Pivot of History". See Anita Sengupta, *Russia, China and Multilateralism in Central Asia* (India: Shipra Publication, 2005), p.12.
- ⁵ Gilles Dorronsoro, *Revolution Unending: Afghanistan:1979 to the Present*. (Trans. John King), (London: Hurst Company, 2005), Pp. 317-318.
- ⁶ See for further detail , Sreedhar, "The Taliban Factor in the Ongoing Afghan Civil War", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol. 19, No.10-11, January-February 1997, pp.1463-1494. See also, Talmiz Ahmad, "Gas Pipelines: Drawing Fresh Lines on the Map" in N.S. Sisodia and Ashok K. Behuria (eds), *West Asia in Turmoil: Implications for Global Security* (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007), pp. 159-162.
- ⁷ Siddharth Varadarajan, n.1, p.10, See also, Rizwan Zeb, "USA in Central Asia and the Caucasus (1992-2003", *Regional Studies*, Vol.22, No.1, Winter 2003-04, pp.39-45 .
- ⁸ See for further detail, George Friedman, *America's Secret War Inside the Hidden Worldwide Struggle Between America and its Enemies* (New York: Doubleday, 2004), pp. 233-237.
- ⁹ Sreedhar, n.6, pp. 1463-1494.
- ¹⁰ See, Dominic Lieven, "Empire's Aftermath: a Comparative Perspective", in Sally N. Cummings (Ed.), *Power and Change in Central Asia* (London: Routledge,2002), p.40.
- ¹¹ Anatol Lieven, "The Secret Policemen's Ball: the United States Russia and the International Order after Sept 11", in, *International Affairs*(the Royal Institute of International Affairs), Vol.78, No.2, 2002, available at:

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- <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.CFM?fa=view&id=949&prog=zru&proj=zusr>, access on 25 August 2007.
- ¹² See for further detail, Sreedhar, n.6, pp. 1463-1494.
- ¹³ Vladimir Radyuhin, "Rising Russia", *Frontline*, Vol.24, No.6, 24 March – 6 April 2007, pp.12-13.
- ¹⁴ George B.De Huszar and others, *Soviet Power and Policy* (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell Company, C 1955), pp.474-475.
- ¹⁵ Nisar-ul-Haq, "Afghanistan a Base for Military Warfare", *World Focus*, Vol.24, No.8, 2003, pp. 6-11., See Also, George B.De Huszar and associates, n. 14, pp.474-475.
- ¹⁶ Sreedhar, n. 6, pp. 1463-1494.
- ¹⁷ Aijaz Ahmad, "Imperial Sunset?", *Frontline*, Vol.24, No.6, 24 March – 6 April 2007, pp. 4-5.
- ¹⁸ Poonam Mann, "Central Asia: The Region in Focus Role for India" in Mahavir Singh(ed.) *Asia Annual-2003*, (New Delhi: Shipra Publications, 2003), pp.84-86.
- ¹⁹ Ian Rutledge, *Addicted to Oil: America's Relentless Drive for Energy Security* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2005), pp.102-105.
- ²⁰ George Friedman, n.8, p.51.
- ²¹ Angelo Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan A Modern History* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), pp. 158-161.
- ²² See, *The Energy War*, available at: <http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,918892-1.00.html>, access on 23 August 2007.
- ²³ Ian Rutledge, n.19, pp. 4-6.
- ²⁴ Vijay Kapur, "Afghanistan and Central Asia: Differentiated Challenges and Priorities in the Twenty First Century", *Himalayan and Central Asian Studies*, Vol.8, No.2-3, April – September 2004, pp.13-14.
- ²⁵ Angelo Rasanayagam, n. 21, pp. 158-161.

Although the USA was determined to isolate Iran, Turkmenistan could not afford to do so, as Iran offered the nearest and most accessible outlet to the South and the Sea. Adroitly, Niyazov wooed the USA while seeking Tehran's help in developing road and rail links. In December 1997, the Iranians completed construction of a 119 mile-long gas pipeline between the Korpedzhe gas fields in western Turkmenistan to Kord-Kuy in north eastern Iran. The Turkmen gas that flies through it is consumed in northern Iran. This pipeline is still the only new pipeline built between Central Asia and outside world after nearly a decade of trying.

Niyazov also courted western oil companies to build gas pipelines that would free him from the Russian pipeline network. In April 1992 Turkmenistan, Turkey and Iran agreed to build a gas pipeline to Turkey and on to Europe which would cost US \$205 billion. That pipeline never got built and subsequently saw several variations as the US tried to block any route through Iran. Finally, in February 1999, Turkmenistan signed another agreement, this time with a US consortium, to build a Turkmenistan – Turkey gas pipeline which would go under the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and avoid Iran.

As Niyazov saw his country's economy crumble, he sought alternative export routes, on the drawing boards in 1994 were plans for a 5,000 mile-long oil and gas pipeline eastwards to China that would cost over US \$20 billion, but the project is still only in the feasibility stage. Also in 1994, Bridas the Argentinean oil company which had concession in Turkmenistan, proposed building a gas pipeline that would cross Afghanistan and deliver gas to Pakistan and India. The US Company Unocal, with support from Washington, proposed a similar pipeline in 1995. The battle between the two companies to build this pipeline, which is explored, sucked in the Taliban and the other Afghan warlords. Thus Afghanistan became the fulcrum of the first battle of the new great game.

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- See Ahmed Rashid, *Taliban: Islam, oil and the New Great Game in Central Asia*, London: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 2000, pp.145-152).
- ²⁶ Magsudul Hasan Nuri, "Pipeline Diplomacy in Central Asia: Problems and Prospects", *Regional Studies*, Vol.19. No.1, Winter 2000-01, pp.36-75.
- ²⁷ See , Rizwan Zeb, n.7, pp.39-45 , and Kees Vander Pijl, *Global Rivalries from the Cold War to Iraq* (New Delhi: Vistaar Publications, 2006), pp. 347-350.
- ²⁸ Ian Rutledge, n.19, pp.102-105.
- ²⁹ Vijay Kapur, n.24, pp.13-14, For further detail about oil pipeline rout see Srreedhar, n.6, pp.1463-1494.
- ³⁰ Angelo Rasanayagam, n.21, pp. 158-161.
- ³¹ Rizwan Zeb, n.7, pp. 39-45.
- ³² Srreedhar, n.6, pp.1463-1494.
- ³³ Zbigniew Brzezinski was the former National Security Advisor to President Jimmy Carter See: Ian Rutledge, n.19, pp.102-105.
- ³⁴ Richard Cheney had spent almost all of his adult life in politics. He had entered public life as a relatively minor civil servant in the Nixon Administration, after which he rose through the ranks to serve briefly as president Gerald Ford's White House Chief of Staff from 1975 until the end of his presidency in 1977. He was then elected to the House of Representatives as Republican Congressman for his home state of Wyoming, a position to which he was re-elected five times. Wyoming is an oil – and coal producing state and it likely that Cheney developed his interest in and knowledge of energy matters during his period continuing to raise through the ranks of republican politics and demonstrating indefatigable support for conservative causes, in 1989 he became Secretary for Defence in the Administration of George Bush Sr. See Ian Rutledge, n.19, pp.60-68.
- ³⁵ Ian Rutledge, n.19, pp.102-105.
- ³⁶ Bridas Company is an Argentinean oil company that had become the third largest independent oil company in Latin America: Bridas had no experience in Asia but had extensive experience in discovering, developing and transporting gas through cross – border pipelines to multiple markets in Latin America. In 1991 Bridas took a huge risk by becoming the first Western oil company to bid for leases in Turkmenistan, shunned by other oil companies because it was land-locked, had no legislation to protect investors and outlets except through the Russian system. See Angelo Rasanayagam, n. 21, pp. 158-161.
- ³⁷ Angelo Rasanayagam, n.21, pp. 158-161.
- ³⁸ Ahmad Rashid, n.25, pp. 155-156.
- ³⁹ Angelo Rasanayagam, n.21, pp. 158-161.
- ⁴⁰ Loretta Napoleoni, *Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks* (London: Pluto Press, 2003), P.190.
- ⁴¹ John K. Cooley, *Unholy Wars: Afghanistan, America and International Terrorism* (London: Pluto Press, 2000), pp. 19-68.
- ⁴² Shams-ud-din and Bhaswati Sarkar, *Afghanistan and Central Asia in the New Great Game* (New Delhi: Lancer Books, 2003), pp. 89-90, see also, Sumita Kumar, "The Pakistan's Goals and Strategies in Afghanistan", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.19, No.10-11, January – February 1997, pp.1459-1460, See also: K.B. Usha. *A Wounded Afghanistan: Communism, Fundamentalism and Democracy*, (Forward by Dr. Tulsiram), (India: Shabhi Publications, 2004), pp.227-229.
- ⁴³ Angelo Rasanayagam, n.21, pp. 158-161.
- ⁴⁴ Loretta Napoleoni, n.40, pp. 113-114.
- ⁴⁵ Angelo Rasanayagam, n.21, pp. 158-161.
- ⁴⁶ Patrick Martin, *US Planned War in Afghanistan Long Before September 11*, available at: (<http://www.wsws.org/articles/2001/nov2001/afgh-n20.shtml>) accessed on 25/August/2007.
- ⁴⁷ Actually behind of key memberships of Bush administration was backed by oil and gas interest group, as Ian Rutledge pointed out: the central role in oil in US geo-strategy in the

region is clearly revealed by checking the membership of an innocuous – sounding body called, the US-Azerbaijan Chambers of Commerce. Originally established in 1996, this body was controlled by key members of the US political establishment, along with senior managers from all the major US oil companies. Its Honorary Council of Advisors' consisted of Dick Cheney, Henry Kissinger and Zbigniew Brzezinski, along with former members of Bush Sr.'s Administration, Brent Scowcroft, James Baker and Lloyd Bentsen. Future. Deputy Secretary of State in George W. Bush's Administration, Richard Armitage, was a member of its Board of Directors, while Richard Perle, soon to be chairman of the Defence Policy, Board at the Pentagon, was a member of its Board of Trustees. The US oil industry itself was represented by the executive Vice President of Exxon Mobil Exploration Co., the President of Conoco, the Vice President of UNOCAL International Energy Ventures. The General Manager for International Government Relations of Chevron Texaco, the Vice President of Devon Energy, and the Chairman of Montcrief oil International.

It would be difficult to imagine a more revealing testimony to the key role which the oil interest was now playing in US foreign policy. Here we see key members of the U.S. power elite – Brzezinski, former National Security Advisor to Democrat President Jimmy Carter; Scowcroft a Republican realist from the Bush Sr. Administration; Perle the arch – ideologue of 'neo-conservatism' – all closely collaborating in an enterprise whose sole objective was the incorporation of Caspian oil into the commercial and political orbit of the USA. See Ian Rutledge, n.19, pp. 107-108.

⁴⁸ Strategy of Silk Route is an EU initiative for which the basis had been laid in May 1993, at the time, eight ex-Soviets signed up in Brussels to the Traceca project, which aim at developing transport links across the Caspian region to provide an alternative to the traditional Trade route through Russia. Marginalizing other initiatives to bring the Caspian region into a single transport infrastructure – such as the 1996 'Innovates' program of the European Commission (interstate oil and gas transport to Europe) – the New Silk Road was confirmed in September 1998 with the aim to link China and Mongolia to Europe, with a permanent secretariat set up in Baku, and meant to secure the participating countries independence from Russian dominance. see Vander Pijl, n.27, pp. 351-352.

⁴⁹ During the 1990s Karzai was involved in negotiations with the Taliban regime for the construction of Central Asian gas pipeline from Turkmenistan through Western Afghanistan to Pakistan. At that time he was a top adviser and lobbyist for UNOCAL, the California-based oil company which was negotiating the right to build the pipeline across Afghanistan. During the anti-Soviet jihad, Karzai was a member of the mujahidin. In the early 1990, he was one who contacted with ISI moved to the US where he cooperated with the CIA and the ISI in supporting the Taliban political adventure. See Loretta Napoleoni, n.40, pp.113-114.

⁵⁰ This policy is well known to what extent powerful Multi-National Cooperation (MNC), once their interests are clearly defined, can go to remove all obstacles in their global operations. At times some MNC have not hesitated in deposing regimes and installing favorable regimes in the third world without any compunction whatsoever. One may recall the involvement of U.S. MNC AT&T in the overthrowing of the legitimate regime of Salvador Allende in Chile in the seventies. During the 19th century, oil companies used intrigue and bribery to gain strategic foothold in the emerging oil industries in many countries. Standard oil of the U.S. monopolizes oil transportation networks for its own gains, often by devious methods. See Sreedhar, n.6, pp. 1463-1494.

⁵¹ Zalmay Khalizad was an Afghan born US citizen who served in the Reagan and Bush Sr. Administrations, worked for the Rand Corporation and served as Counselor to Donald Rumsfeld. He had also been a consultant to Unocal Corporation, the large U.S. multinational oil company, and played a part in that company's negotiations with the Taliban to build oil and gas pipelines across Afghanistan, from the Caspian to the – coast of Pakistan, negotiation, which only came to an end when the Clinton Administration

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- launched missiles against Osama Bin Laden's camps in August 1998. See Ian Rutledge, n.19, pp.60-68.
- ⁵² Loretta Napoleoni, n. 40, pp. 191-193.
- ⁵³ Sreedhar, n.6, pp. 1463-1494.
- ⁵⁴ Patrick Martin, n.46.
- ⁵⁵ *Afghanistan war planned months before 9/11 Suicide Air attacks its all about blood money* <http://www.ronse.com/Generu/115/afghanistanwarplanned.htm>, accessed on 27 August 2007.
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- ⁵⁷ Ibid, pp. 159-162. See also: Narsi Ghorban, "The Iran Gas Pipeline to the Indian Subcontinent", in M.Hamid Ansari (ed.), *Iran today Twenty-Five Years after the Islamic Revolution* (New Delhi: Rupa & C. in association with Observer Research Foundation, 2005), pp.261-263.
- ⁵⁸ Siddharth Varadarajan, "This has nothing to do with energy", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 2 May 2007, p.10.
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- ⁶⁰ During President Bill Clinton's administration, the US South Asia policy was concerned with finding the right balance between India and Pakistan but the US stance changed when George W. Bush (junior) took over the presidency and the balance shifted to India. The administration focused on India as a rising power, at the expense of Pakistan who had been a staunch ally against the Soviet Union. Thus, the Bush administration initiated new policy on South Asia based on an 'India only policy' to counter China's influence in the region. In fact, the Bush administration perceived; India as a potential partner in maintaining stability in the South Asian region particularly in fighting Islamic fundamentalism and checking Chinese ambitions; for this purpose, the administration appointed an Assistant Secretary of State solely for India to play a particularly strong role in setting the tone of the administration's relationship with India.
- However, the events of September 11, 2001 changed the United States strategic scenario and Pakistan became once more key regional player and vital strategic ally of the US-led war against terrorism and offered its military bases, airfields, logistic support and intelligence information to America in the planned counter terrorist campaign against Osama bin laden's al-Qaeda network and the Taliban. Once again, Islamabad occupied considerable attention in Washington, mainly because of the belief of US policy makers that the country could be a dangerous centre of terrorists with unpredictable consequences for the surrounding region. Pakistan combines the two major security threats to the United States; weapons of mass destruction and perceived link with terrorism. In the emerging situation, the Bush administration requested congress to withdraw imposed sanctions on Pakistan and India. The Bush administration described several identifiable interests in South Asia; such as preserving the integrity of the Pakistani states, curbing Islamic extremism, containing terrorist activity in Pakistan and Afghanistan, where possible, and preventing a potential dangerous nuclear arms race in South Asia. See A.Z. Hilali, *US-Pakistan Relationship: Soviet invasion of Afghanistan* (England: Ashgate Publishing Limited, 2005), pp.245-246.
- ⁶¹ Amit Baruah, "What the U.S. is doing to Pakistan", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 19 August, 2006, p.11.
- ⁶² Najam Rafique, "NATO's Expanding Role and its Implications for South Asia", *Strategic Studies*, Vol. 24, No.2, Summer 2004, pp.41-57.
- ⁶³ Gaurav Kampani, *Nuclear Watch – Pakistan: the Sorry Affairs of the Islamic Republi*, available at: http://www.nti.org/research/e3_38a.html, accessed on 24 September 2007.

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- ⁶⁵ Saudi Arabia officials mentioned in early 2004, that they were interested in acquiring nuclear capability on lease from China and Pakistan as a counter balance to Iran, See Nobumasa Akiyama, "Dynamics of global – Regional Concerns on Proliferation: The Case of Iran", in N.S. Sisodia and Ashok K. Behuria (ed.), *West Asia in Turmoil: Implications for Global Security* (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007), p.278.
- ⁶⁶ Gaurav Kampani. n.63.
- ⁶⁷ Marian Abisheva, "Threats to Stability in Asia: Special Focus on West Asia", in N.S. Sisodia and Ashok K. Behuria (ed.), *West Asia in Turmoil: Implications for Global Security*, (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007), pp.152-153.
- ⁶⁸ Nirupama Subramanian, "Musharraf Turns to China", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 12 June 2006, p.11.
- ⁶⁹ David Albright, *Securing Pakistan's Nuclear Weapons Complex*, available at: <http://www.isis-online.org/publications/terrorism/stanleypaper.html>, accessed on 24 September 2007. See also: A.Z. Hilali, *US – Pakistan relationship: Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan* (England: Asghat Publishing Limited, 2005), pp.245-246.
- ⁷⁰ Najam Rafique, n.63, pp. 41-57, see also, Luke Hill JDW, "NATO spell out Strategy Against Terrorism", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol.37, No.25, 19 June 2002, p. 5.
- After ending of cold war signaled a new era in Euro-Atlantic security. At the Washington Summit in 1999, the Alliance's Heads of State and Government adopted the strategic concept and decided to streamline the NATO command structure. The new structure was implemented with a view to achieve the end state by 2006. At the strategic level NATO has only commander responsible for all operations, wherever they may be conducted in or beyond Alliance territory; that is SACEUR, the Supreme Alliance Commander in Europe. Beneath SACEUR, the various 2nd and 3rd level headquarters are being re-configured to fit the new structure or, in some cases, stood down altogether. The Alliance Strategic Concept, recognizing the evolving security environment, makes provisions for operations beyond the territory of member states. The dramatic events triggered in September 2001 have proved this theory right and NATO is increasingly engaged well away from its borders. The aim is to keep risks for NATO's member security at distance and contain crises and conflicts to avoid a spill over. (A) to support the strategic concept, (B) to set up for success in the 21st century, (C) to give real force to the need for change, to transform NATO's capabilities; and (D) to become expert at expeditionary operations.
- Indeed, 11 September 2001 triggered a global re-examination of security and a key shift in attitudes world-wide towards terrorism. One of the consequences of all this has been the Alliance's decision to take over the International Security Assistance Force, or ISAF, Operation in Afghanistan. NATO has taken that lead on 11 August 2003. This operation demonstrates NATO's readiness to deploy forces wherever the Alliance decides in order to ensure common security. NATO's mission is to assist the Afghan Transitional Authority in the maintenance of security, thereby assisting the emergence of a united and sovereign country, integrate into the international community.
- NATO Allies have agreed to the progressive expansion of ISAF beyond Kabul in accordance with United Nation's Security Council resolutions. See General Harald Kujat, "Beyond Istanbul" *NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace*, Vol.1, 2004, pp.140-142.
- ⁷¹ Marian Abisheva, n.67, pp. 153-155.
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- ⁷³ Marian Abisheva, n.67, pp. 153-155.
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- ⁸¹ Sten Rynning, *NATO Renewed: The Power and Purpose of Transatlantic Cooperation* (New York: Pulgrave MacMillan, 2005), pp. 134-135. See also, Siddharth Varadarajan, "On Iran, no news is good news for U.S.", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 17 November 2007, p. 13.
- ⁸² Nobumasa Akiyama, "Dynamics of Global – Regional Concerns on Proliferation: The Case of Iran", in N.S. Sisodia and Ashok K. Behuria (ed.), *West Asia in Turmoil: Implications for Global Security*(New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007) p.278.
- ⁸³ Martin Indyk, "US Policy Priorities in the Gulf: Challenges and Choices" in The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research(ed.), *International Interests in the Gulf Region*, (UAE: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, 2004), pp. 103-115.
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- ⁸⁵ Seema Sridhar, "Iran-India Pipeline One Step Forward, Two Steps Back?", *Mainstream*, Vol.43, No.37, 3-Sept 2005, pp. 10-12.
- ⁸⁶ Vladimir Radyuhin, "Preventing Iran from going to Iraq way", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 16 October 2007, p. 10.
- ⁸⁷ Recently such action also happened to Switzerland when Israel and the United States opposed to the multi-billion dollar Iran-Switzerland gas deal on 17 March 2008. This dealing came under attack from an influential U.S. based Jewish interest group. The Anti-Defamation League (ADL) has targeted Switzerland for the deal, under which Iran will supply Europe 5.5 billion cubic metres of gas annually by 2012. The ADL also criticized and blamed Switzerland of supporting terrorism because the deal would strengthen Iran. The deal would provide Iran with additional resources to pursue its nuclear programme and arm anti Israel groups such as the Lebanese Hezbollah. However, Swiss Foreign Ministry denied that they never involved with that accusation and went on to assert that the agreement did not violate law as it " is in full conformity with the existing U.N. sanctions against Iran," as well as the Iran Sanctions Act of the US he said. Besides, at least 10 other countries were party to major energy deals with Iran, including Japan, France and Italy, he said. See Atul Aneja, "Swiss-Iran gas deal under attack", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 11 April 2008, p.16.
- ⁸⁸ Seema Sridhar, n.85, pp. 10-12.
- ⁸⁹ Faisal O. Al-Rfouh, *West Asia Security Policies After 9/11: A Case Study of GCC Countries* in N.S. Sisodia and Ashok K. Behuria (ed.), *West Asia in Turmoil: Implications for Global Security* (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007), pp. 80-81.
- ⁹⁰ Atul Aneja, "Ahmadinejad seeks to win more friends", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 17 May 2007, p.11.
- ⁹¹ Muhammad Tahir, *Iranian Involvement in Afghanistan*, available at <http://www.jamestown.org/terrorism/news/article.php?articleid=2370239>, accessed on 25 August 2007.
- ⁹² Vladimir Radyuhin, n.86, p. 10.
- ⁹³ Atul Aneja, n.90, p.11.
- ⁹⁴ How important is the straits of Hormuz for U.S. we can see from Brent Scowcroft (National Security Adviser,) warned that it would probably be 'easier to defeat Europe at the straits of Hormuz than on the central front. As the Persian Gulf, the sea routes around the Gulf are the arteries through which that lifeblood passes. Moreover, Gulf oil could

- also be used either as an incentive or as a weapon to placate or coerce restive client states, and to procure new clients in strategically important areas of the world. So our view, one day if Iran becomes capable by procuring arms and weapons to control this area, it would bring tragedy to the West. See , A.Z. Hilali, n.60, pp.18-20.
- ⁹⁵ Martin Indyk, n.83, pp. 117-128.
- ⁹⁶ Chintamani Mahaputra, "US Policy toward Afghanistan", *Strategy Analysis*, Vol.19, No.10-11, January-February 1997, PP.1498-1500.
- . In the period immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent emergence of the newly-independent states in 1991, US policy toward Central Asia centered on a security relationship. By 1994 with cooperation through defence doctrine and training to pursue Central Asian countries to enter NATO's Partnership for Peace Program (PFP). Central Asian membership in the NATO PFP served as the main avenue for Western security engagement . . . The US approach to Central Asia was also driven by overarching geopolitical considerations, with an underlying goal of containing the influence of China, Iran and Russia. See Richard Giragasian, "The US Military Engagement in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus: An Overview", *Journal of Slavic Military Studies*, Vol.17, No.1 March 2004, pp. 45-47.
- ⁹⁷ Gulshan Dietl, "Iran and American Wars on its Flanks", in M. Hamid Ansari, n. 57, pp. 252-253.
- ⁹⁸ "Afghanistan", *The Europa World Year Book 2006*, 47th ed. Vol.1, (London: Routledge Taylor Francis Group, 2006), p.451.
- ⁹⁹ Ibid.
- ¹⁰⁰ Muhammad Tahir, n.91.
- ¹⁰¹ Akmal Hussain, "The post 9/11 Security Predicament in West Asia: the Imperatives for Ending External Intervention", in N.S. Sisodia and Ashok K. Behuria (ed.), *West Asia in Turmoil: Implications for Global Security* (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007), p.66 .
- ¹⁰² George Friedman, n.8, pp.246-248.
- ¹⁰³ Aijaz Ahmad, "Imperial Sunset?", *Frontline*, Vol.24, No.6, 24 March – 6 April 2007, pp.9-10.
- ¹⁰⁴ Vladimir Radyuhin, n.86, p. 10,
- ¹⁰⁵ Vladimir Radyuhin, "Friend in Need", *Frontline*, Vol.24, No. 22, 3-16 November 2007, pp.57-59
- ¹⁰⁶ Vladimir Radyuhin, n.86, p. 10.
- ¹⁰⁷ The IRGC was formed immediately after the Islamic Revolution of 1979 and had played a crucial role in the eight-year war with Iraq. It owes its allegiance to the Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. The IRGC today numbers around 130,000 and runs more than a hundred companies involved in a range of activities including building of roads and airports and manufacturing of cars. They have a big stake in the hydrocarbon sector as well. See John Cherian, "Warmongering", *Frontline*, Vol.24, No.22, 3-16 November 2007, pp.54-56.
- ¹⁰⁸ John Cherian, n.107, pp.54-56.
- ¹⁰⁹ As an article in *The Hindu* newspaper an analyst wrote about the effort of U.S. and its ally (Israel) trying to do everything to bring Iran down or at least to make unstable within Iran by whatever means. Recently quoted by M.K. Bhadra Kumar: Turkish intelligence reported that Israeli experts providing training to Kurdish military forces in the autonomous Kurdish region of northern Iraq. Israeli intelligence provides a perfect setting for mounting covert operations inside Iran. The imperative of regime change in Tehran became the core objective of the US and Israeli policy. However, PKK which being long hostile insurgent groups that turn to against Turkey caused many Turkish troops to die. Meanwhile, the PKK cadres freely roam around in northern Iraq. Its leader openly admitted that they received weapons from US. When Turkey as a NATO close ally of U.S. demanded US to stop the activities of PKK in northern Iraq US replied that US are busy to handle with al-Qaeda in Iraq and have not enough forces to manage with PKK in

- northern Iraq. Turkey feels sad that to know terrorist organisation are sheltering behind America and using American arms against Turkey.(M.K. Bhadrakumar, "Turkey's Kurdish Problem: Lessons for India", *The Hindu*, Delhi, 31 October 2007, p. 12).
- ¹¹⁰ Hamid Ansari, "Changing Security Dynamics in West Asia: Implications for the Region and the World" in N.S. Sisodia and Ashok K. Behuria (ed.), *West Asia in Turmoil: Implications for Global Security* (New Delhi: Academic Foundation, 2007), pp. 38-39. For further detail about NATO's doctrine which relate about the security of Middle East, See Luke Hill JDW, "NATO Spells out Strategy Against Terrorism", *Jane's Defence Weekly*, Vol.37, No. 25, 19 June 2002, p. 5.
- ¹¹¹ Anatol Lieven, n.11.
- ¹¹² John J. Mearsheirmer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton Company, 2001), pp. 360-362.
- ¹¹³ Richard Giragasian, n.72, pp. 45-47.
- ¹¹⁴ Ajay Darshah Behera, "The Battle for Kabul: Interplay of Geopolitics and Cold War Logic", *Strategic Analysis*, Vol.19, No.10-11, January-February 1997, pp. 1375-1377.
- ¹¹⁵ Loretta Napoleoni, n.40, pp.189-190.
- ¹¹⁶ Dominic Lieven, "Empire's Aftermath: a Comparative Perspective", in Sally N. Cumming, n.10, p. 40.
- ¹¹⁷ Pallavi Aiyar, "China asserting its place on world stage", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 15 January 2007, p. 10.
- ¹¹⁸ Pallavi Aiyar, "Going Global", *Frontline*, Vol.24, No.1, 13-26 January 2007, pp.53-56.
- ¹¹⁹ The mount of tension between U.S. and China over energy resources in Central Asia did not start after 11 Sept 2001, but it has started since the break up of Soviet Union. As cited by E William Engdahl in *Asia time*: on December 15, 2007 the state-owned China National Petroleum Corp (CNPC) inaugurated an oil pipeline running from Kazakhstan to northwest China. The pipeline will undercut the geopolitical significance of the Washington-backed Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline (see map 8 and 9) which opened this past summer amid big fanfare and support from Washington. (William Engdahl, *China Lays Down Gauntlet in Energy War*, <http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/navo3,CFM?navo3=44361&navo2:43876&navo1=43092>, accessed on 24 August 2007).
- ¹²⁰ P. Stobdan, "China and Central Asia", *World Focus*, Vol.19, No.3, 1998, pp. 12-14.
- ¹²¹ John W. Garver, n.78, pp.288-291.
- ¹²² William Engdahl, *China lays down gauntlet in energy war*, available at: <http://www.uofaweb.ualberta.ca/chinainstitute/navo3,CFM?navo3=44361&navo2:43876&navo1=43092>, accessed on 24 August 2007.
- ¹²³ *Afghanistan war planned months before 9/11 suicide air attacks its all about blood money*, n.55.
- ¹²⁴ John W. Garver, n.78, pp.201-206.
- ¹²⁵ Ibid, pp.293-295.
- ¹²⁶ William Engdahl, n.122.
- ¹²⁷ John W. Garver, n.78, pp.201-206.
- ¹²⁸ Ibid, pp.197-199.
- ¹²⁹ Stephen Sego "World Affairs", *Britanica Book of the Year 2006*, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc, 2006), p. 359.
- ¹³⁰ Pallavi Aiyar, n.117, p. 10.
- ¹³¹ Vijay Prashad, "Cold War Over Oil", *Frontline*, Vol. 24, No.15, 28 July-10 August 2007, pp. 62-65.
- ¹³² John W. Garver, n.78, pp.197-199.
- ¹³³ Siddharth Varadarajan, n.58, p.10.
- ¹³⁴ P. Stobdan, n.120, pp. 12-14.
- ¹³⁵ Michael Dillon, "First base", *World Today*, Vol.58, No.7, 2002, pp. 13-15.
- ¹³⁶ P. Stobdan, n.120, pp. 12-14.
- ¹³⁷ Michael Dillon, n.135, pp.13-15.

- ¹³⁸ Vladimir Radyuhin, "Shanghai Group begins War Games", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 12 August 2007, p. 14.
- ¹³⁹ See Poonam Mann, n.18, pp. 84-86 .
- ¹⁴⁰ *Major Powers and their Interests in the Gulf Region*, n.3, pp.5-6.
- ¹⁴¹ Rizwan Zeb, n.7, pp. 39-45, see also, Kees Vander Pijl, n.27, pp.347-350.
- ¹⁴² Sreedhar, n.6, pp. 1463-1494, See also Anita Sengupta, n.4, pp. 15-19.
- ¹⁴³ Sreedhar, n.6, pp. 1463-1494.
- ¹⁴⁴ Ahmed Rashid, n.25, pp.162-163.
- ¹⁴⁵ Sreedhar, n.6, pp. 1463-1494.
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- ¹⁴⁷ Ibid, pp.179-180.
- ¹⁴⁸ Ibid, pp. 145-152.
- ¹⁴⁹ Vladimir Radyuhin, "Energy war", *Frontline*, Vol.24, No.2, 27 January – 9 February 2007, pp. 59-62.
- ¹⁵⁰ *Major powers and their interests in the Gulf region*, n.3, pp.5-6.
- ¹⁵¹ Naji Abi-Aad and Michel Grenon, *Instability and Conflict in the Middle East: People, Petroleum and Security Threats*, (Britain: MacMillan Press LTD, 1997), p.7.
- ¹⁵² Maqsudul Hasan Nuri, "Pipeline Diplomacy in Central Asia: Problems and Prospects", *Regional Studies* Vol.19, No.1, Winter 2000-01, pp.45-49.
- ¹⁵³ Vladimir Radyuhin, n.149, pp. 59-62.
- ¹⁵⁴ Vladimir Radyuhin, n.13, pp. 12-13.
- ¹⁵⁵ Vladimir Radyuhin, n.104, pp.57-59.
- ¹⁵⁶ Vladimir Radyuhin, n.86, p. 10.
- ¹⁵⁷ Vladimir Radyuhin, n.149, pp. 59-62.
- ¹⁵⁸ Vladimir Radyuhin, "Russia clinches oil pipeline deal", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 13 May 2007, p. 12.
- ¹⁵⁹ Simon Tisdall, *Moscow and EU Battle for Control in Escalating Energy War*, available at: <http://www.guardian.co.uk/columnists/column/0..2082700.00.html>, accessed on 24 August 2007, see also, "Oil pipeline deal signed", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 5 April 1007, p.14.
- ¹⁶⁰ There were reports that once US had played some game in this region to preserve its pipeline interests, Georgia was the first former Soviet state in 2003 where the US orchestrated a "velvet revolution" to install a pro-American regime. With the opening of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline in May 2005, Washington broke Russian monopoly over energy flows from the Caspian and Central Asia. The US is now pushing to deploy troops and aircraft in Azerbaijan and Georgia for pipeline protection". A key oil pipeline linking Azerbaijan and the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiysk runs through Dagestan. An even more strategically important pipeline operated by the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) passes through neighboring Kalmykia a poor Buddhist territory that may be sensitive to instability in Dagestan. The CPC is Russia's main hope for competing with US-sponsored BTC pipeline.
- A large part of Russia's Caspian naval flotilla is based in Dagestan ports. Dagestan also lies on strategic North-South transport route linking India and South-East Asia with Russia and Europe. And because of instability of Islamic rebels Mr. Putin also ordered the strengthening of the border guards along the border with Azerbaijan and Georgia. See Vladimir Radyuhin, "Threat to Russia's hold on Caucasus", *The Hindu*, New Delhi, 1 August 2005, p.11.
- ¹⁶¹ Vladimir Radyuhin, n.149, pp. 59-62.
- ¹⁶² Talmiz Ahmad, n.56, pp. 162-163.
- ¹⁶³ Vladimir Radyuhin, n.13, pp. 12-13.
- ¹⁶⁴ See for further detail of history of BTC pipeline and political rivalries over gas pipeline to Europe at, Kees Vander Pijl, n.27, pp. 351-352.
- ¹⁶⁵ Vladimir Radyuhin, n.149, pp. 59-62.

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- ¹⁶⁶ W. Joseph Stroup, *The Kremlin and the World Energy War*, available at: http://www.atimes.com/atimes/central_Asia/HA10Ag01.html, accessed on 10 June 2006 .
- ¹⁶⁷ Ian Rutledge, n.19, pp. 102-105.
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- ¹⁷⁰ Stephen Sego, "World Affairs", *Britannica Book of the Year 2003*, (Chicago: Encyclopedia Britannica, Inc, 2003), pp. 390-391.
- ¹⁷¹ Gabriel Kolko, *The Age of War: The United States Confronts the World* (New Delhi: Viva Books Private Limited, 2007), pp.112-113.
- ¹⁷² Ibid, pp.121-122.
- ¹⁷³ Vladimir Radyuhin, n.149, pp. 59-62.
- ¹⁷⁴ Siddharth Varadarajan, n.58, p.10.
- ¹⁷⁵ US has tried to place its base in Southern corridor to Central Asia from the beginning after the end of cold war era, after Soviet withdrawal from invasion of Afghanistan and followed with the collapse of Soviet Union. The west showed sign to replace Russia's hegemony in this region by giving credence to Pakistan to play the role and lead the West into this region. As Ajay Darshan Behera wrote that 'stability in Afghanistan was the main variable in this strategy. Domination in Afghanistan was important to it to exercise powerful control over the Southern corridor to Central Asia. This was the only way to enhance Pakistan's geopolitical standing with the west in shaping the future evolution of Central Asia. While Pakistan would get economic and political rewards by creating a regional dependence on Islamabad to ensure safety for traffic-in other words, the international acceptance of Islamabad's hegemony over the Southern approaches to Central Asia and the Western gateway to China.'
- It could quietly fit into American political and strategic objectives in the Central Asian region which provides vantage ground for preventing Russian hegemony in the region, containing Iran and play a balancing role against emerging powers like China. The control over the Pakistan-Afghanistan corridor and creating an opening from the South would be vital for the West in gaining access to the oil and natural gas resources of the region. See Ajay Darshan Behera, n.114, pp.1375-1377.
- ¹⁷⁶ Najam Rafique, n.62, pp. 41-57, see also, Luke Hill JDW, n.70, p.5.

CHAPTER-5

Conclusion

Afghanistan's history is quite unique where its political internal and external affairs were always mired in the projection of regional and super powers. Since ancient times Afghanistan had always been the land of conquest for other powers. With its geography which settled in the heartland it remained as a buffer zone of many former empires. During Cold War time Afghanistan was a buffer zone of ideology war which plunged it into the ground of proxy politics of super powers. When the Cold War ended again it plunged into Civil War which was exploited by regional powers as their vehicle against their rival states. Even in the 21st century the wounds of Afghans who suffered from long history of battles are not yet better. After the event of 11/September 2001 once again Afghanistan became the military base/ground for a super power for hunting down terrorist base/groups with a long term plan to secure military base in order to promote their energy interest.

The US-Afghanistan relations had begun since the pre-World War II period. That time Afghanistan was under British rule and continued Russian expansionist pressure forced Afghanistan to forge close ties with the United States. Afghanistan hoped that making ties with the United States could enable British India and Tsarist Russia not to intimidate it. Since 1921 Afghanistan made the efforts to establish diplomatic relations with the United States but there was no major breakthrough at that time as the U.S. was aware of the fact that Afghanistan was still under Soviet influence. The U.S. also knew about Afghanistan-Soviet treaty of friendship of 1921, in which the two states recognised their mutual independence and agreed not to enter into any political or military accord with a third state. The period 1917-1933 was the period of U.S. hostility toward the Soviet government; as after communist revolution Russia had called for world revolution to destroy the capitalist economic system.

It was only in 1934, after the U.S. recognition of the Soviet Union, the U.S. came to strengthen the political and economic relations with Afghanistan. However, the U.S. yet did not set up diplomatic mission and still continued to deal with Afghanistan through British offices. That time the government of Afghanistan demonstrated its confidence in America by granting a 75 years concession to the Inland Exploration

Company of New York for the development of Afghanistan's presumed petroleum deposits. But the agreement was done without consulting the Soviet Union which led to a quarrel between Afghanistan and Russia over the agreement because Soviet regarded that Afghanistan was still under its influence. However, later the Inland Exploration Company gave up its concession because of fearing possibilities of the outbreak of World War II. After the end of World War II the U.S. helped Afghanistan in importing its Karakul to American market as it got difficulty in finding market to export its Karakul.

However, in 1942 the diplomatic relations between the U.S. and Afghanistan was established at formal level. When the German advance on Stalingrad led to fears that the logistic link through western Iran would be denied to allies, eastern Iran or western Afghanistan were considered as significant locales for an alternate route. The presence of U.S. in Kabul was seen as an essential prerequisite for securing this route. In June 1942, the first U.S. ambassador was dispatched to Afghanistan. It seemed that the geo-strategic significance of Afghanistan was the main reason behind the U.S. decision to forge close relationship with it.

After the end of World War II the U.S. had emerged as the world leader. After World War II the containment of Soviet Union became the hallmark of the U.S. foreign policy. The U.S. had taken over Great Britain's historic policy of curbing Russian expansion in the direction of the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf and the plains of India as it had a key position in any military advance toward the Soviet Union whether from Iran or from Pakistan. The U.S. got interested in Afghanistan more especially because its position was close to Soviet Union border. It was suitable for the post-war western policy of encircling and rolling back communism. After the end of World War II Afghanistan also came to realise that the power of Great Britain as a barrier against Soviet expansion had been replaced by the United States. During 1946-53 Afghanistan tried to maintain balanced relationship with Soviet Union and the United States. Afghanistan refused to join any chain of anti-Soviet alliances forged under American initiative.

During Cold War period the U.S. policy toward Afghanistan remained quite complicated as it needed allies to contain the Soviet Union. The United States and the Soviet Union entered into competition in the field of aid by providing assistance to Afghanistan via loans which focused on aid for communications, infrastructure, education, and agriculture. But the U.S. did not provide any military support to

guarantee Afghanistan's independence while Afghanistan was badly in need to modernize its military equipments. The U.S. did, however, proposed to Afghanistan that if it wished to obtain American arms, it should join the military alliance (the Baghdad Pact) but Afghanistan ignored to do that as Afghanistan was determined to keep a position of non-alignment or neutrality in its relations with the super-powers. Afghanistan felt that the U.S. refused to provide Afghanistan with arms because it believed that such assistance was more likely to be used against Pakistan, as both Afghanistan and Pakistan were having clash over Pushtunistan issue. While the U.S. gave military aid to Afghanistan's neighbours such as Pakistan, Iran, and some other countries such as Greece and Turkey all with the purpose of bringing them into their military alliance which could be an effective containment of the Soviet Union on its southern frontier. This incident made Afghanistan gradually to turn to Soviet Russia for military aid.

In 1978, a military coup put into power the Afghan communist party, which quickly signed treaties with Moscow when a popular rebellion threatened to topple the Afghan pro- communist regime. The U.S. worried that if the Soviet Union invades Afghanistan it could put its fighter bombers close to the oil jugular of the straits of Hormuz and could direct access toward the Indian Ocean from their newly acquired Afghan bases.

There were many events indicating that the Soviet Union was creeping into this region. In 1975 Soviet intelligence-gathering vessels were maintaining a constant surveillance of the straits of Hormuz. Soviet Mig 25 reconnaissance aircraft made a number of flights over Iran. And there were several occasions of troop movements along the Soviet-Iranian border. In 1978, Soviet Union airlifted twenty thousand Cuban troops into Ethiopia, not only to assist its communist government in its war with Somalia, but also to establish military facilities across the Red Sea from Saudi Arabia. Later that year, a pro -Soviet group in south Yemen took power, thereby giving Moscow a beach-head on the Arabian Peninsula. South Yemen soon launched an overt military attack on North Yemen. Terrorists launched operations against Saudi Arabia from South Yemen and guerrillas conducted attack in a border province of Oman and the same year Soviet had signed a friendship treaty with Turkey and some probing for an accommodation with Pakistan.

The U.S. was facing the anger of Arab world which was disappointed with its role over Israel-Palestine issue and the aggressive behaviour of Israel to its Arab

neighbours. In late 1970 Arab world decided to keep distance from the U.S. and tend to accept the role of Soviet Russia instead. This event was a set back to the U.S. effort to portray the Soviet Union as the chief threat to the region and to forge an anti-Soviet alliance with moderate Arab states. The fall of the Shah of Iran led to the collapse of the balance of power in Southwest Asia. These incidents forced the U.S. to create a new security framework and reassert its power and influence in the region. The U.S. also planned to establish its military bases in Middle East. Probably this plan was the seed of the U.S. decision to move its military forces to settle in Afghanistan after the event of 11 September.

To contain Soviet entry into Gulf countries the United States came to realise that Afghanistan's location could be frontier area or buffer zone state of Gulf countries. To suck the Soviet into Vietnamese quagmire therefore, in 1979 the CIA developed a comprehensive plan for a secret war in Afghanistan by giving clandestine support to Muslim guerillas, ranging from indirect financial assistance to the weapon support and encouraging the influx of foreign volunteers from different countries to join with the Mujahedeen forces (Islamic guerilla). In 1989 the pressure of heavy arms that was supported by the United States and its allies to the Muslim guerillas (mujahedeen) caused Soviet Union to withdraw its military from Afghanistan.

However, the United States was aware of the fact that giving military support to these forces of Muslim guerillas (mujahedeen) would soon thereafter turn their fury on the United States. But the United States chose to give military supports to Mujahideen because Islam was a geopolitical reality in the region and the United States was in a difficult situation. At that time American policy makers still focused on the cold war threat of the Soviets communism that is why choosing to arm the Islamic fundamentalists fighting Soviet troops in Afghanistan was more important than worrying about the threats of those Mujahideen. The main goals of the United State at that time was only the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan and if it could not do so at least made Soviet involvement as costly as possible.

After an accord (Geneva Accord in April 1988) was signed between Afghanistan and Pakistan, guaranteeing non-interference and non-intervention in each other's affairs; a similar agreement was signed between the United States and the Soviet Union in what both had agreed on non-intervention in Afghanistan and promised to act as guarantors of the Accord. This Accord paved the way for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan, which was completed in February 1989. But a friendly

pro-Soviet government had remained in power in Kabul after Soviet troops had left. The United States and its allies still continue to support seven parties of Islamic guerrillas to fight jihad and root out Afghan Pro-Soviet government which finally caused to an end of pro-Soviet Afghan regime in 1992.

The withdrawal of Soviet forces and the fall of pro-Soviet Afghan regime in April 1992 put an end to the communist era in Afghanistan. The human tragedy of long traditional ethnic rivalry and its tribal tradition of the regional struggle for influence had come to ensure a power vacuum in Afghanistan once again. It turned to be the ground of civil war of ethnic rivalry within Afghanistan itself. And soon it became the ground of proxy war of regional powers. They exploited the factional rivalry in Afghan civil war as their vehicle to preserve self interest or against rival state. The discovery of large source of energy, oil and gas in the newly emerged Central Asian countries and the Caspian Sea also encouraged outside powers to involve with their favorite factional group in Afghanistan that could preserve its interest. The landlocked Central Asian countries were looking for the alternative of land-bridge to run pipeline for flowing their oil and gas resources to world market. From a geopolitical point of view Afghanistan formed a potential 'land – bridge' for bulk trade or oil and gas pipelines to be constructed from the Central Asian states to markets in Pakistan, India and elsewhere in the world via Karachi or another Pakistani port on the Arabian sea. Afghanistan's territory could also provide Central Asian Countries an access way to world markets and could be an alternate to total dependence upon Russia's monopoly on trade routes. But it depended which government was in place in Kabul, therefore peace and stability in Afghanistan was a prerequisite to run the project of oil pipelines construction.

Since the early 1990s the United States was impelled by the oil lobby to underestimate the consequences of the disintegration of the equilibrium in central Asia. The dismantling of Soviet power was perceived as the beginning of a lucrative period of exploitation, with U.S. oil companies controlling the vast energy fields of the region. These events made Afghanistan an arena in which regional rivals were competing to influence favorite group as stage to preserve its geopolitics and its interest in Afghanistan. While during 1994-1996 the battle of different factional group was heading on collision, Taliban was the factional group that U.S. believed that it could be most suitable government and had the capability to bring stability in Afghanistan so that the desired goal could be achieved. There was no doubt that the

U.S. administration and its oil companies appreciated the development when the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996.

The factional rivalry in Afghan civil war was also fit in the U.S. strategy of containing Iran. Since pro-American regime (Shah) was overthrown by an anti American group in November 1979, Iran posed a frontal challenge to the United States' hegemony in the region. In particular Iran's defeat became the focal to turn factional group rivalries in Afghanistan as anti Shiites. The United States (during Clinton administration) after the Gulf War focused on dual containment policy against Iran and Iraq. The Clinton administration was clearly sympathetic to the Taliban as they were in line with its anti Iran policy, as Taliban forces were supported by many Arab militants most of them were strongly anti-Shiite. They contributed accentuating the common prejudice among Afghan Sunni against the Hazara Shia, which was backed by Iran with the aim to counter the Pushtun Sunni (Taliban) that was supported by the United States, Saudi, and Pakistan. Fight fire with fire was the U.S. reasoning: combat the militant Shi'ism of the Iranians with even greater militancy and violence by some groups which were considered as orthodox Sunni Muslims. From time to time the U.S. has been using the proxy war tactic against Iran. Besides backing factional rivalries in Afghan civil war, to contain Iran the US also used Iranian Kurdish ethnic group against Iran and we could also see during Iran-Iraq war, where the U.S. itself was willing to back radical Sunni Muslims as well as Saudi backed Wahabist movements against pan-Shiites Iran. There was no doubt that why Iran perceived the Taliban as a creation of Pakistan and Saudi Arabia with US support not just to contain the Iranian role in Afghan affairs, but the Taliban were perceived as a 'trap' set up by the U.S., Saudi and Pakistan to drag Iran into war with Afghanistan. A 'conspiracy theory' sought to explain that since the Gulf war of 1991, the U.S. was seeking to lure Iran into some war or the other that would serve as an opportunity to destroy its renovated military machine and further to exhaust its economy, with the over all objective of restoring Iran to its former status as a piece of US strategic chess board.

Apart from political aspect the Taliban was also utilized as a southbound route of the Central Asian oil and gas. A route that would be projected and promoted in line of the Iranian route, certainly the Taliban appeared to serve the U.S. policy of isolating Iran by creating a firmly Sunni buffer on Iran's border and potentially providing security for trade routes and pipelines that would break Iran's monopoly on

Central Asia's southern trade routes. In view of the U.S. determination to block the route through Iran, the Afghanistan-Pakistan corridor could emerge as the only alternative to unleash Central Asian energy potential.

Well behind the scenes of the U.S. backed factional group (Taliban) in Afghan civil war it was also perceived that the U.S. would serve as a bulwark against Russia's influence in the region. After the collapse of Soviet Union the U.S. was still active in the clandestine operations, supporting extremist Islamic group to wage war against Soviet communist or pro-Soviet regime any where around the world especially in the third world countries. The U.S. did some contrary things. It continued to supply arms and training extremist Islamic group (Taliban) in spite knowing well that in future these groups will turn against itself, but the U.S. regarded that the fall of the Soviet empire was more important than the extremism of Taliban. The U.S. also feared of the Russian ambition and determination to control the flow of oil and gas from Central Asian countries. Russian energy policy could also be a part of an overall policy which aims to keep the West out of the Central Asian states preserving it under an exclusively Russian sphere of influence. Russia also had supported a factional group that would deny to the U.S. to get foothold in Afghanistan's affairs. As President Boris Yeltsin said in 1998, by keeping the conflict in Afghanistan on the boil Russia kept the region unstable and has the excuse to maintain a military presence in the Central Asian States (CASS). As Russia feared that if Afghanistan falls under the control of extremist Islamic party (Taliban) which was sympathetic to Islamic insurgents in Central Asia and Chechnya, Afghanistan could be the place for prop up of this insurgent group. During the civil war (1992-97) between the neo-communist government and array of Islamist forces devastated the country of Tajikistan, especially Islamist fighter in Chechnya Russia found that the groups of this Islamic movement had link with Taliban. It was in the interest of Iran and Russia to keep the region unstable by arming the anti-Taliban alliance. Russia also reportedly had a hand in backing northern alliance when Taliban forces assaulted on the Shias of Hazara as they saw that Pakistan interference in Afghanistan through the Taliban provided an opportunity for American influence in the region. Russia and Iran were working together in supporting military supplies to northern forces. But eventually in 1996 Taliban could defeat its rival group and brought Kabul under its control.

However, the U.S. policy of making Taliban strong appeared broken down shortly after the seizure of Kabul. The U.S. found that Taliban had given hospitality to

the Saudi billionaire Osama Bin Laden, who was suspected by US agencies of having financed anti-American outrages, such as the bombing of a barracks in Saudi Arabia, in which US military personnel were killed. In addition it found that Bin Laden had been a significant source of funding to Taliban, and did not lessen the American mortification given Washington's strong stance against sponsors of terrorism. Indeed the U.S. was not so happy with such type of extreme Islamist group to be the Afghanistan's ruler. It could be the beginning of an integral part of the U.S. design that the Mujahideen (Taliban was a factional group of Mujahideen) could not form their own government after the eviction of the Soviets troops and pro-Soviet Afghan regime. The process also tried to moderate the Islamic tone of the Afghan resistance so that the government which would come to rule Afghanistan after the withdrawal of pro-Soviet regime would not be as extreme as that of the anti-American Ayatollah of Iran. The Taliban was suitable and had capability to bring stability to Afghanistan. Taliban was also serving the actual major U.S. interest, succeeded in evicting factional group of the Moscow-Kabul-Tehran nexus under the Rabbani - Massoud government in Kabul and eviction of the pro-Iranian warlords controlling Western Afghanistan. Even after the capture of Kabul in September 1996 the Taliban showed no signs at all of any internal disunity or disarray. The unity of their political and military command kept getting stronger day by day. Besides, their success in bringing peace and order to the territory under their control attracted volunteers from other factions including even the former communists. All these factors enabled Taliban to establish a durable government in the country.

During 1996-2001 the anti-Taliban became major U.S. foreign policy thrust, applying various modes of coercion and sanctions to pressurize Taliban into political subordination. The U.S. needed an Afghan government that is multi-ethnic, broad-based and observes international norms of behaviours especially which does not suppress women rights. But the actual split between the U.S. and Taliban was precipitated more by the presence of radical groups which Taliban had inherited the networks and training camps which had been established in the 1980s when collaboration between Islamic movements and the Afghan parties had been actively encouraged by the U.S. on Afghanistan soil. The secret development of Islamic radical camp was existed in Afghanistan following the defeat of the Soviets in Afghanistan in 1989. Afghan veteran (Mujahideen) saw the fall of the Soviet Union as a sign of total victory. They ignored the other international and domestic issues that

contributed to the collapse of the Soviet Union, in the mind of the Mujahideen it fell by the hand of God. The Soviet retreat was a sign of God's power, and if God had brought down the Soviet Union through the work of the Mujahideen, other evil nations were doomed to destruction. The next global primary targets of the Mujahideen were Israel, the United States and its interest which exist around the world. They regarded that the U.S. was most oppressive country in the world.

In the early 1990s after the defeat of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan Bin Laden and his Afghan veteran (Mujahideen) friends returned to Saudi and then they came against Saudi regime by branding the Saudi regime as the great hypocrites as Saudi Royal family had allowed the United States to use holy ground for its war against Iraq. Bin Laden was also against the U.S. for maintaining such a regime and enabling Israel to maintain its occupation of Jerusalem (Islam third holiest city after Medina and Mecca) and its brutal suppression of Palestinian resistance. Consequently, he was stripped his citizenship by Saudi authorities and he first moved to Sudan but, by 1996, he had returned to Afghanistan again where at that time Kabul was already under Taliban's control. From here Bin Laden forged an organic alliance with Mullah Mohammad Omar, to build up its Al-Qaeda base. While Bin Laden provided the Taliban with money and Arab fighters and the Taliban giving the Saudi dissident and his supporter's sanctuary and all the basic support that they needed to set up terrorist training camps and expand Al-Qaeda into a trans-national network. This Islamist extremist from around the world including North America, Europe, Africa, the Middle East, and Central, South and South East Asia. They continued using Afghanistan as a training ground and base of operations for their world wide terrorist activities. The Taliban, which controlled most Afghan territory, permitted the operation of training and indoctrination facilities for non-Afghans and provided logistic support to members of various terrorist organisations. From Al-Qaeda base in Afghanistan in 1998, Bin Laden announced the creation of a new alliance of terrorist organisations, the international Islamic front for jihad against the Jews and crusaders, its interest which exists around the world, its allies and regimes, including moderate Muslim pro-western governments.

Since the defeated of the Soviet Union in Afghanistan in 1989, and the returning of Afghan veteran (Mujahideen) to different countries around the world, the United States had gradually been under the attack of terrorist group several time whether in its homeland itself or in foreign countries and whether on its military and its civilian.

The attacks happened more frequently especially in Gulf countries and Africa. The mount of tension with several incidents of terrorist attacks on the United States till US embassies in Nairobi and of the Dar-es-salam, Tanzania was bombed in 1998, the United States alleged that Bin Laden was mastermind behind the scène. The United States demanded the Taliban to hand over Bin Laden to appropriate authorities but the Taliban ignored to do so. In November 1999 the United Nations imposed economic sanctions on Afghanistan in response to the Taliban's refusal to hand over Bin Laden. The tension of the US-Afghan split over Bin Laden's extradition issue was going on till terrorists strike in the United States on 11 September 2001, in which about 5000 people were killed. This incident confirmed that the U.S. homeland itself was vulnerable to the consequences of its foreign policies and that determined enemies could attack and inflict horrendous damage upon U.S. cities. Terrorism replaced communism as the source of fear and loathing the war the United States has been fighting abroad since 1947 had finally reached its shores.

The event of 11 September gave the U.S. a pretext to attack Afghanistan, root out Al-Qaeda base, replace hostile regime with pro-U.S. regime and set up its military base there. Such movement was perceived that there must be something that was covered by war on terror. It was not possible to plan and execute this policy within short time just after this event but it was happening since the beginning of the end of cold war. The event of 11 September 2001 in United States and the resulting conflict in Afghanistan signified not only the beginning of new epoch in world politics, but also a new stage in the struggle for influence in Central Asia. This event has involved the United States deeply in this region which was previously treated as marginal to core American interests. The U.S. policy focused on the energy security which was driven by a bitter experience where after the major disruption in oil supplies that occurred twice in the last quarter of the twentieth century. The Arab's oil embargo of 1973 and the Iranian upheaval in 1979, the risks of overdependence on energy resources from an unstable and politically volatile region were driven home once again by Saddam Hussein's invasion of Kuwait in 1990. In addition the oil reserves of the Persian Gulf countries are not inexhaustible as the current levels of production they are estimated to last up to the end of twenty first century at best. As Carter Said: "the U.S. will become perilously dependent on increasingly costly imported oil we could and anger our freedom as a sovereign nation to act in foreign affairs and we

would constantly live in fear of embargoes.” There was no doubt during Carter administration he has proposed a broad national energy policy.

The gaining independence of Central Asian countries from Soviet Union and following with the discovery of the huge energy resources in this region and Caspian Sea made the western to believe that it could make the region as the Persian Gulf of next century. It also could serve as a replacement once the oil reserves in the gulf start depleting seriously by the middle of the next century. It is in this context that Central Asia is again emerging as a murky battleground among big powers. The agenda is being set by geopolitics and oil. The plan of construction of a massive new oil and gas pipeline infrastructure stretching along an East-West energy corridor that linked Turkey, Georgia, Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and ultimately Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

One of the key concerns for the American policymakers has been how to secure access to the oil and natural gas reserves in the first half of the 21st century, to establish friendly relations with the leaders of the Central Asian republics controlling the oil and gas resources and to secure alternative pipeline routes to world markets. The landlocked nature of the Central Asian states creates obstacles to proposals for creating new alternative routes. Afghanistan’s location could provide alternate route for energy pipeline to the world market through Pakistani or Indian port. During Afghanistan’s civil war the United States saw Taliban as suitable factional group that would bring stability to Afghanistan. But unfortunately Taliban which captured Kabul in 1996 turned to fire the United States’ hope as both plunged into split over extradition of US wanted Al-Qaeda leader Osama Bin Laden till 2001. The events of 11 September provided opportunity to the United States to replace Taliban regime with pro-US government so that the project of running oil and gas pipeline from Caspian Sea and Central Asia to southward (Afghanistan-Pakistan corridor or could beyond to India’s port) would be easier.

The movement of the United States and NATO forces into Afghanistan after 11 September also was perceived that the U.S. setting up its military base there as a long term plan to monitor or secure the future threat of nuclear power of Pakistan. Nuclear issue is a factor which has influenced the course of international politics and diplomacy since the end of Cold War. The west has feared the threat which comes from nuclear proliferation by a number of third world countries, including the South Asian neighbors India and Pakistan. The U.S. perceives that the spread of nuclear

technology know-how and weapon capability to these countries would pose a threat to its own security and the world. The growing instability in Pakistan, where Islamist forces pose challenge to Pakistan Government, is also cause of concern. If Pakistan's government is captured by some party which opposes the U.S. and nuclear arsenal fall in this group's hand or some group which has sympathy with Al-Qaeda or Taliban it will be danger to the U.S. interests in this region. In addition with the loss of Pakistan's government control over nuclear proliferation of its scientist Abdul Qadir khan it could be sold to Iran, Libya or Al-Qaeda group. So what will happen if such lethal weapons fall in the hand of a U.S. enemy? That is the real worry of the U.S. today.

From time to time there has been suggestion that the U.S. want to be in a position to secure these nuclear weapons. The United States was likely to go in position to tackle any authorized proliferation in Pakistan. After 11 September events the United States also had persuaded western defence allies to agree to include India and Pakistan in the NATO's Partnership for Peace Programme (PFP) and also planed to take control of several international military peace keeping operations under the UN mandate. Perhaps with the movement of NATO forces into Afghanistan after the terrorist attacks on the United States NATO invoked article 5 of the treaty relating to joint defence clause which was recognized by the U.S. as a coalition of the willing. The anti-terrorist operations started by the U.S. intensified the process of further NATO expansion, at the same time reinforcing the international evolution of the alliance in terms of building new capabilities to meet new security challenges of the 21st century. The United States is pushing NATO to deliver on an ambitious plan to extend its peace keeping presence beyond Afghanistan and created links with American led military operations in the South, in effort to rout the remnants of Taliban and Al-Qaeda.

The movement of U.S. military forces in Afghanistan after 11 September is a part of the so called project that is the Bigger Central Asia. This project was started slowly in period immediately following the collapse of the Soviet Union which led to emergence of newly independent states in 1991. The core of this plan is to bring together Afghanistan and the Central Asian Republics in a single military strategic and geopolitical whole, making stabilization of the territory and bring them under dominant influence of U.S. and possibly include some other neighbouring regions. This project proposes implementation of a number of organizational-technical and

diplomatic measures to realize the American strategy. To strengthen the effective United States' role in the region it is necessary to strengthen the NATO role. Perhaps with the presence of large number of U.S. and NATO forces in Afghanistan could be a U.S. instrument to coordinate and influence regional policies on continuing basis.

The movement of U.S. and NATO's forces in Afghanistan after 11 September was also perceived as a long term plan to contain Iran, and enhancing security in the Gulf and the Middle East. The United States is focusing on building its stronger military than ever that can deter war, project power and fight in defence of American interests in different field. This project would replace the cold war tactics which the United States focused on containment policy. During Afghan's civil war the United States used containment policy and proxy war tactics to threaten Iran as mentioned above. Since Iran revolution and overthrew of pro-US regime (Shah) in 1978, up to now Iran has disturbed the strategic balance in West Asia, and has been an obstacle to American's hegemony in the region. Various matters make the United States worry about the behaviour of Iran. Such as, it has been trying to get nuclear weapons which could create imbalance in this region. In addition, Iran has been backing Islamic groups (Hizbullah and Hamas) in this region to counter the aggressive Israeli behaviour toward Palestinians and some time Lebanon. Iran was perceived by U.S. as harmful to the political and economic interests that some of the Central Asian states have developed with Iran as Iran could provide alternate route for Central Asian countries to access the sea. They regarded that Iran is better route through which its gas and oil could be exported to world markets through Iran port. Moreover, the United States is more concerned about Iran playing vital role in its Iran-Pakistan-India pipeline (IPI) project to supply its energy resources to South Asia and probably would extend beyond to China. Iran and Russia are also playing vital role over energy of Caspian. Both of them are against the presence of outside powers in the region and more concerned with preventing the U.S. from straddling the Caspian and the energy flow from the region.

The United States worry is also about security strategy of oil flow in the Arabian Gulf water that is the Strait of Hormuz sea lanes through which the bulk of the global oil supply pass could be blocked by Iran one day if U.S. and Iran enter into serious conflict. The United States has been trying to do everything to prevent Iran from gaining nuclear weapons and dominating the region. Therefore the question of the United States setting up its military base in Afghanistan after 11 September was likely

to be a long term plan to contain Iran and preparing possibly to invade Iran or possibly U.S. would use forces to manage with Iran if the situation come to explode. Afghanistan which content with large of U.S. military forces could be viewed as apart of long term plan to circle Iran.

The United States is interested in Afghanistan particularly after 11 September in order to contain China. The clue of U.S. planning to contain China has begun after the end of cold war. Although the Cold War has gone but the basic structure of the international system did not change with the end of Cold War. From the decade 1991-2000 the security competition among the great powers was not obsolete, either in Europe or in Northeast Asia. The rise of China is the most dangerous threat to the United States in the early twenty first century. Although, Russia just was defeated from long Cold War but still trying to back China to be a super power state to counter balance the U.S. in this area. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and following with the emergence of newly-independent states (Central Asia) in 1991, the United States started creeping into this region with the objective to contain China. The U.S. policy focused on relationship with Central Asian countries. It was also perceived as a plan to quit China out of this region, through defence co-operation of 1994, with doctrine and training to pursue Central Asian countries to enter NATO Partnership for Peace Programme (PFP). Central Asian membership in the NATO PFP served as the main avenue for western security engagement. The U.S. approach to Central Asia was also driven by overarching geopolitical considerations, with an underlying goal of containing the influence of China, Iran, and Russia.

The tremendous growth in industry makes China aggressive in looking for energy resource to fuel its need. China came to replace U.S.'s import market in areas such as Iran and Africa. Some Arab countries started looking east over their oil export market, especially in Central Asia and Caspian Sea China had made agreement to import energy from this region through its pipeline to west of China. Recently China signed an energy agreement with Iran in strategic energy cooperation which involved constructing an oil pipeline from Iran to the Caspian Sea, from there to link up with the planned pipeline from China into Kazakhstan. China also planned to build train railway to connect western China-Pakistan-Iran so that China could transport energy from Iran by land. As China has close boundary with Central Asian countries it makes China easy to transport whether by railway linkage or Pipeline. China also revived the

ancient Great Silk Route which would open up China's northern land border for direct links with Europe and the Middle East via Central Asia.

The most important U.S. concern about China is its key role in developing the lethal weapons and civilian nuclear project of Iran. China-Iran cooperation threatened to diminish the military advantages the U.S. enjoyed vis-à-vis Iran and increased Iran's ability to threaten the Sea-lanes and oil supplying states of the Persian Gulf. This conflict between China and U.S. was manifested in the areas of nuclear energy, guided and ballistic missiles, and dual use goods relevant to production of chemical or advanced conventional weapons. China regarded that Iran could play key role to counter U.S. hegemony in this region. Such behaviour made U.S. aware about China's role in this region.

Therefore, there was little doubt about the movement of the U.S. and NATO forces into Afghanistan after the event of 11 September. It seemed the U.S. centered on its security establishment and focused on the alleged threats from major rival states notably China and Russia. Moreover, the U.S. presence in this region could lock out China from the energy business as the U.S. feared that China could assist the Central Asian Republics in setting up their own oil companies.

After 11 September, 2001, behind or beyond war on terror U.S. sought to reassert its own overt influence on global geopolitical developments with a view to ensuring its own security. One of the major U.S. foreign policy goals after 11 September was to replace its influence in newly independent nations comprising the commonwealth of independent states (CIS) or Central Asia. The U.S. would maintain the new world order by rooting out and limiting Moscow's influence in this region.

As Russia has a large reserved energy resources it can play a key role in European market by selling its energy to EU market while using its energy resources as a weapon against U.S. hegemony in Europe. Russia's attempt to control the flow of oil and gas from Caspian Sea and Central Asian countries has been viewed in the west as an attempt by the Russian security establishment to impose a single direction for the pipelines via north Russian territory. This would give Russia tremendous control over the flow of oil and gas to western markets and will make the west vulnerable to Russia's political whims. Russian energy policy could also be part of an overall policy which aims to keep the west out of Central Asian countries and preserving it under an exclusively Russian sphere of influence. Russia tried to establish monopoly over energy resources of this region and dismantle U.S. power position in the region.

Therefore, denying Russia the right to influence the regional economy and politics seemed to be the major concern of the United States in the 21st century. In addition the commitment to multiple pipelines was also perceived as the continuation of the policy of denying Russia any significant role in the region, such as U.S. signing of protocol on the construction of the Baku-Ceyhan pipeline for oil. The U.S. also attempted to assure Georgia that any oil shipped out of the Caspian through its ports should go in part to Ukraine to alleviate its energy dependence on Russia. The scrambling over energy resources in Central Asia and Caspian Sea once again made Afghanistan a proxy war ground. The U.S. was looking for the way to make Afghanistan as a land-bridge to build pipeline route from Central Asia to world market through Afghanistan to Pakistan's port or to India's market. This development took place after few years of the end of cold war and the disintegration of Soviet Union. Once when Afghanistan plunged into civil war both the United States and Russia used proxy war tactics to back favorite factional group which could preserve their interest. While the battling of various factional groups in Afghanistan was heading on, that time a factional group (Taliban) was in the line of US's interest but unfortunately the Taliban came to split with the United States over the issue of terrorism. Therefore, the U.S. invaded Afghanistan after 11 September to replace hostile regime with a pro-U.S. regime. It was perceived as a long term plan to secure oil pipeline route or at least set up the regime which would make the U.S. goal easier and deny any Russia's influence in this region. Russia after the event of 11 September had given a green signal to U.S. of northern alliance support to hunt down Taliban. The northern alliance was Russia's favorite factional group and was considered suitable to be Afghan's ruler. Iran also agreed with Russia, as both of them had been trying to restrain the U.S. to step its foothold in this region.

Recently Russia has been moving spirit behind the idea of a gas OPEC - an organisation of natural gas producing nations. The new body was formalized at a meeting of the Gas Exporting Countries Forum (GECF) in Doha, Qatar, on 9 April 2007. It will unite Russia, Iran and Qatar, which account for 60 per cent of global gas reserve, with Algeria, Venezuela and Central Asian gas exporting countries. Russia has swapped energy assets and developed joint upstream and downstream projects with all of these countries. The idea of a gas OPEC has rattled the U.S and Europe as it would shift the alignment of forces in the energy markets and leave them out in the cold. Russia believed that the gas OPEC could offset Western efforts to control the

energy markets. Russia is using energy resources and arms export potentially to project its influence across the world. Behind Russia's political objective to control Middle East petroleum is to deny to the members of the NATO and to Japan in a prelude to ordering a general conventional war, and in contriving interruptions in supply that could be turned to the Soviet advantage by splitting allies from the United States in a divisive tactic to create oil shortages as a means of weakening allied commitments to U.S. led security arrangements.

Apart from this recently Russia defied U.S. efforts to isolate Iran, by supplying \$ 700 million worth of Torm 1 advanced air defence missile systems to Tehran last year (2006). It was the biggest of several defence contracts between Moscow and Tehran since 2000. Iran armed with Russian weapons and pursuing a common energy strategy may emerge as Russia's strategic partner in West Asia. Russia also supported Iran to build a railway line along the Caspian linking Iran with Russia. It will be part of the north-south transport corridor, a joint project of Russia, Iran and India. The Russian railway, the state owned railway company of Russia, was already involved in a multinational project.

Recently world has witnessed rising tension between U.S. and Iran over nuclear weapon issue. The U.S. has also threatened to use military strike against Iran. In response Russia issued several stern warnings to the U.S and its allies against using forces in Iran and Russia vowed to challenge the U.S. policy of international dictates and unrestrained use of forces.

Thus the U.S. military intervention in Afghanistan after September 2001 attack on the World Trade Centre was probably a part of a long-term planning to ensure its presence in this region to contain Iran, Russia, India, and China. Afghanistan was well-known base of containment and buffer state for former powers. Afghanistan settles in the world's heart land and has its borders on the north with the Soviet Union, (now Central Asian countries) on the west with Iran on the east and south with Pakistan and on the east with China (Sinkiang). In view of its geo-strategic significance Afghanistan would once again become significant for the U.S. strategy to control this region. As Nisar-ul-Haq, wrote: "Afghanistan has become a symbol of monumental tragedy of geography. Its location has been the cause of misery for its people. Afghanistan lies in the region between the seats of historical empires in India, Persia and Central Asia. It has been a traditional invasion route for the subcontinent. It has been on the path of numerous invaders since ancient times." During Cold War

time Afghanistan with the U.S. larger strategic interests created the ground for an emerging cold war (cold war era). This time it will not be over ideology but over economic interests. Unfortunately Afghanistan will once again become the battle ground for the emerging resources wars with the emergence of giant energy producers and consumers. Michael Klave calls it “energo - fascism” in which the Pentagon has increasingly become a global oil protection service.

Annax-1

Estimates of Recoverable Oil and Gas Resources in the Caspian Region

	Proven Oil	Possible Oil	Total	Proven Gas	Possible Gas
	Billion Barrels	Billion Barrels		Trillion Cubic Meters	Trillion Cubic Meters
Azerbaijan	3.6	27.0	31.0	0.3	1.0
Kazakhstan	10.0	85.0	95.0	1.5	2.5
Turkmenistan	1.5	32.0	33.5	4.4	4.5
Uzbekistan	0.2	1.0	1.2	2.1	1.0
Russia	0.2	5.0	5.0	NA	NA
Iran	NA	12.0	12.0	0	0.3
Total	15.6	163.0	178.0	8.3	9.3

Source: US Department of State, Caspian Region Energy Development Report (As Required by HR 3610), undated report attached to letter from Barbara Larkin, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, to Senator Robert Bynd, April 15, 1997, p.3.

Adapted from: Rezwan Zeb, "USA in Central Asia and the Caucasus (1992-2003), *Regional Studies*, Vol.22, No.1, Winter 2003-04, p.65.

Annax-2

Current and Future Pipelines in the Greater Caspian Region


Name	Type	Route	Capacity (Barrels day)	Length	Status
AIOC Early Oil (South-North)	Oil	Balal Novorossiisk via Grozny	120,000+	1,000 mi	Russian side inoperative
AIOU Early Oil (East-West)	Oil	Baku-Supsa via Tbilisi	120,000+	550 mi	Under construction
AIOC Main export pipeline (MEP)	Oil	Undecided, preferable via Turkey	1,000,000	2,000+mi	Decision pending
Caspian pipeline Consortium (CPC)	Oil	Kazakstan/Tengiz- Novorossiisk	1,340,000	1 500 mi	Contracts signed
Turkministan- Afghanistan- Pakistan pipelines	Gas Oil	Doaletabad gas field to central Pakistan Chardzhou, Turkmenistan to Gwadar, Pakistan	2 billion cubic feet/day 1,000,000	872 mi 800+mi	The civil war in Afghanistan is stalling construction
Kazakstan-China	Oil	Western Kazakstan to China	TBA	Approx 3,700 mi	Feasibility study pending
Turkmenistan- China	Oil	Chardzhou to China	TBA	Approx 3,700 mi	Feasibility study pending
Central Asia- Turkey	Gas	Kazakstan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan	TBA	Approx 1,300 mi	Pending decision on the status of the Caspian Sea
Iran-Turkey	Gas	Northern Iran to eastern Turkey	10 bcm/yr over 23 years	600 mi	Contract signed, financing unclear

Source US Department of State, Caspian Region Energy Development Report (As Required by HR 3610), undated report attached to letter from Barbara Larkin, Assistant Secretary for Legislative Affairs, to Senator Robert Bynd, April 15, 1997, p 3

Adapted from Rezwan Zeb, "USA in Central Asia and the Caucasus (1992-2003), *Regional Studies*, Vol 22, No 1, Winter 2003-04, p 65

MAP-1


Projected oil lines through Afghanistan



Adapted from Narendra Taneja, "The Fire Down Below" *Out Look*, Vol.XLI, No 42, 29 October 2001, pp 57

MAP-2


Proposed Pipelines from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan-Pakistan to India and Arabian Sea.



Adapted from: William Malay, "The Perils of Pipelines", *World Today*, Vol.52, No.8-9, 1998, p.213.

MAP-3


Gas and oil pipelines in Central Asia and the Caspian



Adapted from: Angelo Rasanayagam, *Afghanistan: A Modern History*, (London: I.B. Tauris, 2003), pp.4-5.

MAP-4

Figure of Energy Key in the new Asian Architecture




Adapted from: Siddarth Varadarajan, "Energy Key in the New Asian Architecture" *The Hindu*, 25 January 2006, p.11

MAP-5

The contesting pipeline projects


CONTESTING PIPELINE PROJECTS



Adapted from: "Maqsudul Hasan, Pipeline Diplomacy in Central Asia: Problem and Prospects", *Regional Studies*, Vol.19, No.1, Winter 2000-01, p.71

MAP-6

Oil and Natural Gas Export Infrastructure in Central Asia and the Caucasus



Adapted from: "Rizwan Zeb, USA in Central Asia and the Caucasus (1992-2003)", *Regional Studies*, Vol.22, No.1, Winter 2003-04, p.67.

MAP-7

Figure China's Southwest Corridor to the Sea





FIGURE 10-1 China's Southwest Corridor to the Sea

Adapted from: John W. Garver, *China and Iran Ancient Partners in a post-Imperial World*, Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2006, p.290

MAP-8


Energy Pipeline Project- from Central Asia to China



Adapted from: F William Engdahl, "China Lays Down Gauntlet in Energy War", <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GL21Ado1.html>, accessed on 23 August 2007.

MAP-9


BTC oil pipeline: Southern-western route from Azerbaijan to Georgia and onto the Mediterranean via Turkey



Adapted from: F William Engdahl, "China Lays Down Gauntlet in Energy War", <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GL21Ad01.html>, accessed on 23 August 2007.

MAP-10

Figure of Europe's dependence on Russian gas



Adapted from: Vladimir Radyuhin, "Energy War", *Frontline*, Vol.24, No.2, January 27-February 9, 2007, p.62.

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